THE LANGUAGE OF THE UNHEARD: LEGAL SERVICES AND THE 1960S RACE RIOTS

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Abstract

This paper uses newly collected data on communities receiving legal services grants between 1965 and 1975 to evaluate the effectiveness of the federal anti-rioting program. Simple correlations show that legal services programs are associated with lower likelihood of riots. To address concerns about endogeneity and reverse causality, I propose an instrument variable based on the establishment of law schools, which were key to program implementation. Two-stage least squares results indicate a 3.6% reduction in the number of riots and a 56% reduction in the severity of riots due to legal services programs. Further, results also show that legal services programs are associated with higher property values in 1980. These results are consistent with the historical narrative that legal service lawyers' involvement in community empowerment and advocacy mitigated the damage of riots that occurred in the 1960s.

JEL Classification
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Keywords
War on Poverty, legal services, riots, poverty lawyers

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"And I feel that we must always work with an effective, powerful weapon and method that brings about tangible results. But it is not enough for me to stand before you tonight and condemn riots. It would be morally irresponsible for me to do that without, at the same time, condemning the contingent, intolerable conditions that exist in our society. These conditions are the things that cause individuals to feel that they have no other alternative than to engage in violent rebellions to get attention. And I must say tonight that a riot is the language of the unheard."

– Martin Luther King, Jr., "The Other America" - March 14, 1968

I. Introduction

Uprisings in Harlem, Rochester, and Philadelphia during the Summer of 1964 attributed to the tense relationship between law enforcement and blacks. Poverty lawyers were few and far between with *pro bono* services usually located in city centers, making access to lawyers geographically difficult. The lack of legal recourse to police excessive use of force generated anger and frustration in poor black communities and the lack of social justice sparked widespread riots. One federal response by President Johnson was to have poverty lawyers serve as intermediaries between the poor and police. In 1965 the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP) was implemented under the War on Poverty (WOP) umbrella.[1] The goal of the program was to equip the poor with additional resources to remediate grievances, especially those concerning local police, by use of the courts.

NLSP was also introduced with a charge to deter "*militant community effort*" (Cahn and Cahn, 1970). Under the program, lawyers redressed grievances of the poor by bringing civil cases against local municipal police departments and other government institutions (Bernstein, 1967; "6 Sue Police", 1969; "Neighborhood Legal Services to Monitor", 1970; Greenwood, 1971; "Legal Services: Challenging," 1971). Litigation and the threat of litigation coerced policy-makers within city governments and decision makers within police departments to meet with community leaders in an effort to resolve differences between the community and police. Advocates of legal services credited the program with reducing the likelihood of riots and the severity of riots (Loftus, 1967; "Legal Services for the Poor Hailed", 1967). Legal services were deemed influential in ending the

[1] A war against poverty was declared by President Lyndon B. Johnson January 8th, 1964 during his State of the Union address. This declaration of war initiated a series of experimental antipoverty programs funded by the federal government such as head start, the VISTA program, and community health centers. Many also include legislative acts such as Medicare and Medicaid (Goodman-Bacon, 2016), the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, and many others (Bailey and Danziger, 2013). This is also referred to as America's Great Society.

1967 Detroit riot and stopping additional riots in Cleveland (Gillette, 1996; U.S. Senate, 1969). Legal services lawyers were also credited with reducing police brutality and illegal police behavior, as well as securing proper police investigations when victims requested the assistance of the police (Finman, 1971; U.S. Senate, 1969). While several argued that NLSP reduced race riots, there were others who argued the opposite. The program had its fair share of criticism. It was often viewed as an anti-establishment government program that created civil unrest and led to more demonstrations and riots (Herbers, 1967; Pious, 1971; "Subsidizing Violence and Subversion", 1970).

More recently economists have evaluated social programs from the Great Society, drawing new conclusions about the War on Poverty's effectiveness in improving the quality of life for the poor (Hoynes and Schanzebach 2006; Ludwig and Miller 2007; Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach 2011; Baily, 2012; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2013; Goodman-Bacon, 2016). Cunningham (2016) evaluated the NLSP and found that legal services were associated with higher reported crime rates and higher arrest rates. Although it is difficult to disentangle changes in actual crime versus changes in reporting of crime, Cunningham concluded that NLSP increased the demand for law enforcement services and changed law enforcement behavior. Johnson (2014) provided in-depth historical analysis of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program citing the impact the program had in improving the quality of life of those living in poverty as well as highlighting NLSP lawyers' ability to avoid riots on numerous occasions. These findings are consistent with the narrative that NLSP created access to social justice by providing additional channels for blacks in urban communities to settle disputes. In addition, this supports Gillezeau's (2014) narrative that WOP funding may have been targeted and resulted in less rioting. Further, the reduction in severity of riots has implications on property values. According to Collins & Margo (2007), a riot induces losses of 10% in property value when comparing low-severity index riots with medium and high severity index riots.

Most literature on riots, riot outcomes, and anti-riot policy suffers from endogeneity problems, making it difficult to interpret results. The endogeneity problem is a consequence of the relationship between riot behavior and access to economic opportunity. One manifestation of this relationship is reflected by the introduction of the War on Poverty in the 1960s and that decade's wide-spread racial violence. A simple cross-sectional analysis could conclude that an outbreak in civil disorders within the black community are positively correlated with War on Poverty grants.

However, it is likely that those who participated in racialized urban uprisings were not beneficiaries of the experimental programs introduced by the War on Poverty. It is more likely that these individuals expected equal opportunity due to the advancements made by others within the same community (King, 2003). A likely response to unmet expectations is to criticize, dissent, and compel responsiveness of local institutions by participating in social demonstrations (Chandra & Foster, 2005). The federal response of implementing War on Poverty programs in communities that experienced riots would produce estimates that are negatively related to racialized civil disorders. In this case, negative estimates would capture the reactionary response of public officials and regression towards the mean.

This paper is the first to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the NLSP on the likelihood of race riots in the 1960s. I use newly collected data on the communities receiving legal services grants between 1965 and 1975, and I focus on race riots in the 1960s following previous literature by Spilerman (1970), King (2003), Collins & Margo (2007), and Gillezeau (2014). I rely on the differential timing of NLSP's implementation in cities across the United States as well as variation in the location and intensity of treatment to identify a causal relationship between the intensity of treatment and the number and severity of riots that occurred in a city in a given year. I use the age of law schools as an instrumental variable for NLSP funding. NLSP was designed to be affiliated with nearby law schools. Many of the law schools associated with NLSP were established well before the 1960s, thus creating a valid instrument for the treatment that is not related to riot propensities in the 1960s.

My results indicate a reduction in the number of riots and the severity of riots after NLSP grants were received. Ordinary least squares results imply a 19 percent reduction in riot propensities due to legal services. Two stage least squares estimates show that NLSP grants are associated with a 18 percent decrease in the number of riots and a drastic decrease in the severity of riots after a grant is received. These results imply that the typical NLSP grant is associated with a 3.6 percent reduction in riot propensity and a 56 percent reduction in riot severity. Further, two stage least squares results suggest that endogeneity is most likely associated with riot severity and not riot occurrences. Results also show that legal services are not only associated with reducing the likelihood of riots but have a large effect on property values as well.

II. Legal Services, the War on Poverty, and Riots

The War on Poverty recruited professionals and bureaucrats to administer antipoverty programs on behalf of the poor. The declaration of war was supported and financed by legislative acts such as the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, which funded experimental antipoverty programs. Incorporation of the "civilian perspective" into the War on Poverty was motivated by Jean and Edgar Cahn in the *Yale Law Review* in 1964 (Cahn and Cahn, 1964). The Cahns proposed the establishment of a university-law-school-affiliated neighborhood law firms to serve as intermediaries between the poor community and antipoverty bureaucracies. The university law schools would serve as a resource of expertise and human capital, as well as provide volunteers and cheap labor for neighborhood law firms. Legal representation would be available for cases involving divorce, eviction, welfare fraud, coerced confessions, arrests, police brutality, installment buying, and the destroying of momentum in militant community efforts. Thus, the advent of free legal representation would incorporate the civilian perspective into the WOP and give voice to those who were previously unheard.

The Cahns operated one of three neighborhood law firms funded by the Ford Foundation in the early 1960s as an experimental project. The Cahns' article detailed their experience and advocated for the development of a nationwide program. The manuscript was first circulated among colleagues for comments and eventually landed in the hands of Associate Justice Arthur Goldberg. Justice Goldberg was persuaded to send letters to President Johnson advocating for the inclusion of a nationwide legal services program under the WOP (Johnson, 1974). As a result, Sargent Shriver brought the Cahns into the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to spearhead the development and implementation of the program. Vital to the rollout of the legal services program was the support of the American Bar Association (ABA). National support from the ABA could insulate the program from the attacks of local bar associations when controversial cases were undertaken against powerful entities. On February 8, 1965 the ABA fully endorsed the NLSP.

Following the Cahns' proposal the Neighborhood Legal Services Program was launched as part of the WOP in 1965. Neighborhood law firms were financed by grants from the OEO and operated under the Community Action Program. The OEO was responsible for the antipoverty programs and one of its largest initiatives was the Community Action Programs. The community-based approach created wide variation on how federal grants were not only used but received. The OEO grants averted local and state authorities and went directly to community organizations and programs, allowing federal funds to be spent rapidly, almost randomly, with wide variation in

intended purposes (Johnson, 1974; Gillette 1996). With no funding precedent, capitalizing on the political support from the ABA led to a hasty rollout of the program with vague guidelines for grant applications. According to Earl Johnson, Jr (1974, p. 102), "We were committed to building a national institution overnight and could not afford to screen grantees through a fine mesh."

The first year of the legal services program under OEO resulted in over 155 grants being issued with an annual budget of over 20 million dollars. By 1967, the legal services program doubled in size, issuing over 300 grants with an annual budget of over 40 million dollars. By 1968, the federal legal service program was funding 250 projects and providing legal assistance in 48 states. To better understand the environment in which federally funded legal services operated, I use the Legal Service Agency Survey which is publicly available at the *Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research* (*ICPSR*). The Legal Service Agency Survey (LSAS) was conducted in 1970 and 1971 to evaluate the effectiveness of the legal services projects and to make recommendations on whether to expand, cut back, or eliminate certain agencies. Evaluators in the LSAS visited legal services projects for several days. The purposes of the evaluations were to: provide individual reports on legal services projects (which provided a history of the program); study the types of issues in which agencies were involved; evaluate the environment and climate in which the projects operated; evaluate the directors and attorneys in the NLSPs; and provide a systematic way to evaluate legal services project performances.[2]

The LSAS contains geographical information such as state, region, and county of grant recipient. It also contains information on the yearly budget and planned participants by age, race, and income as well as the number of employees who were lawyers, clerical personnel, law students, VISTAs, and other personnel. Lastly, the LSAS provides evaluators average ratings on the effectiveness of federally funded law firms across many dimensions as well as an overall rating for the NLSP. The effectiveness is evaluated in five areas: case handling; law reform; community and economic development; representation in the poverty community; and community education. According to the survey, the typical NLSP in 1970 was staffed with five attorneys, one R.H. Smith Fellow, six clerical support personnel, and three law students.[3] These workers were expected to serve over 1900 participants with a budget of slightly above $200,000. The majority of participants

[2] The LSAS included roughly 2/3 of all the NLSPs operating at that time.
[3] R.H. Smith Fellowship is a prestigious fellowship to attract highly qualified attorneys to practice in legal aid for the poor.

had income below the poverty line, but those with income above the poverty line were served as well. The typical NLSP generally operated in a legal climate where law enforcement was perceived to have a hostile relationship with the community and minorities. According to survey responders, legal services were viewed favorably in the community. The program was also seen as having competent staff and relevant activities.

Legal services attorneys typically spent roughly 20 percent of their time working on caseloads related to criminal and juvenile issues (Levitan, 1969). At the core of many of these cases were complaints of illegal police behavior or the use of excessive force by police. NLSP lawyers often handled these cases by filing lawsuits against local police departments on behalf of clients and community organizations in order to change police behavior and practices (Greenwood, 1968; Silver, 1969; "Legal Aid Assured Federal Support", 1970). Many of these cases were resolved out of court, with police chiefs and other decision makers negotiating new police strategies, implementation of community review boards, additional police officers, and more training related to diverse communities.

For instance, legal services lawyers brought lawsuits on behalf of the black community against police departments in Los Angeles, Cleveland, Washington D.C., and Camden, N.J ("Legal Services: Challenging," 1971). Advocates of the program claimed that NLSP lawyers were influential in reducing police brutality but also in reducing the likelihood and severity of riots. Legal services lawyers often showed up at demonstrations to ease frustrations and prevent violence. For example, at a Senate Subcommittee hearing, NLSP lawyers were lauded for averting violence after a police shooting of local residents in Cleveland (U.S. Senate, 1969). NLSPs often served as a clearinghouse for local complaints of police brutality. The purpose was to reduce the impulse to partake in violent demonstrations and to help build cases against illegal police behavior. Even in instances where violent demonstrations occurred, NLSP lawyers served the community through city panels and organizations to help city and police officials redress the community's grievances. Further, NLSP lawyers often represented individuals at the heart of conflicts between police and the black community. For instance, NLSP lawyers represented the taxi cab driver whose physical confrontation with police sparked the 1967 Newark riot (Finman, 1971). This led to a federal lawsuit accusing Newark's police department of violating the constitutional rights of black residents and asking for a complete overhaul of the Newark Police Department.

This brief history captures just a few instances from a myriad of different situations where NLSP worked on behalf of the poor black community in an attempt to create access to social justice. In general, access to legal services may deter illegal police behavior. This could result in changes to police practices, disciplinary responses, and policies even without litigation or long after litigation is resolved. Some suggestive evidence of whether the NLSPs changed the perception of local police departments, can be found using the LSAS data from a cross-section of cities to explain the law enforcement climate as categorized by site visitors. Table 1 shows that law enforcement agencies in places that received legal services earlier are correlated with having better relationships with poor communities as well as with minorities in 1970. Also, the interaction between NLSPs and law enforcement agencies are considered more supportive in locations where NLSPs were established earlier; however, this result is not statistically significant.

As mentioned earlier, there were several individuals who criticized NLSP, and felt the program actually incited riots. Police officers in Newark and Southern California accused NLSP lawyers of organizing violent demonstrations (Johnson, 2014; Pious, 1971). Legal services in California were accused of "supporting anti-police militants" and organizing citizens into "revolutionary forces" ("Subsidizing Violence," 1970). Legal services in Chicago petitioned for pardons for citizens involved in riots in 1968 ("Pardon for Rioters?" 1970). This led to attempts by public officials to dismantle the program. Congressmen from Kentucky, Missouri, Florida, and California led a charge to strip legal services of its ability to represent alleged rioters and almost were successful at placing a ban on all litigation by NLSPs against local, state, and federal agencies (Johnson, 2014). According to opponents of the program, NLSP lawyers were the cause of civil unrest and violent demonstrations (Herbers, 1967). Neither the discussion at the time nor more recent analyses have resolved the quantitative question: Was legal services an effective anti-rioting policy? In order to address this question, a convincing empirical investigation needs to confront concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality.

III. Empirical Strategy

The baseline empirical strategy to conduct an analysis on the effectiveness of the NLSP as an anti-rioting policy begins with a simple panel regression model. I account for key cross-sectional differences between funded and unfunded cities by controlling for observable demographic characteristics. I also control for cross-sectional differences due to unobserved

heterogeneity by using city fixed effects to capture differences that are unobservable but constant over time. The analysis uses state-by-year fixed effects to account for riot contagion due to unobserved heterogeneity that varies across states or regions over time.[4] The untreated cities in this analysis help estimate how riot propensities are *evolving* over time and provide a *control* group for how riot propensities are expected to *evolve* without treatment.

The treatment variable of interest is NLSP funding in millions of dollars, which measures the intensity of the treatment.[5] The baseline empirical strategy treats the variation in the timing and location of NLSP as exogenous. The key identifying assumption is that the establishment and the funding of NLSP is uncorrelated with determinants of rioting.[6] This is a tenuous assumption considering the fact that the legal services program was promoted as an anti-riot program. It is likely that OEO officials had information about local volatility at the time the grants were issued. If so, the availability of legal services is possibly positively correlated with unobserved characteristics that cause riots. Under this scenario, least squares estimates will be smaller in absolute terms when endogeneity is not properly addressed.

One way to test for reverse causality is to conduct an event-study analysis where the event is the first riot that is recorded in city *i* and the dependent variable is the size of the NLSP grant. This is conducted by estimating the following equation.

$$(1) \qquad Y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_{t,s(i)} + \sum_{\tau=1}^{q} \theta_{-\tau} D_i 1(t - T^* = -\tau) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{p} \delta_\tau D_i 1(t - T^* = \tau) + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the NLSP funding in city *i* in year *t*. D_i is an indicator variable equal to one if the city ever experienced a riot. $1(t - T^* = -\tau)$ is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation year is $-\tau$ years from the date that the first riot occurred or $1(t - T^* = \tau)$ is equal to one if the observation year is τ years after the first riot take place in city *i*. $1(t - T^* = 0)$ is omitted due to collinearity where T^* is the year of the first riot in the sample, q refers to the number of lags or years before the first riot, and p is the lead or years after the first riot. To ensure the coefficients

[4] Contagion is an important phenomenon in rioting literature. Spilerman (1970) documented how the Newark and Detroit riots in July of 1967 ignited riots across New Jersey, Michigan, and Ohio. However, contagion is just not regional. The L.A. riots of 1992 sparked riots in Atlanta, New York, Oakland, Detroit, and many other cities (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998).

[5] Using NLSP funding per capita provided similar results. One may be interested in using NLSP funding per black population. This results are available upon request.

[6] Riots have been defined as spontaneous events, once the size of the black population and geographical region are accounted for (Spilerman, 1970; Spilerman, 1976; Carter, 1986; Collins and Margo, 2007).

are well estimated, event time for $\tau > 5$ and $\tau < -5$ are grouped into endpoints, $q = 6$ and $p = 6$. In the next section, results are presented from such an event-study indicating that NLSP funding increases greatly following a riot. This evidence requires that additional efforts be made to develop a model that can isolate the causal impact of the NLSP.

To isolate the relationship between NLSP and riot propensities and severity, I first control for the implied endogeneity by accounting for past rioting. I estimate the following regression:

$$(2) \qquad Y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_{s(t)} + \pi LSP_{Funding_{i,t}} + R'_{i,t}\delta + X'_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the number of riots, the severity of riots, or the riot severity group in city *i* in year *t*. The riot severity group separates the severity measure into 4 distinct categories; zero severity (no riots), low severity, medium severity, and high severity. As Collins and Margo (2007) highlighted, the severity measure is highly skewed with few cities having extremely deadly riots (Newark, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Washington D.C.) and many cities have less severe or minor riots. Similar to Collins and Margo, the riot index is determined by the index percentile. The low severity group ($Y_{i,t} = 1$) include all riots below the 50th percentile, the median severity group ($Y_{i,t} = 2$) include all riots between the 50th percentile and the 88th percentile, the high severity group ($Y_{i,t} = 3$) include all riots with riot severities above the 88th percentile, and the zero severity group ($Y_{i,t} = 0$) include all cities in which a riot did not occur in year *t*.

The parameter γ_i is city fixed effects and $\alpha_{s(t)}$ refers to state-by-year fixed effects which were previously discussed. The row vector $X_{i,t}$, consists of covariates from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 census, which were linearly interpolated between census years.[7] The covariates are the proportion of the non-white population, the percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, population per square mile, median age, and family median income. According to Spilerman (1970), the only variable correlated with riot propensities and severity is percentage of the population nonwhite. This claim is supported by Collins and Margo (2007) which highlighted that rain in April of 1968 is also important while other variables have little explanatory power conditional on controlling for the share of black residents and the region the city resides.

[7] Census information was gathered from the County and City Data Book and is publicly available at the ICPSR website.

The row vector $R_{i,t}$ consists of indicator variables that capture past rioting. These variables account for the feedback effect of riots and capture the implied endogeneity discussed above. This row vector includes $R_{i,t}^{1}$ and $R_{i,t}^{2}$ which are equal to 1 if a riot occurred in the previous year (*t-1*) or two years ago (*t-2*); and zero otherwise. The independent variable of interest, $LSP_{Funding}{}_{i,t}$ measures the size of the federal grant that legal services received in the previous year (in millions of dollars).[8] A lag measure of NLSP funding is used for two reasons. First, the National Archives Community Action Program (NACAP) files provide the date the grant was issued, not received.[9] Grants issued early in the year may not have been received until later in the year, and the effect of NLSPs could be attenuated. Therefore, variation in the timing of the grant within a year could attenuate any contemporaneous effect that NLSP grants have on riot propensities. Secondly, Cunningham (2016) as well as Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015) highlighted that the utilization of services funded by WOP grants increased over time. The increase in utilization is consistent with the buildup of legal services within a community. After a grant is received, the neighborhood legal services grantee will have to find a location, hire staff, build community support, while also accumulating exposure.

The second approach to deal with the endogeneity concerns involves the use of law schools to construct an instrumental variable. More precisely, this empirical strategy will use the age of the law school as an instrument. The first key identifying assumption for a two stage least squares approach (2SLS), is that the location and founding date of law schools are unrelated to riot propensities in the 1960s. The ABA provides a list of accredited schools, their location, founding date, and closing date. According to the list, 128 cities had law schools that were established and accredited by 1970, 111 cities had law schools established before 1951. A majority of these schools were founded before black migration patterns from the rural south to urban areas were established (Boustan, 2010). Law schools were also distributed evenly in cities across regions and not necessarily residing in places more prone to rioting. Of the 128 cities with law schools established and accredited by 1970, 22 were in the Northeast, 30 in the Midwest, 40 in the South, and 36 in the West. The Midwest had older law schools with an average age of 87, followed by the South,

[8] Analysis spending per capita produced similar results. The per capita variable was produced by interpolating the population between census years and was therefore excluded from the presentation of results.

[9] NACAP files are the primary source for information about recipients of legal services grants from 1964 to 1975. The Descriptive Analysis section will provide further discussion of the NACAP files.

Northeast, and West respectively. However, the South had more cities with law schools older than 100 years old. Additionally, only a select few of these schools provided legal assistance to the poor (Johnson, 2014). According to Johnson (2014), clinical legal education gained attention and the requisite funding through the expansion of the legal aid in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that law schools directly contributed to the legal climate through legal clinics until the introduction of the legal services program. However, there may be unobserved variation in the legal climate across cities that are associated with law schools and determinants of rioting that are not captured by fixed effects. Not satisfying this exclusion restriction threatens the validity of the instrument. The second key identifying assumption for the instrumental variable approach is that there must exist a relationship between the instrument and the endogenous variable. As discussed above, the NLSP was designed to be affiliated with university law programs; so ex ante, one would predict that legal services would be established in cities that have nearby law schools.

IV. Descriptive Analysis

Data on the recipients of federal legal services grants funded by the OEO is compiled from the National Archives Community Action Program (NACAP) files. NACAP provides information on the city, county, and state for which funds were received, as well as the targeted communities. Also provided is the date the grant was issued, the amount of the grant, and a brief description of the intended purpose of the grant. Figure 1 highlights the roll-out of the NLSP between 1965 and 1975.[10] The various colors indicate the variation in the timing of the 11-year rollout of the program. The counties highlighted in red represents those communities that receive federal funding for legal services in the initial years of the program, between 1965 and 1966, while yellow identify communities receiving their first legal services grant in 1967, and green denotes communities receiving their first grant between 1968 and 1971. Lastly, counties highlighted in blue receive their first federal funds for legal services between 1972 and 1975. By 1967, each of the lower 48 states had a county that received a legal services grant. However, there is wide variation in when the first grants were received within each state.

The analysis of legal services influence on racialized civil disorders focuses on U.S. cities and not counties. There are several reasons to conduct a city-level analysis. First, the immediate

[10] The dates 1965 and 1975 are not arbitrary; 1965 represents the introduction of program and 1975 is the last year of operation as the Neighborhood Legal Services Program. After 1975, the program was serviced by the Legal Service Corporation; an independent agency that oversees the legal aid program.

impact of the program may only result in local changes, which would understate the impact of federally funded legal services at the county level. Additionally, the impact of legal services may be negligible for nearby cities due to the neighborhood approach of community action programs and the high volume of caseloads that NLSP lawyers undertook (Silver, 1969). It is also likely that federally funded legal services are utilized only by residents who have immediate access to such services. Previous charitable legal aid was seen as inadequate due to transportation costs associated with obtaining assistance (Cahn and Cahn, 1964).

Figure 2 provides a city level rollout of legal services programs based on the month and year the grant was issued. The blue line indicates the number of newly funded cities while the orange line provides a summary of all the cities funded to that date.[11] The NLSP was implemented in 1965 but initial funding of the program primarily began in the 1966 fiscal year. Similar to Figure 1, there was a ramped buildup of legal services programs over the first three years its existence. By 1969 over 220 cities received a NLSP, with many cities having multiple NLSPs in different neighborhoods. Additionally, there was a steady increase of newly established NLSPs in cities until 1974. Many of these were implemented in more rural areas. However, as political support of the WOP and the NLSP waned in the 1970s, the rollout of NLSP slowed dramatically, which is reflected in the blue line. This is also reflected in the total funding of Neighborhood Legal Services Programs between 1965 and 1975, where there was a steady increase of funding for the NLSP until 1971. Afterwards, spending slowly declined and most funding was used to sustain NLSPs that were already operating.

NLSPs that were established in the 1960s received subsequent support from the OEO which is reflected in Figure 3. Figure 3 plots the estimated probability of receiving a legal services grant for those cities that are treated relative to those which never received a legal service grant. As expected, the probability of receiving a grant is equal to 1 the year the first grant is issued. According to Figure 3, the probability of receiving additional NLSP grants is about 90 percent after the initial treatment. Subsequent funding however, is not just to bolster established NLSPs but also to open new NLSPs in other communities, especially in larger cities. This is reflected in Figure 4, which reports the average amount of NLSP funding received after treatment. It shows a clear increase in funding after the initial grant is received. This funding usually supported more

[11] For grants with no information on the month it was issued, I code these month as January of the year a grant was issued.

than one grantee, such as in Chicago, where five NLSPs were established between 1965 and1971, while two NLSPs were established in Phoenix during this time period.

The riot data in this analysis came courtesy of Collins and Margo (2007), which was originally collected by Greg Lee Carter (1986). This data includes the location and duration of race riots between 1964 and 1971. It also includes the number of people killed, injured, or arrested, as well as the number of arsons reported or discovered by police during a *race riot*.[12] Figure 5 provides a map of cities where rioting occurred between 1964 and 1971. Over this time period more than 700 riots were recorded across the lower 48 contiguous states. Despite the wide variation in the geographical locations of these violent demonstrations, there appears to be a cluster of riots around large cities where major riots occurred. There was a cluster of riots in Michigan, New Jersey, and the Los Angeles areas (Spilerman 1970). These clusters reflect the national attention that such riots garnered and comprise the most severe riots that occurred over the sample period.

One advantage of these data is the creation of dependent variables that measures riot intensity. Similar to previous studies, I focus on the occurrence of violent demonstrations in a given year as well as the cumulative severity of riots in a year (Carter 1986; Dipasquale and Gleaser 1998; Gillezeau 2014).[13] Figure 6 highlights the riot occurrence and riot severity by month and year between 1964 and 1971. Both occurrence and severity lines spike in July of 1967 and April of 1968. The first reflects a cluster of riots that occurred surrounding the Detroit and Newark riots, both of which occurred in July of 1967. The second was a response to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April of 1968. Also, the Watts riot of 1965 displays a sizable increase in the riot severity measure but the cluster of riots surrounding this event is smaller than that of the summer of 1967. Lastly, although the severity of riots decreases after April of 1968, the following three years display a widespread occurrence of riots across the United States that slowly decreases. Many of these cities were prone to rioting. Figure 7 displays the number of cities that experienced multiple riots. Over 161 cities experienced more than one riot over the sample period. Many of the cities where riots occurred in 1967 and 1968 experienced riots prior to 1967. However, there was

[12] A "*race riot*" is defined as a demonstration involving at least 30 participants (some have to be black) that result in some property damage or violence. Further, the event has to occur outside of a school setting or an organized civil rights demonstration.

[13] The riot severity measure is the total number of arrests, arsons, injures, and number of people killed due to rioting in city *i* in year *t* relative to the total share of arrests, arsons, injuries, and the number of peopled killed due to rioting between 1964 and 1971.

also an increase in the number of cities that experienced riots for the first time in 1967 and 1968. The literature on riots has reached a consensus on strong predictors of riots, which are the region of the city and the percentage of the population that is black in a particular city (Spilerman, 1970; Carter, 1986; Dipasquale and Gleaser, 1998; and Collins & Margo, 2007). However, past rioting is weakly correlated with future riots but lacks evidence of positive or negative feedback (Spilerman, 1970, Olzak et al, 1996).[14] The two predictors reflect (1) cultural and political norms that exist in the South, and (2) resources available to sustain an uprising.

I use data provided by Collins and Margo to match legal services grants to city level observations on riot occurrence and severity. I use the size of the grant to measure the intensity of the treatment (having a NLSP).[15] City characteristics in this analysis were taken from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 Census City and County Data Books. The city level demographic information was constructed by linearly interpolating between the 1960, 1970, and 1980 data. The analysis consist of city level observations with riot and census demographic information from 1964 to 1971 for 616 cities. All cities in this sample had a population of over 25,000 residents in each census year. Table 2 reports summary statistics for these cities from the 1960 census. The average population in the sample was 119,893 residents, with a median income of $6,192 ($45,615 in 2010 dollars).[16] The final sample contained 211 cities that received legal services grants (treatment group) and 405 non-grant cities (comparison group). Cities that received legal services grants had a larger proportion of residents who were non-white and a smaller proportion of residents with more than 12 years of schooling, which is reflected in lower median incomes. Lastly, funded cities on average had more riots between 1964 and 1971 than unfunded cities and also had more severe riots. The empirical strategy will account for these differences but untreated cities may not provide a plausible control group; therefore, a specification without the control group is estimated as well.

Figure 8 plots pre-treatment, $\theta_{-\tau}$, effects and post-treatment effects, δ_{τ}, from Equation 1. These estimates describe the dynamics of NLSP funding in cities before and after a riot occurs. Confidence intervals are constructed from heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by

[14] Spilerman argues the possibility of positive and negative feedback but is unable to distinguish feedback from predictors of riots. Positive feedback refers to an increase in the probability of a future riot if a riot takes place while negative feedback refers to a decrease in the probability of a future riots once a riot occurs.

[15] NACAP files do not provide information for grants received in 1969. Data from Federal Outlays are used to supplement NACAP data to provide grants in 1969.

[16] NLSPs were located in larger cities, however, 103 of the 211 cities that received NLSP grants had a population of less than 100,000 residents in 1960 and 45 cities had a population of less than 50,000. Every city with a population greater than 500,000 residents in 1960 received a legal service grant.

city and are presented by dashed lines. According to Figure 8, NLSP funding increases greatly after a riot occurs in a city. Post-treatment effects are positive, statistically significant, and steadily increasing over time. The estimates in Figure 8 highlights the endogeneity problem articulated earlier. Likewise, reverse causality and regression to the mean threatens the internal validity of estimates using ordinary least squares approach.

Table 3 reports coefficients from WLS regressions for the probability of receiving a legal services program and the year the NLSP was implemented based on 1960 characteristics.[17] Columns 1 & 2 refer to predictors of treatment while columns 3 & 4 focus on predictors of the timing of treatment. The independent variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to one if a law school is located in city *i* for columns 1 & 3. Similarly, columns 2 & 4 refer to the age of the law school by 1960. According to columns 1 & 2, law schools and the age of the law schools are strong predictors of treatment. Cities with older law schools are more likely to receive a NLSP grant compared to cities with law schools that are less established. It is also important to note that median income and percentage of the population that is non-white are strong predictors of treatment but not of timing. The only predictor of both treatment and the timing of treatment is the age of law school. Cities with law schools that are older are treated earlier than cities with newer law schools. This may reflect the prestige of older law schools or a network effect amongst lawyers affiliated with the implementation of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program. This is supported by columns 5 & 6 which shows that cities with older law schools received larger initial grants.[18]

V. Results

Table 4 report estimates of π from Equation 2 for the effects of NLSP funding on the number of riots, riot severity, and riot severity group. Equation 2 estimates are produced from a weighted least squares (WLS) regression using the city population in 1960 as weights.[19] The standard errors are constructed from heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by city. The

[17] Cunningham (2016) conducts a similar analysis on the timing of legal services on the presence of a nearby law school. Key differences with analysis is the focus on the age of the law school as well as the inclusion of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Cunningham (2016) main analysis removed these cities to avoid the influence of large cities impact on crime rates when conducting weighted least squares. The results in Table 3 are robust to this sample restriction.

[18] This result holds if cities with very old law schools (over a 100 years old) are removed from the sample.

[19] Population weights were used to gain efficiency when the error term has heteroskedasticity related to city size. However, weighted least squares (WLS) often lead to estimates that are less efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates (Haider, Solon, and Wooldridge, 2013). In this analysis WLS regression produced more precise estimates than OLS without drastically changing the coefficients. OLS results are available upon request.

sample consists of cities with a population greater than 25,000 residents every census year between 1960 and 1980. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates from the full sample of 616 cities while columns 3 and 4, restricts the sample to only treated cities. Also, columns 1 and 3 report estimates from Equation 2 when covariates from the row vector $R_{i,t}$ are removed from the analysis, while columns 2 and 4 report estimates from WLS regression that include dummy variables to capture past rioting. All four columns report estimates from WLS regressions using state-by-year fixed effects as well as city fixed effects.

With regards to the occurrences of riots in panel A, estimates in all 4 columns are negative and statistically significant. Estimates in column 2 imply an average treatment effect on the treated of an 19 percent (-0.18/0.94) reduction in riot propensity.[20] Adding $R_{i,t}$ in column 2 and 4 slightly decreases the marginal effect of legal services funding on riot propensities. The weighted least square regression model is also robust to restrictions in the sample. [21] Restricting the sample to only treated cities produce estimates that are negative and statistically significant. The marginal effect in column 3 is similar to column 1 while the estimate in column 4 is four percent larger than column 2.

Table 4B reports estimates of legal services on riot severity. According to panel B, the coefficient on legal services funding imply a large average treatment effect on the treated, but none of the reported estimates are statistically significant.[22] Table 4C report estimates of legal services influence on riot severity group. This approach places less emphasis on outliers in the dependent variable. Estimates in all 4 columns are negative.[23] The results indicate that riot severity was lower in places that receive larger grants. The marginal effects are large in the full sample and estimated more precisely.[24] Estimates in panel A imply are reduction in the number of riots and panels B &

[20] Negative binomial regression estimates imply a much larger marginal effect. These results are available upon request.

[21] Using population weights to gain efficiency exerts greater influence of large cities which can alter results. Excluding the three largest cities from the sample decreases the point estimates in the full sample but increases the marginal effect by 28 percent in the treated only sample. Removing the weighting scheme from the analysis results in estimates that are smaller in magnitude but are statistically significant in columns 3 and 4. The point estimate is 24 percent smaller and the standard error is larger, resulting in a smaller t-ratio relative to column 2.

[22] It is important to note that the estimates in Table 4B are negative despite changes in the sample and weighting scheme. Estimates are negative when using ordinary least squares instead of weighted least squares.

[23] Estimates from an ordered logit model also imply a negative relationship between legal service funding and riot severity group. Results are available upon request (marginal effects are positive – high severity group equal to 0 and no riot group is equal to 3).

[24] Using grant size per capita provides negative coefficients in panels A and C and are statistically significant in column 1 and 2 of panel A.

C provide evidence that NLSP successfully abated riots that did occur.[25] However, the results have to be taken with caution due to the endogeneity concerns outlined above.

Table 5 reports estimates from the first-stage regression using the age of law school as an instrument. Similar to Table 4, regression analysis includes state-by-year fixed effects and city fixed effects, as well as city demographics from the census and measurements of past rioting. Each column corresponds to the model and restrictions discussed above. The first-stage results indicate a strong relationship between age of law school and NLSP funding. As it relates to the validity of the instrument; the F-statistic in all four columns are larger than the traditional threshold of 10. It is plausible that the IV influences the legal climate in ways that are correlated with unobserved determinants of rioting. However, reduced-form regression results from the relationship of the age of law school on riot propensities and severities indicates no correlation between the IV and dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 report the largest coefficients while adding $R_{i,t}$ reduces estimates of the marginal effect. Although each regression satisfies the weak instrument threshold, the F-Statistic dramatically decreases with sample restrictions. It is also important to note that the identification of the instrument exploits the variation within the panel and not between cross-section units. Table 3 provides strong evidence of legal services association with law schools and older law schools. However, Table 5 shows that places with law schools receive additional funding over time relative to places without law schools. The results in Table 5 are analogous to results in Figure 3 showing the intensity of treatment increases over time conditional on initial treatment.

Tables 6 report the estimated value of π from Equation 2 using 2SLS for the effects of NLSP funding on the number of riots, riot severity, and severity group. Estimates in Table 6A are typically smaller than OLS estimates reported in Table 4A. The estimates of π are negative and at least marginally statistically significant in both the full and treated-only sample. According to column 2, a one-million-dollar increase in NLSP funding reduces the number of riots by 18 percent (-0.17/0.94). As it relates to riot severity, estimates in Table 6B are much larger than those reported in Table 4B and marginally statistically significant in all columns. The 2SLS estimate in column 2 is 135 percent larger than in column 2 of Table 4B, implying a much larger impact of legal services on the severity of riots. According to column 2, a one-million-dollar increase in NLSP

[25] Using funding for one period does not highlight the increase social and human capital from previous years of receiving legal service grants. It is plausible that years of funding or cumulative funding are more important than funding for one year. Results using cumulative funding provides a stronger and larger estimate for NLSP funding on riot severity. The results are similar in size to Table 4B but are marginally statistically significant.

funding reduces riot severity by 278 percent (-1.693/0.61). Considering the average annual budget of a typical NLSP was $200,000; this implies a treatment effect equivalent to a 3.6 percent reduction in the number of riots and a 56 percent reduction in the severity of riots. As stated earlier, the riot severity index is highly skewed and dominated by outliers which is problematic under weighted least squares. Panel C report 2SLS estimates using severity group which accounts for the skewness of the dependent variable. Once again, reported estimates are negative but only statistically significant in the full sample. Similar to panel B, 2SLS estimates are larger than OLS estimates.

Although the 2SLS estimates are not measured as precisely, they substantiate the negative marginal effect reported in the OLS regressions and also shed light on the endogeneity problem. Two stage least squares estimates are at least 130 percent larger than those report by OLS for NLSP effect on riot severity. This provides suggestive evidence that the endogeneity concerns are related to the severity of riots, where local officials and OEO administrators are responding to the most hostile environments. Under this consideration, legal services are associated with locations that have severe rioting, thus under estimating the impact of legal services on riot severity in OLS regressions. This also give further credence to Margo and Collins (2007) measure of riot severity, grouping small riots with non-rioting cities.[26] Small riots typically do not involve property damage and many arrest. According to the data, there is an average of 8 arrest, 1 arson, 1 injury and 0 deaths in the low severity group; compared to 70 arrest, 11 arsons, 11 injuries, and 1 death in the medium severity group; and 852 arrest, 218 arsons, 152 injuries, and 3 deaths in the high severity group. With such differences, it is plausible that OEO officials targeted places where riots would be severe or likely garner national attention.

VI. Discussion

As mentioned earlier, the interactions between poor blacks and law enforcement, in which black citizens reported excessive force, occurred frequently without riots. As a result, researchers view riots as a spontaneous event, once the size of the black population and geographical region are accounted for. The main analysis includes both urban and rural areas as well as cities with a

[26] Downes (1968) also highlights the underreporting of small riots which further gives credence to the severity measure grouping small riots and zero riots together.

very small black population. The effects of NLSPs may be exacerbated by the lack of riots or small riots in rural areas or communities with small black populations.

Table 7 examine the heterogeneous treatment effects of NLSP. Column 1 includes cities where the proportion of the residents that are nonwhite in 1964 is larger than the median proportion of residents that are nonwhite. The sample contains 310 cities; 144 receive a NLSP grant. The marginal effects reported in column 1 are larger than those reported in column 1 of Table 6. Legal services are negatively related to the number of riots, riot severity, and severity group in cities with a larger share of black residents. An additional million dollars in legal services funding reduces the number of riots by .191 or 20 percent. The coefficients for the effect of NLSP on riot severity and severity group are slightly larger than those reported in Table 6. The marginal effect of NLSP funding is smaller when the sample includes only cities with a population over 100,000 residents and the marginal effects are not statistically significant.

Also as expected, the marginal effects vary by region. The marginal effects are the smallest when the Midwest or the West is excluded and largest when the Northeast and South is excluded. The results in column 3 imply NLSP has a much larger impact on rioting when the Northeast is removed from the sample. Dropping the southern region produce marginal effects similar to Table 6, while dropping the Midwest and West regions result in estimates that are not statistically significant. This further supports Spilerman (1970) and Carter (1986) findings that the South is less likely to participate in riots, and therefore attenuates any effect of NLSP funding on riot propensities.

So far, 2SLS results have shown that the Neighborhood Legal Services Program reduced riot propensity and severity. These estimates imply that legal services are associated with average treatment effect on the treated of a 3.6 percent reduction in riot propensity and a 56 percent reduction in riot severity. The decrease in riot severity is mostly driven by cities with a larger share of black residents as well as cities in the Midwest and West regions. The reduction in riot propensities due to legal services is supported by Table 1 which shows that places treated earlier are more likely to report positive interactions with the police in 1970. These results should have a large implication on community resources. Collins and Margo (2007) highlighted the negative impact that severe riots can have on property values. Their analysis shows that the impact of riots adversely impacted property value for the city as a whole but had a more adverse effect on black-owned property.

In an attempt to link the Neighborhood Legal Services Program to property values, I estimate the following difference-in-difference regression:

$$(3) \qquad Y_{i,t} = \gamma_i + \alpha_t + \delta_1 LSP_{i,t} + \delta_2 R_{i,t} + X'_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$

The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for all homeowners in city *i* in year *t* from 1960, 1970, and 1980 Decennial Census. *LSP* is equal to the cumulative legal services funding in city *i* before census year *t* in the first specification. In the second specification, *LSP* is equal to $D_i 1(t - T^* > 0)$, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a legal services project is established in city *i* before census year *t*. Lastly, *LSP* is equal to the years of exposure in the third specification. The row vector $X_{i,t}$, consist of covariates from the 1960, 1970, and the 1980 census. The covariates are the following: the proportion of the non-white residents, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, median income, and the population per square mile. Also included is an indicator variable, $R_{i,t}$, equal to one if a riot has occurred in city *i* before census year *t*.

Table 8 displays the results from Equation 3 where the dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for all homeowners. Column 1 refers to specification one, while columns 2 and 3 refers to specification 2 and 3 respectively. Columns 4 restrict the samples to cities with the share of the black population larger than the median. Columns 5 through 8 drops one region at a time. According to column 1, a one-million-dollar increase in total legal services funding is associated with 1 percent increase in property values. However, riots are not statistically significant. Using an indicator variable for the presence of a NLSP increases the riot indicator variable by 136 percent. The riot indicator in column 2 implies that the property values decrease by 8 percent when a city experiences a riot. [27] This estimate is similar to Collins and Margo (2007) OLS estimate implying an 8 percent loss when a city experience a medium or high severity riot.[28] According to column 2, the presence of a legal services agency increases property values by 5 percent. Similar to Table 1, exposure to legal services is also associated with higher property

[27] Although LSP funding has been shown to be negatively correlated with riot propensities, the analysis does not use it as an instrument. It is possible that NLSP influence property values in ways unrelated to rioting (housing discrimination, lending practices, public resources, etc.). Therefore, the results in Table 8 highlights the problem of excluding a relevant regressor. The coefficient on the riot variable is -0.07 (0.03) when legal services is not included in the analysis. The variable decrease when NLSP funding is included in the analysis and increases when NLSP treatment is included.

[28] See Collins and Margo (2007) Table 3B on p. 860.

values. Places that receive legal services earlier are associated with higher property values in 1980 relative to cities that did not receive a legal services program or receive legal services later in column 3.[29] Also results in Table 8 shows that legal services are associated with higher property values in cities with a larger share of black residents as well as in the Midwest and Northeast regions.

Estimation of the overall effect of legal services on property values uses a similar procedure employed by Collins and Margo (2007). Using the estimated effects in column 2, the log of median property values in 1980 is predicted for each city. These predicted values are used to calculate a counterfactual for property values in treated cities by subtracting the estimated value-added due to legal services. Using the number of owner-occupied housing units in each city as weights, the weighted average of property values in 1980 across cities is calculated to construct an average counterfactual value of homes. The weighted average of property values in the non-NLSP counterfactual is $15,981. The weighted average of the actual property in 1980 is $18,007. The difference between the actual and counterfactual property values implies an additional $2,026 in property value due to the presence of legal services. The average number of owner-occupied housing units in 1980 across cities is 24,468. Using this number, the LSP is associated with a $50 million increase in property values by 1980.[30]

VII. Conclusion

The Legal Services Program was implemented to provide the poor a voice in court. Those who advocated for the existence of the NLSP believed that the poor were often victims of the judicial system. In their view, the poor were not able to defend themselves against unfair treatment from public officials in welfare offices, landlords in their own community, creditors and local businesses, and local police officers. The lack of access to justice created an environment ready for explosion. However, the 1960s were not the first time racial uprisings occurred in the United States. There were a series of riots in the 1940s as well as riots recorded pre-1940 in black

[29] Regressions for impact of NLSP on black owned property rates produce estimates that were mixed and not statistically significant with regards to specification 2 and 3 (δ = -0.002 and δ =0.001 respectively). Specification 1 produce estimates that were positive and statistically significant (δ =0.008). The impact of riots on black on property values were nearly identical to columns 1 through 3.

[30] Cunningham (2016) performed a similar exercise. The key difference in those findings and the results presented in Table 7 has to do with the sample. Cunningham (2016) sample consisted of 606 cities while this sample includes 616 cities. More importantly this analysis includes Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles.

communities (Cook, 2011; Downes, 1968, Lieberson and Silverman, 1965). The uniqueness of the 1960s was in the frequency of these community uprisings over a short time-span. Over 700 riots were recorded between 1964 and 1971. This period of wide-spread violent demonstrations is followed by a period with fewer major incidents. The most notable of these were the 1980 Miami Riot and the 1992 Los Angeles Riot.

As the number of riots declined in the 1970s, so did the support of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP). By 1976, the NLSP had been supplanted by a new entity with more structure, less autonomy, and less federal funding. The newly created Legal Service Corporation (LSC) shifted focus away from community organizing, community advocacy, and law reform to focus more on individual representation that would result in more civil cases. Legal services lawyers switched cases from crime and divorce to housing and tenant-landlord disputes. Even as the LSC handled cases for the poor that were less controversial, federal funding still eludes access to social justice. This frustration once again resulted in community uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore and peaceful protest in many large U.S. cities in 2014 and 2015.

The NLSP was used as a vehicle for those without voices to express their grievances in the 1960s. Although the program did not prevent riots, it did work to redress the grievances that sparked them. According to the results presented, legal services decreased the number of riots by 15 percent and greatly reduced their severity. Cities that received NLSP grants earlier reported better relationships with the police by 1970 compared to cities that received NLSP grants later. These results are consistent with the historical narrative of legal services lawyers' involvement in community empowerment and advocacy, as well as the program's effectiveness in mitigating the damage of riots that occurred in the 1960s. Access to lawyers as well as social justice has greatly decreased since the 1960s and 1970s. A reexamination of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program provides policymakers an additional tool to ameliorate grievances that lead to violent demonstrations.

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TABLES & FIGURES

Figure 1. The Roll-Out of Federal Grants for Legal Services, 1965-1975



Source: The National Archives Community Action Program (NACAP) provided information on the recipients of legal service grants funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity between 1964 and 1975.

Figure 2. The City Level Roll-Out of Federal Grants for Legal Services by Date, 1965-1975



Source: The National Archives Community Action Program (NACAP) provided information on the recipients of legal service grants funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity between 1964 and 1975.

Figure 3. Estimated NLSP Funding Propensities



Notes: Regression includes city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented. Dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the city received a NLSP Grant. The horizontal axis corresponds the years before and after the first NLSP grant is received.

Figure 4. Estimated Average NLSP Funding (In Millions)



Note: Regression includes city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented. Dependent variable is size of a NLSP Grant in millions. The horizontal axis corresponds the years before and after the first NLSP grant is received.

Figure 5. Locations of 1960s Race Riots



Source: Courtesy of Carter and Margo (2007). Carter (1986) original source of race riots between 1964 and 1971.

Figure 6. City Level – Number of Riots & Riot Severity



Source: Riot data comes courtesy of Carter and Margo (2007). Carter (1986) original source of race riots between 1964 and 1971.

Figure 7. Number of Riots per City, 1964-1971



Source: Riot data come courtesy of Carter and Margo (2007). Carter (1986) original source of race riots between 1964 and 1971.

Figure 8. Estimates of the Effects of Riots on NLSP Funding



Note: Regression includes city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented. Dependent variable is size of a NLSP Grant in millions. The horizontal axis corresponds the years before and after the first riot is recorded between 1964 and 1971.

Table 1. Law Enforcement Legal Climate from the Legal Service Agency Survey

VARIABLES	(1) Effect on NLSP	(2) Relation to Community	(3) Relation with Minorities
Time Since NLSP Established	0.0335*	0.0477**	0.0473**
	[0.0229]	[0.0232]	[0.0235]
Proportion of Residents			
with 12 years of education	-0.00415	-0.00473	0.00138
	[0.00812]	[0.00941]	[0.00953]
with fewer than 4 years of education	-0.00291	-0.0237	-0.0268
	[0.0167]	[0.0194]	[0.0196]
65 or older	0.0161	0.0589*	0.0481
	[0.0264]	[0.0306]	[0.0310]
Under 5 years of age	0.0419	0.0705	0.0824*
	[0.0385]	[0.0447]	[0.0453]
Nonwhite	0.00829	0.00555	-0.00307
	[0.00557]	[0.00646]	[0.00655]
in urban areas	-0.00558**	-0.00307	-0.00520*
	[0.00232]	[0.00269]	[0.00273]
of households with income under $3,000	0.0125	0.0200	0.0151
	[0.0109]	[0.0127]	[0.0128]
of households with income greater than			
$10,000	0.0107	0.0268**	0.0291**
	[0.0115]	[0.0134]	[0.0135]
Observations	181	181	180
R-squared	0.366	0.380	0.366

Note: The data in the Legal Service Agency Survey (LSAS) 1970 survey was collected from the Auerbach Corporation for an evaluation of OEO legal service projects (NLSP) in 1970 and 1971. Each column reports estimates from a separate linear regression. All three regressions use state fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. The survey questions are in response to the perceived legal climate by evaluators with regards to law enforcement. The dependent variable is the ***average*** score from 3 to 5 evaluators of the local legal services project. In column 1, the responses were the following: 1. Law enforcement agencies tend to bring pressure on LSP to curtail activities; 2. Neutral or no interaction; 3. Cooperative relationships. In column 2, the responses were the following: 1. Law enforcement agencies are generally hostile to poverty community residents; 2. Agencies neutral; 3. Agencies support efforts for equal services. In column 3, the responses were the following: 1. Law enforcement agency generally hostile to and abusive of minority group persons; 2. No significant minority population or neutral disposition to minorities; 3. Generally supportive of efforts to increase cooperation.

Table 2. Characteristics of Cities from 1960

A. 1960 City Characteristics	All Cities (N=616)	LSP Cities (N=211)	Non-LSP Cities (N=405)	T-Test of Difference
Means				
Population	119,893	253,333	50,373	*<0.01*
Population per square mile	5,258	6,065	4,837	*<0.01*
Median Income	6,192	5,907	6,340	*<0.01*
Median Age	30.1	30.6	29.9	*<0.05*
Proportion of residents				
nonwhite	9.7	13.2	7.9	*<0.01*
with 12 years of education	46.0	43.7	47.2	*<0.01*
Means between 1964 & 1971				
Number of Riots	0.94	2.19	0.29	*<0.01*
Severity of Riots	0.61	1.64	0.07	*<0.01*

Source: Table displays averages from the 1960 Decennial Census. Census data from 1962 County and City Data Book publicly available at the ICPSR. Riot data comes courtesy of Carter and Margo (2007). Carter (1986) original source of race riots between 1964 and 1971.

Table 3. The Relationship between First Legal Services Grants and 1960 City Demographics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable	0/1 Receive LSP		Year LSP Established		First LSP Grant (in Millions)	
Median Age	0.00558	0.00676	-0.0215	-0.0180	-0.00686	-0.00738
	[0.00547]	[0.00559]	[0.0455]	[0.0472]	[0.00688]	[0.00695]
Median Income	-0.0650**	-0.0610**	0.0241	-0.0674	0.0602	0.0740
	[0.0265]	[0.0281]	[0.259]	[0.278]	[0.0550]	[0.0563]
Population per Square Mile	-0.00248	-0.00878*	0.00771	0.0209	0.0358***	0.0327***
	[0.00376]	[0.00478]	[0.0172]	[0.0222]	[0.00712]	[0.00674]
Log of the Proportion of Residents						
w/ 12 or more years of schooling	-0.00252	-0.00221	0.0313	0.0343*	0.00234	0.00146
	[0.00293]	[0.00306]	[0.0200]	[0.0207]	[0.00379]	[0.00365]
Nonwhite	0.0115***	0.0147***	-0.0134	-0.0166	0.00494*	0.00465*
	[0.00251]	[0.00244]	[0.0173]	[0.0163]	[0.00267]	[0.00268]
Riot in 1964	0.145	0.0390	0.266	0.455	0.0580	0.0439
	[0.109]	[0.136]	[0.404]	[0.424]	[0.121]	[0.118]
Riot in 1965	0.0511	0.0863	-0.318	-0.340	0.0173	0.00332
	[0.0514]	[0.0600]	[0.406]	[0.374]	[0.0847]	[0.0824]
Law School in County	0.450***		-0.683*		0.0613	
	[0.0444]		[0.380]		[0.0439]	
Age of Law School		0.00453***		-0.00729*		0.00105**
		[0.000586]		[0.00372]		[0.000462]
Observations	616	616	211	211	211	211
R-squared	0.547	0.509	0.495	0.487	0.857	0.860

Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate weighted least squares regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 &2 is an indicator equal to 1 if a city receives a NLSP grant between 1965 and 1975. The dependent variable in columns 3 & 4 is the year a city first receives a NLSP grant. The dependent variable in columns 5 &6 is the size of the first LSP grant in millions of dollars. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for clustering with state and presented in brackets. City demographic variables are from the 1960 Decennial Census. All columns use 1960 population as weights.

Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of NLSP on Riot Propensities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. DV: Number of Riots				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.198***	-0.180***	-0.200**	-0.188**
	[0.0688]	[0.0672]	[0.0782]	[0.0728]
R-squared	0.545	0.573	0.707	0.718
B. DV: Riot Severity				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.750	-0.721	-0.847	-0.846
	[0.652]	[0.645]	[0.643]	[0.654]
R-squared	0.422	0.425	0.562	0.563
C. DV: Severity Group				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.184***	-0.173***	-0.169**	-0.172**
	[0.0624]	[0.0575]	[0.0792]	[0.0753]
R-squared	0.451	0.458	0.597	0.599
Covariates (X)	X	X	X	X
Covariates (R)		X		X
Treated Sample Only			X	X
Observations	4,928	4,928	1,688	1,688
Number of Cities	616	616	211	211

Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained estimating Equation 2. All columns include city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects and covariates, X, from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 city linearly interpolated in columns. Columns 2 & 4 add indicator variables, R, to capture past rioting. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. All columns use 1960 population as weights. Columns 1 & 2 refers to the entire sample while columns 3 & 4 only include cities that receive a NLSP grant between 1965 and 1975.

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Law School on NLSP Funding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	LSP Grant (In Millions)			
Age of Law School	0.160***	0.141***	0.152***	0.138***
	[0.0223]	[0.0235]	[0.0294]	[0.0325]
Covariates (X)	X	X	X	X
Covariates (R)		X		X
Treated Sample Only			X	X
Observations	4,928	4,928	1,688	1,688
R-squared	0.758	0.766	0.816	0.826
F-stat	29.8	40.0	14.6	15.4
Number of Cities	616	616	211	211

Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained for the first stage regressions. All columns include city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects and covariates, X, from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 city linearly interpolated in columns. Columns 2 & 4 add indicator variables, R, to capture past rioting. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. All columns use 1960 population as weights. Columns 1 & 2 refers to the entire sample while columns 3 & 4 only include cities that receive a NLSP grant between 1965 and 1975.

Table 6. Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of NLSP on Riot Propensities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. DV: Number of Riots				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.157*	-0.166**	-0.208**	-0.177*
	[0.0952]	[0.0830]	[0.103]	[0.0921]
R-squared	0.681	0.701	0.783	0.791
B. DV: Riot Severity				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-1.961*	-1.693*	-2.420*	-2.257*
	[1.169]	[1.005]	[1.256]	[1.178]
R-squared	0.489	0.494	0.605	0.608
C. DV: Severity Group				
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.276**	-0.231*	-0.253	-0.218
	[0.136]	[0.134]	[0.169]	[0.171]
R-squared	0.612	0.619	0.698	0.700
Covariates (X)	X	X	X	X
Covariates (R)		X		X
Treated Sample Only			X	X
Observations	4,928	4,928	1,688	1,688
Number of Cities	616	616	211	211

Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained estimating Equation 2. All columns include city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects and covariates, X, from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 city linearly interpolated in columns. Columns 2 & 4 add indicator variables, R, to capture past rioting. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. All columns use 1960 population as weights. Columns 1 & 2 refers to the entire sample while columns 3 & 4 only include cities that receive a NLSP grant between 1965 and 1975.

Table 7. Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of NLSP on Riot Propensities by Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Black Population	Population Greater		Dropped Region		
	Above Sample Median	Than a 100,000	NE	MW	S	W
A. DV: Number of Riots						
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.191**	-0.189	-0.388**	-0.131	-0.185**	-0.0627
	[0.0851]	[0.119]	[0.153]	[0.0950]	[0.0772]	[0.0603]
R-squared	0.753	0.808	0.710	0.664	0.699	0.722
B. DV: Riot Severity						
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-1.959*	-2.553	-4.366**	-1.980	-1.637*	-0.178
	[1.034]	[1.652]	[1.734]	[1.251]	[0.989]	[0.175]
R-squared	0.593	0.646	0.505	0.468	0.449	0.628
C. DV: Severity Group						
Legal Service Grant (In Millions)	-0.281*	-0.155	-0.547***	-0.178	-0.242*	-0.0937
	[0.157]	[0.227]	[0.207]	[0.150]	[0.128]	[0.122]
R-squared	0.673	0.720	0.635	0.572	0.621	0.636
Observations	2,480	1,032	3,864	3,376	3,608	3,936
Number of Cities	310	129	483	422	451	492

Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained estimating Equation 2. All columns include city, C, and state-by-year, S-Y, effects, covariates, X, from the 1960, 1970, and 1980 city linearly interpolated, and indicator variables, R, to capture past rioting. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. All columns use 1960 population as weights. Column 1 limits the sample to cities with above sample median Black population. Column 2 limits the sample to cities with the population greater than 100,000 Columns 3-6 are from separate regressions, each dropping one region at a time.

Table 8. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of NLSP and Riots on Log of Median Property Value, 1960 - 1980

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
				Black Population Above Sample	Dropped Region			
DV: Log of Median Residential Property Rates				Median	NE	MW	S	W
NLSP Funding	0.0104**							
	[0.00410]							
NLSP (0/1)		0.0500**		0.0697**	0.0248	0.0173	0.0807***	0.0687**
		[0.0245]		[0.0333]	[0.0219]	[0.0209]	[0.0274]	[0.0285]
Time Since LSP Established			0.00342*					
			[0.00202]					
Riot	-0.0353	-0.0834***	-0.0832***	-0.0818**	-0.0349	-0.0490*	-0.116***	-0.0933***
	[0.0266]	[0.0282]	[0.0261]	[0.0381]	[0.0247]	[0.0270]	[0.0294]	[0.0357]
Observations	1,848	1,848	1,848	930	1,449	1,266	1,353	1,476
R-squared	0.552	0.514	0.515	0.455	0.526	0.651	0.481	0.588
Number of Cities	616	616	616	310	483	422	451	492

Notes: Table display least-squares estimates obtained from estimating Equation 3. The dependent variable is the log of the median rent provided in the City and County Data Books from 1962, 1972, and 1983. Covariates are also from the City and County Data Books; the proportion of the non-white residents, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, median income, and the population per square mile. Riot indicator variable is based on data from Carter and Margo (2007). All regressions include year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. Each regression is weighted by 1960 population.