Neoliberal Heritage Redress

At a time when global financial regulation and the partial nationalization of industries are mainstream items of political discussion, using the word “neoliberal” in a chapter title suddenly feels anachronistic. Discussing the topic fifteen years after the appearance of pioneering works such as political scientist Stephen Gill’s “Disciplinary Neoliberalism” might seem superfluous in any event. Yet when it comes to the subject of this collection and chapter, Canadian redress politics and the broader arena of diversity politics in which it is situated, it remains illuminating to speak of neoliberalism in the present tense: or, at least, so this chapter will argue.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Stressing neoliberalism’s concern to remake the conditions under which organized groups communicate with government and society, I outline how this concern has reshaped Canadian multiculturalism. Although astute criticisms of Canada’s multiculturalism policy abound, the policy’s importance for groups challenging the terms of belonging within the Canadian settler society ought equally to be noted; this role has made multiculturalism a particularly important target of neoliberal change in this
country. While the profile of Canadian multiculturalism has diminished in recent years, the debates around coming to terms with historical injustice have not. In the remainder of the essay, I show how the characteristic tactics and tools of a neoliberalized multiculturalism have latterly been transported and applied to the newly important terrain of historical redress. The result is a template for taming the past’s transformative potential, which I call—referencing Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel’s account of multiculturalism’s 1990s-era neoliberalization under the newly created Canadian Heritage ministry—“neoliberal heritage redress.”

Referring originally to late 1980s and early 1990s policies of trade liberalization, economic deregulation, and state retrenchment, “neoliberal” has become a general descriptor for the dominant ideological sensibilities and imperatives of the post-Keynesian globalization era. For reasons which will soon become apparent, students of social movements have charted neoliberalism’s impact in part by studying changes to the bureaucratic mechanisms and discursive processes through which government filters and considers the concerns of organized citizen groups. Relevant bureaucratic mechanisms include state agencies that consult and communicate with interested organizations, as well as programs that provide funding to advocacy groups. Pertinent discursive processes include the quasi-official symbols and languages that are used as frameworks for defining and treating public problems. Taken collectively, political scientists call
these mechanisms and processes “systems of interest intermediation”: the overall means by which the concerns of organized social groups are conveyed to government. For citizen groups, interest intermediation mechanisms and processes offer prospective opportunities for influencing the state that go beyond the polar alternatives of lobbying officials on the one hand and demonstrating in the streets on the other. For government, interest intermediation represents both a prudential means of understanding the political views and reactions of organized groups and a disciplinary vehicle for shaping those views and reactions.

It is important to understand this overall field of interest intermediation—the diverse bureaucratic mechanisms and discursive processes of state consultation and communication with advocacy groups—as a site of neoliberal change. Perhaps most famously, the strategic importance of interest intermediation was articulated in the 1975 inaugural report of the Trilateral Commission, an influential American free-market organization whose founders included the future head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. Blaming an “excess of democracy” for what it called “government overload,” the Commission argued that the state’s increased permeability to activist demands was undermining the principles of low taxation and limited state intervention. Accordingly, the Trilateral Commission proposed a new tactic for reviving what was then a largely moribund war against the welfare state: enhancing the state’s autonomy from unwelcome societal influences, most notably, equality-seeking
groups. The thinking was simple: if activist influence had led to undesired reforms in areas such as social policy and civil rights, then those avenues of influence would have to be curtailed.

As Canadian political scientists such as Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips and Miriam Smith have shown, in the 1990s successive federal governments pursued precisely this neoliberal focus on curtailing activist influence by narrowing the channels of interest intermediation. The approach featured two main thrusts. First, changes to public policies and state funding regimes destroyed the relationships between the federal bureaucracy and progressive advocacy groups built starting in the Trudeau “just society” years. Second, authorities and their media allies used discourses valorizing the so-called “ordinary Canadian,” figured as a taxpayer and consumer, to delegitimize group experiences and identities as positive considerations in civic deliberation and debate. This neoliberalization of interest intermediation involved a corresponding set of changes to Canadian multiculturalism policy as well, which this chapter will soon discuss.

For cultural theorists such as Jodi Melamed, the phrase “neoliberal multiculturalism” describes a set of dominant normative distinctions between globalizing cosmopolitanism and parochial traditionalism which polices the borders between legitimate and illegitimate diversity. The cosmopolitan trope was used by groups arguing for a multiculturalism policy as early as the 1960s,
and, in the rather general sense of establishing discursive equivalences linking globalization, diversity, and prosperity, Canadian multiculturalism can be said to have been incipiently neoliberal all along. For example, Ukrainian- and Polish-Canadian organizations advocated official multiculturalism in the early 1960s by stressing that their upwardly mobile constituencies deserved recognition as global assets for government: once “penniless, uneducated, [and] unskilled,” their members were now “engineers, doctors … prominent … trusted and efficient world servants.”9 Thus, as the Canadian Polish Congress put it at the parliamentary hearings that led to the October 1971 introduction of the multiculturalism policy, embracing multiculturalism would give Canada an “international advantage in business.”10

Notwithstanding the cosmopolitan trope’s endurance, captured perfectly in Abu-Laban and Gabriel’s title, Selling Diversity, the contemporary, state-driven neoliberalization of Canadian multiculturalism reflects a more distinctly domestic set of preoccupations.11 One factor suggesting a more fine-grained analysis is that of timing; long before Amsterdam’s 2004 van Gogh assassination and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005 made anti-multiculturalism ubiquitous in Europe, Canadian multiculturalism was being transformed in response to what political philosopher Will Kymlicka describes as a campaign of “apocalyptic scenarios” and “near hysteria.”12 As will soon be seen, this campaign and its outcome can be usefully understood as the application to the field of Canadian
multiculturalism of the “excess of democracy” thesis first articulated by the Trilateral Commission.

The notion of multiculturalism was certainly part of former prime minister Trudeau’s long-term campaign to deflect Québécois claims for national recognition and political reordering. Worse, framings of multiculturalism that present Canada monophonically as a “land of immigrants” finding “unity in diversity” efface the country’s ongoing nature as a project of settler colonialism resting on Indigenous dispossession. But other deployments are part of the record and need to be considered as well. In terms of this chapter’s more bounded and limited focus on the politics of immigrant integration and antiracism within the rest-of-Canada settler society, official multiculturalism discourse has served, to a not entirely insignificant extent, the causes of equality and inclusion.

For example, ethnocultural-minority organizations capitalized on the policy in the early 1980s when they argued, to some effect, that Canadian multiculturalism would be exposed as a sham unless Ottawa strengthened the equality rights provisions of the soon-to-be entrenched Charter of Rights. In the years immediately thereafter, similar invocations of multiculturalism led to the creation of a special House of Commons committee on the Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society, whose groundbreaking report, Equality Now!, passed recommendations that led not only to the creation of a stand-alone multiculturalism ministry, but to strengthened hate-crime laws, new employment
equity legislation, and the dismantling of the War Measures Act as well.\textsuperscript{16} The \textit{Equality Now!} report also played a role in the Canadian politics of redress: it recommended Japanese-Canadian interment reparation and induced Ottawa to provide funds to help the National Association of Japanese Canadians develop its claim.\textsuperscript{17} Key participant Roy Miki, while noting considerable community ambivalence about the appropriateness of pursuing redress under the multiculturalism framework, observes that many of his fellow internment redress activists shared the basic perspective on multiculturalism outlined above: that is, they “recognized the power of multiculturalism discourse in bringing to prominence the issue of redress for Japanese Canadians.”\textsuperscript{18}

The point here is not to foment nostalgia for a multiculturalist golden age that never was. It is, instead, to argue that racialized and minoritized immigrant groups exploited the official emphasis on multiculturalism—a leading discourse of Canadian citizenship in the first decade of the Charter of Rights—as a tool of civic voice for historically excluded and oppressed people. This role was perhaps most apparent during the epic constitutional battles of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which equality-seeking movements invoked the official commitment to multiculturalism in order to buttress their claims for inclusion and respect.\textsuperscript{19} Resenting the attention paid to considerations of diversity and pluralism in the constitutional debate, right-wing critics launched a counterattack, portraying multiculturalism and its constituency of “politically correct special interest
groups” as a menace to sound governance and national unity. And when the federal government decided during the mid-1990s deficit crisis to work more energetically toward neoliberalizing the Canadian welfare state, it brought precisely these concerns to bear on its reconsideration of the multiculturalism policy. That is, it sought to remake the channels of communication between organized groups and the state—Canada’s systems of interest intermediation—in ways that might marginalize the activist voices associated with the heightened prominence of recognition politics over the previous decade.

Abu-Laban and Gabriel chart the ensuing neoliberalization of Canadian multiculturalism in *Selling Diversity*. In 1994, the former multiculturalism ministry was transformed into a low-profile unit subsumed under the new Department of Canadian Heritage. Subsequent budget cuts made an “always … meagrely supported” program into one “even leaner.” Core funding for ethnocultural organizations was replaced in 1996 by a regime of ad hoc program funding, which, by inducing groups to compete for one-off grants to provide particular designated services, both financially weakened organizations representing minoritized groups and subjected them to intensified levels of state discipline. At the same time, a former emphasis on social equality and antiracism—as signalled, for example, by the sheer existence of a government publication demanding *Equality Now!*—was overshadowed by new framings. Internationally, multiculturalism became Ottawa’s branding strategy for
promoting Canadian business; domestically its 1980s-era antiracist edge succumbed to an emphasis on “Canadian heritage” and “social cohesion.”

A classic instance of what Miriam Smith calls neoliberalism’s “narrowing of the legitimate field of the political,” these changes expressed the Trilateral Commission’s “excess of democracy” manifesto as filtered through the constitutional frustrations of Canada’s state elites and activist right. At the most general level, transforming multiculturalism into a discourse of “cohesion” and “heritage” attenuated its former role as a quasi-official language for promoting difference recognition in civic debates: a move signalled explicitly by multiculturalism’s bureaucratic subordination to the new Heritage ministry in 1993. Although the notion of subordinating multiculturalism to “heritage” may recall older criticisms of multiculturalism as a song-and-dance affair, it in fact represented a new and importantly different tactic. Rather than following the preoccupation of its 1970s-era predecessor with folkloric “ethnic heritages,” the 1990s approach stressed “Canadian heritage” in the singular to convey a newly aggressive stance towards the politics of difference.

For their part, the programmatic changes to multiculturalism’s funding regime aimed to weaken activist groups while boosting the profiles of less challenging entities oriented towards providing government-mandated services. Eliminating core funding in favour of one-off support for particular state-approved projects clearly reflected the neoliberal focus on offloading state
responsibilities onto the so-called voluntary sector. But the underlying strategic vision was arguably more crucial: it aimed to enhance the state’s autonomy from progressive advocacy groups in the interest of engineering a deeper, long-term rightward shift in Canadian politics and society. Thus, like the discursive changes associated with the new heritage emphasis, the multiculturalism funding changes sought to constrain political forces that had formerly moved state policy in expansionist and egalitarian directions.

In more recent years, the basic status of multiculturalism as an official diversity-promotion framework seems have entered a new stage of doubt and decline. A senior federal official speculated to me under anonymity in 2006 that the policy’s continued existence reflected little more than inertial fear of the expected outcry attending any formal move to eliminate the program.26 The “selling diversity” pitch has certainly become a less useful Canadian branding strategy in countries where equating multiculturalism with terrorism promotion is now a commonplace position. Literary and cultural critic Pauline Wakeham offers a perceptive analysis situating what she calls Canada’s “culture of redress” in light of these developments. In particular, she suggests that an emergent emphasis on Canadian deeds of reconciliation and repair is beginning to address some of the international branding and domestic diversity management functions once shouldered by an increasingly “worn out” multiculturalism.27
The development has been rapid; until recently Ottawa’s position on redress was aptly described as a “non-policy”: a stance of refusal interrupted by the occasional grudging act of expediency.\textsuperscript{28} However, change became apparent in 2005 with the appearance of a new policy, which I call “neoliberal heritage redress.”\textsuperscript{29} Neoliberal heritage redress builds directly on the turn from antiracism to sanitized discourses of heritage and cohesion that Abu-Laban and Gabriel link to the 1990s neoliberalization of multiculturalism under the Heritage ministry.\textsuperscript{30} Four years and two federal elections later, neoliberal heritage redress stands as a full-fledged and relatively settled policy for governing whatever Canadian historical injustices lie outside the purview of the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs.\textsuperscript{31} Analyzing it more closely will help us to probe further the recalibration of multiculturalism and redress highlighted by Wakeham.

In February 2005 the Paul Martin Liberal government announced the establishment of the Acknowledgment, Commemoration, and Education Program (ACE) within the multiculturalism directorate of the Department of Canadian Heritage.\textsuperscript{32} The program’s basic parameters and concerns became clearer in the succeeding months as three agreements-in-principle with redress-seeking groups were reached under the ACE framework.\textsuperscript{33} Although Stephen Harper’s Conservatives won the January 2006 federal election before the agreements were finalized, in the spring of that year Harper’s government introduced the Community Historical Recognition Program (CHRP), which retains many of the
essential elements of the ACE program. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, this chapter’s analysis of neoliberal heritage redress treats both initiatives jointly as a single redress policy.

Before proceeding further, one difference between the ACE and CHRP programs should briefly be noted. In announcing the CHRP, the Harper government moved the program from its former home in the multiculturalism directorate of Canadian Heritage to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Removing redress from the bureaucratic ambit of Heritage, which still retains responsibility for the multiculturalism portfolio—that is, the portfolio to which the Canadian state had formerly insisted that all non-Aboriginal redress demands be directed—may thus be a further instalment in the ongoing marginalization of multiculturalism. At the time of writing, it was simply too early to tell. In any event, the preoccupations associated with the 1990s-era “heritage” transformation of multiculturalism continue as forces driving the new redress policy, the change in bureaucratic location notwithstanding.

The durability of neoliberal heritage redress at a time of federal partisan realignment and tumult reflects an underlying Liberal-Conservative consensus on the policy, whose emergence I will now explain. Between the years 2002 and 2004, Conservative opposition immigration critic Inky Mark proposed several private member’s bills on redress. In an attempt to attract electoral support from minoritized communities, Conservative Leader Stephen Harper tapped the Mark
bills as party policy in 2004, thus establishing a clear contrast with no-redress policy maintained by the governing Liberals since 1994. After the 2004 federal election campaign reduced the former Liberal majority to a minority and saw ethnocultural-minority voters show a new openness to the Conservatives, Martin quickly abandoned the Liberals’ no-redress position. Announced in the February 2005 budget, the Martin government’s ACE program embraced the key outlines of the initial Inky Mark bills as championed by the opposition Conservatives.

The basic concept behind the ACE program was in fact first broached in the late 1990s by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Responding to the Chrétien government’s insistence that offering apologies and compensation for historical injustices was backward-looking and divisive, Ukrainian-Canadian redress activists formulated a new appeal. Dropping earlier demands for apology and compensation for the First World War internment, they requested official “acknowledgment” and financial assistance for commemorative projects instead. Although it failed to sway Chrétien, the modified Ukrainian-Canadian position shaped both the Inky Mark redress bills and the Conservatives’ subsequent 2004 pro-redress announcement.

In the Ukrainian-Canadian approach, the Conservatives saw a way of reaching minoritized voters in terms that might prove acceptable to the party’s right-wing base. For example, the party’s 2004 campaign platform emphasized the primarily hortatory and commemorative thrust of the new proposal by calling
it “heritage redress.” Mark framed the point in the following terms: “I don’t agree that [people] should receive an apology or receive individual compensation. … The purpose … is education, acknowledgement, recognition.” The eventual ACE program acronym conveyed the premise succinctly: “acknowledgment,” but not “apology”; “commemoration” and “education,” but never “compensation.” Thus, pioneered in part by the Ukrainian-Canadian campaign, embraced by Inky Mark and the opposition Conservatives, and then adopted by the governing Martin Liberals after their near-defeat in 2004, neoliberal heritage redress was from the outset a deliberate and quite explicit departure from more activist and reparatory approaches.

This departure shaped the debate at the fall 2005 parliamentary hearings of the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, which examined Mark’s bills on Ukrainian-Canadian internment and Chinese head tax redress as a prelude to their proposed implementation under the new ACE program framework. On the one hand, exhibiting levels of accord rare in a parliamentary system known for its intense government-versus-opposition dynamic, Liberal and Conservative committee members joined repeatedly to defend the commemorative or “heritage” emphasis of the program. As explained by a supportive Paul Grod of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, whose organization had just negotiated the first preliminary agreement to be reached under the ACE program, this emphasis meant “no compensation and no apology.” For their part, New Democratic Party
and Bloc Québécois MPs criticized the “no compensation, no apology” rule, which they saw as an unreasonable and deliberately imposed impediment to the redress claim of the Chinese Canadian National Council. The leading proponent of redress for Canada’s infamous “Chinese head tax” and “exclusion act since 1984, the Council had always insisted on an official apology and individual compensation for head-tax payers and their families. I will return to discuss the Chinese-Canadian claim and its treatment under the ACE-CHRP framework later in the chapter.

While the origins of the “no apology, no compensation” rule reflect in part the tactical decisions of the Ukrainian-Canadian campaign, a closer look at the new redress programs also reveals the reliance of state policymakers on the strategic vision underlying Canada’s neoliberalized multiculturalism. In particular, the ACE and CHRP programs have followed the latter in using conditional project funding as a disciplinary tool for shaping advocacy-group behaviour. In the specific case of redress, conditional project funding makes the recipient group the junior entity in a sort of public-private partnership; funded organizations are those that have applied successfully to undertake particular “commemorative” and “educational” projects under terms dictated by the state. As will be seen below, this funding regime aims not only to discipline groups, but also to resituate Canadian redress politics on a sanitized field of official remembrance created to tame the past’s politically disruptive potential.
Consider, for example, the ACE and CHRP program stipulation that only injustices qualifying as “wartime measures or immigration restrictions” are eligible for consideration. This stipulation continues the 1990s-era focus on marginalizing antiracism by striving pre-emptively to narrow the range of injustices of which Canadians are made aware. As the African Canadian Legal Clinic, which has focused on redress issues such as slavery, the destruction of Africville, and the mistreatment of the Black Loyalists, observed in 2005: “African Canadians are not even contemplated,” given the “wartime measures and immigration restrictions” provision. Indeed, the provision makes many other injustices ineligible for consideration, including, for instance, the long-term federal disfranchisement of Chinese-, Japanese-, and Indo-Canadians. It also restricts Canada’s redress focus to a relatively small number of specific, temporally confined, and extraordinary acts: “wartime measures” are by their very nature exceptional and discrete, while group-based “immigration restrictions” were abolished in 1967.

These stipulations are not merely proscriptive; they seek actively to construct popular understandings of injustice in ways congenial to the neoliberal project of remaking a public sphere devoid of critical dissent. Thus, to the extent that public understandings of Canadian injustice will be shaped by the commemorative projects that neoliberal heritage redress presents, we can predict that those understandings will centre around a pre-selected group of singular past
government acts abstracted from any deeper consideration of the long-term structural and attitudinal racism that tends to give rise to historical wrongs in the first place. This approach contrasts strongly with that of the 1988 Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement, which, among other things, established an endowment that funds the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, whose ongoing activities include media work, a research and publications program, and training and workshop services—all premised on the challenge that Canada needs to make “more progress in addressing systemic and institutional racism.”

The focus of neoliberal heritage redress on constructing a sanitized field of remembrance and memory is particularly evident in the ACE program requirement that participants carry out funded activities in ways consistent with “cohesion,” “Canadian identity,” and “cross-cultural understanding.” As geographer Audrey Kobayashi suggests, emphasizing “cross-cultural understanding” ignores the dominant society’s culpability and infers wrongly that the victims somehow contributed to the injustices themselves. For its part, the nature of the “cohesion” and “identity” stipulation can be gauged by consulting the official press releases outlining the agreements-in-principle with redress-seeking groups reached under the ACE program. Announcements dealing with the Ukrainian-Canadian internment, Italian-Canadian internment, and Chinese head tax, respectively, say virtually nothing about the injustices: they emphasize the “experiences and contributions” of the affected groups instead. Similarly, the
press releases announcing the agreements were all titled under a common formula that defined each agreement’s purpose as that of highlighting the affected group’s “Contribution to Building Canada.” Framing internment, racist taxes, and categorical exclusion as “Contributions to Building Canada” constitutes a kind of Potemkin-village approach to injustice: it takes histories of racist wrongdoing and reinscribes them as signposts of national progress and triumph.

Although the “cohesion and identity” stipulation has formally been dropped from the CHRP program, the program’s funding rules indicate that the broader purpose has not wavered. On the contrary: by taking decision-making powers on individual grants away from the nonpartisan bureaucracy and giving them to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the stipulation is no longer necessary; the new CHRP rules ensure that decisions on who receives funding and how that funding will be used will reflect the Conservative government’s political and ideological predilections. In any event, the CHRP mission statement indicates that the Potemkin-village approach continues to guide the policy: the statement describes the program’s overall purpose as that of “commemorat[ing] historical experiences” and group “contributions to building Canada.” Thus, establishing both a pre-determined menu of past injustices eligible for recognition and an official account of the sort of framings in which recipients can engage, neoliberal heritage redress transforms Canadian histories of wrongdoing from
potential tools of national self-criticism and introspection into paternalistic occasions for congratulating victim groups on their “contributions.”

Beyond the substantive concerns outlined above, the form of neoliberal heritage redress deserves notice as a political strategy in its own right. As Wakeham’s observation of the policy’s “assembly-line operations” suggests, what now pass for Canadian acts of redress both emerge from and enact in their form a standardized bureaucratic routine of rule and procedure. As we have seen, this routine governs the events eligible for recognition, the activities on which monies can be spent, and even what redress recipients can do and say. In his analysis of the historical “normalization” strategies of the mainstream German right, sociologist Jeffrey Olick explains that this kind of routinization helps to remove the past from the arena of contemporary political conflict and debate. Subjecting the controversial past to a smoothly repetitive ritualization helps to turn historical injustices into the nonpartisan and unremarkable objects of consensual commemoration. The resultant onset of an official routine of predictable commemorative procedure thus helps to quell potentially unwieldy debates about past conduct and contemporary responsibility; the past becomes the requisite object of “correct” observance and nothing more. In this sense, then, the remembrance-by-template that characterizes neoliberal heritage redress seeks rather to anaesthetize memory than to enrich it.
A distinctively Canadian aspect of the routinization of collective memory ought also to be noted. The new use of redress as a framework for recognizing group contributions suggests that redress policy has been given partial responsibility for one of the longstanding functions of official multiculturalism. Proclaimed originally in 1971 and carried forward in the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, this function is to “recognize … [the] historic contribution [of ethnocultural minority groups] to Canadian society.” The continuation of long-term multiculturalism objectives under a framework in which “multiculturalism” is itself taboo—the word appears only once in the myriad press releases associated with the ACE and CHRP programs—may shed light on some recent debates about the contemporary status of the multiculturalism concept.

In a wide-ranging survey of multiculturalism’s global diffusion, Kymlicka points to the relative international durability of most of the formal policy initiatives associated with multiculturalism; he argues on this basis that the notion of a generalized “retreat from multiculturalism” tends to be exaggerated. While in many ways persuasive, Kymlicka’s analysis may underplay the importance of multiculturalism as a discourse used by minoritized groups to amplify their claims for equality and recognition in Canada since the 1960s. Used as a tool of civic challenge from its inception, and reframed for specifically antiracist purposes in the 1980s, the evident retreat of multiculturalism in official Canadian discourse and rhetoric is from an activist standpoint significant. Moreover, the analysis
offered here suggests that the advent of neoliberal heritage redress constitutes a further instalment in this retreat; the new, and in many ways, primary, focus of official redress on recognizing group contributions retains multiculturalism’s patronage aspect while abandoning multiculturalism discourse itself—a discourse that, however fitfully and unevenly, once helped to promote Canadian difference-recognition and equality claims.  

Whether neoliberal heritage redress achieves these aims remains a question for further research. The policy certainly seems to have rendered moot the concerns of its initial right-wing opponents, who reacted to the original 2005 ACE announcement by blending the “ungovernability” language of the Trilateral Commission with the doomsday scenarios of 1990s-era anti-multiculturalism. Characterizing redress politics as a field of endlessly escalating demands and intensifying conflict unsusceptible to rational containment, critics called the ACE program a “fund for the aggrieved” which would unleash a limitless increase in claims and promote incivility. The Globe and Mail’s normally even-toned Jeffrey Simpson typified this view: “As anyone who knows the victim industry could have predicted, once a government starts down this road of recognizing past injustices, there is no end in sight.”

Although actual expenditures are difficult to gauge, it would appear that the total amount disbursed to groups under the CHRP and ACE programs will reach no more than $30 million, while the compensation under the separate 2006
Chinese head-tax redress agreement is expected to total roughly $800,000. Thus, the expenditures by national policy standards have been relatively small. Neither has there been any liberalization of the eligibility rules since the original ACE program’s inception. Indeed, contrary to the predictions of a “rush of claims” that would “run and run,” the general policy community of redress-seeking groups—the most prominent participants have been Chinese, Italian, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Indo Canadians—has remained unchanged since the Liberal government proclaimed its original no-redress policy in 1994. Thus, we can say that neoliberal heritage redress has largely succeeded in one of its crucial aims, if we characterize that aim as formulating an approach to redress that might eventually prove satisfactory to right-wing critics.

The policy’s long-run success in neoliberalizing ethnocultural-minority interest intermediation remains an open question. It is nevertheless suggestive to consider the differential treatment of the Ukrainian- and Chinese-Canadian redress campaigns. The campaign to redress the Chinese head tax and exclusion act, led since the early 1980s by the Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), constitutes an expression of what I have called social movement multiculturalism. The campaign used its focus on the head tax to call attention to other injustices, particularly in contemporary immigration and refugee policy. It also helped to strengthen activist networks linking Chinese Canadians to labour,
antiracist, and other progressive groups. The CCNC itself continues to participate in a wide range of social-justice campaigns.

In their fight against the ACE program provision ruling out apologies and financial compensation for historical injustices, the CCNC and its allies won a significant victory in 2006 when the Conservative government apologized for the head tax and agreed to compensate living head-tax payers and the surviving spouses of deceased head-tax payers. However, the organization itself received no federal monies or any other sort of redress consideration. This was precisely the outcome sought by the policy’s original proponent, Inky Mark, whose private member’s bill on head tax redress deliberately excluded the CCNC, an organization he derided as “an arm of the NDP across Canada.” Instead, Mark’s bill stipulated that commemorative and recognition activities be carried out by the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, a shadowy group founded in 1991 “to play down Chinese human rights abuses … and improve business relations,” and which had no history of antiracism activity and lacked even a website.

Although the Liberal government and opposition Conservatives joined forces behind this plan, the December 2005 federal election campaign intervened. In ridings where Chinese-Canadian voters had a significant prospect of influencing the outcome, the CCNC made an election issue out of the government’s no-compensation and no-apology approach. Brandishing the signatures of 4,000 head-tax payers on a petition it had been compiling since
1984, the CCNC organized community events, embarrassed Liberal cabinet ministers on open-line radio shows, and mustered support from a broad coalition of progressive organizations.\textsuperscript{72} Seizing the electoral and public relations opportunity the controversy represented, opposition leader Stephen Harper reversed position in mid-campaign, promising that a Conservative government would indeed apologize for the head tax and pay individual compensation. Although Harper subsequently made good on these pledges and quietly shelved the plan to place the rival National Congress of Chinese Canadians in charge of the commemorative and educational fund, the CCNC itself was ignored; funds for head-tax redress activities have since gone almost entirely to local, non-activist groups, mainly history associations, arts groups, university programs, and media companies.\textsuperscript{73}

By contrast, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) has been rewarded for pioneering and remaining true to the no-apology, no-compensation approach. In 2008 the Conservatives placed a $10 million endowment fund for projects relating to the First World War internment directly under the control of the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko, a funds management arm of the UCC.\textsuperscript{74} The Conservatives also developed a $5 million National Historical Recognition Program, which focuses on erecting plaques and monuments at locations associated with “wartime measures and immigration restrictions.” This program appears to have been created almost entirely for the Ukrainian-Canadian
campaign; according to the government’s own information, the program
“centerpiece … is the development of a major exhibit … to tell the national story
of First World War internment operations.” This relatively generous treatment is
significant. Even excepting the separate National Historical Recognition Program,
the $10 million given the UCC is twice the amount earmarked for any other single
redress issue under the CHRP. Furthermore, the other CHRP funds have been
scattered among numerous small, typically local organizations, with the final
funding decisions made by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. But in
the Ukrainian-Canadian case, the full $10 million amount has been given directly
to the UCC to disburse as it sees fit—a considerable source of prestige and
influence, given the funding instability that affects most ethnocultural-minority
organizations, and indeed a complete departure from the typical insistence of
neoliberal heritage redress on controlling the framings, utterances, and activities
of project funding recipients.

The UCC cannot be described as an exponent of social movement
multiculturalism. Although it has taken strong stands on the treatment of war
crimes suspects of Ukrainian origin and on Canadian relations with Ukraine, the
organization has not participated in antiracist campaigns or cultivated links with
labour or progressive groups more generally. Neither have Ukrainian-Canadian
redress advocates used their campaign as an opportunity to confront contemporary
issues of inequality and disadvantage. Certainly, the discriminatory treatment of
Ukrainian Canadians under the pretext of national security during the First World War bears obvious parallels to Ottawa’s current policy of disregarding the citizenship and human rights of Arab and Muslim Canadians accused of links to terrorism. Yet UCC and other community leaders have refrained from making such connections, even when specifically invited to by others.

Thus, the case of the UCC shows that neoliberal heritage redress has been used to reward and boost the profile of a group whose conduct and activities do not challenge prevailing civic arrangements and power relations. Tellingly, the only other national-level minority organization to receive funds under the CHRP is B’nai Brith Canada, which recently awarded Prime Minister Stephen Harper its Presidential Gold Medal for Humanitarianism in recognition of his staunch defence of Israeli policy in the Middle East. Meanwhile, and in stark contrast, the case of the CCNC indicates that the policy has been used to punish one of Canada’s most visible and longstanding redress-seeking organizations, one committed to progressive activism and social movement multiculturalism.

A somewhat similar case should be noted, one involving the disrespectful treatment of a redress cause linked to contemporary issues of racism in immigration and refugee policy. In response to Indo-Canadian calls for an apology for the rejection and harsh mistreatment in 1914 of Indian migrants aboard the Komagata Maru, Prime Minister Harper delivered a quasi-apology in a way that conveyed what seems to be a deliberate public snub. Rejecting
community requests for prior consultation about the apology’s possible details, and ignoring the statements of community leaders that a pre-emptive statement of regret unaccompanied by a formal parliamentary apology would be most unwelcome, Prime Minister Harper appeared at the August 2008 Mela Gadri Babian Da event in Surrey, B.C., offering words of supposed apology that led angry attendees to afterwards take the stage in displeasure. The federal Privy Council Office, a central cabinet agency directly responsible to the Prime Minister, refuses to make available the contents of Harper’s public remarks, denying this author’s request under the Access to Information act for a transcript.

To say that official utterances and government funds have been used to exclude and punish activist groups while rewarding their more amenable counterparts is not necessarily to say that the actual individual projects funded under the CHRP are themselves worthless or insignificant. Grants to help recount the struggles of Chinese-Canadian pioneers, to develop a teaching kit about the head tax for use in secondary schools, and to commemorate Canada’s wartime exclusion of Jewish refugees indicate that even neoliberal heritage redress can in various ways serve the goals of humility and awareness. The point is simply that the policy’s overriding purpose is to do otherwise.

This chapter has argued that neoliberal heritage redress follows neoliberalized multiculturalism in building new interest intermediation processes
that exclude critical voices and perspectives. It has also argued that the policy seeks partially to supplant multiculturalism discourse with a new system for recognizing group contributions. As we have seen, this system turns experiences of historical injustice into a kind of company-store currency, which groups are then expected to barter in return for grants and forms of acknowledgment whose acceptance requires in turn that they forsake more ambitiously reparative discourses and claims.

The end product is a new, state-driven field of remembrance that aims to numb critical memory instead of fostering it. The public-private “partnership” project model; the vetting of proposals by the minister; the narrow range of eligible injustices; the sanitizing emphasis on cohesion and heritage; the mystification of oppression with a discourse of group “contributions”; and the pacifying routine of bureaucratized commemoration, with its grants competitions, agreements-in-principle, project announcements, and monument unveilings—these core features of neoliberal heritage redress strive primarily to discipline, narrow, and contain the reparation struggles of antiracist movements and groups. The possible, though of course never inevitable, result is the further marginalization of the sorts of voices and claims that helped to turn Canadian multiculturalism into an at least incipiently antiracist field in the first place.

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Endnotes

1 Stephen Gill, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium 24:3 (1995): 399-423. The author wishes to thank the editors for their helpful criticism and suggestions, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding support, and Julia Bareman, Paul Dyck, Adam Molnar, and Mark Willson for research assistance.

2 For some of these criticisms, see Himani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Gender (Peterborough: Broadview


Ibid., 75.

Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*.

13 Paquet, “Multiculturalism.”

14 Bannerji, Dark Side.

15 James, Misrecognized Materialists, 79-82.

16 House of Commons Special Committee on Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society, Equality Now! (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1984), 135-141.


19 James, Misrecognized Materialists, 104-106.

20 For examples of this reaction, see the essays in Rethinking the Constitution: Perspectives on Canadian Constitutional Reform, Interpretation, and Theory, ed. Anthony A. Peacock (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1996).

21 Abu-Laban and Gabriel, Selling Diversity, 115.

22 House Special Committee on Visible Minorities, Equality Now!

23 Abu-Laban and Gabriel, Selling Diversity, chap. 4, “Multiculturalism and Nation-Building.”

25 On these older criticisms, see Peter, “Multiculturalism.”

26 As they put it, while multiculturalism is now “basically off the radar screen,” political sensitivities mean that “you just can’t kill it.” S. Jones [pseud.], interview by Matt James, 11 August 2006, transcript, Ottawa, Ontario.


30 Abu-Laban and Gabriel, Selling Diversity, chap. 4, “Multiculturalism and Nation-Building.”

31 Although developing the point is beyond the scope of this essay, the official Canadian frame for discussing the Indian residential schools policy shares an important similarity with neoliberal heritage redress: both downplay the details of Canadian wrongdoing by focusing euphemistically on the “experiences” of targeted groups instead. See Matt James, “Uncomfortable Comparisons: The


33 The provisional agreements involved Ukrainian Canadians (World War One internment), Chinese Canadians (head tax and exclusion act), and Italian Canadians (World War Two internment).

34 In 2008, the Conservatives also unveiled an ancillary measure, the National Historical Recognition Program, discussed later in this chapter. For information on the CHRP, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Community Historical Recognition Program,”


35 For example, see House of Commons, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 15 November 2004, Bill C-333, “An Act to recognize the injustices done to Chinese immigrants,”

http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/private/c-333_1.pdf (accessed 2 December 2009). For technical reasons, the final version of Bill C-
333 was formally sponsored by Mark’s Conservative colleague, Bev Oda. For more information, see Inky Mark, M.P., “Private Member’s Business,”


40 House of Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, *Minutes of Evidence, 38th Parl., 1st Sess.*, 20 October 2005,

Ibid.

Ibid.

The Chinese Canadian National Council’s campaign will be discussed later in this chapter. For more information, see James, “Redress Politics.”

For example, see op. cit., Bill C-333, “An Act to recognize.” More generally, see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Community Historical Recognition Program, “Applicant’s Guide, 2009-2010”


Department of Canadian Heritage, “Table 13: Details on Transfer Payments Programs (TPPs) for the Department of Canadian Heritage,”


On disfranchisement, see Canada, Minister of Public Works and Government Services, A History of the Vote in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997).
48 Of course informal class and gender biases in the points-based immigration regime remain. See Abu-Laban and Gabriel, *Selling Diversity*, 47-54.

49 Canadian Race Relations Foundation, “Welcome,”


50 Canadian Heritage, “Backgrounder.”

51 Audrey Kobayashi, “The Japanese-Canadian Redress Settlement and its Implications for ‘Race Relations’,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 24 (1992): 1-19. Although Kobayashi rightly criticizes the “race relations” paradigm implicit in the Canadian Race Relations Foundation name, the Foundation’s relatively activist mandate and activities go far beyond anything allowed in the ACE and CHRP programs.


53 “The Minister will make all final funding decisions”: CHRP, “Applicant’s Guide,” 14. More recently, Ottawa has sought to dispel the appearance of politicization by appointing arms-length expert panels to advise the Minister on
funding decisions. However, continued politicization was apparent when Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney came under fire for appointing an advisory panel on Italian-Canadian internment dominated by known opponents of Italian-Canadian redress. See Canada News Wire, 23 March 2009, “The National Congress of Italian Canadians Responds to Minister Kenney’s Announcement Regarding the Community Historical Recognition Program: A Shameful Attempt to Divide and Conquer.”


55 Wakeham, “Cunning of Reconciliation.”


58 This focus, I have argued recently, also informs the basic mandate and design of the TRC. See James, “Uncomfortable Comparisons.”


62 James, *Misrecognized Materialists*, 78-82.


65 The January 2006 defeat of the Liberals meant that no ACE program funds were spent. For the CHRP figures, see “Applicant’s Guide,” 5. There are roughly 400 living head-tax payers and surviving spouses of deceased head-tax payers who are eligible to receive $20,000 each. See Stephen Winter, “The Stakes of


67 James, “Campaigns for Historical Redress,” 222.


69 See Chinese Canadian National Council, “Advocacy,”


78 For example, see the exchange between NDP MP Libby Davies and Andrew Hladysheksy of the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko at House Standing Committee, Minutes, op. cit.


81 On the notion of quasi-apology, see James, “Wrestling with the Past.”

The passage cited from the Access to Information Act to support denying the transcript request reads, “Certain information has been withheld from disclosure pursuant to subsection 19(1) (personal information), paragraph 21(1)(a) (advice or recommendations) and paragraph 21(1)(b) (consultations or deliberations) of the Act.” It is hard to see how a transcript of public remarks made by a prime minister while conducting public business fits these criteria.

See CHRP, “Projects Funded.”