Dr. Hyunseop Kim: "Why We ought to Accept, as opposed to Believe, Non-Natural Moral Realism"

February 21: (Philosophy Department Colloquium)

Dr. Hyunseop Kim (Stanford University)
Title: Why We ought to Accept, as opposed to Believe, Non-Natural Moral Realism 
CLE A203 at 2:30pm

Abstract: In this paper, I propose a (meta-)meta-ethical position and sketch out an argument in its defense. I explain some characteristics of acceptance that distinguish it from belief as well as from mere supposition and pretense. I argue that we do not have conclusive reason to reject non-natural moral realism, so it is justifiable to believe that there might be attitude-independent, non-natural moral facts. Since we do not know for sure that these robust moral facts do not exist, we can accept them and act on the acceptance without self-deception or pretense. I examine a practical reason to accept robust moral facts in our practical reasoning and action - strengthening our moral will - and respond to the worry that accepting them without conclusive evidence would encourage epistemic vices. I clarify my meta-ethical view further by comparing it with moral fictionalism. I argue that it is superior to moral fictionalism both as a descriptive and a prescriptive account.