Event Details
Monotonicity in Voting Systems
Presenter: Anthony Quas - Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Memphis
Supervisor:
Date: Tue, June 3, 2003
Time: 14:30:00 - 00:00:00
Place: Clearihue A-303
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT:
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that in an election with 3 or more candidates, there is no voting system satisfying a small number of basic fairness requirements. In spite of this, many voting systems are used with a wide variety of properties. Here, we focus on the requirement of monotonicity: that the more votes you get, the more likely you are to win. Surprisingly, a fairly popular voting system does not have this property. We will discuss the probability that unfairness of this type arises in the single transferable vote system.
Please notice this Colloquium is TUESDAY, June 3, 2003
Refreshments will be served at 2:00 in Cle. A-303