Thursday 25 April 2024 

Friday 26 April 2024

Organised by

With support from

Panels and Panellists

Opening Remarks

• Keynote: Daniel Holton, Global Affairs Canada
• Kevin Hall, President, UVic

Panel 1: Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Southeast Asia

• Jay. L. Batongbacal, College of Law, University of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines
• Kasira Cheeppensook, Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
• Socheata Sao, Royal University of Law and Economics, Phnom Penh
• Hugh Stephens, CAPI Associate and Associate Faculty, Royal Roads University, Victoria, Canada

Co-Moderators: Helen Lansdowne and Victor V. Ramraj

Panel 2: Climate, Sustainability & Trade

• Charika Channuntapipat, TDRI, Bangkok, Thailand
• Patricia Fuller, Senior Fellow, University of Ottawa, and former Ambassador for Climate Change
• Basma Majerbi, Gustavson School of Business, University of Victoria, Canada
• Stephen Wortley, Partner, McMillan LLP, Vancouver & Chair, Hong Kong Office 

Co-moderators: Helen Lansdowne & Carol Liao

Panel 3: Security Implications for Canada and Southeast Asia

• Kasira Cheeppensook, Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
• Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Admiral CMM, CD (retired), former Deputy CDS, Victoria, Canada
• Swaran Singh, Visiting  Professor, UBC & Professor of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
• Major-General Gregory Smith, Director General, International Security Policy, Ottawa, Canada

Co-moderators: Reeta Tremblay and Yves Tiberghien

Closing Remarks:

• Jeff Nankivell, CEO, Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, Vancouver

Canada, Southeast Asia, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy:

Engaging a Critical Region

15th CAPI Roundtable on Southeast Asia in Global Context

Friday, 3 March 2023 | University of Victoria

Summary of the Discussion 

by Ngozi S. Nwoko, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria

This roundtable was convened on 3 March 2023 by the Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives (CAPI) as the 15th instalment of its Roundtable series, Southeast Asia in Global Context. CAPI’s Acting Director, Professor Pooja Parmar, welcomed the participants, acknowledging the lək̓ʷəŋən peoples and the Songhees, Esquimalt and W̱SÁNEĆ peoples on whose traditional territory the conference took place. CAPI Law Chair Victor V. Ramraj then offered some welcoming and framing remarks (also on behalf of co-convener, CAPI Senior Research Fellow Phil Calvert). He noted, as the Director (currently on leave) of CAPI, an interdisciplinary Asia-focussed centre, how pleased he was that Canada was once again engaging the Indo-Pacific region. He then explained that although he served as an advisor on the Indo-Pacific Advisory Committee, he did not feel he had an authorship stake and welcomed a robust, critical engagement with the Strategy in the spirit of debate and constructive feedback, confident that the funders shared these values as well. He then invoked a modified version of the Chatham House Rule, explaining that the participants could use the information obtained, but without attributing any specific point or comment to a specific speaker or their institutional affiliation.

Professor Ramraj then introduced UVic President Kevin Hall, who spoke to the University’s engagements with Asia, and the keynote speaker, Daniel Holton, from Global Affairs Canada, who offered some framing remarks on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. He presented the strategy as a comprehensive and well-funded signal of Canada’s commitment to being a full-spectrum stakeholder and reliable partner to the region. He underscored Canada’s strong support for ASEAN centrality, highlighting a range of new initiatives focused on Southeast Asia, and stressed that Canada is not asking regional partners to choose between the region’s major powers. Finally, he thanked CAPI for its exceptional work fostering research and policy debate related to this critical region. The conference then proceeded with three roundtable panels, the discussion of which, in the spirit of the modified Chatham House Rule, is summarized here without attribution of specific points to individual speakers.

Panel 1: Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy and Southeast Asia

The first panel began with a high-level discussion of the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). The panel began with a question about Canada’s visibility in Southeast Asia. One panelist started by noting that “Canada is back” and was again using its convening power in the region. The panelists spent some time considering whether the country was mainly pursuing its own or broader interests through the IPS. The panel then considered the co-moderators’ questions about possible gaps in the IPS, whether the IPS was a constraint on China’s influence in Southeast Asia, and whether it pushed countries in the region into making difficult foreign policies choices.

Some members of the panel traced Canada’s lack of visibility in Southeast Asia to the late 2000s when the Canadian government directed its attention to Europe, the Caribbean, and South America, respectively. In contrast, the presence of the United States has been more constant. Some panelists thought that there were opportunities for Canada to engage more economically and to contribute positively in relation to the experiences of Indigenous peoples and on health issues in the region. Nonetheless, the panel acknowledged that Canada is known for welcoming asylum seekers, for its peacekeeping activities in Southeast Asia, and for advocating on landmine issues in the region. 

It was noted that IPS will be focussed on advancing Canada’s interests, while at the same time, seeking complementarity of interests in all areas including free trade, human rights, security, and support for dialogue in times of conflict, among other areas. The implementation of some elements of the IPS (e.g., human rights) in some countries in Southeast Asia may at times conflict with Canadian interests and values. One panelist suggested that there should be a coherent mechanism for implementing the IPS. Another panelist noted that Indigenous communities and workers in the textile and extractive industries in some Southeast Asian states have become victims of human rights violations committed by Canadian and other foreign companies.

In considering possible gaps in the IPS, panel members noted that there is a lack of detailed information on how the programs in the IPS would be implemented. For example, at the time of this roundtable, there was still no special envoy to coordinate the Canadian government activities across the Indo-Pacific region. The role of the trade representative for the IPS was also not clearly specified. There was also a lack of clarity on who will oversee the regional engagement initiative of the IPS. The IPS’s capacity uplift would require the involvement of trained and experienced facilitators. One panelist suggested that there should be an annual report on how the IPS programs are implemented and to create room for measurable outcomes. One panel member noted that the IPS was silent on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the AUKUS security pact; an enhanced naval presence in Southeast Asia and human rights were considered important priorities.

Some panel members suggested that another “Western” Indo-Pacific strategy might be received by countries in Southeast Asia with some discomfort. Some governments might be receptive to China’s economic and investment overtures precisely because Beijing does not attach human rights conditions to its economic aid. Other governments might agree to work with Canada if it presents a reliable alternative to what China has to offer. Despite key ideological differences with some governments in the region, there are opportunities for Canada to engage and cooperate with China and with countries in Southeast Asia on climate change, maritime security, and green technology. While engaging China, Canada should continue to recognize the risks posed by such engagement, making its areas of disagreement clearly known, while pursuing areas of common interest with Beijing. 

Panel 2: Climate, Sustainability & Trade

The second panel began by considering the concepts of trade and sustainability as used in the same context and whether trade policy can be used to save the planet. It highlighted some sustainability challenges facing Southeast Asia such as biodiversity, deforestation, water scarcity, rising sea level in small island states, and huge infrastructure projects with their consequential displacement of communities and land disputes. It identified a tension between trade and sustainability in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, noting that trading activities between Canada and the Indo-Pacific region will lead to increased emissions, particularly in the shipping, aviation, and extractive activities. The panel suggested that the tension could be resolved through effective policies and regulation. It acknowledged, however, some positive indicators of sustainability in the IPS document such as regulation of illegal fishing, and increased capacity for FinDev to expand its green infrastructure in SEA. The panel observed that most of the trading activities in the IPS were focused on the export of Canadian goods to Southeast Asia; it noted further that for the IPS to work, there must be win-win trade, investment, and sustainability collaborations and outcomes for Canada and Southeast Asian countries. Trade and investment can help facilitate sustainability. Canadian businesses and investors from South Korea and China have begun to work together on the production of hydrogen to power vehicles, the export of small nuclear reactors from South Korea to Alberta to tackle energy consumption, and lithium mining for electric vehicle batteries.

The panel also considered China’s domination of the processing of critical minerals in Southeast Asia, and the need for Canada to work within the region on the diversification of the supply chains that are largely controlled by China. It observed that critical minerals are central to Canada’s energy systems and that a clean energy future is an opportunity for every country to be more energy independent. One panelist expressed a concern that China has the potential to weaponize energy dependency to the detriment of others. Another suggested that Canada needs to accept investors from diverse political and legal systems and ideologies; such an approach would be beneficial to its socio-economic and technological development. One panel member noted that despite any security threat that China might pose, an adversarial posture toward Beijing would be counterproductive. Canada, it was urged by one panel member, needs to forge military, educational research, and economic partnerships with China that will lead to renewed and increased engagement, eventually reducing conflicts between the two countries. Another panelist disagreed, positing that Canada should engage with investors from like-minded countries instead. It was also observed that Canadian values and standards should be applied equally in the Indo-Pacific and not selectively to make China seem like the only country in the region that engages in human rights violations. It is hypocritical when the poor human rights records of other key Canadian partners mentioned in the IPS are hardly mentioned.

One panel member observed that although the IPS contains many of green initiatives, it is silent on the clean energy transition from fossil fuels and how Canada and Southeast Asia will forge just energy transition partnerships with international financial institutions. It was suggested that the omission might be due to Canada’s planned export of liquefied natural gas to Asia in 2025. The panel noted that the IPS budget for green projects is inadequate, and that Canada should showcase its leadership in green technology in Southeast Asia.

Panel 3: Security Implications for Canada and Southeast Asia

The panel members began by asking whether the IPS was mainly about containing China and how to strengthen the security initiatives in the strategy document. Some panel members thought that the IPS goes beyond normatively containing China, clearly expressing Canada’s approach to dealing with China and other countries in Southeast Asia and informing the world about Canada’s position in difficult bilateral and multilateral relations. It was noted that the IPS also addresses how Canada could manage other emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific, bringing its own expertise and drawing on the experience of Southeast Asia in areas of climate change and illegal migration. However, it was also suggested that Canada should maintain its status in international relations as a peacekeeper, particularly in light of the high cost of global military spending. However, since China is a major focus in the IPS, Canada might be perceived as less neutral, sharing a similar view as the UK and the European Union.

In discussing whether the IPS was focused on containing China, the panel highlighted some areas in which Canada is forging military relationships with Southeast Asia—for example, by engaging in capacity building. It was noted that Canada is putting three frigates in the Indo-Pacific and will be conducting military exercises and exchanging military expertise with countries in the region. Ottawa will share its expertise on cyber defence and women, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. Canadian embassies and high commissions in the region will be staffed with experienced policy officers to help coordinate the security initiatives of the IPS. Some panelists reiterated that Canada stands ready to clearly communicate and reinforce its national interest in the Indo-Pacific and contribute to the rules-based order. For some members of the panel, there was a demand for a robust Canadian security presence in the Indo-Pacific and that Canada needs to constantly engage with other regions.

The panel outlined thematic issues that were either missing from the IPS or could be expanded or enhanced, such as anti-piracy operations, access to water, funding for feminist international assistance and women’s participation in peace processes, initiatives to address the underlying causes of gender violence in the Asia-Pacific, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, security engagement with India, and some potential flashpoints of the region such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Furthermore, it was suggested that there should be a performance management framework that will be overseen by the Canadian Parliament to evaluate how Ottawa is delivering on the commitments set out in the IPS.

Some members of the panel thought that for Canada to be successful in implementing the IPS, it need to be embedded in Canadian foreign policy, and Canada needs to constantly engage with other regions, while protecting areas of sovereign national interest. Panelists noted that there is no desire for Canada to mirror the defence structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Indo-Pacific. Canada should add value through exchange of knowledge with Southeast Asian countries in areas of rule of law, health, and disaster relief operations, among others.

A Summary of the Closing Session

The closing session featured Jeff Nankivell, CEO of the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada, who highlighted the points that stood out for him in the panel discussions and raised additional observations and concerns about the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). Following his remarks, Professor Ramraj thanked him and closed the conference with a further vote of thanks to the funders, organizers, panelists, and online guests for their contributions to the success of the conference.

| By Dulma Karunarathna, visiting CAPI Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, and Panch Rishi Dev Sharma, UVic Law PhD student

The 14th instalment of CAPI’s Roundtable Series on Southeast Asia in Global Context brought together a distinguished panel of academics, researchers, and diplomats on Economy, Climate and Security in the Shadow of Covid-19 in the region. The roundtable’s interdisciplinary discussion focused on the coexistence of energy justice and environmental security with post-pandemic priorities for the region on economy, trade, and global supply chains. The roundtable also addressed issues of national security, political economy and regional politics in the wider framework of geopolitics and current international developments.

Participants were invited to consider three sets of interdependent questions: (1) As countries in Southeast Asia are emerging from Covid-19, how have health and environmental priorities affected trade and investment flows in the region? (2) If countries are prioritizing economic growth, what will be the impact on the use of fossil fuels and green energy plans, and what are the implications for climate commitments (and rising healthcare costs)? (3) How have competing public priorities affected — or destabilized — institutions, domestic or international?

The first part of the discussion focused on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on larger issues of environmental, economic, and social policy-making by bringing a human dimension to existing vulnerabilities in ASEAN. One participant stressed that investment is not value-neutral and also not simply a transactional modality, so questions of energy policy need to be linked to climate change and sustainability. Another participant identified three dimensions of economic recovery in the region: moderating globalization with a reduced reliance on global trade and investment by concentrating on resilient regional supply chains; prioritizing health and environmental concerns of economic recovery within the prism of green growth; and taking precautionary economic efforts in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war and other security risks that disrupt global supply chains.

Many Southeast Asian countries, panelists observed, were not planning a green recovery because of the absence of a collective climate change strategy and because of the massive dependency on global energy supply chains. Southeast Asian states have shown some isolated positive efforts, such as retiring aging coal-fired power plants, but ASEAN governments need to collaborate more effectively on regional energy connectivity, and on a regional regulatory framework to realize its climate goals. The panel stressed the importance of diversifying short-term technological strategies such as blending natural gas with hydrogen and long-term technological strategies such as solar, wind, and tidal energy. The competition to develop semiconductors and lithium batteries as the short-term strategies has also caused environmental concerns, including mining of rare earth materials, so states should rationally prioritize short-term and long-term technological strategies for a green energy transition.

One panelist highlighted regime change in Southeast Asia as a political consequence of the pandemic, focusing on autocratic regimes in the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The panel also discussed how the pandemic presented an opportunity for governments to use extraordinary emergency powers such as the Anti-terrorism Law in Philippines in 2020, and the Emergency Law and Precautionary Law for Covid-19, along with detentions and curtailing of civil liberties in Cambodia. The roundtable concluded with general reflections Canadian foreign policy in the region.

| By Dulma Karunarathna, visiting CAPI Post-Doctoral Research Fellow

This roundtable session convened another distinguished panel of national and international experts to discuss the implications of the new AUKUS alliance, consisting of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This new alliance potentially raises the stakes for conflict and recalibrates the prospects for cooperation on other pressing global issues. This roundtable examined how the evolving geopolitical realignment complicates the ability of countries in the Southeast Asian region and great powers to cooperate on ongoing global challenges such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis. The session sought to raise awareness of Southeast Asia as a critical node in the Indo-Pacific region, one deserving of close attention in understanding the balance of geopolitical power, and its important role in striving for greater human security, ethical economic development, and environmental protection.

The discussion was framed around three sets of questions: (1) What are the implications of AUKUS for security and trade alliances in the region, especially the Quad, the Five Eyes, and the CPTPP? What are the implications more generally for geopolitics and the trade agenda? (2) What are the implications of the new alliance for Southeast Asia and ASEAN? What are the implications for Canada’s engagement with that region? (3) How does the new alliance affect the prospects for international cooperation on the Covid-19 pandemic and climate action?

The panel began with a discussion of the implications of AUKUS for Canada, Southeast Asia, and global politics generally. One panelist suggested that AUKUS was not necessarily a new alliance for Australia but a technical agreement to share nuclear propulsion technology and to assist Australia in bolstering instability; it strengthens many elements of existing agreements and arrangements for sharing advanced technologies, the development of nuclear submarines for Australia. But beyond this  “technical” perspective, the geopolitical tensions and narratives around AUKUS reflected existing traditional and non-traditional security challenges for Southeast Asia, such as the strategic autonomy of many countries within ASEAN. Other challenges highlighted by the panelists included growing tensions between major powers, possible marginalization by great power contestation, the relative hierarchy among the members of the AUKUS alliance, and the risk of misperception or miscalculation of threats. Panelists also noted the importance of acknowledging the vast diversity of views in Southeast Asia and ASEAN, between and within its member countries.

The implications of AUKUS for great power contestation of the Indo-Pacific was a recurring theme in the discussion. One panelist drew the attention to the symbolism behind the term “Indo-Pacific” instead of “Asia-Pacific,” which is seem by some as an attempt to challenge China’s influence in the region and strengthen India’s position. On Canada’s role of Canada in Southeast Asia, Canada's exclusion from the AUKUS alliance was considered. Some panelists noted that Canada’s soft power in the region and its influence shaping multilateralism in the region, was highly appreciated and  would be welcome. A final theme that emerged from the discussion was the importance of separating and “cabining” geopolitical security issues from other issues such as the climate crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic, to allow for collaboration on these issues in the region. However, the panelists also stressed the importance of working together under a proper crisis management plan to preventing miscalculation.

“A Fine Dance”: A Reflection on The South China Sea, What is Now and What is Next?

| By Frances Ankenman, J.D. Candidate, UVic Faculty of Law 

In the latest roundtable event of the Southeast Asia in Global Context series, CAPI welcomed interdisciplinary experts from both Asian and North American institutions to explore contemporary trends in the Pacific Ocean’s most pressing maritime and territorial dispute: the South China Sea. As one of the world’s most biologically, economically and strategically significant marine environments, the South China Sea is a geopolitical hotspot with implications for security, trade, and balances of power at a global scale.

As a centuries-old conflict engaging nations both within and far beyond the region, the ongoing international dispute mirrors the South China Sea itself: old and deep, whose currents flow to the rest of the world. Discussion centered on the evolving relationships among claimants and key strategic players, with a particular focus on the relationships between the United States, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Panelists agreed the dispute has reached a fragile equilibrium between China and US superpowers, with the US continuing to conduct uninterrupted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) patrols and China asserting sovereignty through a strong military presence and surveillance of maritime activity in the region.

While there have been relatively few state-driven conflicts in the region in recent years, panelists agreed that close proximity situations in the South China Sea, whether between military or non-military vessels, could easily escalate. Some expressed low confidence in the region’s ability to de-escalate a complex conflict with existing tools, owing to growth in domestic pressures in claimant countries, densification of military presence, sophistication of weapons, and progressively rapid cycles of action and reaction. Nationalism and jingoism in claimant states could also flare in the face of an international conflict and complicate de-escalation efforts, though governments in China and Southeast Asia have generally limited nationalist movements to the extent that they threaten economic relations with other states.

Panelists debated whether US involvement in the South China Sea has shifted under Trump administration, with a general consensus that it is louder and lacking in strategic focus compared to engagement under Obama administration. ASEAN states broadly find themselves caught between superpowers and have chosen, in the words of one panelist, to ‘swim in the middle’. There will likely be more pressure on ASEAN states moving forward to align their security and economic interests with one of the superpowers, which may fracture the association as a whole.

Next, panelists examined the role of public international law a tool to promote international cooperation and manage conflict in the South China Sea. Panelists pointed to the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision, which was rejected by China, as an example of the limited effectiveness of non-binding international law. The Code of Conduct (COC), under negotiation, is seen as a significant opportunity to create a binding, long-lasting agreement among nations in the region. Importantly, from China’s perspective a COC could support peripheral stability, one of its long-term primary strategic goals.

In South China Sea: What is Now, What is Next?, panelists dove deep into the murky waters of the South China Sea dispute to critically examine the large-scale strategic adjustments driving complex, multifaceted and interwoven relationships among the world’s most powerful nations. Gathering experts with diverse perspectives and experiences, this event produced a vibrant and stimulating dialogue on the latest chapter – and those yet to be written - of the story of the South China Sea.

By Frances Ankenman, J.D. Candidate, UVic Faculty of Law 

The Ethno-Religious Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia roundtable event invited cross-sector experts to join in a series of interwoven and evolving conversations about trends in human rights, as understood through shifting relationships among religion, the state and the political economy in Southeast Asia. 

The discussion began with an acknowledgement of the highly variable human rights record in Southeast Asia, explained by the diverse political systems, legal traditions and ethno-religious compositions within and among states in the region. Panelists noted both localized examples of advancements in human rights and broader regional trends of increasing state constraints on a range of fundamental human rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and minority protection. Some noted that although liberal democracies often have strong human rights records, the democratic/autocratic divide may not be an informative predictor of human rights protections in Southeast Asia, where there are several contemporary examples of human rights violations under democratic systems, and human rights advancements under authoritarian regimes.

Beyond state-driven trends in human rights, panelists discussed the roles of inter-state, international and non-state actors in the region. Some characterized human rights protection at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) level as weak, with no mechanism for human rights protection or cooperation on migrant and refugee issues. Beyond the region, panelists cited the United States’ decreased presence in Southeast Asia and shifting balance of global powers as a cause of reduced international pressure for state-driven human rights protection. Panelists also identified a trend of shrinking space for civil society to advance human rights agendas in both authoritarian regimes and democracies in the region. Despite these top-down challenges, panelists pointed to optimistic stories of peace-building initiatives led by civil society, such as interfaith groups established at the village level, that continue to meaningfully advance human rights efforts.

The discussion of human rights led panelists to consider the close and interconnected relationships between religion, ethnicity and the state across the region, and the concerning trend of political instrumentalization of ethnoreligious issues. While this trend is widespread throughout the region, panelists pointed to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and the relationship between the state and Buddhism in Cambodia as key examples of the intentional use of religion and ethnicity as state instruments to maintain power, control and popular support. 

Participants examined trends in the political economy, cautioning that while there are many signs that economies in Southeast Asia are growing, resource distribution is a pressing issue in Southeast Asia that is driving some of the trends in politics and human rights protection. Beyond the region, panelists considered the role of Chinese investment in shifting the regional economic balance and reimagining international economic and political relations. 

Raising topics of immediate significance within and beyond Southeast Asia, the Ethno-Religious Nationalism and Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia roundtable event laid a strong foundation for continued conversations about shifting trends in state-religious interactions, the evolving role of the political economy, and the future of human rights in Southeast Asia.