

Why are women more protectionist than men?

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Abstract

This paper investigates the gender differences in the support for trade liberalization across a broad range of countries. On average, males are eight to ten percentage points more likely than females to support trade liberalization. The paper quantifies the contribution of group differences in measurable characteristics such as education, labor market participation and country location and finds that very little of the gender difference is explained by observable characteristics. Neither sectoral differences in employment by gender nor gender differences in employment between traded and non-traded sectors explain the gap. Country level data are analyzed to determine if this gender gap exists for reasons pertaining to country specific characteristics. We find that the gender gap exists in most rich countries, but is less likely in lower income countries. Otherwise, this gender gap is very robust and may only be explained by differences in immeasurable male and female attributes.

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1 Introduction

Female participation in the labor force and in public policy making have increased across a broad number of countries (World Development Indicators, 2007). The labour market has seen an increased number of females attaining high government and corporate positions (Jensen, 2002), in which females have influence in national and international markets. Women are taking leadership roles in government and in business and there is some evidence that this increased role is affecting public policy. There is evidence that women vote differently than men and that the enfranchisement of women may have affected the size and scope of government.¹ Some researchers have argued that female participation in the political process has altered trade policy. Hall, Kao and Nelson (1998) study the connection between changes in female political influence and trade policy. The authors suggest that the emergence of female enfranchisement in the US contributed to the move toward trade liberalization because women are more likely than men to oppose trade protection. They contend that this evidence supports their theoretical model where households consist of two individuals: a woman and a man. Women make consumption decisions and so are more directly affected by tariffs via higher prices for such goods, while men are prominently in production.

Unfortunately, we know very little about gender differences in views on trade policy. In fact, the little that we do know may be wrong.² Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) challenge the conjecture by Hall et al (1998) that men are more protectionist than women and find evidence that in 1939 females were 7% more likely to support a tariff than males. Furthermore,

¹See Lott and Kenny (1999).

²We know what Mark Twain said about this predicament: "It ain't what we don't know that will hurt us. It's what we know that ain't so."

females who described themselves as ‘homemakers’ were 7.7% more likely than other females to support a tariff. There is considerable evidence that females are more likely than males to oppose trade liberalization from a literature that examines the differences in support for trade liberalization between skilled and unskilled workers. O’Rourke & Sinnott (2001), Baker (2003), Beaulieu, Benarroch & Gaisford (2004), Baker (2005), Mayda & Rodrik (2005) and Hiscox (2006) find a gender difference in support for international trade where females are less likely than males to support trade liberalization by as much as eight to ten percentage points. This literature provides evidence of a gender difference in trade policy preferences. However, the central focus of this literature is on the difference in preferences between skilled and unskilled workers, gender is treated as a control variable. There is very little discussion in these papers about the gender difference and there are no attempts to explore the robustness of the difference - nor to explain why it exists.

If there is a gender difference in views on trade policy then the increased role of females may affect the direction of trade policy. For example, if females are less likely than men to support trade liberalization, then it is possible that increased female influence could affect the resolve of governments to pursue trade liberalization policies. Therefore, it is important to determine why this gap exists and whether the existence or size of the gap varies across different segments of the population and/or some across different types of countries. For example, it is possible the the gap primarily exists for people employed in import-competing sectors or it may exist in rich countries but not in poor countries.

Until now, the only attempt to explain the gender gap in trade preferences is Burgoon and Hiscox (2004). They examine the gender differences in trade preferences for the United States. They claim that the gender gap exists only amongst older generations of Americans

and higher education level cohorts. They suggest that most of the gender bias is attributable to differences in exposure to college level economic ideas. This is the only study on gender preferences in trade policy that we are aware of and it has several shortcomings. First, the study only included the United States, only one year was studied and they did not find any conclusive reasoning as to why this gap exists. It is not known if it is simply females in general that support trade less than men; or if the gender gap only exists among certain demographics; or if it reflects differences in human capital endowments or other related characteristics. Second, the conclusion that the gender bias is due to differences in exposure to college level economics courses is not compelling. The authors did not use econometric methods to arrive at this suggestion, but merely an observation from a comparison of US education data from the 1960s and early millennium. These data compare the number of women to men taking economics, business or political science college degrees in the 1960s to those of 2003. They find that a higher ratio of women to men are taking these degrees in 2003 compared to the 1960s and that this is why the gap is “non-existent” in younger generations. The problem is that Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) are basing the gender gap of ten percentage points on less than one third of the US population - the approximate fraction of citizens attending (or that have attended) college in the US (National Center for Education Statistics, 2007).

This paper examines the robustness of the gender gap in support for trade liberalization by examining the predictors of support for trade liberalization between males and females in 24 and 35 countries using International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data for 1995 and 2003, respectively. This paper examines whether the gender gap remains after controlling for socio-economic characteristics such as age, marital status, education, employment, political

affiliation, religious beliefs and sector of employment, in addition to country specific effects. The paper then examines how much of the gap is explained by differences in individual endowments, and alternatively by immeasurable attributes of males and females.

The next section presents evidence that women and men have different attitudes toward trade policy. This leads to the subsequent section which examines and tries to explain why this difference exists. This section borrows the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (BOD) methodology from the discrimination literature to examine whether the gender differences in trade policy are from observed differences, or unobserved differences, between men and women.

2 Gender Differences in Attitudes on Trade Policy

There are a number of empirical papers examining individual survey data on support for trade liberalization. The starting point for most of these studies is the well-known Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem, which predicts that free trade will increase the wages of skilled workers in skill-abundant countries and will decrease the wages of unskilled workers in those same countries. According to the theorem, the opposite occurs in low-skill abundant countries - i.e., free trade will increase wages of unskilled workers and decrease wages of skilled workers. The empirical methodology has examined whether individual trade preferences are consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the evidence that has emerged is somewhat mixed. There is unequivocal evidence that, on average, skilled workers are more supportive of free trade than are low-skilled workers. The first empirical studies to examine trade preferences focused on Canada and the United States. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and

Beaulieu (2002b) find that skilled workers were more likely than were low-skilled workers to support free trade in the United States and Canada respectively. This begs the question: how do trade preferences unfold in low-skill abundant countries? A number of researchers have examined this question. Using cross country data from ISSP (1995), O'Rourke & Sinnott (2001), Beaulieu *et al.* (2004), and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) all find compelling evidence that skilled workers are more likely to support free trade than are unskilled workers. Beaulieu, Yatawara and Wang (2005) use the Latinobarometro (1996) data set to show that, in general, skilled workers are more likely than low-skilled workers to support trade liberalizing policies in Latin American countries.

An important result from this literature that is not controversial and is particularly important for our purposes is that country characteristics do modify individual preferences on trade policy. As mentioned, all three studies (O'Rourke & Sinnott (2001), Beaulieu *et al.* (2004), and Mayda & Rodrik (2005)) find that individual trade policy preferences are modified by country characteristics. O'Rourke and Sinnott (2002) use the ISSP (1995) data set to show that rich countries experience more trade support from higher skilled individuals than poor countries. Beaulieu *et al.* (2004) find that high-skilled workers are more likely to support trade liberalization in almost all countries but the difference in preferences between skilled and unskilled are greater in countries with high levels of intra-industry trade (IIT) in high-tech goods and smaller in countries with low levels of high-tech IIT. Baker (2005) also finds evidence that country characteristics modify individual preferences on trade policy. Baker examines whether differences in income determine the support for free trade using the World Values Survey (WVS) and finds that poor people are less likely to support trade liberalization than rich people, in moderately-rich and rich countries. He finds that countries that

experience the highest prices see trade as a solution to the high rents on consumption goods. Baker's ultimate conclusion is that not only do labor market skills matter in trade policy preferences, but so do consumers' tastes. This result is confirmation of Baker's consumption based theory of support for trade liberalization. His theory explains that consumers in countries of previous/current protectionist views are more likely to support trade liberalizing policies for the consumption-based pros rather than oppose these policies due to the labor market losses (Baker, 2003).

Another important result from the literature is that the industry in which a person works may determine trade policy preferences rather than (or as well as) the skill level of individuals. This result was first discovered in a seminal paper by Magee (1980) using aggregate lobbying data for the United States. That industry affiliation may help determine trade preferences was also found in a study of Canadian preferences by Beaulieu (2002b) and for Americans by Beaulieu (2002a) and Beaulieu and Magee (2004). Mayda and Rodrik (2005) provide evidence across countries that opposition to international trade is more likely in sectors that experience high trade flows and individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are more likely to oppose trade. All of the papers examining individual preferences on trade policy, except Baker (2003), find a statistically significant gender gap that males are more likely than females to support trade liberalization.

The *National Identity* survey data from the ISSP are used to determine the size of the gender gap in trade liberalization support. The ISSP is an annual survey that has a number of different question sets. The *National Identity* survey has thus far only been conducted in 1995 and 2003 and is the only survey group that contains a question regarding international

trade.³ The 1995 survey includes 24 countries, 28,964 observations and many socio-economic, demographic and specific national identity questions (age, gender, education level, income, marital status, political affiliation are all common demographic variables included in this survey). The 2003 survey includes 35 countries, 44,170 observations, all the same questions as the 1995 survey and some additional questions.⁴ These surveys are conducted by either self-completion methods or face-to-face interviews and are a random sample within each country. The unit of observation is the individual. All interviews and survey organization are completed by referees employed by the ISSP. The referees have strict instructions to follow to ensure consistency across countries. Beaulieu *et al.* (2004) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) use the 1995 ISSP data set and mention that the survey over-represents developed nations. The 2003 ISSP data set, however, includes more poor countries than the 1995 data set and, until now, has not been analyzed.

The 1995 and 2003 surveys asked respondents' opinions on imports. More specifically, the respondents are read the statement "*[Respondent's Country] should limit the imports of goods from foreign nations in order to protect its national economy*".⁵ The respondent could then strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, or respond with 'neither'. Table 1 presents contingency tables demonstrating that, without controlling for any variables, a gender difference exists. The top panel of Table 1 shows that in 1995, 27% of males disagree with the anti-trade statement while 19% of females disagree with the statement. Therefore, on average, there is an 8 percentage point difference between male and female support for trade liberalization. In 2003, 35% of men disagree with the statement

³In addition to National Identity, the ISSP also provides surveys on the Role of Government, Family and Changing Gender Roles, Environment, Religion and Work Orientations.

⁴These data consist of two cross-sections; it is not panel data.

⁵Issues around the framing of this question are discussed in Section 4.

while 26% women disagree. In this case, there is a 9 percentage point difference between support for trade liberalization among males compared to females.

Table 1 demonstrates the gender difference in views on trade policy, but this evidence is merely observational. Next we employ multivariate regression analysis to determine the size and the robustness of the gender differences and attempt to understand whether they are determined by labor market characteristics of individual respondents. The baseline specifications include mostly common demographics such as gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, religious views and political affiliation. Country level data are then employed to see if GDP per capita, labor market participation rates or a country's openness to trade has any effect on the gender gap. Lastly, sector of employment is controlled for to determine if certain sectors experience more of a gender gap than others.

These survey responses to the questions on trade policy were converted into a binary variable used as the dependent variable for regression analysis. TRADE equals 1 if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the original statement in which case the respondent supports trade liberalization.⁶ If the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, or responded with 'neither', then TRADE equals 0 and the respondent does not support trade liberalization.⁷

The probit model used to estimate the model is,

$$Pr(FT_{r,c} = 1) = F(\alpha S_r + \beta X_r + \delta D_c) \quad (1)$$

⁶Similar methods of 'extension' are used by Beaulieu *et al.* (2004) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005).

⁷To ensure that the construction of TRADE does not lose variation by over-aggregating the responses into a dummy variable, ordered probit regression analysis was also used so that zero aggregation is performed on the dependent variable.

where $FT_{r,c}$ equals 1 if respondent r from country c supports trade liberalization and 0 if r opposes trade liberalization; S_r is the respondent's sex, which equals 1 if male and 0 if female; X_r is a set of additional explanatory variables controlling for potential determinants of trade policy preferences; D_c is a set of country dummy variables and $F(.)$ is the standard normal distribution function.

Baseline specifications are presented in Tables 2 & 3 for the respective years. Models (I) to (V) in both tables use probit estimation analysis because the dependent variable is binary. Marginal effects are reported; they are interpreted as the effect on the probability of supporting free trade for a discrete change as the dependent variable changes from 0 to 1.

Country dummies are included in all models to pick-up any country specific effects. After controlling for these variables, the coefficient on MALE does not substantially change and therefore, these variables do not appear to explain much of the gender gap.

The positive coefficients on MALE across all columns of Tables 2 & 3 indicate that males are more likely than females to support trade liberalization regardless of what variables are included or what baseline methods are used. The first column (Model I) in both tables only control for age and marital status. This is to demonstrate that the gender gap does exist when controlling for basic demographics such as age and marital status as well as country fixed effects. The second specification includes skill level⁸, employment status, religious beliefs and political affiliation. Model III in these tables include country level data while the fourth specification adds sectors to the analysis. Model (V) is the same specification as Model IV, but omits anyone who responded with 'neither' so that the dependent variable is strictly support or oppose trade liberalization.

⁸Remember skill level is a synonym for education in this study.

Education level is a categorical variable that has been converted into six dummy variables: no formal qualification, lowest formal qualification, above lowest formal qualification, secondary completed, more than secondary education completed and university completed. From these six variables, an additional dummy variable is created called SKILLED. A respondent is considered skilled if they have more than secondary completed or university completed, in which case SKILLED equals 1, and 0 otherwise.⁹ The coefficient on SKILLED is positive and statistically significant across all specifications where it is included. This implies that respondents with an education above a secondary diploma are approximately 16 percentage points more likely than someone with a secondary degree or less to support trade liberalization. This is consistent with conventional trade theory, which predicts that higher skilled individuals are more likely to benefit from free trade. This is also consistent with Scheve & Slaughter (2001), Beaulieu *et al.* (2004) and Mayda & Rodrik (2005) who all obtain this same result while using three different data sets.

The employment variables yield intuitive results as well. The possible responses for a respondent when asked “[What is your] current employment status?” are: fulltime, part time, semi-part time, helping a family member, student, retired, unemployed, housewife/househusband, permanently disabled and not in the labor force. From these responses, four dummy variables were created. EMPLOYED consists of all workers who reported themselves as ‘full time’, ‘part time’, ‘semi-part time’ or ‘helping a family member’. The STUDENT and UNEMPLOYED variables are self-explanatory. The NOTINLABFORCE variable consists of housewives/househusbands, the permanently disabled, non-labor force participants and re-

⁹Originally the education dummies used to construct SKILLED were included instead of SKILLED itself. Upon computing an F-test, which determined that including SKILLED in the estimations instead of these dummies did not statistically change the results, SKILLED is included for more concise analysis.

tires.¹⁰ The omitted variable is EMPLOYED. The coefficient on STUDENT is positive and statistically significant; students are more likely than those who are employed to support trade liberalization. This is expected because students are more likely to be currently learning about the benefits of trade while those who are employed are more likely to have been directly or indirectly negatively influenced by trade through previous personal, co-worker or spousal job loss. Also, given the above analysis on the SKILLED coefficient, one would expect students, in general, to be more supportive of trade (Peng & Shin, 2001). This is especially true for this sample because only 27% of the students have not completed high-school (and are therefore regarded as unskilled) while 73% are currently a college or university student (and are therefore considered skilled).

Additional intuitive results include the negative and statistically significant coefficients on NOTINLABFORCE and UNEMPLOYED. Individuals that report to be not in the labor force or unemployed are less likely than those who are employed to support trade by 3 to 4 percentage points. It is possible that those who are unemployed or not in the labor force feel threatened by perceived increased competition from foreign firms. Trade liberalization leads to adjustment in employment across firms and sectors and although this may not increase the unemployment rate, it may increase uncertainty in the labor market which would affect unemployed workers directly. Note that the coefficients are slightly lower in the 2003 data set for all employment variables suggesting that employment effects are less substantial in 2003.

The RELIGIOUS variable is equal to 1 if the respondent claimed to be part of any religion,

¹⁰These employment categories were constructed based on intuitive thinking, but F-tests confirmed the legitimacy of their construction.

and 0 if the respondent declared ‘no religion’. Religious people are 4 to 7 percentage points less likely to support trade liberalization than those who are not part of any particular religion. This is not surprising as many religions have restrictions on consumption and activities, which might generate more socially conservative people. The question regarding the respondent’s political affiliation is broken down into whether the respondent is left, center, right or has no party affiliation¹¹ Those who consider themselves right-wing, or ‘liberal’, are more likely than those who consider themselves to be left-wing, or ‘conservative’, to support trade liberalization. This result is only statistically significant in the models where sector of employment variables are not included. This could reveal a correlation between the sector the respondent is employed and their political views as many government policies directly effect how much money people make compared to how much the government gives and takes. Lastly, those who report themselves as ‘center’ do not support or oppose trade any more than those who are left-wing.

Country level data such as GDP per capita is not included in the 1995 and 2003 ISSP data sets. Female labor market participation rates are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) for both years. The inclusion of this variable will capture the amount of the gender gap that is related to the percentage of women in the labor force. GDP per capita data are collected from the WDI as well and are reported in year 2000 USD for all countries. This variable will determine if there is a difference in the gender gap between rich and poor countries. Also, trade openness will be included at the country level to determine

¹¹This variable exhibits great problems in most data because this question usually asks the respondent to rank themselves by ‘left’ or ‘right’. However, these classifications express very different views in many countries. The same goes for the question of are you ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’? This does not differentiate from the contradicting interpretations of economically or socially liberal/conservative. There is potential to associate political variables with instrumental variables, but this data set does not allow for such substitution.

if simply living in a country that is highly open to trade might sway the gender gap one way or another. Openness is measured as a country's exports plus imports all divided by GDP. Openness data is obtained from the Penn World Tables (PWT).

Country level data are included in model (III). GDP per capita displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which implies that individuals in richer countries are more likely to support trade liberalization. Note that, as shown below, this result is not robust because of the nature of the macro variables included in micro data regressions. Further analysis on GDP per capita is performed using BOD. The female labor force participation rate of a country has a positive effect on the support for trade liberalization in the 1995 data but has a negative effect in the 2003 data. Both coefficients are statistically significant. It is puzzling that the coefficients switch between the years. The OPENNESS coefficient displays a small but positive coefficient that is statistically significant in both years. Although very small, this result is intuitive because countries that are more open to trade will also likely have citizens that support trade.

Models (IV) and (V) in Tables 2 and 3 include sector specific variables. Nine categorical variables were constructed using four-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes; aggregated at the two-digit level and then organized into nine sectors. One problem with this sector data is that because many of the respondents are not working, the number of observations is much lower. Also, some countries had zero respondents asked about occupation, which severely decreases the number of observations. Lastly, about half of the countries in the 1995 data use the 1968 ISCO while the rest use 1988 ISCO. Therefore, before any analysis can be completed, the 1968 ISCO codes were matched accordingly to the 1988 ISCO. Due to changes in definitions, this may not be 100% accurate. The 2003 data

are all reported in 1988 ISCO.¹² These regressions are run using only individuals who are employed in the survey. There are nine sectors; PROFESSIONALS is the excluded variable. If a respondent works in a given sector, that variable equals 1 and the rest of the sectors equal 0 for that individual. International trade generally has a more positive impact for those who are high-skilled while those who are low skilled are generally negatively impacted by trade. However, skill level is already controlled for in these regressions. Therefore, an additional explanation for the results is required. It is possible that these results below are due to differences in preferences in traded and non-traded sectors. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) demonstrate that those working in traded sectors are less likely to support trade liberalization than those in non-traded sectors.

The coefficients on MANAGERS, which includes legislators, senior officials and managers, is insignificant implying that there is not much difference in trade liberalization support between professionals and managers. This is not necessarily surprising because many of the occupations in the professional and managerial sectors are far from traded professions. ASSOCPROS and CLERKS are also insignificant in the 1995 data, but statistically significant in the 2003 data. However, all of these coefficients are negative suggesting respondents in these sectors are less likely than professionals to support trade liberalization. Some, but not a lot of the professions in these sectors are traded which would explain some of the protectionist views, but also the small magnitude of the coefficients.

The remaining five sectors experience negative coefficients and are all statistically significant in both years. The highest magnitude is on AGRICFISHERS, which consists of

¹²To see the list of occupations at the four digit level and to see how these sectors variables are constructed, contact the author.

skilled agricultural and fishery workers. Based on the work of Mayda and Rodrik (2005), this result is not surprising. Agriculture is one of the most traded sectors worldwide. Most occupations contained in SERVICESALES, CRAFTTRADES, PLANTMACHOPS and ELEMENTOCCS are also traded jobs making these sectors heavily traded as well. From this, one should expect that individuals in these sectors would support trade less than individuals in non-traded sectors, such as the omitted PROFESSIONALS.

These results are interesting, but the lack of detail regarding the traded and non-traded sector analysis provides motivation for further analysis of sectors. Perhaps there are more women than men in traded sectors compared to non-traded sectors. If this is the case, it could explain why women are more protectionist in the support for international trade liberalization.

The overall issue is whether there is a true gender difference in trade liberalization preferences, and whether this gender gap reflects differences between males and females in endowments or other observable characteristics? An estimation method that would address this issue is the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (BOD). This allows one to perform the regressions on males and females separately and then decompose the results to show how much of the gender difference can be explained by differences in endowments and characteristics of males and females. This estimation method is described and employed in Section 5.

3 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition

We have shown that there is a gender gap in preferences on trade policy after controlling for a number of individual characteristics as well as country characteristics. The goal of the

paper is to determine whether the gender gap can be explained by observable characteristics at the individual level (such as education/skill) or at the country level such as GDP per capita. In order to determine whether there exists a gender gap that is not explained by observable characteristics we adopt an approach used in the literature on gender pay gaps. As the name implies, this approach, known as the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition (or BOD), decomposes the estimated difference in trade preferences between males and females into the part that is explained by observable characteristics and the part that is unexplained by these characteristics. We now use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to determine how much of the gender gap is explained by differences between males and females in endowments and characteristics versus differences in attributes (coefficients).

Although conventionally used to decipher differences in the gender pay gap, this study uses BOD to determine differences in the gender gap in the support for trade liberalization. In this method of modeling, gender is not included as a covariate in the regressions. Instead, the model estimates each specification separately for males and females. The intuition of the decomposition can be illustrated using a linear regression framework where the equation is estimated separately for each gender:

$$FT_r = \alpha + \beta_r X_r + \epsilon_r \quad (2)$$

where FT_r equals 1 if respondent r supports trade liberalization and 0 if r opposes trade liberalization; X_r is a set of additional explanatory variables controlling for potential determinants of trade policy preferences; α is a constant and ϵ_r is an error term. Assuming that $E[\epsilon_r] = 0$, the expected value of FT_r is

$$E[FT_r] = \alpha + \beta_r X_r \quad (3)$$

Therefore, the equation used in the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for males and females is

$$\widetilde{FT}_r = \widetilde{\alpha} + \widetilde{\beta}_r X_r \quad (4)$$

where \widetilde{FT}_r , $\widetilde{\alpha}$ and $\widetilde{\beta}_r$ are fitted values.

The difference in the support for trade liberalization between males and females - the gender gap - is derived from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition equation as follows:

$$\widetilde{FT}_r^m - \widetilde{FT}_r^f = (\widetilde{\alpha}^m - \widetilde{\alpha}^f) + (\widetilde{\beta}_r^m X_r^m - \widetilde{\beta}_r^f X_r^f) \quad (5)$$

This model is commonly expressed as,

$$\widetilde{FT}_r^m - \widetilde{FT}_r^f = [(X_r^m - X_r^f)\widetilde{\beta}_r^m] + [(\widetilde{\beta}_r^m - \widetilde{\beta}_r^f)X_r^f + (\widetilde{\alpha}^m - \widetilde{\alpha}^f)] \quad (6)$$

where $X_r^{m,f}$ are vectors of means from the equation of males or females; $\widetilde{\beta}_r^{m,f}$ are estimates from regressing on only males or females.¹³

The BOD calculates how much is explained by the individual's endowments and the amount that is unexplained based on the coefficients. The more that is explained by the endowments, the more that is explained by covariates included in the models. Table 4 displays the results from gender specific linear regression model, which uses the same specifications

¹³This Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is altered from a description used in Gosse (2002).

as in model (II) of Tables 2 & 3. Columns (I) & (III) are males only and (II) & (IV) are females only. This table includes the results from the country dummies if the reader would like to see how males' and females' trade opinions differ in a particular country. This is shown in Figures 1 & 2, which plot country specific MALE coefficients against GDP per capita. Notice that as GDP per capita rises, so does the coefficient on MALE. Figures 1 & 2 also show that there is a slight upward trend between MALE coefficients and female labor force participation rates in both years. There does not appear to be a trend in MALE support for free trade and the level of country openness in Figures 1 & 2.

The BOD specifications (1) and (2) in Table 5 use the stored estimates from the regressions in Table 4 to calculate the gender difference in trade liberalization support and how much of that difference is explained by the included covariates and how much is not explained, as shown in equation 7. The first row of Table 5 reports the observed gender difference between males and females after controlling for the observed characteristics. There is a 9 percentage point difference in support for trade liberalization among males relative to females in 1995 and this difference is 8 percentage points in 2003.

The lower panel reports the decomposition. There are three different computations of each BOD. Weights are given based on the two groups involved. When $W=1$ the reference group is males, when $W=0$ the reference group is females, and when $W=0.4824$ or $W=0.4815$, the reference group is the ratio of the high-outcome group (males) to the sum of the high- and low-outcome (females) groups. The outcome groups are chosen arbitrarily because of the binary nature of the dependent variable. Notice that the amount explained by the averaged weights falls between the two extremes of 1 and 0. The explained and unexplained coefficients add up to the total difference (9 percent and 8 percent respectively). The "explained"

coefficient of 0.021 under $W=1$ means that only 2 percentage points of the 9 percentage point difference between males and females is explained by the observable characteristics in the 1995 data. This means that a 7 percentage point difference between males and females is not explained. For the 2003 data, only 1.2 percentage points of the 8 percentage point difference between males and females is explained while 6.7 a percentage point difference is unexplained. The results are similar when we use the different reference groups. This implies that a only small portion of the gender gap is explained by the X_r variables and most of the gap is captured by the model's constants for the male and female estimations.

Due to the prominent nature of this gender gap, further analysis still is required. To start, country specific BODs are now estimated. Specifications (II) and (IV) from Tables 2 & 3 are estimated for every country individually and for each gender. The estimates from these regressions are stored and BOD is performed and tabulated in Tables 6 and 7. These country gender differences are then organized by GDP per capita. Table 6 contains specification (II) from Tables 2 & 3 in 1995, while Table 7 presents the results for the 2003 data. These results verify that the gender gap exists in more rich countries than poor countries and that the size of the gap is larger in rich countries than in poor countries. One possible method to test this theory is to take the gender gap means in support for free trade, and regress them on country level data. This exercise should be investigated in the future.

4 Additional Statistics and Regression Results

A problem with many survey data questions that is generally not addressed is the framing issue. As shown by Hiscox (2006) who uses US data from the TESS program, the framing

of a question can influence how a respondent answers a question about trade policy. In the TESS, all respondents were asked the same question, “*Do you favour or oppose increasing trade with other nations?*” However, some respondents were given a negative introduction toward trade, which pertained to people losing their jobs due to trade. These respondents were 17% less likely to support trade than someone with no introduction to trade before the question was asked. Other respondents were given a positive introduction to trade, which mentioned how trade can lower prices for consumers. These respondents revealed no difference in their responses compared to those who received no introduction to trade. So do the questions regarding trade in the studies mentioned above have framing issues?

It is possible that the framing of the question may in part explain the gender bias in trade preferences. Consider the statement studied in the ISSP data set; “[*Respondent’s Country*] should limit the imports of goods from foreign nations in order to protect its national economy”. This statement implies that trade is bad for the economy and as Hiscox (2006) demonstrates, this could increase the proportion of people who respond in favour of trade protectionism. A couple studies mention this problem, but dismiss it by arguing that it is the variation across individuals that matters and so this will not affect the results.¹⁴ This is true, as long as certain groups of individuals are not more sensitive to framing issues than others. However, Hiscox demonstrates that uneducated people are more sensitive to framing issues. Although Hiscox does not explore whether males and females are affected differently, it is possible. Perhaps females are more sensitive to framing issues than men. Given the female protectionism analysis above, females may be more likely than men to agree with the statement above because it is framed in a protectionist nature.

¹⁴See Beaulieu *et al.* (2004) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005).

Table 9 provides *prima facie* evidence that framing may not be an important issue in understanding the gender gap in trade preferences. Notice that all of the results reported in Table 9 found a statistically significant gender difference except Baker (2003). The difference in his results might lie in the data he is using. Baker uses data from Wall Street Journal Americas (1998). He uses two different trade questions to construct his one dependent variable¹⁵. Table 9 presents all of the questions asked from their respective data sets along with a ranking of the fairness of each question. The first of Baker's questions contains a positive bias of trade while the second one is neutral. Using these questions to construct the dependent variable, Baker (2003) does not find a gender gap. The last column of Table 9 presents the fairness rankings of each study. It also shows the data set used in each study. The rankings are determined by how 'fair' or 'unbiased' the questions are. The amount of bias is measured by: '-' implies a negative bias, '0' implies no bias and '+' implies a positive bias. Therefore, for these observations to match this theory that the framing of the question might actually explain much of the gender gap in trade liberalization support, one should expect that as the questions should become less negatively biased, the coefficients decrease and approach zero (and/or become less significant). Based on Table 9 it is not clear that the gender gap is strongly affected by the framing of the question. There is a large range of estimated gender differences in the the studies with negative and neutral framing. There is only one study with positive framing. Similarly, it is not clear from this table that the stronger support for trade by skilled workers is explained by the framing of the question.

Table 11 contains survey question summary statistics that relate to national identity and reveal respondents' opinions on immigration and globalization matters. There are seven

¹⁵This could be a limitation as the questions differ substantially.

variables that are the same across the two years and five that are unique to the 2003 data set. Table 12 shows the OLS regression results from including these variables in the analysis. In general, these results are very intuitive, but do not explain the gender gap.

First analyzing the variables that arise in both years, respondents who believe that it is important to live in the country in which one is born are less likely to support trade liberalization by 10 to 11 percentage points. Those who support their country's decisions on political issues even if that country is in the wrong are also less likely to support trade liberalization by 6 to 7 percentage points. Furthermore, individuals who are citizens of the country in which they currently reside are 6 to 7 percentage points less likely to support international trade. These three survey questions reveal how strongly one feels toward national identity, how important their country is to them and how they feel international activities are threatening their country's nationalism. Therefore, it is expected that these coefficients are all negative and statistically significant. If the respondent lives in an urban area, then he/she is more likely to support trade liberalization than someone from a rural community by 2 to 4 percentage points. Also, a respondent who considers themselves to be above middle social class is more likely than a lower class individual to support trade liberalization. These two variables relate to people that generally have higher incomes suggesting that these higher income individuals are more likely to support trade liberalization. As seen below, this is not the case. Perhaps then it is merely people who participate in a higher income lifestyle that support international trade. Oddly, those who are proud of their country's economic achievements are no more likely to support trade liberalization than someone who is not proud. This is somewhat puzzling because international trade is an economic achievement; therefore this variable being correlated with trade support would be an expected result.

Lastly, those who think international bodies such as the United Nations should be in control of international problems, such as pollution, are actually less likely to support international trade. This is surprising because the WTO organizes trade at the international level, which is exactly what these individuals are supporting.

The 2003 data set contains some additional interesting questions regarding immigration. Three of the variables; `IMMINCCRIME`, `IMMTAKEJOBS` and `IMMGETTOOMUCH$`, contain negative connotations toward immigrants. All three of these variables display negative and statistically significant coefficients. This suggests that anyone that agrees with these statements is also less likely to support trade liberalization. On the other hand, `IMMGOODECONOMY` and `IMMDIVERSECULTURE` both contain positive connotations toward immigrants, and yet both are statistically insignificant. All of these results from this supplementary data suggest that those who are opposed to most international activities do not consider international trade an exception.

Robustness checks were performed and additional variables were controlled for to ensure this gender gap is truly robust. None of these results are shown but are available upon request. Firstly, the dependent variable is reported as a categorical variable in which there are five responses as discussed in section 3. Ordered probit estimation is employed to ensure that the aggregation of the trade variable or omission of the ‘neither’ responses has any adverse effects on the results presented in section 3. The ordered probit interprets the values in the dependent variable as “the higher the better”. Therefore, a positive coefficient on `MALE`, for example, is interpreted as for every increase in the dependent variable, males are more likely than females to disagree with the statement of interest or support trade liberalization. These results are quite consistent with the results in section 3.

Family incomes were changed into USD from the respondent's own country currency for the given year of the survey using exchange rate data from the PWT. Then, a variable was constructed which equaled 1 if the respondent earned more than USD35,000 per annum, and 0 otherwise. This number was chosen because it was also used in Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) and because it represents a developed nation low-income individual. This may seem biased upward, but there are more countries in the data set that are developed nations. A family income variable was constructed in the same manner. Also, individual and family incomes were separated into groups of five; the first group being zero to USD20,000 per annum, then USD20,000 to USD40,000, USD40,000 to USD60,000, USD60,000 to USD80,000 and the last group consisted of USD80,000+. None of the income variables had any effect on the results.

Trade union membership, working for the private or public sector and self-employment were included, but these variables all experience low observations as many countries were not asked these questions and also, some people cannot answer questions on these topics because they are not working. After including these variables in a number of regressions, there was no change in the gender gap.

In addition to including age-squared in the regressions, age group dummies were included instead. Group 1 ranged 14-34; group 2 ranged 35-55; group 3 ranged 56-76 and group 4 ranged 77-97. Each group ranges an equal 21 years. This grouping made no statistically different changes in the gender gap. Interacting these groups with MALE and SKILLED also had zero effect on the gender gap suggesting that the arguments of Burgoon and Hiscox (2004), that the gender gap only exists in older cohorts and higher educated people, is not true when several countries are taken into consideration.

5 Why are women more protectionist than men?

Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) suggest that women are more protectionist than men since they are more risk-averse.¹⁶ These authors also conclude that the gender gap only exists among older cohorts, but there is no conclusive evidence that the gender gap exists only among older cohorts in any of the studies mentioned above. Studies analyzing individual support for social, welfare and tax policies provide evidence that females are more supportive than males for different kinds of welfare and social assistance programs, income redistribution and the provision of public goods.¹⁷ Explanations for this stem from the fact that women tend to sacrifice more of their professional careers to bear and nurture children, which then leads women to support generous welfare measures such as maternity leave, child care and tax-breaks more than men (Iversen & Soskice, 2001). Another explanation is that women tend to be more compassionate toward the support and treatment of the less-fortunate members of society, and less driven by the personal monetary impacts of government policies (Gilligan, 1982; Welch & Hibbing, 1992).

Risk-aversion as a basis for trade preferences would heighten the salience of the disadvantages to trade liberalization such as immediate job loss, low-skilled workers tend to gain less than high-skilled workers and increasing wage-inequality. These disadvantages to trade

¹⁶Greater female risk-aversion is confirmed by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999). These authors conduct a meta-analysis of 150 studies; all of which analyzed differences in risk-taking behaviours by males and females. For similar analysis, see Arch (1993), Schubert, Gysler, Brown & Bachinger (1999) & (2000) and Bernasek & Shwiff (2001). The studies were grouped as either a ‘type of task’ (ex. self-reported characteristics versus observed characteristics), ‘task content’ (ex. smoking vs. sex) and age levels. The authors found that in 14 out of 16 risk-taking behaviours, males were more risk-taking than females. Most notably, the gender gap was largest in intellectual and physical skill risk-taking while the gap was statistically non-existent in the smoking group. Although the study concludes that, in general, males are more risk-taking than females, there are age-related trends for specific activities and characteristics.

¹⁷See Gilligan (1982), Kornhauser (1987), Welch & Hibbing (1992), Alvarez & McCaffery (2001), Iversen & Soskice (2001).

are observed and discussed more frequently in the news and in individual life than are the gains, such as long-run economic growth and job creation, cheaper prices, increased quality of goods and increased varieties (Trefler, 2004).

Can gender differences in risk aversion explain the gender gap in support for trade liberalization? The Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is a decreasing function of income. In developed countries like Canada and the United States, there exists a gap in incomes between men and women. To the extent that the risk aversion should be declining with the level of income, then two empirical regularities should be able to be identified. First, within a given country, the estimated coefficient on the gender variable should decline in magnitude (if not disappear) after controlling for the income of the individual respondent. When specifications including income were estimated, the estimated gender coefficient did not change in magnitude. Second, we should see more opposition by both men and women in poorer countries than we see in richer countries. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that men and women in poorer countries tend to support trade liberalization less than richer countries. Finally, if greater risk aversion of females is an inherent characteristic of the gender and unrelated to income, then we should see a consistent gap in support for trade liberalization across all countries. This is not found to be the case, as the gender gap in support for free trade does not exist in poorer countries and increases with country income in richer countries. This theory may be examined further in future studies by comparing changes in GDP per capita to changes in gender gap coefficients over time.

6 Conclusion

This paper addresses the gender gap in the support for international trade liberalization; why do females support trade less than males? It employs the International Social Survey Programme's *National Identity* surveys from 1995 and 2003, along with country level data from the World Development Indicators and the Penn World Tables. After demonstrating that probit and OLS regression analysis produce very similar results, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is used on the OLS estimates to determine the robustness of the gender gap and determine whether there is an economic explanation as to why this gender gap exists.

Using these methods and data, the gender gap is found to be very robust after controlling for a wide range of demographic variables such as education, employment, age, religion, political affiliation and marital status. Sector level data is included in this study, which was constructed from the 4-digit ISCO codes included in the study. In addition, country dummy variables are included to capture any country specific effects. Lastly, GDP per capita, female labor market participation rates and a country's openness to trade are controlled for in the model. Although most of the results deriving from the variables just discussed produce intuitive results, none of the gender gap is explained using these data.

The paper then turns to Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to try and solve the gender gap. This estimation method attempts to determine if the gender gap in support for trade liberalization is a difference in male and female endowments or their attributes. Given the different variables controlled for throughout this study, it appears as though this gender gap may be strictly differences in immeasurable attributes as the gap is very robust. The BOD method does confirm that the gender gap nearly disappears in poor countries, but why this

is true is still unknown.

Although there currently appears to be no evidence as to why this gender gap exists, a couple of theories are still outstanding. As aforementioned, women may simply be more sensitive to the framing of survey questions, causing them to answer more towards the bias, as in the question of interest in this study. This issue, however, cannot be addressed with the ISSP data sets. Also, are males or females more likely to lose their jobs due to increased trade liberalization? If women are more prominent in traded sectors, then according to Mayda and Rodrik (2005), women would be less likely to support trade liberalization. Examining traded and non-traded sectors more closely could provide some explanation as to why this gender gap is currently unexplainable. Lastly, although it is not likely that risk aversion will explain any of this gender gap; women are in general more risk averse. However, risk aversion as a possible explanation for the gender gap cannot be estimated empirically with the ISSP data sets as they do not contain a proxy for risk.

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Table 1
Contingency Tables on Gender and Trade Policy Preferences
ISSP 1995

	Female		Male		Total
Strongly Agree	3,711	27%	2,925	23%	6,636
Agree	4,821	36%	4,005	32%	8,826
Neither	2,540	19%	2,248	18%	4,788
Disagree	2,004	15%	2,546	20%	4,550
Strongly Disagree	503	4%	934	7%	1,437
Total	13,579	100%	12,658	100%	26,237

ISSP 2003

	Female		Male		Total
Strongly Agree	3,459	21%	2,928	19%	6,387
Agree	6,114	37%	5,140	33%	11,254
Neither	3,403	21%	2,906	19%	6,309
Disagree	2,838	17%	3,348	22%	6,186
Strongly Disagree	643	4%	1,153	7%	1,796
Total	16,457	100%	15,475	100%	31,932

Reported in Number of Respondents and Percentage Points

Source: ISSP 1995 and 2003.

Table 2
Baseline Results for ISSP 1995: Probit Estimation

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
MALE	0.089 (0.010)**	0.076 (0.010)**	0.076 (0.010)**	0.092 (0.015)**	0.115 (0.018)**
AGE	0.003 (0.001)*	0.002 -0.001	0.002 -0.001	0.002 -0.001	0.002 -0.002
AGE ²	0 (0.000)**	0 (0.000)*	0 (0.000)*	0 0	0 0
MARRIED	-0.008 -0.007	-0.003 -0.007	-0.003 -0.007	-0.001 -0.013	-0.01 -0.014
SKILLED		0.126 (0.015)**	0.126 (0.015)**	0.08 (0.017)**	0.106 (0.022)**
STUDENT		0.046 (0.020)*	0.046 (0.020)*		
NOTINLABFORCE		-0.036 (0.006)**	-0.036 (0.006)**		
UNEMPLOYED		-0.028 (0.011)*	-0.028 (0.011)*		
RELIGIOUS		-0.046 (0.010)**	-0.046 (0.010)**	-0.049 (0.015)**	-0.076 (0.020)**
CENTER		0.009 -0.016	0.009 -0.016	0.002 -0.028	-0.001 -0.036
RIGHT		0.049 (0.020)*	0.049 (0.020)*	0.029 -0.027	0.028 -0.035
NOPARTYAFFIL		-0.008 -0.015	-0.008 -0.015	0.012 -0.026	0.016 -0.029
GDPPERCAP			0.008 (0.000)**		
FEMLABFORPAR			0.004 (0.000)**		
OPENNESS			0.003 (0.000)**		
MANAGERS				0.036 -0.022	0.029 -0.024
ASSOCPROS				-0.012 -0.013	-0.012 -0.016
CLERKS				-0.019 -0.025	-0.029 -0.028
SERVICESALES				-0.042 (0.019)*	-0.062 (0.023)**
AGRICFISHERS				-0.105 (0.028)**	-0.143 (0.031)**
CRAFTTRADES				-0.08 (0.017)**	-0.108 (0.022)**
PLANTMACHOPS				-0.074 (0.018)**	-0.104 (0.022)**
ELEMENTOCCS				-0.091 (0.019)**	-0.12 (0.026)**
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CONSTANT					
Observations	26237	26237	26237	9815	8139
R-squared					

Source: ISSP 1995, WDI & PWT. Marginal effects reported for probit models. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Models (I) to (IV) all differ by variables included in the regressions. Models (IV) to (VI) have the same specifications, but (IV) includes respondent's that answered 'neither', (V) omits these respondents.

Table 3
Baseline Results for ISSP 2003: Probit Estimation

	Probit Regression Estimation				
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
MALE	0.077 (0.008)**	0.072 (0.008)**	0.068 (0.008)**	0.085 (0.006)**	0.105 (0.008)**
AGE	0.003 (0.001)**	0.003 (0.001)**	0.003 (0.001)*	0.003 -0.002	0.003 -0.002
AGE ²	0 (0.000)**	0 (0.000)**	0 (0.000)**	0 0	0 0
MARRIED	-0.006 -0.006	-0.003 -0.006	-0.001 -0.006	-0.011 -0.009	-0.021 -0.011
SKILLED		0.125 (0.013)**	0.123 (0.013)**	0.081 (0.010)**	0.107 (0.014)**
STUDENT		0.041 (0.015)**	0.043 (0.016)**		
NOTINLABFORCE		-0.01 -0.008	-0.011 -0.008		
UNEMPLOYED		-0.021 -0.011	-0.02 -0.012		
RELIGIOUS		-0.049 (0.010)**	-0.052 (0.010)**	-0.045 (0.012)**	-0.075 (0.016)**
CENTER		0.004 -0.015	0.004 -0.015	0.001 -0.018	-0.008 -0.025
RIGHT		0.03 (0.013)*	0.031 (0.013)*	0.035 (0.017)*	0.028 -0.021
NOPARTYAFFIL		-0.009 -0.016	-0.008 -0.016	0.002 -0.018	-0.004 -0.026
GDPPERCAP			0.007 (0.000)**		
FEMLABFORPAR			-0.009 (0.000)**		
OPENNESS			0 (0.000)**		
MANAGERS				0.011 -0.015	0.009 -0.015
ASSOCPROS				-0.042 (0.012)**	-0.055 (0.016)**
CLERKS				-0.077 (0.012)**	-0.102 (0.017)**
SERVICESALES				-0.089 (0.014)**	-0.115 (0.018)**
AGRICFISHERS				-0.157 (0.019)**	-0.219 (0.026)**
CRAFTTRADES				-0.111 (0.016)**	-0.158 (0.019)**
PLANTMACHOPS				-0.115 (0.014)**	-0.158 (0.017)**
ELEMENTOCCS				-0.087 (0.014)**	-0.124 (0.015)**
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
CONSTANT					
Observations	31932	31715	30058	16684	13240
R-squared					

Source: ISSP 2003, WDI & PWT. Marginal effects reported for probit models. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Models (I) to (IV) all differ by variables included in the regressions. Models (IV) to (VI) have the same specifications, but (IV) includes respondent's that answered 'neither', (V) omits these respondents.

Table 4
Results from Gender Specific Oaxaca Regressions

	ISSP 1995		ISSP 2003	
	Male (I)	Female (II)	Male (III)	Female (IV)
AGE	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004 (0.002)*	0.001 (0.001)
AGE ²	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)*	0.000 (0.000)**	0.000 (0.000)
MARRIED	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)
SKILLED	0.151 (0.020)**	0.094 (0.018)**	0.16 (0.019)**	0.087 (0.013)**
STUDENT	0.053 (0.028)	0.044 (0.019)*	0.04 (0.020)*	0.037 (0.017)*
NOTINLABFORCE	-0.047 (0.011)**	-0.028 (0.008)**	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.008)*
UNEMPLOYED	-0.037 (0.015)*	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	-0.031 (0.014)*
RELIGIOUS	-0.058 (0.010)**	-0.037 (0.012)**	-0.055 (0.013)**	-0.042 (0.011)**
CENTER	0.020 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.001 (0.018)	0.005 (0.014)
RIGHT	0.059 (0.023)*	0.036 (0.021)	0.034 (0.014)*	0.021 (0.014)
NOPARTYAFFIL	0.000 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.017)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.017)
Germany West	0.329 (0.006)**	0.306 (0.005)**	0.271 (0.010)**	0.229 (0.006)**
Germany East	0.163 (0.005)**	0.097 (0.006)**	0.209 (0.012)**	0.173 (0.007)**
Great Britain	0.059 (0.007)**	0.058 (0.005)**	0.037 (0.008)**	0.039 (0.004)**
United States	0.019 (0.011)	0.071 (0.006)**	0.03 (0.005)**	-0.003 (0.004)
Austria	0.125 (0.009)**	0.104 (0.007)**	0.169 (0.011)**	0.085 (0.007)**
Hungary	0.049 (0.013)**	0.074 (0.011)**	0.063 (0.011)**	0.031 (0.006)**
Italy	0.162 (0.012)**	0.171 (0.011)**		
Ireland	0.188 (0.020)**	0.137 (0.016)**	0.176 (0.008)**	0.146 (0.005)**
Netherlands	0.305 (0.009)**	0.289 (0.008)**		
Norway	0.187 (0.008)**	0.217 (0.008)**	0.276 (0.006)**	0.192 (0.004)**
Sweden	0.183 (0.010)**	0.152 (0.008)**	0.297 (0.009)**	0.186 (0.005)**
Czech Republic	0.153 (0.010)**	0.192 (0.008)**	0.196 (0.012)**	0.100 (0.006)**

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 4 (Continued)
Results from Gender Specific OLS Oaxaca Regressions

	ISSP 1995		ISSP 2003	
	Male (I)	Female (II)	Male (III)	Female (IV)
Slovenia	0.204 (0.010)**	0.179 (0.008)**	0.254 (0.012)**	0.118 (0.007)**
Poland	0.069 (0.012)**	0.133 (0.010)**	0.051 (0.012)**	0.011 -0.007
Bulgaria	0.007 (0.012)	0.04 (0.009)**	0.055 (0.013)**	0.046 (0.007)**
Russia	0.056 (0.005)**	0.151 (0.003)**	0.082 (0.008)**	0.082 (0.005)**
New Zealand	0.173 (0.018)**	0.178 (0.014)**	0.160 (0.010)**	0.085 (0.006)**
Canada	0.185 (0.012)**	0.184 (0.009)**	0.196 (0.008)**	0.065 (0.005)**
Philippines	0.062 (0.014)**	0.146 (0.011)**	-0.015 (0.011)	0.002 (0.007)
Israel Jews			0.142 (0.009)**	0.100 (0.007)**
Israel Arabs			-0.144 (0.010)**	-0.091 (0.009)**
Japan	0.294 (0.014)**	0.227 (0.010)**	0.200 (0.010)**	0.113 (0.007)**
Spain	0.043 (0.009)**	0.055 (0.008)**	0.079 (0.012)**	0.031 (0.007)**
Latvia	-0.014 (0.011)	0.087 (0.011)**	0.024 (0.006)**	-0.017 (0.006)**
Slovak Republic	0.181 (0.014)**	0.180 (0.009)**	0.007 (0.011)	-0.031 (0.006)**
France			0.178 (0.008)**	0.122 (0.004)**
Portugal			0.163 (0.012)**	0.125 (0.007)**
Chile			0.161 (0.010)**	0.080 (0.009)**
Denmark			0.387 (0.005)**	0.300 (0.003)**
Switzerland			0.379 (0.007)**	0.273 (0.008)**
Venezuela			0.176 (0.014)**	0.262 (0.007)**
Finland			0.296 (0.006)**	0.242 (0.004)**
Taiwan			0.251 (0.009)**	0.135 (0.008)**
South Korea			0.106 (0.006)**	0.078 (0.004)**
Uruguay			0.029 (0.010)**	0.029 (0.004)**
Constant	0.132 (0.057)*	0.039 (0.036)	0.049 (0.039)	0.139 (0.026)**
Observations	12658	13579	15373	16342
R-squared	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.07

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

Table 5
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of
Model (II) in Tables 2 & 3

	1995	2003
	(1)	(2)
Gender Difference	0.090 (0.030)**	0.079 (0.025)**
<u>Linear Decomposition</u>		
<u>W=1</u>		
Explained	0.021 (0.034)	0.012 (0.028)
Unexplained	0.070 (0.010)**	0.067 (0.009)**
<u>W=0</u>		
Explained	0.012 (0.027)	0.010 (0.022)
Unexplained	0.078 (0.010)**	0.070 (0.009)**
<u>W=0.4824</u>		
Explained	0.016 (0.029)	
Unexplained	0.074 (0.007)**	
<u>W=0.4815</u>		
Explained		0.011 (0.024)
Unexplained		0.068 (0.006)**

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Weights are given based on the two groups involved. When W=1 the reference group is males, when W=0 the reference group is females, and when W=0.4824 or W=0.4815, the reference group is the ratio of the high-outcome group (males) to the sum of the high- and low-outcome (females) groups.

Table 6
Country Specific Oaxaca Decompositions Sorted by GDP per Capita: ISSP 1995

Country	GDP per Cap. '95	Difference	Std. Err.	Explained	Std. Err.	Unexplained	Std. Err.
Japan	\$35,322	0.190	(0.030)**	0.023	(0.028)	0.168	(0.040)**
Norway	\$32,077	0.069	(0.026)**	0.031	(0.013)*	0.037	(0.026)
United States	\$29,942	0.049	(0.021)*	0.004	(0.015)**	0.046	(0.025)
Sweden	\$23,374	0.131	(0.027)**	0.017	(0.013)	0.114	(0.026)**
United Kingdom	\$21,124	0.104	(0.025)**	0.019	(0.018)	0.085	(0.029)**
Austria	\$21,088	0.113	(0.026)**	0.022	(0.018)	0.091	(0.030)**
Germany-West	\$21,073	0.129	(0.031)**	0.045	(0.023)*	0.084	(0.036)*
Germany-East	\$21,073	0.183	(0.038)**	0.060	(0.022)**	0.123	(0.040)**
Netherlands	\$20,811	0.134	(0.023)**	0.050	(0.017)**	0.084	(0.028)**
Canada	\$19,862	0.102	(0.026)**	0.003	(0.012)	0.099	(0.027)**
Australia	\$18,268	0.109	(0.015)**	0.012	(0.011)	0.097	(0.018)*
Italy	\$17,565	0.079	(0.027)**	0.030	(0.023)	0.049	(0.034)
Ireland	\$16,795	0.164	(0.028)**	0.056	(0.026)*	0.108	(0.037)**
New Zealand	\$12,636	0.106	(0.030)**	0.035	(0.018)*	0.071	(0.032)*
Spain	\$12,056	0.084	(0.021)**	0.005	(0.021)	0.080	(0.029)**
Slovenia	\$7,828	0.119	(0.031)**	0.022	(0.015)	0.097	(0.031)**
Czech Republic	\$5,101	0.073	(0.029)*	0.029	(0.018)	0.044	(0.032)
Hungary	\$3,713	0.042	(0.021)*	0.002	(0.007)	0.040	(0.022)
Poland	\$3,413	0.012	(0.020)	0.011	(0.009)	0.001	(0.021)
Slovak Republic	\$3,146	0.099	(0.025)**	0.026	(0.010)*	0.073	(0.026)**
Latvia	\$2,364	0.008	(0.024)	-0.024	(0.013)	0.032	(0.027)
Russia	\$1,618	0.021	(0.023)	0.024	(0.015)	-0.003	(0.026)
Bulgaria	\$1,564	0.041	(0.020)*	-0.003	(0.010)	0.044	(0.021)*
Philippines	\$909	0.005	(0.023)	-0.009	(0.015)	0.014	(0.027)

Source: ISSP 1995 and WDI. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

The 'Difference' column shows the size of the gender gap in trade liberalization support for each country. 'Explained' shows how much of the gap is explained by the variables included in the specification and 'Unexplained' is how much is not explained by the variables included in the specification.

Table 7
Country Specific Oaxaca Decompositions Sorted by GDP per Capita: ISSP 2003

Country	GDP per Cap. '03	Difference	Std. Err.	Explained	Std. Err.	Unexplained	Std. Err.
Norway	\$38,404	0.104	(0.028)**	0.015	(0.014)	0.089	(0.029)**
Japan	\$37,244	0.121	(0.037)**	-0.039	(0.026)	0.160	(0.043)**
United States	\$35,313	0.074	(0.024)**	0.011	(0.011)	0.063	(0.025)*
Switzerland	\$33,886	0.173	(0.034)**	0.030	(0.021)	0.143	(0.038)**
Denmark	\$30,273	0.118	(0.032)**	0.018	(0.014)	0.100	(0.033)**
Sweden	\$28,327	0.122	(0.033)**	-0.026	(0.016)	0.148	(0.033)**
Ireland	\$28,323	0.045	(0.030)	-0.015	(0.021)	0.060	(0.034)
Great Britain	\$25,885	0.030	(0.029)	0.027	(0.016)	0.003	(0.030)
Austria	\$24,650	0.096	(0.030)**	0.025	(0.017)	0.071	(0.031)*
Finland	\$24,462	0.077	(0.032)*	-0.006	(0.016)	0.082	(0.032)*
Canada	\$24,165	0.165	(0.030)**	0.017	(0.016)	0.148	(0.032)**
Germany- West	\$23,277	0.061	(0.040)	0.039	(0.022)	0.022	(0.042)
Germany-East	\$23,277	0.070	(0.053)	0.037	(0.026)	0.033	(0.056)
France	\$22,963	0.060	(0.025)**	-0.036	(0.015)*	0.096	(0.027)**
Australia	\$22,405	0.057	(0.017)**	-0.007	(0.008)	0.064	(0.018)**
Israel Jews	\$17,307	0.050	(0.029)**	-0.018	(0.010)	0.069	(0.030)*
Israel Arabs	\$17,307	0.020	(0.030)	-0.005	(0.029)	0.025	(0.039)
Spain	\$15,138	0.053	(0.023)*	0.033	(0.019)	0.020	(0.028)
New Zealand	\$14,802	0.089	(0.029)**	0.018	(0.017)	0.071	(0.032)*
South Korea	\$12,245	0.071	(0.026)**	-0.009	(0.026)	0.080	(0.036)*
Portugal	\$10,966	0.051	(0.026)*	0.010	(0.011)	0.042	(0.026)
Slovenia	\$10,549	0.147	(0.031)**	0.020	(0.015)	0.127	(0.032)**
Czech Republic	\$6,014	0.118	(0.031)**	0.006	(0.017)	0.112	(0.033)**
Uruguay	\$5,315	0.012	(0.027)	-0.008	(0.017)	0.020	(0.030)
Hungary	\$5,199	0.037	(0.025)	0.007	(0.012)	0.029	(0.027)
Chile	\$5,176	0.104	(0.026)**	0.037	(0.036)	0.067	(0.043)
Poland	\$4,776	0.043	(0.023)	0.009	(0.010)	0.034	(0.024)
Slovak Republic	\$4,263	0.062	(0.023)**	0.009	(0.010)	0.053	(0.024)*
Latvia	\$4,154	0.088	(0.030)**	0.006	(0.018)	0.081	(0.033)*
Venezuela	\$3,968	0.075	(0.030)*	-0.021	(0.025)	0.096	(0.038)*
Russia	\$2,122	0.026	(0.024)	0.004	(0.014)	0.014	(0.026)
Bulgaria	\$1,838	0.025	(0.036)	-0.003	(0.016)	0.028	(0.037)
Philippines	\$1,049	0.006	(0.019)	-0.029	(0.017)	0.036	(0.025)

Source: ISSP 2003 and WDI. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.

The 'Difference' column shows the size of the gender gap in trade liberalization support for each country. 'Explained' shows how much of the gap is explained by the variables included in the specification and 'Unexplained' is how much is not explained by the variables included in the specification.

Table 8
National Identity Survey Questions: ISSP 1995 & 2003

	ISSP 1995		ISSP 2003		
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
MALE	0.077 (0.005)**	0.063 (0.006)**	0.070 (0.005)**	0.076 (0.005)**	0.070 (0.005)**
IMPBORNCOUN	-0.102 (0.006)**		-0.111 (0.006)**		
SUPPORTCOUNWRONG	-0.062 (0.006)**		-0.07 (0.005)**		
ECONACHEIVEMENT	-0.002 (0.006)		0.007 (0.005)		
INTLBODSDECIDE	-0.014 (0.006)*		-0.027 (0.005)**		
CITIZENOF COUN		-0.071 (0.018)**		-0.082 (0.017)**	
LIVEINURBAN		0.021 (0.007)**		0.041 (0.005)**	
HIGHSOCIALCLASS		0.062 (0.007)**		0.038 (0.005)**	
IMMINCCRIME					-0.025 (0.006)**
IMMGOODECONOMY					-0.007 (0.006)
IMMDIVERSECULTURE					0.004 (0.006)
IMMTAKEJOBS					-0.079 (0.006)**
IMMGETTOOMUCH\$					-0.071 (0.005)**
Constant	0.116 (0.026)**	0.075 (0.035)*	0.141 (0.025)**	0.076 (0.030)*	0.115 (0.023)**
Observations	24206	17256	30136	29925	31715
R-squared	0.11	0.07	0.1	0.09	0.11

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003 and WDI. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%;
** significant at 1%. AGE, AGE², MARRIED, SKILLED, STUDENT, NOTINLABFORCE,
UNEMPLOYED, RELIGIOUS, CENTER, RIGHT and NOPARTYAFFIL are also included
in these regressions but not shown here. These results are available upon request.

Table 9
 Estimates of the Gender Gap in the Support for Trade Liberalization
 Marginal Effects are reported for all but Baker (2003) who uses 2-Stage Least Squares

Author(s)	Data Set	Organization Data	Male vs Female Trade Support	Trade Support by Skilled Workers	Framing of Question
Beaulieu <i>et al.</i> (2004)	ISSP (1995)	Pooled	0.099*	0.277*	-
Beaulieu <i>et al.</i> (2004)	ISSP (1995)	Country IIT	0.098*	-0.057	-
Beaulieu <i>et al.</i> (2005)	Latinobaro (1996)	Pooled	0.038*	0.071*	-
Beaulieu <i>et al.</i> (2005)	Latinobaro (1996)	Country IIT	0.036*	0.084*	-
Mayda Rodrik (2005)	ISSP (1995)	Pooled	0.077*	0.020*	-
O'Rourke Sinnott (2002)	ISSP (1995)	Pooled	0.222*	0.020	-
O'Rourke Sinnott (2002)	ISSP (1995)	Country Effects	0.220*	0.300*	-
Scheve Slaughter (2001)	NES (1992)	One Country/Year	0.210*	0.217*	-
Baker (2005)	WVS (1995)	Pooled	0.195*	0.198*	0
Burgoon Hiscox (2004)	TESS (2003)	One Country/Year	0.092*	0.180*	0
Hiscox (2006)	TESS (2003)	One Country/Year	0.111*	0.197*	0
Mayda Rodrik (2005)	WVS (1995)	Pooled	0.037*	-0.100*	0
Baker (2003)	Wall Street (1998)	Pooled	-0.006	0.237*	+
Baker (2003)	Wall Street (1998)	Country Effects	-0.004	0.017*	+

These studies use a variety of data sets yet all but one study calculate a statistically significant gender gap.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use data from the National Elections Studies (NES) (1992).

Fairness Labeling: “-” is negatively biased; “0” is not biased; “+” is positively biased. See Table 2

** statistically significant at the 5%; * statistically significant at the 1% level.

Table 10
Trade Questions from the Different Data Sets Used in Determining Who Supports Trade

Rank	Data Set	Question
-	ISSP 1995	[Respondent's Country] should limit the imports of goods from foreign nations in order to protect its national economy.
-	NES 1992	Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?
0	WVS 1995	Do you think it is better if goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them, or that there should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here to protect the jobs of people in this country?
0	TESS 2003	Do you favor or oppose increasing trade with other nations?
0	Latinobarometro 1996	Generally speaking, do you think that trade with other countries, both the buying and selling of products, helps [nations] economy or harms [nations] economy?
+	Wall Street 1998	1) The Presidents or North and South America are talking about forming a single free trade zone for the entire continent. Are you in favor of or against this idea? Very or slightly? 2) Over the last few years the country has had more and more business and trade with other countries. This tendency is called 'free trade'. Do you think that free trade is good or bad for the country? Very or somewhat?

The rankings, by judgment of the authors, are determined by how 'fair' or 'unbiased' the questions are.

The amount of bias is measured by: '-' implies a negative bias, '0' implies no bias and '+' implies a positive bias.

Table 11
 Supplementary Descriptive and Summary Statistics: ISSP 1995 & 2003

Variable	Description	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>ISSP 1995</u>						
IMPBORNOUN	Important to be born in [Respondent's Country]	25814	0.673	0.469	0	1
SUPPORTCOUNWRONG	Should support country even if in the wrong	26237	0.319	0.466	0	1
ECONACHEIVEMENT	Proud of [Country's] economic achievements	24512	0.518	0.500	0	1
INTLBODSDECIDE	UN etc. should have right to enforce intl. solutions	26237	0.722	0.448	0	1
CITIZENOFCCOUN	Respondent is a citizen of [Country]	25108	0.973	0.161	0	1
LIVEINURBAN	Live in an urban, not rural, community	20466	0.724	0.447	0	1
HIGHSOCIALCLASS	Upper middle social class or higher	21911	0.509	0.500	0	1
<u>ISSP 2003</u>						
IMPBORNOUN	Important to be born in [Respondent's Country]	32222	0.741	0.438	0	1
SUPPORTCOUNWRONG	Should support country even if in the wrong	32740	0.357	0.479	0	1
ECONACHEIVEMENT	Proud of [Country's] economic achievements	31281	0.537	0.499	0	1
INTLBODSDECIDE	UN etc. should have right to enforce intl. solutions	32740	0.692	0.462	0	1
CITIZENOFCCOUN	Respondent is a citizen of [Country]	32683	0.951	0.216	0	1
LIVEINURBAN	Live in an urban, not rural, community	31697	0.503	0.500	0	1
HIGHSOCIALCLASS	Upper middle social class or higher	31992	0.489	0.500	0	1
IMMINCCRIME	Agree that immigrants increase crimes rates	32740	0.500	0.500	0	1
IMMGOODECONOMY	Disagree that imm.s are good for [Country's] economy	32740	0.321	0.467	0	1
IMMDIVERSECULTURE	Disagree that imm.s bring new ideas to [Country]	32740	0.266	0.442	0	1
IMMTAKEJOBS	Agree that imm.s take jobs from ppl born in [Country]	32740	0.414	0.492	0	1
IMMGETTOOMUCH\$	Agree that the gov. spends too much assisting imm.s.	32740	0.464	0.499	0	1

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003 data sets.

Table 12
National Identity Survey Questions: ISSP 1995 & 2003

	ISSP 1995		ISSP 2003		
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)
MALE	0.077 (0.005)**	0.063 (0.006)**	0.070 (0.005)**	0.076 (0.005)**	0.070 (0.005)**
IMPBORNCOUN	-0.102 (0.006)**		-0.111 (0.006)**		
SUPPORTCOUNWRONG	-0.062 (0.006)**		-0.07 (0.005)**		
ECONACHEIVEMENT	-0.002 (0.006)		0.007 (0.005)		
INTLBODSDECIDE	-0.014 (0.006)*		-0.027 (0.005)**		
CITIZENOF COUN		-0.071 (0.018)**		-0.082 (0.017)**	
LIVEINURBAN		0.021 (0.007)**		0.041 (0.005)**	
HIGHSOCIALCLASS		0.062 (0.007)**		0.038 (0.005)**	
IMMINCCRIME					-0.025 (0.006)**
IMMGOODECONOMY					-0.007 (0.006)
IMMDIVERSECULTURE					0.004 (0.006)
IMMTAKEJOBS					-0.079 (0.006)**
IMMGETTOOMUCH\$					-0.071 (0.005)**
Constant	0.116 (0.026)**	0.075 (0.035)*	0.141 (0.025)**	0.076 (0.030)*	0.115 (0.023)**
Observations	24206	17256	30136	29925	31715
R-squared	0.11	0.07	0.1	0.09	0.11

Source: ISSP 1995 & 2003 and WDI. Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 5%;
** significant at 1%. AGE, AGE², MARRIED, SKILLED, STUDENT, NOTINLABFORCE,
UNEMPLOYED, RELIGIOUS, CENTER, RIGHT and NOPARTYAFFIL are also included
in these regressions but not shown here. These results are available upon request.

Figure 1
 Plotting Country Specific MALE OLS Coefficients against Country Data




Figure 2
 Plotting Country Specific MALE OLS Coefficients against Country Data (with Sectors)

