Matthew Albert Woodhead Noel

Topic

State Capitalism in Transition: ASEAN SOE Governance Shifts and OECD-Country Trade Policy Options

School of Public Administration

Date & location

• Monday, October 19, 2026
• 9:30 A.M.
• Virtual Defence

Reviewers

Supervisory Committee

• Dr. Evert Linguist, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria (Supervisor)

• Dr. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, School of Public Administration, UVic (Member) 

External Examiner

• Dr. Victor V. Ramraj, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria 

Chair of Oral Examination

• Dr. Dr. Aloysius Maduforo, Department of Educational Psychology & Leadership Studies, UVic

   

Abstract

This thesis examines how state-owned enterprise (SOE) governance across the 10 ASEAN Member States (AMS) has changed since Richard W. Carney’s 2018 analysis, and what those changes mean for OECD-country officials preparing to negotiate SOE and competitive-neutrality disciplines in free trade agreements (FTAs) with AMS. ASEAN has become increasingly important to governments and firms seeking new markets, more resilient supply chains, and alternatives to dependence on China. At the same time, many AMS continue to use SOEs, government-linked companies, sovereign wealth funds, and national champions to provide public services, support economic development, implement industrial policy, and maintain control over strategic sectors. These functions may be legitimate, but concerns arise when commercially active SOEs receive non-commercial assistance (NCA) such as preferential finance, regulatory exemptions, monopoly rights or other forms of government support unavailable to private competitors. 

Three related gaps are identified and discussed: 1) WTO subsidy rules do not capture every advantage conferred through state ownership; 2) The existing literature does not provide a sufficiently current comparison of SOE governance across all ten AMS; and 3) Carney’s 2018 regime typology does not accurately depict differences among countries and their significance for negotiating of SOE disciplines in FTAs. The thesis therefore assesses advantages conferred to AMS SOEs; AMS SOE governance reform—assessing expectations created by Carney’s regime typology against observed country behaviour—and considers OECD country trade policy responses considering this assessment. The negotiating strategies consider economic cooperation and technical assistance (ECOTECH), soft-law reform, and binding trade disciplines. 

The research combines two literature reviews with a jurisdictional scan of the ten AMS. The first literature review examines OECD, government, ASEAN, and Asian Development Bank sources concerning competitive neutrality, corporate governance, competition policy, and capacity building. The second uses scholarly literature to examine the political, developmental, and institutional factors affecting SOE reform among AMS. The jurisdictional scan then considers common indicators across ten AMS country reports: state ownership and political control; transparency; corporate governance; market exposure; competition-law coverage and exemptions; preferential treatment; institutional capacity, and implementation. Carney’s regime typology provides an initial expectation for how each AMS might be expected to reform its SOEs. The evidence from the country reports is then used to determine whether observed behaviour conforms to, exceeds, or falls below that expectation. 

The findings show that Carney’s 2018 regime typology remains useful in 2026 for identifying the political and institutional conditions from which SOE reform begins, but does not fully explain the pace, depth, or direction of reform. The Philippines and Indonesia broadly conform to the stronger reform expectations associated with democracies. Vietnam and Singapore perform more reform-mindedly than their respective single-party and dominant-party regime types would suggest. Thailand and Malaysia have undertaken meaningful reforms but continue to preserve substantial roles for national champions, state capital, monopolies, exemptions, and development policy. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei lack the transparency, implementation capacity, or political conditions required for deeper commitments to be credible in the near term.

On this basis, the thesis classifies each AMS as either Reformist, Gradualist, or Resistant. The Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore are Reformist because they possess comparatively strong reform institutions or perform better than their regime categories would predict. Thailand and Malaysia are Gradualist because their reforms are real but remain limited by political and economic constraints. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei are Resistant because weak disclosure, uneven implementation, concentrated state control, or institutional weakness continues to prevent deeper reform. These reform categories describe each country’s overall reform position and likely readiness for SOE negotiations; they do not replace Carney’s regime typology, which remains useful for understanding political starting conditions. 

Four broader findings to inform negotiating strategies follow from the analysis of the ten country reports. First, regime type does not determine reform behaviour. Second, formal reforms such as competition laws, corporatisation, public listings, and improved reporting do not necessarily remove preferential treatment or produce competitive neutrality. Third, SOE reform in ASEAN often creates stronger and better-governed state enterprises rather than quantifiably reducing the state’s economic role. Establishing common governance principles requires different approaches and timelines of implementation across countries. 

The proposed FTA negotiation strategy links the level of commitment sought to each country’s observed approach to SOE reform. Reformist AMS may be ready to discuss deeper obligations concerning transparency, commercial conduct, non-discrimination, procurement, and non-commercial assistance, although important country sensitivities remain. Gradualist AMS are more likely to require phased commitments, transition periods, sector-specific reforms, and retention of domestic policy space. Resistant AMS requires support with basic transparency, SOE inventories, reporting systems, accounting capacity, stronger institutions, and anti-corruption safeguards before any binding commitments can credibly be implemented. ECOTECH and soft-law reform are not substitutes for binding disciplines. They may create the informational, institutional, and administrative environment needed to make later legally binding commitments possible. 

The study relies on publicly available literature and country evidence rather than interviews, confidential records, or econometric analysis. The availability and date of SOE information also vary across AMS. The findings should therefore be understood as a structured guide for further research and negotiation preparation rather than a final account of each country’s SOE regime. The central conclusion is that OECD countries should retain common competitive-neutrality objectives while scaling the starting point, ambition, and disciplines in FTA negotiations to the reform category of each ASEAN partner.