The European Union between Regional Enlargement and Global Irrelevance
Stanley Hoffmann

Editor’s Note: The following is the Keynote Address delivered by Stanley Hoffmann, in accepting EUSA’s third Lifetime Contribution to the Field Prize, at EUSA’s 8th International Conference, March 28, 2003, Nashville, Tennessee.

I will devote the first part of my address to a tribute to Professor Ernst Haas, who received this same award four years ago, and who was the pioneer of European integration theory in the 1950s. Haas, who died in February 2003 at age 78, was both a fine human being with unlimited reserves of good humor, wit, and energy, and a liberal who felt acutely the disconnection between the traditional liberal vision of international relations and the realities of a nuclear world. His Uniting of Europe displayed the liberal faith in knowledge and science, acknowledged the importance of converging interests in moving “beyond the nation-state” and expressed the need to constrain the inescapable role of state power. What he added to these classical themes was a theorization of the “Monnet method,” with such concepts as spillover, or upgrading the common interest, and the aim of providing a new way of uniting peoples: still from the top, but not by force. Haas’s hopes diminished gradually. The Monnet method, he concluded, was not exportable beyond Europe, and met serious obstacles in Europe itself. He cautioned against the perils of collective interventions in domestic affairs on humanitarian grounds. He ended his prodigious scholarly career with a two-volume work, not on international integration or cooperation, but on nationalism—encased, however, in a philosophy of history, progress and rationality.

In the second part, I will analyze the current state of the European Union. Several developments have been disturbing: the difficulty of obtaining popular approval of EU treaties, of obtaining substantial results at recent EU summits, the malaise about the “democratic deficit,” which reflects unease not only about the preponderance of the Executive over Parliaments—a phenomenon that is pervasive within European states also—but also about the behavior of the European Council as energetic defender of national interests, about the more “European” Commission’s relative marginalization, and about the importance of non-democratically selected institutions such as the European Courts and the European Bank: technocracy over democracy.

Three particularly worrisome cases are the way in which the current EU enlargement is proceeding—many EU governments are reluctant, and their lack of enthusiasm cools the ardor of several of the new applicants—the difficulties of the Convention (there are limits to the consensus method, and the Franco-German plan for two presidencies has been badly received), and, of course, the spectacular current crisis of the attempt at establishing a common foreign and security policy.

In order to get to the roots of this malaise, one needs to look at the problem of the EU’s institutions. Are the Convention, and a new Constitution, the best way for an enlarged Union to proceed? It could be counterproductive if it makes it more difficult to move ahead in the pragmatic way that had been followed in the past: by accretion, adaptation and flexibility (the common law rather than the Roman way). Moreover, if the purpose of the Convention is to make the EU more effective, and to reinforce democracy, the latter aim would require in the present Europe of nations a greater participation of the representatives of the different demoi in the decision-making process of the EU. If one wants to push toward a future European demos despite the multiple languages and cultures, one needs to do much more than a Constitution can do in order to create a European public space, genuine European parliamentary elections, and a single Executive composed of members functioning in a dual capacity—as delegates of their nations and as European statesmen. Would this be acceptable by the new members, and by the smaller of the older ones?

As always, the deeper root of the malaise is the unwillingness of the EU nations to tackle directly the key issue: What is Europe for? (L’Europe: pour quoi faire?) There is agreement on the welfare function, but it demands the right combination of financial stability and economic growth. This, in turn, requires a more effective European executive with a policy of non-inflationary growth (which could make the issue of subsidies to the poorer members and regions less contentious); but for such a policy, Europeans depend on the state of the U.S. economy, as well as on the willingness of their peoples to accept some limitations on the European welfare state model.

However, on the idea of a Europe that would be a “full power,” with a common foreign policy and defense, there really is no agreement at all. The new members, for obvious reasons, turn to the U.S. for their security not only because of America’s enormous might but perhaps also because they have not yet liquidated intra-European suspicions that the (continued on p.3)
From the Chair

Martin A. Schain

I am writing this column just after our very successful 8th International Biennial Conference in Nashville, Tennessee, which—in spite of the war in Iraq and sagging economies around the world—drew over five hundred participants (including the EU depository librarians group) from some thirty countries. Along with the entire EUSA board, and the 2003 Conference Program committee, I am very pleased not only with the turn-out, but also with the quality and seriousness of the scholarship presented. Our conference mirrored the vitality of the field of EU studies. Those who gave papers included many scholars from the broad fields of international relations and comparative politics, as well as specialists on European integration and the European Union. Our prize awards, given to Virginie Guiraudon of the Université de Lille II (for the best paper given at the 2001 conference) and Georg Menz, from the University of Pittsburgh, now at Goldsmiths College (for the best doctoral dissertation written since the last conference), reflect well the transatlantic character of EUSA. The keynote address by Stanley Hoffmann, who received our award for lifetime scholarly achievement, marked the high point of the conference, and the lecture by Benjamin Cohen provided a distinguished conclusion. In addition, the well-conceived poster presentations, the meetings of the seven interest sections to set their agendas for the next two years, and the book exhibits and paper sales provided a lively context for our conference. Now please mark your calendars with the dates of our 9th Biennial International Conference, March 31-April 2, 2005, in Austin, Texas, and plan to attend. We will issue the Call for Proposals in Spring 2004. Please keep an eye on our 2005 Conference Web page at www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html.

The growth and development of the European Union Studies Association has paralleled the maturing of the field of EU studies, and we proudly celebrate our 15th anniversary throughout 2003. At the Nashville conference we recognized the founding board members, and I would like to acknowledge and thank them here as well: Desmond Dinan, Roy H. Ginsberg, Leon Hurwitz, Pierre-Henri Laurent, Donald Puchala, and Glenda Rosenthal. In addition, as we did in 1998 for our tenth anniversary, the EUSA office will be issuing a member survey in which we seek your suggestions for activities—look for it with your Summer 2003 EUSA Review.

Celebrating our 15th anniversary is also an appropriate moment to do some stocktaking. As I write this, the Association has over 1600 members in well over forty countries around the world. Over the years, we have given dozens of dissertation fellowships for doctoral students who are working on the EU, and curriculum development grants for instructors developing new EU courses. Our biennial book series, State of the European Union, is an important resource in the field. Please look for Volume 6, Law, Politics, and Society (co-edited by Tanja Börzel and Rachel Cichowski), forthcoming from Oxford University Press later this year. Our occasional U.S.-EU Relations

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Western Europeans have overcome in the past sixty years. In the “old” Europe of the EU, the budgetary costs of a significant defense effort seem prohibitive, or not worth it, since the U.S. can, in any case, do so much more, and several of the smaller members like the idea of Europe as a peaceful and somewhat curative civilian power. Add to this the current “revolt” of the smaller states, and of the European middle powers (Spain, Italy), against the Franco-German leadership of the EU (but without it, there would be no motor at all). Finally, add the factor of the UK as Hamlet, oscillating from St. Malo to the Bush “coalition.” As a result, the common diplomacy attempt has, it seems, only a choice between mutual exasperation and a rhetoric of incantation and deploration.

In the third part of my address, I will deal with Iraq and after. As of now, the split within the EU over Iraq is clearly a disaster. St. Malo seems to have been destroyed by the feud between Blair and Chirac. Even the modest objectives of the St. Malo program look trivial next to America’s global capabilities, and a return to these timid goals would require that Blair move back toward the EU: his recent talks mention only the U.S. and the U.N. The crisis has shown a reckless willingness of the U.S. to divide and to neutralize the Europeans, and a great capacity of the U.S. to do so imperiously (or imperially). While France and Germany revolt against the U.S., much of official Europe revolts against France and Germany. Nevertheless, the worst is not always sure to happen. If one seeks straws in the wind, one may cite: the fact that the public opinion of European nations has been far more opposed to the Iraq war than the division of the governments would have suggested; the fact that the UK, largely ignored by the U.S., may rediscover Europe as its only real field for support and leadership, given the Bush administration’s hostility to the U.N. One may hope that France and Germany will understand the need to invite other European powers—not necessarily the same over each issue—to share their leadership role, and also to resort more often to the procedure of “reinforced cooperations” leading partially to a “Europe à la carte” (a Europe with a more integrated core surrounded by a less integrated periphery is more unlikely and less desirable). Finally, if the Bush arrogance of power and unilateralist aggressiveness should persist, it may provoke in Europe a “balancing” reaction, which has been avoided during the long, more multilateralist phase of American preponderance after 1945. If Bush is re-elected and his administration remains in office for six more years, that will do more to unify Europe than anything has done in the past fifty years.

Stanley Hoffmann is Paul and Catherine Buttenwieser University Professor, Harvard University, where he has taught since 1955, and where he founded and chaired the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies (1969-1995). Hoffmann is the 2003 recipient of the European Union Studies Association’s Lifetime Contribution to the Field award. Previous recipients were Ernst Haas (1999) and Leon Lindberg (2001).
The State of the Field

AS PART OF OUR ONGOING CELEBRATION of EUSA/ECSA’s fifteenth birthday, we are pleased to present a collection of essays written by leaders of the various interest sections set up within EUSA over the past several years. Contributors were asked to address a simple question: “What is the state of European integration studies today as seen from the vantage point of your particular interest section?” The essays speak for themselves, yet it is fair to say that together they describe a field marked by vibrant interdisciplinarity, theoretical innovation, and empirical relevance.

– Jeff Anderson

From the EU as Global Actor Interest Section

AS I WRITE, THE WORLD is on the brink of war. The leaders of three European Union member states, Spain, the United Kingdom and Portugal, have just met with President George Bush in the Azores and declared the “moment of truth” to be nigh. Two other EU states, France and Germany, have joined with Russia in adamantly opposing any move to war. On March 17th we will know if the U.S. is going to lead a coalition of the willing into war against Saddam Hussein in order to disarm Iraq and drive out its leader. Inevitably, this will color some of my concluding remarks on the study of the EU as global actor, or, put another way, EU foreign policy in Spring 2003.

Up until the turn of the millennium, for observers of the EU, foreign policy meant its external relations or, as Roy Ginsberg, a co-founder of this section, has always asserted, its foreign policy “actions.” I have never found the term “external relations” to be particularly satisfactory for the English speaker, since presumably it has to do with everything and anything the EU has to do with non-member states. On the other hand, since external relations is such a singularly catch-all label, we can place foreign trade, overseas development, enlargement, and a whole cluster of issue areas that go beyond EU borders (agriculture, environment, climate, air and sea transport to name a few) under its heading. The Treaty of Rome contained provisions for a common commercial policy. Its Part Four and the 1963 Yaounde Treaty dealt with colonial and former colonial territories, development aid and associated African countries. Thus, from the sixties on, every self-respecting general text on the history and development of the EU has included a chapter on external relations/trade policy with the requisite discussions of GATT negotiations, association arrangements and development aid.

With the genesis of European political co-operation (EPC), in the seventies and early eighties, a very small number of scholars, mostly British, began to focus on EPC: Geoffrey Edwards, Michael Smith, David Allen and William Wallace in the UK and Wolfgang Wessels, Alfred Pijpers, Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete, and Reinhardt Rummel on the other side of the Channel. By the late ’eighties and early ’nineties, scholars writing about what some viewed as an emerging European foreign policy included a sizeable contingent publishing in the UK: Christopher Hill, Simon Bulmer, Martin Holland, Kevin Featherstone, Simon Nuttall and Fraser Cameron and, for the first time, a small band of American scholars: Roy Ginsberg and Michael E. Smith (co-founders of our EUSA section on Europe as global actor) and Carolyn Rhodes. All three American scholars, particularly Ginsberg and Rhodes, moved beyond analysis of EPC and began to look at the way the EU functioned in the international system, with an emphasis on EU-U.S. relations. These were also the first genuine attempts to develop conceptual and theoretical approaches to the study of the EU as global actor that were not grounded in international relations theory, but endeavored to apply concepts and methods unique to the EU.

Book-length studies and even articles on the EU’s relations with the developing world were few and far between: Carol Cosgrove, William Zartman and Olufemi Babarinde figuring among the most widely published. As for other parts of the world, there was almost nothing. When I researched my own book on the Mediterranean in 1979/80, there was precious little to draw on except for a couple of very useful edited collections (Loukas Tsoukalas and George Yannopoulos) and some groundbreaking work by Alfred Tovias.

The end of the Cold War brought a whole new perspective to the study of the EU. As one Central European country after another applied to join the EU, the concept of “widening and deepening” gained greater prominence. From quite early in the nineties, scholars and practitioners such as Fraser Cameron and Graham Avery, Marc Maresceau, Christopher Preston, Alan Mayhew, Kirsty Hughes and Heather Grabbe, Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace and, more recently, Michael Baun, joined others like John Redmond and Lee Miles, who had been writing on the EFTA countries’ applications to join the EU, to create a whole body of literature on enlargement. Much of this, as a relatively new field of study, was by definition descriptive and historical. The economics of enlargement literature, typified by Richard Baldwin, Richard Portes and Andras Inotai was, in contrast, more adventurous and endeavored to model the consequences of enlargement for both EU member and candidate countries. EUSA (then ECSA) biennial Conferences included more and more panels on enlargement from 1991 on. The first comparative study of the various enlargements from 1973, edited by John Redmond and myself, emerged from two panels at the 1995 conference. The ECSA-sponsored biennial series, The State of the Union, also followed this trend with volume 4, edited by Pierre-Henri Laurent and Marc Maresceau, subtitled “Deepening and Widening.”

Nineteen-ninety-two brought another historic change for the role of the EU in the world: the signing of the Maastricht Treaty with its all-important provisions for a common foreign and security policy and ultimately a common defense. Since then, ever-increasing attention has been devoted to European foreign policy by some of the familiar names such as Christopher Hill,
William Wallace, Wolfgang Wessels and Roy Ginsberg who have been joined by younger scholars such as Anand Menon, Kalypso Nicolaidis and Mark Pollack. In addition, well-known observers of the integration process through an international relations lens, such as Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane and Andrew Moravcsik, have contributed to the lengthening debates about the ultimate fate of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and, most recently, the European Security and Defense Policy. Everyone asks the question if one or both of these policies are capable of being implemented in the current international environment?

The seismic change in the international system brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the growing realization that the United States is the world’s only superpower, has turned all approaches to the study of the role of the EU as global actor upside down. We are back, I believe, to the old notion that the member states are to be considered as individual nation states: “for” the United States like the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Portugal, or “against” the U.S. like France and Germany. It is all very well for the Greek Presidency or Chris Patten or Javier Solana to convene meetings or make statements about EU solidarity, but no one is going to call Brussels now if they want to know what Europe is going to do about Iraq, the Maastricht Treaty, Petersberg Tasks, St. Malo or Helsinki notwithstanding. However pro-EU one is, it is hardly possible to contemplate the creation of the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force by the end of 2003, or take other than seriously the demeaning characterization of Europe’s role to be that of “cleaning up the kitchen.” With ever-growing divisions in Europe, not only between France and Germany on the one side and the other 13 EU states on the other, but now between “old” and “new” Europe, where do we go from here? Common policies, let alone united action by the EU, now seem like nothing more than quixotic illusions. Study of the EU as global actor appears to have beaten a retreat in the face of the U.S. versus Europe, “hard” versus “soft” power, Mars versus Venus and globalization versus development approaches. For the moment, however hard this is for me to say, and despite the occasional brave soul like Joseph Nye, who asserted recently that Europe is too important to be ignored, the field appears to have been left to the Kagans of this world.

Glenda G. Rosenthal
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From the EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section

SOME SALIENT TRENDS APTLY ILLUSTRATE the Latin American and Caribbean perception of the European Union integration process and its implications for the region. First of all, it is obvious that Latin American scholarly activity in this field is highly selective, limited in resources, and heavily centered on the work of a small number of dedicated individuals (who also simultaneously cover other fields and engage in other professions). Second, the political and economic elite perception is dominated by the predominant popular view that reduces the EU process to trade and economics. While this assessment may seem pessimistic, the fact that the path to economic integration in the Americas is in essence a reaction to the European challenge is a very positive accomplishment that has already rendered benefits for the better understanding of the European Union. Moreover, the steady growth of studies and attention on the EU at a worldwide level offers hope for the future. Latin American and Caribbean eyes closely focusing on the process will depend on the successful internal EU experience. Otherwise, these studies will fall into the inertia of general regional cooperation centered exclusively on the role of trade.

While in government circles it is widely recognized that the EU supranational integration experience has been a success, a realist view, replicating a traditional pessimist approach to democracy outside the core of Europe and Anglo America, perceives it as being good for Europeans, but not feasible under the current Latin American circumstances. As a matter of fact, the deeper variance of EU integration has faced formidable resistance in the Americas, increasingly so when the U.S. presence is stronger, such as in NAFTA and the FTAA, while experiences such as MERCOSUR still show signs of hope. The Caribbean process has lost strength since the call for the conversion of CARICOM into a more deeply integrated Caribbean Community. The basic framework of the former Central American Common Market has survived thanks to the EU insistence on institutionalization, but with scant practical results. The Andean Community, heir to the Andean Pact of the old-fashioned regional integration model, is struggling to survive its internal national convulsions (Venezuela, Colombia). In sum, the consensus is that the EU model can be partially adapted, not adopted. This is reflected in the fact that the EU is often studied merely in the comparative setting of trade agreements, causing misunderstandings and distortions.

This perception, reflected in the advancement of the purely free-trade pacts and alternatives, is also noticeable in scholarly productions and educational programs. Educational and research resources are limited, independent funding is non-existent, or it is linked almost exclusively to European largesse, mostly from EU official sources and European governmental foundations.

When the Jean Monnet program was opened to the rest of the world, after expanding from the EU member states to the candidate countries, modest results were generated in Latin America. Chairs and modules were awarded in state universities in Mexico and Buenos Aires, and in very select private universities, such as Piura, Peru. In all cases, these examples reflect the individual work of scholars or EU direct support. The “European Community Studies Associations” in Latin America, while holding seminars and conferences, are certainly not as active as those in other parts of the world. Those in Argentina and Brazil, as well as ECSA Latin America, are some of the most sporadically active associations.

Publishing in Spanish is dominated by Spain’s commercial presses, and the result is that the texts are very expensive for Latin American students. Latin American journals covering international relations very seldom publish pieces entirely
dedicated to the European Union. Ironically, the only Latin American publication exclusively dealing with European affairs is Cuba’s Revista de Estudios Europeos, of extremely limited circulation, with notable content on the European Union. Chile’s Estudios Internacionales, the Colegio de México’s Foro Internacional and UNAM’s Relaciones Internacionales occasionally include pieces related to the European Union. Two outstanding replicas of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires’ Archivos del Presente (connected to the Universidad Tres de Febrero, offering a degree on comparative trade) and Mexico’s Foreign Affairs en Español (published by ITAM, offering a degree on EU studies, sponsored by the EU Commission), pay attention to the European scene, but hardly on a regular basis. Inter-American institutions such as INTAL and the BID often generate studies of a comparative nature.

The context of the field of Latin American studies (in essence, a U.S. “invention”) shows resistance to widen the traditional regional scope, while presenting a notable progress of innovation. Gone are the times that European-Latin American relations in LAS studies were reduced to historical colonial studies or modest comparative analyses between the literatures of Spain and Portugal and Latin America. However, although the European Union has played an increasing role in humanitarian aid, foreign direct investments, and supporting peace and democracy, the focus of Latin American relations with the outside world remains with the United States. Topics of confrontation (trade, Cuba) in Washington over Latin American issues usually attract closer attention.

The activities of the U.S.-based Latin American Studies Association reveal an increasing interest in Europe, and by extension on the European Union, as exemplified by the development of the Europe-Latin America interest section, which was in essence an expansion of the traditional section of scholarly relations with Spain. While the interest in Spain (due still in part to its model of political transition) has continued, as reflected by panels organized in the biennial conferences, the bulk of the research presented has been at the comparative level of similar experiences in Europe and Latin America. Steadily, the European integration experience has appeared as a selective topic for research. Trade and development assistance seem to be the subtopics that attract the attention of specialists. European-Latin American relations are only taught in full courses in select universities in the United States (such as the case of the University of Miami) or the topic is supplementary in seminars on the external dimensions of the European Union.

A symptomatic sign of the limitations presented by the study and attention of the EU in the Latin American context is the development and demise of the Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA). Originally designed to be located in an important Latin American capital, it operated since the mid 1980s in Madrid until its termination in 2000. It was exclusively dependent on the direct funding provided by the European Commission. In spite of the fact that its activities, research and publications were of high quality and use, IRELA never had any financial support of Latin American private or government sources. Its place in the field has not been filled by a counterpart. A fraction of the support is received by several European think-tanks and institutes coordinated by the Europe-Latin America Cooperation Network, while some of its programs are supported in an ad-hoc fashion and through different Commission budgets.

The next two years, with the completion of enlargement and the constitutional process, plus the potential impact of the Iraq conflict on the external face of the European Union, will surely witness noticeable changes in the perception and study of the EU in the Latin American context. A successful enlargement and the reinforcement of the foreign and security policy would surely generate increased attention in scholarly circles. Maintaining current levels of funding for Latin American development and democratisation processes, as well as a more flexible trade policy benefiting the Latin American economies through solid agreements, will round up the picture of the EU as a viable adaptable model and an alternative partner to the predominant United States. On the other hand, internal EU disputes and an erratic enlargement process, added to economic limitations, will result in a decrease of the scholarly interest in the EU experience.

Joaquin Roy and Aimee Kanner
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From the EU Law Interest Section

ALL WHO STUDY LAW-MAKING and enforcement in the European Community recognize the profound influence that economics and politics have on these processes. Often the law, as passed or as interpreted, is the product of the other two influences, rather than the other way round. That is, the law itself is the last manifestation of the Community’s intention. Sadly, this dynamic is not sufficiently emphasized in U.S.—far less in European—legal studies, which makes the evolution of EC law much more difficult to comprehend. Law making in Brussels (as in Washington, D.C.) is not a textbook process!

When I began to study the EU intensively in 1991, media and academic attention devoted to it and its laws was extremely limited. Note how much this has changed, in both the public media and the academy, in the past decade. The EU position on everything from GATT negotiations, to product preferences and exclusions, to the Middle East, is world news and influences U.S. policy. Since, according to the European Court of Justice, the EU is first and foremost a legal regime, the study of private international law (if not the EU directly), both at the graduate and undergraduate levels, necessarily involves EU law.

The EU has always progressed in fits and starts, with the energizing role shifting between and among the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, and (not least) the Community courts. Reluctant concessions by EU member states, only at the last possible moment (for example, Nice), or when political and economic circumstances allow (the SEA), do not make for an orderly or efficient process. The Community, built on big ideas (the Common Market, EMU, and steady enlargement), too often gets bogged down in petty details.
Given the Community’s origins, it is natural that further delegations of power are resisted. But this disunity costs the EU dearly (e.g., energy, financial services) until legislative inertia is finally overcome or the courts step in (daCosta and Dori). Even what is intended as self-protection (e.g., EC Article 5, concerning subsidiarity), can become a profound vehicle for change. Subsidiarity is a two-edged sword. It was meant to protect member states from encroachments by the Community. But, if nation states can do some things better than the Community, the obverse must also be true; there are things that the Community can do better than its constituent members. And the list seems to be steadily increasing.

Consider the work and political capital needed to establish a common currency, handle a mass enlargement, complete a common market in steadily increasing sectors, and fashion a common immigration and asylum policy. And these examples only scratch the surface. The “federalization” of the EU is well and truly begun.

Hence, Europeans are gradually learning what Americans have over the past two centuries; namely that the “F” word is a process and not an event, and that greater harmonization is often the sine quo non of greater prosperity, freedom and security. Member state politicians are confronted daily with public resistance to an “ever closer union,” and are under pressure to deliver more to their constituents, even at the expense of their partners. Voters always want it both ways: more benefits, fewer burdens. In the short term, politicians may capitulate. But, a borderless Europe is only as strong as its weakest link. Its laudable goals may be achievable only through more harmonization. Consider the rapid growth of Pillar III (Europol and Eurojust).

Although Common Market legislation is well ahead of other Community initiatives (energy, air traffic control, and financial services to name but a few), there remains much to do even in that relatively advanced sector. So the apolitical European courts are frequently left to force the pace of integration. They appear to be doing so again, via recent decisions regarding “open skies” agreements, untransposed directives, and poor anti-competitive market analysis.

Recent events in Europe—EMU; the growth and security pact; enlargement; the Constitutional Convention; immigration and asylum—any one of which could easily have split the Community, have been or are being absorbed. They are likely to strengthen the EU, following a period of adjustment. The stress that these initiatives and problems place on EU institutions, processes, and budgets also force the direction of change, if not always its pace. Changes, that start de facto, become de jure; resulting in new laws and further harmonization. Enlargement is likely to hasten this process of integration, which is the focus of intense study both in the U.S. and in Europe.

The increasing homogenization of Europe also has increased tension with its trading partners, particularly the U.S. The difference between the U.S. and EU positions regarding GMO products or competition policy may reflect legitimate differences about civil society. Or they may be pernicious non-tariff barriers to trade, meant to protect European businesses from external competition. As with internal conflicts, these trade policy differences are usually resolved.

It is worth remembering that the EU (not Japan) was the last bargainer at the table with the U.S. at the end of the Uruguay GATT negotiations. And concessions by the U.S. and EU at Doha (after they failed to agree in Seattle) led to the launch of that round. While EU member states act more independently in foreign affairs and military matters, the EU clearly is a growing presence in world affairs. And other nations in the world welcome a counterweight to U.S. influence. If the U.S. and EU agree, their resolution is likely to become the world standard. If they disagree, other traders can choose sides.

In a world fraught with economic, social and security problems, transatlantic relations are more important than ever. The U.S. and EU need to collaborate not just in the reconstruction of greater Europe, but to develop the world economy as well. This they do through semiannual leaders’ summits, the transatlantic business and consumer dialogues, “early warning” of trade disputes, and “positive comity” in the antitrust sector. Like EU law-making, the relationship can be dicey, but it is generally positive. The news media tends—as always—to focus on points of conflict, obscuring the positive. As researchers and educators, we must continue our efforts to see that this does not happen.

In 1991, when I offered my course at the New England School of Law, it was the seventeenth law school to offer a course on EC law in the U.S. Now EU law represents a huge chunk of the curriculum both in Europe and in the U.S. Law schools stand separate from the rest of the university and one teaches as if law were a freestanding discipline, but in reality law is the glue that holds together economics, politics, and society—as EUSA’s forthcoming volume, Law, Politics, and Society, demonstrates.

Thomas C. Fischer
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From the EU Political Economy Interest Section

THE DRAMATIC RESURGENCE OF European Union studies over the past decade or more has coincided with a growth of interest in the overlap between politics and economics as well. Indeed, the two developments are reinforcing. Many European Studies publications in one way or another contain a political economy dimension—which is to say they combine an analysis of an interest based (market-oriented) approach with an analysis of the politics that underlie the creation of policies and institutions. Similarly, many studies in political economy touch upon the European Union—the process of European integration provides a rich source of case studies concerning the interface between politics and economics.

The EUSA EU Political Economy (PE) interest section was set up to take advantage of this mutual reinforcement. On the one hand, our goal is to discuss European integration from an interdisciplinary perspective that combines economic and political factors. On the other hand, we hope to provide a forum that students of political economy can access when they have questions about the relevance of European experience.
That said, the overlap was never so neat and tidy as we might have imagined. Divisions on both sides have complicated the fit between political economy and European Union studies. An obvious example is the divide between domestic (or comparative) and international approaches. What are the important actors and forces behind European integration: governments, interest groups, bureaucracies, institutions, relative bargaining power, interests or ideas? How should they be aggregated? And how comparable are these actors and forces across different aggregations? Of course we did not seek to address such questions definitively. However, we did not expect them to emerge in such a cacophonous or divisive manner either.

Another set of distinctions lies in the areas of methods and objectives. Those political economists who place greater emphasis on the economics side of the overlap tend to deal more in formal methods and replicable outcomes. They deploy models to describe regularities and then seek to demonstrate that these regularities actually occur in the real world. By contrast, political economists who place greater emphasis on the political side are somewhat less formal (though no less rigorous) in their analysis and less general in their ambitions. They also draw upon regularities, but they often resist modelling these too rigidly. And while they are interested in the real world, they often work to explain specific phenomenon rather than repeated case types.

It is important not to overestimate the importance of this methodological division. There is a widespread belief—particularly in Europe—that excessive focus on more formal modelling has over the past two decades led to a “schism” in the discipline of political science taking the form of battles over “substance versus method” or “analytical versus descriptive approaches.” The recent battle over the American Political Science Review suggests that this belief is prevalent among American political scientists as well. Nevertheless, while the divisions may run deep in the general political science community, they are less striking among political economists. The political economy literature has been able to achieve a degree of methodological pluralism without too many battles.

This methodological pluralism is particularly evident in the context of European Union studies. Despite the frequent criticism that Europeanists are too focused on the particular and the descriptive, rather than the general and the analytic, European Union studies as a sub-field supports a large number of explicitly interdisciplinary journals—both old and new. The Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP), European Union Politics, Comparative European Politics, and the Journal of European Integration, to name just a few, all have different tendencies or editorial preferences. Still it would not be inaccurate to suggest that at least some of the articles published in any one of these journals could as easily have found a home in any of the others.

We are not unrealistically optimistic on this matter and our direct experience is a useful case in point. Creating a forum that can satisfy both methodological tendencies in political economy (the economic and the political) equally and immediately is no easy task. It is therefore not surprising that a EUSA interest section on “Economics” has recently been set up.

Our PE section is particularly keen to promote methodological and analytical diversity. To talk in the language of economists, we find that various approaches have different “costs” and “benefits.” More descriptive approaches are able to draw different inferences than do the analytical approaches. A methodology based on thick description might provide insights into a particular case study that would not be obtained otherwise, although it might not necessarily lead to a revision of an established theory. Likewise, theory testing efforts work well to advance academic knowledge about mechanisms and principles put forward by a certain theory, but might not provide us with the insights into specific cases. In sum, we need the diversity to obtain a broadly based knowledge of cases and theories.

Since its creation in June 2000 and its first meeting at the EUSA (ECSA) conference in Madison in May 2001, the PE section has focused its attention in particular on these theoretical and methodological issues. We have sought to collect contributions from scholars that use political economy as a useful lens for studying the European integration process. We were keen not only to stress the fact that one benefits from conducting a study that combines insights from both economics and politics, but also from adopting a specific political economy approach. The field has developed methodological and theoretical tools that are adopted in European integration studies. We seek to collect that information and disseminate it among our members.

Our first collection of different political economy approaches to European integration studies was published in February 2003 in a part special issue of JEPP, which we edited. In that issue we focus on the methodological division (Verdun), on the importance of omitted variables (Maria Green Cowles), on the analysis of institutionalized relationships (Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon) and on the implications of particular notions of causality (Jones). In the wake of that publication, we decided to expand our collection of papers to a full-fledged (student) textbook that examines the European integration process from the various political economy perspectives. We are delighted that the EUSA Interest Section on Political Economy is in a position to make this valuable contribution to the literature, and hope that other projects will emerge in the years to come.

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From the EU Economics Interest Section

I would like to begin with a comment on most of what follows. Economists are notoriously “two-handed” when it comes to expressing their views about the world in which we live. The old jokes about numbers of economists correlating directly with the number of views on any issue contains more than a grain of truth, as anyone who has attended a lively session at economics conferences can attest. What follows is partially my own personal reflections on the discipline and, following on from this, where I
believe EU economics is. The commentary is divided into two main sections: the first deals with economics as a discipline, and
the second the study of the EU in economics. From an outsider’s
perspective, the latter, I believe, can only really be understood if
placed in the context of the overall direction in which the
discipline is headed. Perhaps surprisingly to an outsider, there is
likely much more agreement about EU economics than there is
in terms of the discipline as a whole.

As various authors have emphasized, economics is fast
becoming a science and losing its place as a social science by
relegating the function of non-formal discourse to an inferior
form of research. Formalization is rampant, models are pervasive,
econometrics mainly focuses on long-run time-series properties
of data (co-integration, for example), and many of the journals
have become so dry to read that even academic economists tend
to shy away from them (the leading journals such as the American
Economic Review and Econometrica can hardly be classified as
bedtime reading, or even the slightest bit relevant to most
economists). This pernicious use of formalism has alienated many
both in and outside the discipline and has caused a deepening
rift between those that seek “relevance” and those that seek
“stardom.” Indeed, attending economics conferences, although
necessary for most careers, is probably the least stimulating type
of conference to attend as a real academic. Most (non-
“mainstream” and many “mainstream”) economists rarely go to
economics conferences as it is rare to leave actually having
learned anything new.

Economists, notoriously, also have problems talking to other
disciplines, politicians, or getting their message across to the
general public. Yes, we have our own language: yes, it is virtually
impenetrable to an outsider who has not had some graduate
training in economics; and yes, most economists (even Nobel
Prize winners) are better than ambien at inducing sleep at public
lectures. But that should not stop the effective communication of
ideas and recommendations for policy formulation, and although
economists like Paul Krugman are now regular contributors to
the media, this is only a recent phenomenon, and furthermore
there are very few Paul Krugmans in our discipline who can
communicate in simple language or are willing to even make the
effort. The formalization of our subject, plus the inability of most
economists to communicate their ideas, has led to a fortress/
isolationist/clubby mentality and, to put it bluntly, a superiority
complex that is only now beginning to erode. Where is the
evidence for this? One only has to think of counter examples,
and there are many of them around. For example, if economists
were really able to communicate effectively, we likely would
not be having any of the budget cuts currently taking place at the
U.S. state level. Politicians, and many political scientists for that
matter, just do not understand the economic stabilization role of
government, and although economists like to blame politicians,
I think much of the blame should be placed at our feet for
inadequate and ineffective communication and advice.

Let us now turn to EU economics. In terms of the economics
that is now being done within the EUSA, the cross-disciplinary
nature of the organization will hopefully foster interesting
research into subjects such as the economic and institutional
implications of the increased heterogeneity of the EU as new
members join, the shape and direction of the reforms to the
Stability and Growth pact, and the timing and appropriateness
of UK’s potential membership in the eurozone. It is important
not only to be open to theoretical and empirical work on these
issues, but given our unique position in an inter-disciplinary
organization, to develop a greater institutional perspective and
to perhaps combine some of the other perspectives on the EU
with the work being done in economics.

As for what can be observed in the mainstream journals,
there are essentially three strands of research on the EU. The
first is on the expansion of the EU. This is obviously a forward
looking research project that focuses on the effects and
desirability of membership for the Central and Eastern European
democracies. Part of this research agenda looks at whether the
accession countries will fit in with the rest of the EU (with respect
to either the Stability and Growth pact or EMU), and the other
part looks at the costs of absorption and the budget implications.
Clearly the expansion of the EU is such a major challenge, that
the project will likely continue well beyond 2004. The second
strand of research is on EMU, and monetary policy in euroland.
Once again there are essentially two parts to this research strand
—the first looks at the development and implementation of
monetary policy, while the second consists of studying the
Stability and Growth pact, and recent proposals for its reform.
The fall in the value of the euro, the internal review of
monetary policy undertaken by the ECB, will no doubt prompt
more research on voting patterns on the ECB Council and how
euroland monetary policy is implemented, not only in terms of
the differing transmission mechanisms in the EU, but also in
terms of whether monetary or price targets are used as
intermediate targets. The third strand on the EU consists of
research on other EU policy areas, such as trade policy,
environmental policy, and competition policy.

In my view, EU economics needs to start looking beyond
the current research agenda and consider such questions as: How
effective will the ECB be operating in an environment where
there are 25 member states, not 15? Is the Stability and Growth
pact really necessary? If not, what should replace it? If so, how
should it be reformed? In any new constitution for the EU, how
should economic powers be allocated? Addressing these
questions will give rise to issues and debates that will likely be
central to the future development of the EU, will impact on other
disciplines, and will also make economics more relevant to
policymakers and other academics.

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From the EU Public Opinion and Participation Interest Section

THE EU PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTICIPATION Interest Section is one of EUSA’s newest, having begun just a year ago and having just held its first meeting at the recent EUSA conference in Nashville. In this essay, I will highlight recent developments in academic research on public opinion and participation as it relates to European integration, with special emphasis on six distinctive areas. Readers will find a more complete discussion of these themes, together with a lengthy bibliography, in my article in the EUSA Review, 15: 3 (Summer 2002 issue).

First, a great deal of recent scholarship has focused on voting behavior in national referendums on European integration. Some scholars have studied EU referendums as a class of events. Hug and Sciarini developed and tested a theoretical model of how institutional features—e.g., voluntary vs. obligatory referendum—mediate the impact of political factors on referendum voting behavior. Christin and Hug demonstrated that public support for integration generally increases in response to a referendum. Finally, a recent book by Hug provides insights into the policy effects of referendums.

Another strand of referendum research has focused predominantly on the Danish experience. In a study of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren argued that voting behavior in that referendum—and referendums on issues of low salience to voters more generally—tend to reflect voters’ attitudes toward domestic political parties, particularly the governing parties. Svensson and Franklin each revisited this argument in a special issue of European Journal of Political Research last year. Their exchange further develops our understanding of the conditions under which party elites can influence voting behavior in European referendums.

Second, several recent studies have examined whether and how voters’ policy attitudes affect EU policy-making. Clifford Carrubba demonstrated that voters’ attitudes toward integration affect the positions that national parties take on integration. This raises a further question: why do voters vary in their preferences over EU policy? Ray provided an interesting answer. He shows that the national context—in terms of the level of social protection and other welfare policies—tempers how citizens in similar socioeconomic positions in different member states view the same EU policy.

Public opinion is particularly relevant for maintaining a common currency (e.g., Barro). Here, too, national context matters for public opinion. Karl Kaltenthaler and Anderson, Banducci, Karp, and Loedel (forthcoming), and Gabel show that individual-level and aggregate-level support is affected by national economic and political contexts.

Third, several articles have examined public support for institutional and geographic reforms. Rohrschnedier explored support for the creation of parliamentary government at the European level. He found that support varies positively with citizens’ perception of the quality of representation at the European level. Interestingly, this effect grows in strength with the quality of national political institutions. One important implication of this study is that a common proposal to alleviate the democratic deficit—an increase in the power of the EP—faces serious public opposition because of the perceived democratic deficit.

Tucker, Pacek, and Bernisky examined support for EU accession among citizens of the applicant countries. They found that the beneficiaries of economic liberalization and supporters of a market economy are significantly more supportive of membership than the economic losers from the transition. It is important to note that they do not argue that support for accession is based on utilitarian evaluations of economic benefits from EU membership itself. As Ehin and Cichowski showed, such concerns are poor predictors of support for accession.

Fourth, Evans, Gabel, and Scheve present evidence that voters’ attitudes toward the EU have had a significant effect on vote choice in some national elections. Van der Eijk and Franklin conclude that this effect could increase in the future. They find the voters’ positions on integration are sufficiently distinct from their left-right positions that EU issues could dramatically disrupt traditional electoral politics.

Fifth, several recent studies identify cultural and religious sources of citizen attitudes toward integration. McLaren showed that citizens’ perceptions of cultural threat are an important factor in explaining opposition to integration. De Master and Le Roy demonstrate that xenophobia is a significant factor as well. Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser focus on the nature and strength of Christian religious affiliations. Carey shows that national and regional identities shape support for integration.

Finally, Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson provide a thorough and provocative analysis of participation in elections for the European Parliament (EP). In particular, they investigate the causes of abstention. Their findings cast doubt on the common characterization of the EP elections as “second-order.” Also, contradicting earlier findings, their research seems to show that participation levels are a poor indicator of EU legitimacy.

What is the direction of future research? One of the more exciting areas of research explores the process by which citizens form their attitudes toward the EU. Some scholars assume that voters conduct a sophisticated reading of elite messages that provide an informational short-cut. Others consider voters as simply passive recipients of their favorite elites’ opinions. Both may be right, but under specific conditions. Some very creative work is underway to evaluate the framing of integration as a policy issue, the way in which voters resolve trade-offs regarding the complexities of policy consequences, and how the informational environment influences the relationship between party positions and voter sophistication. We hope that the new EUSA section focusing on this “sub-field” of EU studies will be able to participate in and benefit from the new research.

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From the Teaching the EU Interest Section

The attempt to understand and teach about the European Union (EU) has always been challenging, not least because the EU resembles a “moving target.” Many of us teach courses on the EU with the word “integration” in the title, but can the ever-increasing complexity of the institutional arrangements, wholesale enlargement to the East, or the Europeanization of social, political and cultural realms be captured by the term integration? We question the dominance of integration within EU studies and argue for an approach to the EU in which the idea of integration is problematized rather than assumed.

The complexity of the EU and the ways it challenges accepted notions of bordered polity suggests a need to transcend disciplinary boundaries and to cross sub-disciplinary borders in order to understand—and teach about—the EU. We argue for an approach that seeks to embed the study of the EU within wider avenues of social science enquiry. We suggest that EU studies should not separate the EU from the rest of the world and should be informed by an interdisciplinary social science. We therefore invite a fresh debate on the nature of European integration and on the parameters and priorities of a social science with which we attempt to understand EU developments.

Questions deemed central to an understanding of the European project have tended to coalesce around the extent to which the nation-state has been transformed and the degree to which the EU represents a supranational state. EU studies, we suggest, focuses disproportionately on integration without either adequately problematizing the concept or contextualizing the contributory processes. The integrative logic of EU studies has been legitimated by the central cleavage in the study of the European Union: that between the neo-functionalists and the intergovernmentalists, as well as a debate between comparative politics analysts and international relations scholars - not always fruitful dialogues. Integration and supranationalism have become virtually inseparable: integration equals the building of a European supra-state. Where dissent from this view exists, it takes the form of a restatement of the alternative position, the intergovernmentalist thesis.

In the face of this intellectual stalemate, we question the assumption that integration is a given. Moreover, the meaning of integration is often unclear or confusing, referring variously to political objective, theoretical model, or policy process, depending upon the context. The institutionalization of integration studies is responsible for the idea that developments with the potential to create widespread disruption and fragmentation—ranging from enlargement to the East to mass unemployment and the ever-increasing scope and complexity of EU policy realms—can be subsumed by the idea of integration. This has contributed to a lack of critical awareness of the outcomes and characteristics of the integration process, and has divested it of any real meaning. Nevertheless, conceptual inertia or convenience ensures that it is frequently the idea of first resort when the EU is discussed.

The cross-fertilization of research into transnational processes and global phenomena with research on the EU has been piecemeal to date. We urge that a global framework—comprehending the EU within a broader understanding of state, society, economy and culture, not necessarily territorially bounded—be incorporated into EU studies. Rather than becoming an increasingly narrow and solipsistic discipline, EU studies need to situate itself more broadly within an interdisciplinary version of political science, one capable of apprehending the multidimensional process taking place within the EU by drawing on a broad range of intellectual resources. We are not alone in recognizing this need. Rosamond has suggested that the theorization of European integration is only fully understood with reference to wider currents in political science (2000), and Bellier and Wilson (2000) point to the calls for more involvement among, and understanding of, cognate disciplines, citing anthropology as an example.

It is not sufficient for EU studies to attempt to understand the changing fabric of economic, social, political and institutional arrangements that are constitutive of the contemporary EU. EU studies must also be able to apprehend the multiple scripts within which EU developments are discursively constructed. Mair (1996) points to three developments in the study of comparative politics that have pertinence for this debate and for our plea for a global approach and scope: the near-absence of comparative analysis with a global or cross-regional ambition; the tendency of the profession to become compartmentalized; and thirdly, the tendency in methodology to stress the advantages of “small n” comparisons. We urge that social science should not be restricted to the focus on European integration qua integration, and concur with those analysts who hold that the study of the EU is not an “n of one,” and who argue convincingly against the use of the term sui generis in defining the EU (Sbragia, 1992; Newman 1996). It is important to seek bridges in order to move beyond compartmentalism to an interdisciplinary approach to the EU.

We contend that the EU studies debate can be advanced by foregrounding three key issues. The first is the value of greater interdisciplinarity. It is not simply the case that legal studies, sociology, and cultural studies can offer fresh perspectives on European integration (Alter, 2002), or even that these disciplines can help to problematize the assumptions that underlie rigid thinking on integration—although this is the case. A plurality of approaches will assist EU studies in accessing the multiplicity of meaning attached to the many key issues—globalization, deterritorialization, enlargement, post-national polity—without which the dynamics of the EU, the transformative nature of its organization of economic space, and its relationship with the rest of the world cannot be fully understood. We do not urge that specialists in one discipline become experts in another—we urge them to seek understanding across disciplinary boundaries and move outside of what often appears to be conventional EU studies.

The second issue is the need for a clearer EU studies agenda independent of any academic or political agenda promoted by any EU institution, for whatever laudable reasons. In our estimation the potentially cozy relationship between the Commission and EU studies, exemplified by the fact that the EU funds a considerable amount of integration studies directly or indirectly, has the very real danger of tending towards inadequate objectivity and a continued commitment to integration studies
per se to the detriment of an extended inter-disciplinary dialogue. In short, we are concerned that European integration studies does not always successfully avoid the trap of what Mair (1996) calls privileging the official story, at the expense of alternative versions.

Thirdly, there is a need to develop appropriate concepts and theories with which to question and investigate the dynamics of European integration. Although the field has expanded in recent years—for example, debates on the merits of new institutionalism and constructivism have been productive—integration remains the focus of EU studies. In line with the call for greater interdisciplinarity, we urge more bridge-building (and conceptual borrowing) across disciplines in order to pursue creative and original social scientific research.

The global and non-integrative aspects of the EU have not been accorded sufficient attention. A multidisciplinary approach with some synthesis of analytical approaches would result in a rich pooling of diversity, a cross-referencing of models, an avoidance of over-specialisation; a corrective to the tendency towards the ghettoization of integration analysts, and a healthy engagement with other disciplines and sub-disciplines. Political scientists are learning to be attentive to silences and gaps—“what is left out and what goes unsaid” (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996). We are calling for an attentiveness to such gaps and silences in our advocacy of a multidisciplinary and more independent approach to the study of the EU.

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Notes
1. See also ECSA Review X: 3 (Fall 1997) “Does the European Union Represent an n of 1?” with essays by Gary Marks, James A. Caporaso, Andrew Moravcsik, and Mark Pollack.
2. An outline of a course which would take on these challenges might include these (thirteen) weekly topics:
   - Perspectives on integration (i) claims and scope of integration theories
   - Perspectives on integration (ii) the teleological logic of integration: a critique
   - Globalization (i) EU polity and world polity: a new comparative politics?
   - Globalization (ii) catalyst for integration or cause of fragmentation?
   - Democracy (i) the public sphere and democratic contestation
   - Democracy (ii) the EU and the rise of European civil society
   - Democracy (iii) democracy promotion and the European social model
   - Europeanization (i) EU citizenship and social exclusion
   - Europeanization (ii) does integration require cultural cohesion?
   - Europeanization (iii) enlargement and multiple European modernities
   - Beyond territoriality (i) rethinking European space: core-periphery relations
   - Beyond territoriality (ii) sub-national regions and trans-national networks
   - Current debates: EU studies, integration, governance, and interdisciplinarity

Summer Programs in European Integration Studies

The Academy of European Law, Florence, Italy, will hold summer courses for students on human rights law and EU law in June and July 2003. Deadline for applications is April 30, 2003. The Session on Human Rights Law takes place June 16-27 and the Session on the Law of the European Union takes place June 30-July 11. Lectures and courses given by academics and practitioners. For information and an application, visit <www.iue.it/AEL> or e-mail <academy@iue.it>.

The European Summer Institute 2003 will be held in Prague, Czech Republic, June 28-July 8, 2003, on the topic, “Future of Europe: Addressing Enlargement and the Convention.” It is for undergraduate and graduate students with demonstrated interest in EU affairs. Organized by Europeum Institute for European Policy, with Charles University, the application deadline is May 1, 2003. Visit <www.europeum.org/summer_school> or e-mail <esi2003@europeum.org>.

The Université Libre de Bruxelles and Michigan State University offer the International Summer School, “External Relations of the European Union,” July 1-31, 2003, in Brussels, language of instruction, English. Instruction by high-level practitioners and academics from Europe and the U.S. For information see the Web site <www.ulb.ac.be/soco/summer> or e-mail <summereu@aul.ac.be>. No deadline given.

The Amsterdam-Maastricht Summer University and the European Institute for Public Administration are offering two summer seminars in 2003, the first one June 30-July 2, in Maastricht, entitled “A Secure Future for an Enlarged Union?” and the second one July 16-18, entitled “Challenges and Risks of GMOs: What Risk Analysis is Appropriate? Options for Future Policy Making Towards Integrated Agro-Food Systems.” Sessions will include structured debates with opportunities for active participation. For details, visit <www.amsu.edu> or e-mail <office@amsu.edu>. No deadline given.

This new book contributes to a growing literature on Europeanisation, taking as its central question how we can explain the differential patterns of national administrative adaptation to the requirements of European Union policy. It has emerged from Cambridge’s “Themes in European Governance” series, which has produced some excellent work, and this is no exception.

Knill examines the extent to which European policy implementation has brought with it administrative reform. His starting point is the basic tension between pressures of convergence stemming from European policy content on the one hand, and divergent, historically-rooted administrative styles on the other. Knill asks whether pressures for convergence are indeed noticeable. The implementation of environmental policy in Germany and Britain form the empirical basis of this study (although in the concluding chapter the author resorts to transport policy to illustrate his points). Knill sees environmental policy offering analytical advantages in the sense that there is a lot of it—environmental policy is a rapidly expanding area of EU competence—and there are clear administrative requirements in terms of implementation. To overcome the problem of lack of functional comparison, he subdivides environmental policy into five legislative areas.

Knill distinguishes Britain and Germany’s administrative arrangements by state traditions, the legal systems, and the political-administrative systems. He examines two dimensions of impact of EU policies: administrative style and administrative structures. He finds no clear and compelling pattern either between different types of environmental policy or between the two countries. Knill advances various explanations for this: for example, the level of “misfit” between national administrations and European requirements. Where the level of misfit is high—that is, when the new European policy requires radical changes to existing structures and styles, adaptation tends to be low. Domestic change (in positive policies, where specific institutional requirements are made) is only possible where “European adaptation requirements remain within the institutional core patterns” (p.223). Knill sees agency-based theoretical approaches as necessary to understanding this resistance. Administrative reform capacity heralded a greater likelihood of adjustment, and provided evidence of agents working independently of institutional constraints.

In using historical institutionalism, Knill accords primary importance to those patterns of political life—the rules, processes, repeated and accepted practices—which provide maps of acceptable and unacceptable ways of doing things. Only when historical institutionalism fails to provide convincing explanations does he look to agency-based approaches for help. Knill argues that for analytical purposes it is useful to conceive of Europeanisation taking one of three possible forms. The first is highly prescriptive, requiring member states to adopt a “concrete institutional model” (p.213) for compliance. The second affects domestic opportunity structures without requiring specific institutional forms. The third is aimed at influencing domestic beliefs and expectations.

Institutional change is most likely to be prescriptive in the areas of positive policy—environmental, health and safety, consumer protection, and other areas which reduce the negative consequences of market liberalization. These policies ask more of member state governments in that they “imply and prescribe specific institutional requirements for domestic compliance” (p.214). However, this approach is further conditioned by two variables—one is the extent to which member state reforms to the core administrative area have affected national administrative traditions. The second is the case where less adaptive pressure is applied (what Knill terms “changes within the core,” p.215). Here the agency approach—actors’ beliefs, preferences, and strategies—also is important.

Thus, in the area of environmental policy, institutionalist explanations go a long way toward providing the answer to why Europeanisation takes the form it does. Part of this institutionalist explanation has to do with the requirements of the EU itself—to what extent is a prescriptive (new) institutional model being imposed on the member states? Another part of the institutional explanation is the member state administrative “environment” and this provides another, possibly countervailing, institutional influence. Moreover, agents’ preferences, beliefs, and strategies provide some of the answers to why domestic adaptation differs.

The second general means of categorizing Europeanisation is to see it as altering domestic opportunity structures. These have distributive consequences and may lead to new equilibria for domestic institutions, but they do not prescribe institutional outcomes. These policies are likely to be found in the “negative,” market-making area of EU policy. Knill suggests that though they do not prescribe institutional structures, they are constraining nonetheless in that they proscribe certain domestic policies.

These go under the general heading of “within core” administrative changes—giving member states leeway to find their own paths to compliance. Consequently, the author asserts that agency-based explanations best account for results here—since European level pressures are insufficiently determinative of institutional outcomes. For an example, he cites road haulage liberalization in the four biggest member states. The fact that they liberalized in far different ways from one another suggests that institutional pressure from above does not offer an explanation of national outcomes, or Europeanization at the national level.

But is this “fair-weather institutionalism”? One could argue that just because institutional pressure is not coming from the EU level does not mean that institutionalist explanations are inadequate, since the member states themselves have institutions of many kinds—from bargaining practices and traditions of consultation/conflict to safety and consumer regulations—that
have an impact on market liberalization too. Institutions are many and conflicting, they overlap, they exist at many levels, and the lack of a prescribed institutional configuration emanating from Brussels does not mean that agents are in a rule-free dogfight, with outcomes favoring the canniest or strongest. The very fact that Italian road hauliers had “many institutional vetoes” (p.219) with which to reject domestic reform, and German hauliers by contrast had a “much weaker veto position” suggests the importance of institutions as much as agents.

Knill recognizes these national institutional arrangements, and in fact defines agency approaches as conceiving of institutions as intervening variables affecting agents’ abilities to achieve their outcomes (p.28). But the explanatory emphasis shifts to agents’ preferences, beliefs, and strategies in cases of weak institutional change. To a certain extent this must be true—given that no institutional configuration has been imposed, it is up to actors to shape them to suit their own interests. On the other hand, some action is definitely ruled out by EU policy—including overt protection through cabotage restrictions in domestic markets. This means EU-derived rules as well as domestic institutions continue to play a key role in outcomes.

The third major form of Europeanisation is the “weakest”—seeking only to “alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors” (p.221). The “cognitive logic” of this framing, according to Knill, is its affect on the “strategies and preferences of domestic actors.” He uses another transport policy—railways—to illustrate his point here. Railway policy is an example where the social logic (regional and social cohesion) has yet to overcome the consumer logic (competition and consumer gains) that is a necessary precondition to full liberalization. European policy consequently was weak, and like in the second category, did not provide explicit institutional requirements for member states. Instead, what was happening in the member states themselves had a big influence—reform of the public sector in the UK was linked to British Rail privatization, while non-reform in Italy had a big influence—reform of the public sector in the UK was consonant with continued public monopolization of rail services. In both cases, therefore, the EU meant little. In Germany and the Netherlands, EU policy had more significance.

The difficulty of using an institution versus agency dichotomy is further revealed here. Knill again assumes that agents’ preferences, beliefs, and strategies are the key to understanding how domestic change comes about in policy areas only weakly influenced by the EU. Again the point may be made that domestic institutional arrangements also influence actors’ “life-chances” in reform/change scenarios. What changes when EU policies (whether positive, negative, or cognitive proto-policies) come home to member states is not the preferences, beliefs or strategies of actors, which presumably remain the same, but their ability to bring them to fruition. Their ability changes because institutions have changed. To some extent, domestic actors apply their preferences to shape the new institutional context in their own image, and to some extent they are constrained by the institutions that still exist at the domestic level.

There is plenty of grist in this impressive volume for such debates to continue among scholars of Europe and scholars of institutions. On balance, Knill has produced an extremely insightful and important piece of work, of lasting value to students of EU politics in general and Europeanisation in particular. It is to be highly commended.

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Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union is a most welcome addition to the literature on EU law and politics. Scholars of the EU, legal and non-legal alike, have long tired of celebrating or, as the case may be, condemning the landmark jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on direct applicability, direct effect, supremacy and member state liability. They have turned in their scholarship in large numbers to legal actors other than the Court of Justice, most notably to the public and private actors that determine how the EU is “governed,” and the means they characteristically use in doing so. So great is the interest in “governance,” broadly construed, that this has become the virtual center of gravity of scholarship emanating from members of the legal no less than the political science academy, be their focus on comitology, “open methods of coordination,” or anything else.

In Justice Contained, Lisa Conant restores the Court of Justice and its jurisprudence to the governance picture, but in a new, interesting and important way. What makes Justice Contained new, interesting and important is above all its focus on the political dynamics that determine the actual impact of the Court’s more innovative rulings. Conant’s point of departure is that political impact cannot adequately be measured (as is so often attempted) in terms of the conformity or compliance by either EU-level institutions or by national courts with the pronouncements that emanate from Luxembourg. Measuring and explaining the impact of judicial rulings requires a broader compass.

On the way to tracing the impact of Court of Justice rulings in four sample areas—liberalization in the telecommunications and electricity sectors, non-nationality-discrimination in public sector employment, and access to social benefits by migrant EU nationals—Conant develops an important general theory of “contained justice,” a term whose meaning, while far from self-explanatory, emerges clearly from her presentation. Conant demonstrates that, while state actors (judicial and non-judicial alike) usually comply with the Court of Justice rulings as such, they have ample means for restricting the scope of compliance. Among other things, they can implement the ruling within the context of the case that gave rise to it, while refusing—at times utterly—to apply it to future cases, however analogous. Even if they are prepared to give the ruling precedential effect, they can construe the ruling narrowly so as to reduce its scope of application.
Indeed, Conant shows how member state actors (again judicial and non-judicial alike) have countless other devices—from unpunished refusals to make preliminary references to avoidance of sanctions for non-compliance—to lessen the impact of revolutionary Court of Justice rulings. For this reviewer, recounting the ways in which Court of Justice pronouncements fail to have political effect commensurate with the rulings’ apparent import (i.e., Conant’s premise) is as useful as the inquiry into what determines the effectiveness they do have (i.e., Conant’s conclusions). Conant’s account of “pervasive evasion through contained compliance,” as she puts it (p.6), is original and convincing, and would alone make the book illuminating. The panoply of devices for national judicial and administrative resistance to the Court’s pronouncements is nothing less than impressive.

But Conant’s main point is a more affirmative one, from which quite concrete political lessons can be drawn. That point is that, notwithstanding the amenability of revolutionary Court of Justice rulings to “contained,” and even “constricted,” readings and applications, they can have broad political impact if an effective coalition of support is assembled among interested groups. While the Court itself is in no position to see to it that such coalitions are assembled, and does not necessarily even have an institutional interest in doing so, those interests that stand to benefit from these judicial pronouncements do have such an incentive. The term “mobilization” is well-chosen: support does not merely happen; it needs to be organized, and to be organized by those who stand most to benefit.

The four episodes in Conant’s sample demonstrate the range of possibilities, from very broad to very narrow impact, depending on the political configuration that results, or fails to result, from whatever mobilization efforts are made. None of the four stories is simple, and Conant does justice to the complexity of each, both in terms of the substantive issues at hand and the political interests at stake. Least of all do they suggest that, once the necessary political support is assembled, the policy underlying the Court of Justice ruling in question comes fully into play. As will come as no surprise to political scientists, concessions and compromises may need to be made in order for that support to be enlisted. Perhaps Conant should acknowledge that if those concessions and compromises are significant enough, what we may be observing is yet another form, and not an overcoming, of “contained” justice.

The lessons to be drawn from the account are many. Some are obvious, such as the futility of over-relying on the Court of Justice, and on the judiciary generally. Others are less obvious. Among these, perhaps the most intriguing is Conant’s suggestion that the processes of political mobilization may hold a key, if not the key, to the democratic and accountability dilemmas under which the Court has labored from the beginning. In Conant’s account, the real impact of Court of Justice rulings (that is, the impact beyond the confines of the specific cases that gave rise to them) depends on political forces within the member states. To that extent, potentially democratic and accountable forces are determining the depth and breadth of change initiated by the Court. Of course, as Conant herself acknowledges, becoming less court-centric and more broadly political in assessing the impact of Court of Justice pronouncements does not put all democratic and accountability misgivings to rest. Access to the political processes that Conant rightly portrays as determinative of the impact of the Court’s rulings—in a word, “voice”—is itself unevenly distributed.

I confess to puzzling a bit over the book’s title, and for several reasons. Are the processes of political mobilization that Conant describes just another exercise in “containment” of Court of Justice rulings, alongside non-compliance and legislative overruling? I am more inclined to see them as an exercise in potential salvage of those rulings, at least of their “core.” More generally, while one readily understands and appreciates what Conant means by “containment” of Court of Justice rulings, it is less clear that what is being “contained” is “justice.” What is being contained is justice only if we conflate Court of Justice pronouncements with justice. But perhaps we should not do so. Perhaps, the logical conclusion of Conant’s argument—especially if we take her democratic accountability point seriously—is that the political mobilization, while in some cases and in some senses transforming those rulings, renders them more politically “just.”

Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union merits careful reading. While provocative, it treats the conventional legal sources—the treaties, legislation and case law—with respect and fidelity, which only serves to heighten the book’s impact. Among those most apt to benefit is the community of EU legal scholars who know better than to take Court of Justice, or any judicial, pronouncements too seriously, but too seldom consider the forces, political or otherwise, that will determine just how effective those pronouncements really are.

George A. Bermann
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AMIE KREPEL’S BOOK EXAMINES the European Parliament in comparative and historical context. Once primarily a talking shop, the European Parliament has become an important component of EU decision-making processes. Kreppel wants to know not only how the parliament has changed, but also the ways in which its development is different from or similar to that of other parliaments. Doing so requires her to move well beyond the existing literature. Most treatments of the European Parliament have been descriptive. Kreppel draws on the literature on the U.S. Congress to develop an analytical framework suitable for the examination of a multiparty legislature whose connections to its electorates are, at best, weak. Undertaking this approach requires that she explore incentives which shape party tactics and behaviour in a multiparty context.

Kreppel argues that changes in legislatures and the ways in which they operate can either reflect exogenous or endogenous forces. The first provides the basis of her macro model. Changes reflect external forces, such as the accession of new states and changes in EU treaties. The macro model predicts that internal changes will occur in response to external stimuli, but it cannot predict what changes will occur. For this, a rational actor or micro model is needed. This argues that changes will reflect the actions and interests of more powerful actors—in the case of the European Parliament, the largest party groups—who seek to control processes of change and turn them to their advantage. Kreppel derives hypotheses from each model and tests them by examining changes in organization and procedures of the European Parliament and its party groups.

Chapters 1 and 2 set the terms of discussion by introducing the European Parliament and placing it in a comparative context. Here the macro and micro models are introduced. In sharp contrast to the American Congress, the electoral connection is considerably weaker. Rather than examining the ways in which individual legislators pursue their own self interest, Kreppel concentrates on the largest party groups and the ways in which they have exploited changes in the powers of the European Parliament. Chapter 3 considers the development of the European Parliament’s party system in light of the micro and macro models and the comparative parties literature, while chapter 4 traces the history of the European Parliament from the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community to the present. Chapters 5 through 7 test hypotheses laid out in previous chapters by examining changes in the rules and internal organization of the EP, patterns of cooperation and conflict among party groups, and the impact of the cooperation and co-decision procedures. Chapter 8 ties the book together.

Kreppel considers the institutional development of the parliament and patterns of interaction among supranational parliamentary groups in three periods. The first begins with the establishment of limited control over the EC budget in 1970. The second runs from the first direct elections in 1979 through the Single European Act in 1986. The third includes the first uses of cooperation procedure for single market legislation, its expansion in the Maastricht Treaty, and the introduction of the newer co-decision procedure. The three periods take in substantial changes in the size, operation, and political impact of the parliament. At the outset, the parliament was a much smaller body whose members held dual mandates and sat both in their national parliaments and the EP; the introduction of direct community financing gave the parliament limited control over the EC budget. In the final period, the European Parliament is not only much larger but also directly elected and because of successive treaty changes, much more involved in EU decision-making.

Kreppel examines changes in European Parliament’s rules and procedures to test her suppositions that changes will flow from external stimuli and reflect the interests of the larger groups. In the first period, those changes which took place codified previous norms and made rules more precise. Far more extensive changes took place after the first direct elections in 1979.

The 1981 revision produced better organized, and more precise rules, laying out the legislative process in greater detail. Committees gained additional powers, and the power of the President was increased. In addition, the parliament was reorganized. The Conference of Presidents replaced the Parliamentary Bureau and the President gained greater control over debate. All of these changes are consistent with Kreppel’s macro hypothesis. Consistent with the micro hypothesis, many of these changes worked to the advantage of the larger parliamentary groups. Rules changes limited the power of individual members, making it more difficult to intervene in or obstruct debate. Weighted voting in the conference of presidents also increased the influence of the larger party groups.

Kreppel is concerned not only with changes in rules and procedures, but also relationships between party groups, particularly the Party of the European Socialists (PSP), and the European People’s Party (EPP). Both came together in the 1980s and early 1990s to enhance their own power and the power of the European Parliament as a whole. Kreppel uses coordinate analysis of roll call votes to the formation of legislative coalitions in each period. She finds evidence of growing cooperation between the PSP and EPP. Coordinate analyses from the first period demonstrate that the two groups were far from each other on a number of issues. By the third period, they had moved closer together. Both also had strong reasons to work together to overcome absenteeism and meet requirements for special majorities. To do so, Socialists and Christian Democrats had to adopt positions closer to those of the median member-state on the Council of Ministers. Kreppel also demonstrates increased cohesion within parliamentary groups and the growing influence of parliamentary group leaders. However, this is counter-balanced to some extent by the influence of national delegations on committee assignments.

This is a good book. Kreppel takes the reader through complex changes in the internal organization and operation of the European Parliament and demonstrates not only that the macro and micro models are needed to understand change, but also that
real power—won to some extent through the Parliament’s own efforts—has turned the Parliament into a more serious and effective body. The book should be useful not only to readers who are interested in the history and development of the European Parliament, but also to students of political parties and those concerned with legislatures, how they develop, and what difference legislative caucuses make. The book also will interest scholars examining the ways that legislatures evolve in countries transiting to liberal democracy. The book is readable and accessible. However, some specialized knowledge is needed to interpret coordinate analyses. Also needed is microscopic vision or a magnifying glass to distinguish triangles from squares or circles on many of the diagrams. Here, Cambridge University Press and not the author bears greatest responsibility.

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Spotlight on Ireland

Many EUSA members focus on EU member states. This feature highlights an individual EU member state’s major presences in the USA and beyond.

Important Web sites
• Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland, with up-to-date press releases, features on the Forum on Europe and the Future of Europe Debate, North-South Ministerial Council, etc. www.irlgov.ie/fiveagh
• Central Statistics Office Ireland, a government agency, has current statistics on agriculture, demography, the economy, economic indicators, trade, industry, the labor force, etc. Web site www.cso.ie
• The European Commission maintains a Web site, “EU Ireland,” at www.euireland.ie


The Embassy of the United States in Ireland:
42 Elgin Road, Dublin 4, Ireland; telephone 353.1.668.87.77; Web site www.usembassy.ie

Media
• Largest Irish-American newspaper (weekly): Irish Echo, 309 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, telephone 212.686.1266; Web site www.irishecho.com
• Irish Radio Network, USA (founded in 1970), has affiliates in northeastern U.S. states, Illinois, and Texas, for Irish and Irish-American news, politics, culture, etc. Web site www.irishradio.net

Selected scholarly resources
• Dublin European Institute, Room L520, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland; telephone 353.1.716.7634, e-mail dei@ucd.ie; Web site www.europeanstudies.ie
• Centre for European Studies, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland; telephone 353.61.20.22.02; Web site www.ul.ie/~ceuros
• American Conference for Irish Studies, contact Kathryn Conrad, Dept. of English, 3116 Wescoe Hall, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045; e-mail kconrad@ku.edu; Web site www.acisweb.com
• Canadian Association for Irish Studies, based at the University of Alberta, publishes Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, emphasis on humanities but some attention to social sciences; e-mail jerry.white@ualberta.ca; Web site www.arts.ualberta.ca/~cais

Archive of European Integration  http://aei.pitt.edu

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY SYSTEM, University of Pittsburgh, announces the new Archive of European Integration (AEI), a major online repository for non-commercial, non-governmental full text publications (short monographs, working or policy papers, conference papers, etc.) dealing with some aspect of European integration, whether they are already on the Web or not. The AEI co-sponsors are the European Union Studies Association and the Center for West European Studies/European Union Center, University of Pittsburgh. All those who presented papers in person at the 2003 EUSA Conference in Nashville are invited to post their conference papers on the AEI.

The AEI is partnering with the European Research Papers Archive (ERPA) and the European Integration online Papers (EIoP), and seeks to acquire other appropriate papers which do not reside on the ERPA. It will be possible to access and search simultaneously the AEI, the ERPA, and the EIoP. Together, the ERPA and the AEI will constitute the most comprehensive, accessible single interface to materials on European integration either already available on the Internet or in another format that can be converted to be deposited on the AEI.

Anyone can access and download materials on the AEI. The search engine allows searching by author, title, keyword, year, etc. Not only are titles free to all for reading and downloading for personal use, the AEI is an archive for the permanent retention of articles submitted (authors can have titles removed upon request).

The AEI editors invite all with appropriate papers to submit them to the AEI. The AEI editors will be happy to help any individual or organization seeking assistance with the process of contributing materials to the AEI. If you wish to deposit papers in a series, you must contact the AEI editor before beginning deposit of papers. With questions about the AEI, e-mail <aei@library.pitt.edu>.
EU-Related Web Sites

Editor’s note: The following URLs and annotations have been updated as of April 2003. The EUSA is not responsible for the content or availability of any Web site noted below. All Web addresses are preceded by http:// (omitted here for brevity). Copyright © 2003 European Union Studies Association.

Library and bibliographic sources

**www.ebliuda.org**
The European Bureau of Library, Information and Documentation Associations represents national library and information associations and institutions in Europe, on issues of copyright, culture, Central and Eastern Europe, information society, and technology.

**www-library.pitt.edu/subject_guides/westernuropean/wwwes/**
The West European Studies Virtual Library is an excellent World Wide Web resource from the University of Pittsburgh on West Europe (primarily post-1945) and the EU in general.

**library.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/ec.html**
The History of Europe as a Supranational Region lists and links to every key historical document in European integration beginning with the 1957 Treaty of Rome and to the present.

**www.lib.berkeley.edu/GSSI/eu.html**
The University of California at Berkeley Library has an extensive electronic catalog devoted to scores of EU-related sources called European Union Internet Resources.

**europa.eu.int/eclas**
Register to become a user of the European Commission Libraries Catalogue (ECLAS). Site in French and English.

**www.mun.ca/ceuep/EU-bib.html**
The European Union: A Bibliography is a very thorough compilation of EU resources, regularly updated.

Official European Union sources

**europa.eu.int**
Europa is the official server of the EU and is the primary resource on its institutions, goals and policies, documents, news, and treaty texts. Europa has many searchable databases and Web portals.

**ue.eu.int**
The Council of the European Union has a Web site with information about past and current Presidencies, the major treaties and other documents, the Intergovernmental Conferences, and so on.

**europa.eu.int/eur-lex**
Eur-Lex is the EU’s “portal to EU law,” with an electronic archive of legal and juridical texts from all the institutions, the Official Journal, background information on EU legislation in force, links to white papers, and more.

**www.europarl.eu.int**
The official site of the European Parliament, with full details of the current MEPs and their committees, Parliamentary sessions, hearings, conferences, documents issued, and more.

**www.curia.eu.int**
The Curia site focuses on the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, providing documents on recent case-law (full texts), pending cases, and cases removed from the register.

**www.echr.coe.int**
The European Court of Human Rights site has information on the current composition and history of the Court, pending cases, judgments and decisions, and basic texts, inter alia.

**www.ecb.int**
The European Central Bank’s Web site (in the 11 official EU languages) is the definitive site on the European System of Central Banks, the monetary policy and framework of the Eurosystem, texts of the relevant legal documents, and more.

**europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo**
The Eurobarometer site has downloadable reports (in PDF format) with qualitative and quantitative data as recent as the current month from EU member states and candidate countries.

**www.eurunion.org**
The European Union in the U.S. is the Web site for all official EU activities in the U.S., with links to their U.S.-based missions.

**U.S. Government sources**

**www.useu.be**
The United States Mission to the European Union in Brussels maintains a Web presence with a valuable list of the key documents of the U.S.-EU relationship, current news, and more.

**www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/eureconindex.html**
The U.S. Department of State has a Web presence (archived) focusing specifically on U.S.-EU diplomatic relations.

**www.sce.doc.gov**
The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a Showcase Europe site on doing business in the EU, including country-specific commercial guides, links on the EU and EBRD, and more.

**EU-related NGOs (and quasi-NGOs)**

**www.eumap.org**
The EU Accession Monitoring Program, run by the Open Society Institute, monitors human rights and the rule of law in ten CEECs (EU candidates) and the five largest EU member states.

**www.tabd.com**
The TransAtlantic Business Dialogue Web site fully documents this government-business initiative to lower trade and investment barriers across the Atlantic.

**www.tacd.org**
The TransAtlantic Consumer Dialogue is a forum of U.S. and EU consumer organizations which makes joint consumer policy recommendations to the U.S. government and European Union to promote consumer interests in EU and U.S. policy making.

**EU external relations sources**

**www.cires-ricerca.it**
The Interuniversity Research Centre on Southern Europe studies the impact of Europeanization on southern European countries and the Euro-Mediterranean area. Their bilingual Web site has working papers, a bibliography, hyperlinks, and other resources.

**www.ue-acp.org**
Actors and Processes in EU-ACP Cooperation (see next entry)

**www.acpsec.org**
Secretariat of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States

Resources on the Lomé Convention, renegotiations, and related topics. The first site, above, hosts all historical documents on the EU-ACP Forum; the second site (in English and French), has summit documents, texts of treaties and agreements, etc.
www.ul.ie/eac
The University of Limerick’s Euro-Asia Centre investigates Asian and European business, sociocultural, and technical relations, and the trade/competition problems facing Europe and Asia.

www.abhaber.com/english_nt.htm
Ab Haber is devoted to EU-Turkey relations, particularly news and current developments, in both Turkish and English.

www.europaveien.no
In Norwegian, this site/portal is the gateway to EU information for Nordic and Scandinavian researchers, officials, businesses, and others. It provides searchable EU news sources, inter alia.

www.canada-europe.org
Site (in French and English) of the Canada Europe Round Table for Business, a forum on major trade and investment matters among Canadian and European business and government leaders.

www.recalnet.org
Recal is a policy-oriented network of research centres in the EU and Latin America who further bi-regional relations through joint study and reflection and the program “Latin America 2020.”

EU skeptics sources
www.euroseptic.com
In English (and French in parts), this site focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the campaign for an independent Britain.

www.teameurope.info
The European Alliance of EU Critical Movements “connects over 40 EU-critical organizations and parties in 14 European countries,” groups such as the Green Party, The Bruges Group, the Democracy Movement, and the Norwegian “No to the EU.”

On-line archives and publications
www.etsg.org
The newly launched Archive of European Integration is an electronic repository for research materials on the topic of European integration and unification. It is fully searchable, and searches of it will also include both EIoP and ERPA (see below).

www.eiop.or.at/erpa/
The European Community Studies Association of Austria publishes a bilingual (German and English), peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary e-journal, European Integration online Papers. Includes downloadable working papers and current trade news.

www.eurostudies.org
The European Research Papers Archive is a portal to (currently) nine on-line papers series in the field of European integration studies, primarily, but not exclusively, from European institutions.

www.rome-convention.org
The Jean Monnet Working Papers series (a joint project of the Academy of European Law, European University Institute, and New York University School of Law) covers many issues related to the EU and law, and papers can be downloaded from the site.

www.uea.ac.uk/eurososig/index.html
The Jean Monnet Working Papers series (a joint project of the Academy of European Law, European University Institute, and New York University School of Law) covers many issues related to the EU and law, and papers can be downloaded from the site.

www.ejil.org
The European Journal of International Law site provides a fully searchable database of all book reviews published to date, a forum for discussion, and the table of contents as well as a full text version of the lead article in each recent issue.

Other EU sources
www.eustudies.org
The European Union Studies Association (EUSA) is the primary academic and professional association, worldwide, devoted to study of the EU and the European integration project. EUSA’s Web site describes its programs, publications, and interest sections, and features the main articles from the EUSA Review.

www.notre-europe.asso.fr
Led by Jacques Delors, Notre Europe is a research and policy group on European integration; its papers and reports are posted on the Web site in French and English.

www.rome-convention.org
All the case law, searchable (by country, e.g.), and a bibliography.

www.etsg.org
An interactive communication network for academics working in the field of European integration studies, the European Community Studies Association is organized and funded by the Commission’s DG for Education and Culture.

www.tiesweb.org
The Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) promotes international research on European integration and discussion on public policies and political options for Europe. TEPSA is an association of 20+ think tanks in all EU member states and several of the candidate countries.

www.euractiv.com
Euractiv is a Belgium-based information source focused on “EU news, policy positions, and EU actors,” including European politics, broadly defined, with daily news and information on the EU, governments, parliaments, parties, NGOs, and more.
The Fulbright Scholar Program offers lecturing/research awards in some 140 countries, for the 2003-04 academic year, for college and university faculty and administrators, business and government professionals, journalists, lawyers, scientists, artists, independent scholars, and others; most awards require U.S. citizenship. Of particular interest to EUSA members is the European Union Affairs Research Program, for conducting research on EU affairs or U.S.-E.U. relations. Preference will be given to projects focusing on the organizations of the EU, particularly on the process of institution building within the EU. Fluency in French or German may be required, depending on the nature of the project; fluency in one or more of the other languages of the EU may be required if based in another EU member state. Must have proven teaching and research experience and publications. Professionals with at least five years experience will also be considered. Applicants must arrange the institutional affiliation and the letter of invitation. For 2-5 months, between September 2004-June 2005. Preference given to grants starting in September.

Also of interest to EUSA members is the Fulbright Lectureship in U.S.-E.U. Relations, to teach a course on some aspect on transatlantic relations and supervise a few M.A. theses at the College of Europe, Brugge, Belgium. The courses are taught in the framework of a master’s program to a select group of graduate students from all European countries and North America. There is one seminar taught during the second term, taught in a “block system” with dates individually arranged. Average class size is 20-30 students. Grantee may also be asked to participate in conferences and other activities. Language: fluency in French is desirable but not required. Additional qualifications: several years of teaching experience at the graduate level, associate or full professor rank desired. Six months starting September 2004 or January 2005. For both programs, see <www.cies.org> or contact Daria Teutonico, telephone 202.686.6245, e-mail <dteutonico@cies.iie.org>. Deadline for both programs: August 1, 2003.

For undergraduate or very recently graduated students, the Educational Programmes Abroad offers professional internshipships in Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Edinburgh, London, Madrid, and Paris (among other cities). Opportunities include internships in British politics with a Member of the British Parliament, in Scottish politics with a Member of the Scottish Parliament, in EU politics with a Member of the European Parliament, in German politics at the Bundestag, in French government in the research branches of French government think tanks, and others too numerous to list in law, business, media, and other fields. A minimum grade-point average is required and some internships require proficiency in a foreign language. Educational Programmes Abroad is a non-profit organization founded in 1972, with offices in the U.S. and the UK. Visit <www.studyabroad.com/epa> or e-mail <usoffice@epa-internships.org>. Deadlines vary by program, from May 1 to November 15, 2003.


May 19-20, 2003: “Promoting the Civic Engagement of Minorities in the EU and the U.S.,” Columbia, Missouri. Co-sponsored by the EU Center of Missouri and St. Louis University. See <eu.missouri.edu> or e-mail <EUCenter@missouri.edu>.

Calls for Papers

“International Governance After ‘September 11’: Interdependence, Security, Democracy” September 24-26, 2003, Belfast, UK. Organized by Institute of Governance, Public Policy and Social Research, Queen’s University of Belfast. Papers invited in any discipline, but academic-practitioner collaborations especially welcomed. Proposals for whole panels are preferred; abstracts of 500 words for each paper and a rational of no more than 1000 words for the panel itself, plus names and full contact details of all speakers, are required. Papers and presentations must be in English, and must address one of the following themes: new approaches to democratic governance; globalisation, regionalisation, and democracy; democracy and sub/intra-state governance; security and democratic governance (international issues); regulation, accountability, and democratic governance; democracy and development: towards Cosmopolis? See <www.qub.ac.uk/gov>. Send proposals to Alex Warleigh, e-mail A.Warleigh@qub.ac.uk. Deadline: April 30, 2003.

“Food Security in Europe and the World,” September 26-27, 2003, Aix-en-Provence, France. 2nd International Workshop for Young Scholars, organized by the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales et Communautaires, Université de Droit, d’Économie et des Sciences d’Aix-Marseille III, and the European Law Journal. Proposals are invited on European law concerning any aspect of food security, including food supply security and food safety. Examples of relevant topics are: food supply security and food safety in EU law, including the CAP; the European Food Safety Authority; relations between the EU and member states re: food security (e.g., competence, subsidiarity); relations between the EU and the WTO re: food security; European food policy and world food security, including food aid. E-mail 400-500 word proposals in French or English to <europeanlawjournal@wanadoo.fr>. Deadline: April 30, 2003.

“Immigration in a Cross-National Context: What Are the Implications for Europe?” Spring 2004 conference organized by the EU Center of the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and the Luxembourg Income Study. For scholars studying cross-national population immigration, both legal and extra-legal, and its economic, demographic, social, and political effects in Europe and surrounding areas. Selected papers will be published in a conference volume. Abstracts of no more than 500 words are invited on these topics, related to immigration in a cross-national European context: education of immigrants; ethnic conflict; social stratification; political incorporation; population aging; economic and social well-being; income support programs; social stability; human rights; political systems and voting; institutional response; labor market issues; culture and identity. Young researchers encouraged. Selection will be competitive. Notification in August 2003; papers due in early 2004. See call at <www.lisproject.org/links/immigration/immigcall.pdf>. E-mail proposals to <caroline@lisproject.org> Deadline: June 1, 2003.

Publications

New EU-Related Books and Working Papers


EU-Related Journals Received


Journal of Modern Italian Studies and Journal of Modern Italy (Journal of the Association for the Study of Modern Italy) (both Vol. 8, 2003) Taylor & Francis.
Are you moving? We know that many EUSA members move frequently. Please drop an e-mail to the EUSA office at eusa@pitt.edu in advance, to let us know your new address. Six weeks’ advance notice is ideal. As much as we wish we had a crystal ball, there is no way we can intuit that you are moving, much less what your new address is. We are not able to replace membership materials that you have missed when you have not provided us with your new address. Thanks very much.

Please make a note in your planner that the dates of our 2005 9th Biennial International Conference in Austin, Texas, are March 31-April 2, 2005. We will be at the Hyatt Regency right on the water. Austin is not only the scene of much live music and independent filmmaking, but it is also the site of the largest state university in the United States (University of Texas at Austin), as well as being the state capital. During our conference dates, the Texas State Legislature will be in session and the sessions (in a stunning capitol building) are open to the public. We have already posted a 2005 conference Web page, so please check it for updates: www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html. We will be circulating the Call for Proposals in Spring 2004.

Your home institution may have a fund to pay the professional membership dues of its faculty and staff. As association dues go, ours remain low. We recommend that you ask at your place of employment whether your EUSA membership dues can be covered. (A two-year membership will save your institution some paperwork and a bit of money as well.) Please contact the EUSA office in Pittsburgh if your institution needs our federal ID number in order to process your membership dues payment.

The EUSA Review follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas: Winter (December 15): EU-Related Academic Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide); Spring (March 15): EU-Related Web Sites (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies); Summer (June 15): EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers and institutes with significant EU aspects in their missions); and Fall (September 15): EUSA Members’ Research Notes (EUSA members’ current, EU-related funded research projects). Send brief announcements by e-mail to <eusa@pitt.edu> or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

From the Chair

(continuation from p.2) Project is about to produce its fifth monograph, by Elizabeth Pond, to be published for us by Brookings Institution Press. Pond presented a preliminary version of her manuscript on the state of transatlantic relations at a roundtable in Nashville. In all these ways, the Association has pursued its mission to enhance and develop the field of EU studies.

This is my last piece for the EUSA Review in my role as Chair of EUSA, as my term comes to an end at the end of May. During my two years as Chair we launched four new interest sections, on EU economics, EU - Latin America - Caribbean relations, EU public opinion and participation, and most recently, the EU as global actor. (Details about all our sections are posted on our Web site.) We also established our new sustaining memberships at the beginning of 2002 and we are very happy to have twelve sustaining members on board already. I would urge any of you who runs a center, think tank, department, publication, or organization, to give serious consideration to the sustaining membership option for your institution. Please contact the EUSA office in Pittsburgh if you would like more information about this, or take a look at www.eustudies.org/sustaining.html.

I am also pleased to announce the results of our 2003 Executive Committee election, in which you, the membership, elected four new members to the board: Gráinne de Búrca (European University Institute), Virginie Guiraudon (Université de Lille II), John Keeler (University of Washington), and Sophie Meunier (Princeton University). These new members will take office on May 31st to serve four-year terms, and they will join the three Executive Committee members currently on the board whose terms expire in 2005: Karen Alter, Jeffrey Anderson, and George Ross. I want to congratulate the new board members and to thank the 2001-2003 EUSA board. Karen Alter, Jeffrey Anderson, George Bermann, Donald Hancock, Mark Pollack and George Ross have provided thoughtful and strong leadership for EUSA, and I have greatly enjoyed working with them. John Keeler led a program committee that created a first-class conference from a multitude of panel and paper proposals. And, of course, all 1600 of us owe a special debt of thanks to Valerie Staats, the executive director of EUSA, whose daily work on our behalf is at the core of our growth and expansion.

For me, this has been a very special two years. Working with these friends and colleagues has made what might have been a burden into a pleasure of collaboration. As I pass the baton to a newly elected board, I hope that our individual and sustaining members increase in number, that we identify new sources of funding for our projects and activities, and that we continue to work with our membership to find ways to enhance further this field, the study of the European integration process and the European Union. I look forward to remaining involved in the Association as a regular member.

Martin A. Schain
New York University
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