

Nationalism and Economic Development

Abstract for Brown Bag Presentation

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February 24, 2010

Nationalism is Janus faced, simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. On the one hand defensive, it distinguishes a specific nation or nationality from an imagined Other, typically another nation or a group of other nations or nationalities presumed inferior to the home nation. On the other hand it is integrative: making use of language, symbols (flags, statues, stamps) and patriotic songs to express a common (typically manufactured and idealized) historical heritage, enlisting national branding to evoke a collective future destiny that can best be realized by members of the national polity. The question is: why did nationalism develop first in Europe? Why did it develop simultaneously with industrialization, more generally with modern economic growth? Using three examples – Great Britain from 1700-1850; Germany from 1815 to 1945; and Yugoslavia from 1918 to the early 1990s – this paper argues that nationalism arose because of (1) declining unit costs in material production and the (2) evolution of ideology. In the material realm declining unit costs in manufacturing, in transportation and communications, and in exerting military force due to the application of scientific principles and the knowledge economy were crucial. Falling costs in manufacturing and transport/communications promoted integration generating scale economies in the production of human capital within national groups, at the same time empowering the careers of new elites committed to exploiting the benefits accruing from declining costs. This is emergent nationalism. The second kind of nationalism is reactive stemming from declining unit costs in exerting military force. Both emergent and reactive nationalism are characteristic of the spread of nationalism in Europe, emergent nationalism being more important in the case of Great Britain (and France); reactive nationalism more important in the case of Germany, especially in Yugoslavia. Transformation in the material world can not completely account for the characteristics of nationalism since the 18th century. Ideological transformation is also important. Emerging out of religion nationalistic ideologies – liberalism (Great Britain), National Socialism (Germany), or self management style Communism/market socialism (Yugoslavia) – channel beliefs once exclusively associated with religion into systems of belief. This ideological transformation is partly due to the assault on established religions from the diffusion of scientific principles, the knowledge economy gaining force with industrialization. Moreover the ideological transformation is integral to branding, political elites making use of national branding to instill a sense of undying eternal national purpose and destiny transcending the lifetimes of individual citizens.

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Propositions

I Nation-States

- I.A** *Commencing in the 18th century, nation-states emerged out of states in Europe (beginning with Great Britain, France and the Netherlands). Since then the nation-state system has spread worldwide through a combination of emergent and reactive nationalism.*
- I.B** *Many ideologies constituting nationalist branding - for instance, the theory of the “night-watchman” state in classical British liberalism/civic nationalism; or the theory of state withering away under classless Communism - suggest the state will wither away (Fascism is a prominent exception). This has not happened; states have not withered away, rather they have been strengthened.*
- I.C** *States lacking a firm foundation in nationalist branding tend to become failed states, falling into civil war.*

II Military Issues

II.A Military Equation

$$M = f(m, Y, p_{mf}) = f(m, [y * P], p_{mf})$$

where M is military potential for a nation-state, P is population, y is per capita income, Y is total income, m is the rate at which resources are channeled from the civilian economy into the military sector (note: the opportunity cost of reducing civilian employment is an important consideration in estimating “m”, and p_{mf} is the relative price of exerting military force (relative to other prices in the economy)).

II.B Trade, Military Force and Geopolitical Spheres of Influence

Under the logic of the gravity model of trade, countries bordering on each other are more likely to trade with one another than with countries far away.

But military force is exerted at lowest cost over short distances. Thus countries adjoining each other are more likely to fight each other than countries far away.

Thus close by countries may be unreliable trade partners in the long-run. For this reason countries look for spheres of influence in their surrounding environments, focusing in on smaller countries that they can “bring into line” for both economic and military purposes.

Irredentist frictions tend to be strongest in border regions, inciting conflict between bordering nation-states.

II Military Issues [Continued]

II.C The Danger of Arming Citizens

When conscription is used to raise armies, demobilized soldiers have the potential to become revolutionaries threatening state power.

III Branding

III.A Branding Types

In the period since the 18th century five main types of national branding have emerged:

- ***Civic Nationalism***
- ***Religion***
- ***Fascism***
- ***Communism***
- ***Personality Cults***

Personality cults often overlap with the other forms of branding, especially in cases of branding other than Civic Nationalism. Part of the reason why personality cults arise is due to factionalism arising from differing interpretations of religious and/or ideological doctrine.

III.B Branding Changes

Branding in nation-states change either for internal domestic reasons (e.g.: domestic political or cultural change) or because branding in the Other confronting a nation-state changes.

Growth Rates for Per Capita Income for France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom, 1820-1998

Country	1820-1870	1870-1913	1913-1950	1950-1973	1973-1998
France	0.85	1.45	1.12	4.05	1.61
Italy	0.59	1.26	0.85	4.95	2.07
Germany	1.09	1.63	0.17	4.95	2.07
United Kingdom	1.26	1.01	0.92	2.44	1.79
12 Western European Countries	1.00	1.33	0.83	3.93	1.75

Sources: Page 186 in Maddison (2006).

Urbanization in Great Britain, France and Germany: 1500-1890

A: Percentage of Total Population Living in Cities of 10,000 Persons or Over, 1500-1890

Country	1500	1600	1700	1800	1850	1890
England & Wales	3.1%	5.8%	13.3%	20.3%	40.8%	61.9%
Scotland	1.6	3.0	5.3	17.3	32.0	50.3
France	4.2	5.9	9.2	8.8	10.8	25.9
Germany	3.2	4.1	4.8	5.5	14.5	28.2

B: Distribution of Urban Population by Size Category, Circa 1800 (%)

Category	England & Wales, 1801	France, 1806	Prussia, 1801	Germany Left of Rhine, 1806
Cities 10,000 and over	20.3%	8.8%	7.8%	6.6%
Cities 5,000 – 9,999	4.7	3.5	4.2	4.5
Cities 3,000 – 4,999	6.7	2.5	4.9	5.0
Cities 2,000 to 2,999	n.e.	2.6	4.7	n.e.
Cities of 2,000 to 9,999 as % of Cities 10,000 or over	54%	98%	177%	144%

Notes: n.e. = not estimated.

Source: Various tables in de Vries (1984)

*Size of European Armies, 1470-1814
(1,000s)*

Period	France	Spain	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Sweden	Russia
1470s	40	20	0	25	n.a.	n.a.
1550s	50	150	0	20	n.a.	n.a.
1590s	80	200	20	20	15	n.a.
1630s	150	300	50	n.a.	45	35
1650s	100	100	29	70	70	n.a.
1670s	120	70	110	15	63	130
1700s	400	50	100	87	100	170
1812-1814	600	n.a.	n.a.	250	n.a.	500

Notes: n.a. = not available.

Source: Page 83 in Maddison (2006).

The Big Three Powers of Western Europe and the USSR

Panel A

Shares of Western European Population (P%) and Shares of Western European Income (Y%) for the United Kingdom (UK), France (F) and Germany (G) and Ratio of The Levels for the USSR as Percentage of the Levels for Western Europe

Period/Year	Percentage of Western Europe Population (P%)			
	UK	F	G	USSR
1700	10.5%	26.4%	18.4%	n.e.
1821-1830	17.9	25.5	21.0	n.e.
1831-1840	16.9	22.5	19.5	n.e.
1841-1850	16.8	21.7	19.9	n.e.
1851-1860	16.3	21.6	20.4	n.e.
1861-1870	16.6	20.8	20.8	n.e.
1871-1880	17.0	19.8	21.3	n.e.
1881-1890	17.3	19.0	21.8	n.e.
1891-1900	17.6	17.9	22.7	n.e.
1901-1914	17.6	16.5	24.3	n.e.
1915-1920	17.8	15.1	24.6	n.e.
1921-1930	16.8	15.1	23.6	60.1%
1931-1939	16.5	14.7	23.5	63.7
1940-1945	16.5	13.5	23.7	n.e.
1946-1950	16.6	13.7	22.3	58.7
1951-1960	16.2	13.9	22.3	62.5
1961-1970	15.9	14.3	22.1	67.7
1971-1980	15.5	14.6	21.7	70.6
1981-1990	15.3	14.9	21.0	75.0
1991-2000	15.2	15.1	21.1	75.6
	Percentage of Western Europe Income (Y%)			
1921-1930	23.0%	16.7%	22.7%	6.5%
1931-1939	23.2	15.5	24.3	28.3
1940-1945	27.7	9.3	29.9	27.0
1946-1950	27.9	15.1	15.9	34.1
1951-1960	21.9	15.4	22.5	36.4
1961-1970	18.2	16.0	23.8	37.0
1971-1980	15.9	16.8	22.9	36.8
1981-1990	15.4	16.9	22.2	35.3
1991-2000	15.7	16.7	21.3	20.0

The Big Three Powers of Western Europe and the USSR [Continued]

Panel B

Relative Population Sizes and Income Levels for France Relative to That for the United Kingdom and for Germany = 100, 1700-2000

Period	Population of France Relative to:		Income of France Relative to:	
	UK as base	G as base	UK as base	G as base
1700	251.0	143.1	n.e.	n.e.
1821-1830	156.6	133.7	n.e.	n.e.
1831-1840	133.5	115.4	92.9	n.e.
1841-1850	129.4	109.2	93.6	n.e.
1851-1860	132.7	106.1	85.6	120.8
1861-1870	125.9	100.3	81.0	109.4
1871-1880	116.0	92.8	70.4	94.7
1881-1890	109.8	87.3	67.0	89.4
1891-1900	102.1	79.0	70.4	83.7
1901-1914	93.6	67.8	62.0	64.7
1915-1920	84.4	61.4	49.8	65.1
1921-1930	89.9	64.0	72.6	73.9
1931-1939	89.3	62.5	67.0	64.7
1940-1945	81.4	56.8	33.9	31.4
1946-1950	82.4	61.4	54.8	96.5
1951-1960	85.5	62.5	70.7	68.9
1961-1970	89.7	64.6	87.9	67.0
1971-1980	93.9	67.2	106.0	73.2
1981-1990	97.4	70.8	109.5	76.1
1991-2000	99.5	71.5	106.4	78.3

Sources: Various tables in Maddison (2006).

Correlates of War Data

Panel A

Correlates of War for the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy: Iron and Steel Output, Tons per Capita, (ispc); Military Personnel per 1,000 Persons, (milppc); and Energy Consumption in Coal-Ton Equivalents per Capita (engpc), 1821-2000

Period	United Kingdom			France		
	ispc	milppc	engpc	ispc	milppc	engpc
1821-1830	28.2	6.8	1.3	6.8	8.1	0.1
1831-1840	36.7	5.8	1.4	8.6	9.3	0.1
1841-1850	65.5	6.8	1.8	12.5	11.5	0.2
1851-1860	118.3	10.0	2.6	21.1	13.5	0.3
1861-1870	158.9	9.6	3.1	31.3	12.7	0.5
1871-1880	201.6	7.6	3.6	36.3	14.7	0.6
1881-1890	222.9	7.2	4.0	45.3	13.9	0.8
1891-1900	197.4	8.2	4.2	53.5	15.3	1.0
1901-1914	140.1	9.9	4.6	68.3	15.5	1.3
1915-1920	195.5	69.2	4.6	45.4	103.6	1.2
1921-1930	161.6	7.7	4.3	178.3	11.9	1.9
1931-1939	480.1	7.2	4.4	158.1	12.4	2.0
1940-1945	262.0	71.2	4.6	91.4	30.9	1.1
1946-1950	294.0	22.8	4.4	170.8	14.2	2.0
1951-1960	385.6	14.4	4.4	292.5	18.8	2.4
1961-1970	465.6	7.9	8.7	404.3	13.0	3.4
1971-1980	381.4	6.2	5.4	446.6	11.0	4.7
1981-1990	284.1	5.8	4.9	335.9	10.2	3.2
1991-2000	289.1	4.2	5.3	323.3	8.2	4.3
Period	Germany			Italy		
1861-1870	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	0.8	9.4	0.02
1871-1880	44.3	11.8	0.9	0.7	6.6	0.1
1881-1890	74.1	10.5	1.4	0.6	7.0	0.1
1891-1900	105.2	11.6	1.9	0.6	7.8	0.1
1901-1914	186.0	11.3	2.6	14.1	7.7	0.2
1915-1920	190.7	55.9	2.7	26.7	68.3	0.2
1921-1930	338.2	1.8	2.7	38.4	8.1	0.3
1931-1939	223.0	9.5	2.7	45.3	12.2	0.3
1940-1945	266.7	85.5	3.5	34.9	38.4	0.2
1946-1950	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	40.4	6.1	0.3
1951-1960	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	109.5	6.6	0.9
1961-1970	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	251.2	9.0	2.5
1971-1980	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	406.3	8.8	3.7
1981-1990	n.e.	n.e.	n.e.	421.2	9.0	3.1
1991-2000	514.9	4.5	5.1	448.1	7.3	3.8

Correlates of War Data [Continued]

Panel B

Correlates of War for Yugoslavia and the USSR: Iron and Steel Output, Tons per Capita, (ispc); Military Personnel per 1,000 Persons, (milppc); and Energy Consumption in Coal-Ton Equivalents per Capita (engpc), 1921-2000

Period	Yugoslavia			USSR		
	ispc	milppc	engpc	ispc	milppc	engpc
1921-1930	4.6	10.7	n.e.	15.2	9.7	0.2
1931-1939	8.5	8.1	n.e.	66.7	6.3	0.7
1946-1950	23.6	14.0	n.e.	110.0	18.1	3.0
1951-1960	49.0	21.2	n.e.	236.1	24.9	2.3
1961-1970	95.6	15.1	n.e.	404.0	15.2	3.8
1971-1980	134.8	12.6	n.e.	545.2	15.6	5.1
1981-1990	190.7	10.8	n.e.	557.9	13.7	6.8

Sources: Maddison (2006) for population data; other figures from Correlates of War website www.correlatesofwar.org (Version 3.02 version of National Material Capabilities file accessed in October 2009).

France as Great Britain's Other: Major Conflicts between Great Britain and France, 1700-1815

A: Prior to Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars

Conflict	Major Allies of Great Britain	Major Allies of France	Branding	Geopolitics
War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)	Austria, Holy Roman Empire, Holland, Prussia	Spain, Bavaria	Protestant Great Britain versus Catholic France	Great Britain insures Spain does not fall under French power
Jacobite Uprisings 1715, 1745	Civil war in Great Britain between those supporting Stuart restoration	Jacobite rebels	Protestant Great Britain versus Catholic France	Uprisings defeated; Stuart bid to be restored abandoned
War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748)	Holy Roman Empire, Holland, Russia, Hanover	Prussia, Spain, Sweden	Protestant Great Britain versus Catholic France	Maria Theresa succeeds to hereditary Hapsburg domains
Seven Year's War (1756-1763)	British colonies, Prussia, Portugal	French colonies, Holy Roman Empire, Sweden, Spain	Protestant Great Britain versus Catholic France	French lose imperial possessions to British in India and Americas
American Revolutionary War (1775-1783)	United Empire loyalists, Iroquois Confederacy, some German states	United States (rebels), Spain, Holland	Loyalty to Great Britain	British defeat, loss of imperial possessions

France as Great Britain's Other: Major Conflicts between Great Britain and France, 1700-1815 [Continued]

B: Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars

Conflict	Major Allies of Great Britain	Major Allies of France	Branding	Geopolitics
<i>B.1: Wars of the French Revolution</i>				
War of First Coalition (1791-1798)	Prussia, Holy Roman Empire, Austria, French Royalists	United Irishmen, Polish legions, French satellite states	British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	France begins drive to hegemony in Western Europe
War of the Second Coalition (1799-1802)	Russia, Austria, Ottoman Empire	French satellite states	British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	French bid to weaken British empire in Middle East and India blunted
<i>B.2: Napoleonic Wars</i>				
War of the Third Coalition (1803-1806)	Prussia, Austria	French satellite states	British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	Napoleon issues Berlin Decrees setting up Continental System; plans invasion of Great Britain that fails at Trafalgar
War of the Fourth Coalition (1806-1807)	Prussia, Russia	Holland, Denmark, Confederation of Rhine	British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	France defeats Prussia at Jena, drives Russians out of Poland, dissolves Holy Roman Empire and sets up Confederation of Rhine
War of the Fifth Coalition (1809)	Austria, Spain (switches sides from pro-France), Portugal		British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	British Royal Navy wins victories against French colonies

France as Great Britain's Other: Major Conflicts between Great Britain and France, 1700-1815 [Continued]

B: Napoleonic Wars [Continued]

Conflict	Major Allies of Great Britain	Major Allies of France	Branding	Geopolitics
War of the Sixth Coalition (1812-1814)	Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Austria, some German states, Portugal	Confederation of Rhine, Poland	British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	Russia leaves Continental System; Napoleon invades Russia, retreats after Moscow burned; Napoleon abdicates and is sent to Elba; monarchy reestablished in France
War of the Seventh Coalition (1815)	Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Holland, some German states		British constitutional monarchy/gradual reform versus French Republicanism	Napoleon escapes from Elba, raises army, ultimately defeated at Waterloo; Wars end with Second Treaty of Paris

Adam Smith in “The Wealth of Nations” on Political Economy and Warfare

I On Political Economy [Nation and State]

I.A Page 397 (Of Systems of Political Economy) “Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposed two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public service. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.”

I.B Duties of the Sovereign [The State]: Defence/Military, Laws, Infrastructure

Page 653 (Book V, Part 1) “The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force.”

Page 669 (Book V, Part II) “The second duty of the sovereign [is] establishing an exact administration of justice...”

Page 681 (Book V, Part III) “The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain.”

II On Warfare and Military Matters: Specialization and Division of Labor, the Impact of Technological Progress, the Superiority of Standing Armies

II.A Page 657-8 “Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which pays the expence of their service.” [Level of **m**]

II.B Page 658: “The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them [hence] it should be the principal occupation of a particular class of citizens, and the division of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art it is the wisdom of the state only which can render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation; and states have not always had this wisdom ...” [**m** should income wages for a standing army]

II [Adam Smith on Warfare, Etc, Continued]

II.C Pages 660-1: “The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance of pay which the state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well-disciplined and well-exercised standing army.”

II.D Page 661: “Since the invention of fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms ... are ... of less consequence. The nature of the weapon, though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts him more nearly so than he was he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough acquired by practising in great bodies.”

John Stuart Mill on Nationalism and Freedom: From “Considerations on Representative Government” (1851) and “On Liberty” (1851)

I From “Considerations on Representative Government”

I.A On Democracy and Civic Nationalism

Page 207: “There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community; every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general.”

I.B On the Economic Benefits of Freedom

Page 210: “...all free communities have both been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity, than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom.”

I.C On Nationalism

Page 359-60: “A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others – which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation; pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.”

John Stuart Mill on Nationalism and Freedom [Continued]

II From “On Liberty”

II.A On Integrative Tendencies

Page 130-1: “Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called different worlds; at present to a great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, go to the same places, and have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects and the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvement in the means of communication promotes it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State.”

Von Clausewitz in "On War"

*[Quotations from "On War" Translated by Colonel J, J, Graham, Volume III,
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.]*

Original publication posthumous in 1832

On Dynastic Wars

Page 96: "Armies were supported out of the treasury, which the Sovereign regarded partly as a private purse, or at least as a resource belonging to the Government, and not to the people in proportion as the Government separated itself from the people, and regarded itself as the State, War became more exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on by means of the money in its coffers and idle vagabonds it could pick up in its own and neighbouring countries..."

On the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon

Page 83: "Would Prussia have ventured to penetrate into France in the year 1798 with 70,000 men, if she had foreseen that the reaction in case of failure would be so strong as to overthrow the old balance of power in Europe?"

Page 100: "Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria and Prussian tried their diplomatic Art of War; this very soon proved insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had again suddenly become an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a citizen of the State."

Page 101: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Buonaparte, this military power, based on the strength of the whole nation, marched over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, that where it only encountered the old-fashioned Armies the result was not doubtful for a moment. A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain, the War became of itself an affair of the people. In Austria, in the year 1809, the Government commenced extraordinary efforts, by means of Reserves and Landwehr, which were nearer to the true object, and far surpassed in degree what this State had hitherto considered possible. In Russia, in 1812, the example of Spain and Austria was taken as a pattern ..."

Page 102: "In Germany, Prussia rose up the first, made the War a National Cause, and without money or credit and with a population reduced one-half took the field with an Army twice as strong as that of 1806."

Page 102: "...since the time of Buonaparte, War, through being first on one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole Nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection."

Page 128: "The influence of any military man except the General-in-Chief in the Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able vigorous action. The example of France in 1793, 1794, 1795, when Carnot, while residing in Paris, managed the conduct of the War, is to avoided, as a system of terror is not at the command of any but a revolutionary government."

The Changing Nature of War

Page 103: "Each period [of history] would, therefore, also keep its own theory of War ..."

The Importance of Size (Population)

Page 170-171: "If Austria, Prussia, the German Confederation, the Netherlands and England, determine of a War with France, but Russia remains neutral they are able to carry on an offensive War, having for its object of the enemy. For powerful and great as France is, it is still possible for it to see more than half of its territory overrun by the enemy, its capital occupied The countries that we have named have, exclusive of their possessions out of Europe, above 75,000,000 inhabitants, whilst France has only 30,000,000; and the Army which they could call out for a War against France, really meant in earnest would be as follows, without exaggeration:

Austria	250,000
Prussia	200,000
The rest of Germany	150,000
Netherlands	75,000
England	50,000
Total	725,000

Should this force be placed on a War footing, it would, in all probability, very much exceed that which France could oppose; for under Buonaparte the country never raised troops of the like strength."

Hegel's Theory of the Nation-State

Quotations from Hegel's Writings

A From "Hegel's Philosophy of Right" [Translated with Notes by T. M. Knox]

A.1 The State

Page 155: "The state is the actuality of the ethical IdeaThe state is absolutely rational as it is the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses"

Page 160: "The state is the actuality of concrete freedom ...]"

Page 212: "The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and is therefore the absolute power on earth. It follows that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors."

A.2 War

Page 210-211: "Sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is the substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal dutyif the state is in jeopardy, all its citizens are in duty bound to answer the summons to its defence. If in such circumstances the entire state is under arms and is torn from its domestic life at home to fight abroad, the war of defence turns into a war of conquest."

A.3 Historical Evolution

Page 217: "In the course of this work of the world mind, states, nations, and individuals arise animated by their particular determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and conditions ... the shapes which they take pass away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage."

Page 217-218: "The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world mind. This nation is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and its only once that it can make its hour strike."

Page 220: "In accordance with these ... principles, the world-historical realms are the following: (1) the Oriental; (2) the Greek, (3) the Roman, (4) the Germanic"

Page 222: “(4) The Germanic realm: Mind and its world are thus alike lost and plunged in the infinite grief of that fate Mind is here pressed back upon itself in the extreme of its absolute negativity. This is the absolute turning point; mind rises out of this situation and grasps the infinite positivity of this its inward character, i.e. it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self-consciousness and subjectivity, a reconciliation with the fulfilment of the principle of the north, the principle of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted.”

B ***Quoted in K. R. Popper “The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and The Aftermath***

B.1 ***The Nation-State and War***

Page 29: “The Universal is to found in the State; The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth ... ;The State is the march of God through the world ;The Stateexists for its own sake; “The State is the actuality existing, realized moral life.”

Page 60: “Nations are what their deeds are Each particular National Genius is to be treated as only One Individual in the process of Universal History ...The Spirit or National Genius must finally prove itself in World-Domination ...”

Page 62: “....It is this state of war in which the omnipotence of the State manifests itself”

Page 62: “Against the State there is no power to decide what is ... right...”

Page 71: “In peace civil life becomes more extended, every sphere is hedged in ... and at last all men stagnate It is necessary to recognize ... property and life as accidental Let insecurity finally come in the form of Hussars with glistening sabres, and show its earnest activity!”

B.2 ***The Cult of Personality***

Page 69: “In public opinion all is false and true, but to discover the truth is the business of the Great Man ... World Historical Men – the Heroes of an epoch – must therefore be recognized as its clear-sighted ones ...”

Popper on Hegel and Marx

Quotations from K. R. Popper, "The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II. The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and Its Aftermath"

A On Hegel

Page 25: "These passages show that Hegel's radical collectivism depends as much on Plato as it depends on Frederick William's Prussianism..."

Page 37: "...Hegel derives a very different lesson from his dialectic triad. Since contradictions are the means by which science progresses, he concludes that contradictions are not permissible and unavoidable but also highly desirable. This is a Hegelian doctrine which must destroy all argument and all progress."

Page 44: "...Hegel's absolute dialectical proof that Prussia is the 'highest peak,' and the very stronghold of freedom; that is absolutist constitution is the goal towards which humanity moves; and that its government preserves and keeps, as it were, the purest spirit of freedom ..."

Page 49: "In short of its inherent reactionary and irrational tendencies, modern nationalism ... was in its short history before Hegel a revolutionary and liberal creed. By accident it had made its way into the camp of freedom. It is not without interest to sketch the history of this accident, and of the way in which Hegel brought nationalism back into the totalitarian camp where it had belonged from the time when Plato first maintained that Greeks are related to barbarians like masters to slaves."

Page 53: "At the time when Fichte became the apostle of nationalism, an instinctive and revolutionary nationalism was rising in Germany as a reaction to Napoleon's conquest. The people demanded democratic reforms which they understand in the sense of Rousseau and of the French Revolution but which they wanted without French oppression. They turned against their own princes and against the emperor at the same time It is clear that such an untamed new religion was a source of great irritation, and even of danger, to the ruling class, and especially to the king of Prussia. How was this danger to be met? After the wars of liberation, Frederick William met it first by dismissing his nationalist advisors, and then by appointed Hegel ..."

Page 54: "His anti-liberal tendencies induced Hegel to refer to England as the most characteristic of a nation in the bad sense. 'Take England ... which, because private persons have a predominant share in public affairs, has been regarded as the freest of all constitutions. Experience shows that country, as compared with the other civilized states of Europe, is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation, in the law and liberty of property, and in arrangements for the arts and sciences, and that objective freedom or rational right is sacrificed to formal.'"

On Marx and Marxism

Pages 78-79: “Marxism is a purely historical theory, a theory which aims at predicting the future course of economic and power-political developments and especially of revolutions. As such, it certainly did not furnish the basis of the policy of the Russian Communist Party after its rise to political power ... as Lenin admits, there is hardly a word on the economics of socialism to be found in Marx’s work – apart from such useless slogans as ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.’ The reason is the economic research of Marx is completely subservient to his historical prophecy.”

Page 94: “He [i.e.: Marx] looked upon the human actors on the stage of history, including the ‘big’ ones, as mere puppets, irresistibly determined by economic ties, and by historical forces over which they have no control. The stage of history, he taught, is set in a social system which binds us all; it is set in the ‘kingdom of necessity.’ (But one day we shall destroy this system and attain the ‘kingdom of freedom.’)”

Page 95: “There is a well-known passage in *Capital* where Marx says that ‘in Hegel’s writing, dialectics stands in its head; one must turn it the right way up again....’ Its tendency is clear. Marx wished to show that the ‘head,’ i.e. human thought, is not itself the basis of human life but rather a kind of superstructure on a physical basis. A similar tendency is expressed in the passage: ‘The ideal is nothing other than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human mind.’”

Page 104: “We can buy a greater degree of freedom only at the cost of enslaving other men, by splitting mankind into classes; the ruling class must pay for their freedom by a new kind of bondage. They are bound to oppress and to fight the ruled, if they wish to preserve their own freedom and their own status...”

Page 188: “Marx’s attitude toward Christianity is closely connected with the fact that a hypocritical defence of capitalist exploitation was in his day characteristic of official Christianity.”

Pages 190-191: “Marx and Engels preferred to look upon their humanitarian aims in the light of a theory which explains them as the product, or the reflection, of social circumstances This theory of morality may be characterized as historicist because it holds that all moral categories are dependent on the historical situation our moral ideas are weapons in the class struggle.”

German Unification: The Military and Economic Agendas

A [Quotations from W. H. Dawson, "The German Empire 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement"]

A.1 The Liberal Economic Agenda and the Frankfort National Assembly (1848-1851)

Pages 42-43: "So it was when, after the overthrow of Prussia by Napoleon Stein and Hardenberg won over a reluctant King to their own firm conviction that Prussia could only be made secure against foreign enemies by being made freer in her own life ... The reforming work of Stein was continued after his resignation. In his spirit was the law of May 26, 1818, 'On the customs and excise duties on foreign goods and on trade between the provinces of the State,' which introduced freedom of trade within the kingdom abolished the last of the old prohibitions, and relaxed the remaining restrictions upon foreign trade..... A still larger step forward was taken by the reduction and ultimate unification of the customs system of the German States. The two best-known protagonists of a policy of freer trade at that time were Friedrich List ... and Karl Friedrich Nebenius ..."

Page 44: "List in particular was a consistent advocate of the 'infant industry' argument for protection. For the present he worked for freedom of trade within the frontiers of Germany ..."

Page 47: "It is an altogether inadequate view that the only motive behind the democratic movements which turned Germany upside down in 1848 was to increase the power of the people at the expense of the prerogatives of the Sovereigns ... a genuine and strong desire for closer union existed at that time ... To the ardent reformers of those days, Liberalism and national unity were merely two aspects of the same question. Without a representative parliament emanating from the free choice of free peoples, and frankly expressing the principle of popular sovereignty, unity had for them neither attraction nor meaning. Herein lay a fundamental difference of principle which hopelessly divided the Sovereigns from the great body of the nation. Many of them were still openly hostile to all constitutional innovations"

A.II Bismarck (1863)

Page 133: "Germany ... did not look to Prussia's Liberalism but to power. Prussia must concentrate her power until the favourable moment The great questions of the time will be decided not by speeches and resolutions of majorities – that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by blood and iron."

A.III Motke (1868)

Page 89: “What sensible man would not wish that the enormous expenditure incurred in Europe for military purposes should be directed towards peaceable objects? But international negotiations, such as have often been recommended, will never lead to that result. If this end is to be achieved I see only one possibility, and it is that in the heart of Europe there shall be created a Power which, without itself being one of conquest, shall be so strong that it will be able to forbid its neighbours to enter upon war. Hence I believe that if this benevolent work is ever to be achieved it will proceed from Germany. That, however, will only come when Germany is sufficiently strong, that is, when it is united. In order to attain this result in spite of Europe’s disfavour we need a navy as well as an army.”

[Note: “From 1867 to 1875 the peace strength of the army was fixed at 1 per cent of the population according to the census of 1867, giving a force of 402,000 men, and the expenditure upon it as £33 15s. per man called up.”]

B From Liah Greenfeld, “The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and National Growth”

B.1 List

Page 205: “Smith, List argued, ‘[nullified] nationality and State power [and exalted] individualism to the position of author of all effective power.’ He conceived of a nation merely as a ‘a community, i.e. a number of individuals dwelling together [who] know best for themselves what branches of occupation are most to their advantage, and can best select for themselves the means which promote their prosperity.’ This, List insisted, was ‘nothing more than a mere shopkeeper’s theory – not a scientific doctrine showing how the productive powers of an entire nation can be called into existence, increased, maintained, and preserved – for the special benefit of its civilization, welfare, might, continuance, and independence.’”

The German National Socialists Struggle With Their Others: Democracy, Jews, Communists, France, and Russia

I Adolf Hitler in "Mein Kampf"

[Downloaded from Website www.crusader.net/texts]

*I.A Chapter XI: Nation and Race
[Eugenics, Social Darwinism and Community]*

Page 1: "In the struggle for daily bread all those who are weak and sickly or less determined succumb, while the struggle of the males for the females grants the right or opportunity to propagate only to the healthiest. And struggle is always a means for improving a species' health and power of resistance and, therefore, a cause of its higher development."

Page 9: "But, since true idealism is nothing but the subordination of the interests and life of the individual to the community ..."

Page 11: "In the Jewish people the will to self sacrifice does not go beyond the individual's instinct of self-preservation his sense of sacrifice is only apparent ..."

Page 19: "His [a Jew's] ultimate goal in this stage is the victory of 'democracy' or, as he understands it: the rule of parliamentarianism."

Page 24: "Slowly fear of the Marxist weapon of Jewry descends like a nightmare on the mind and soul of decent people."

*I.B Chapter II: The State
[Racial Purity and Will-Power]*

Page 5: "...the highest purpose of a folkish state is concern for the preservation of those original racial elements which bestow culture and create the beauty and dignity of a higher mankind."

Page 19: "Of the highest importance is the training of will-power and determination, plus the cultivation of joy in responsibility."

Page 25: "The crown of the folkish state's entire work of education and training must be to burn the racial sense and racial feeling into the instinct and the intellect ..."

**I.C Chapter XIV: Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy
[France and Russia as the Other]**

Page 7: “...we National Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled on earth ...”

Page 9: “Here Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia to Bolshevism, it has robbed the Russian nation of that intelligentsia which previously brought about and guaranteed its existence as a state For centuries Russia drew nourishment from this Germanic nucleus of its upper leading strata [today] it has been replaced by the Jew ... We have been chosen by Fate was witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the folkish theory.”

Page 13: “Germany is today the next great war aim of Bolshevism...”

Page 15: “Today every power is our natural ally, which like us feels French domination on the continent to be intolerable ...”

II The Views of Other National Socialist Leaders

[From Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp (translators) “Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation”

II.A Alfred Rosenberg

1 “The Russian Jewish Revolution”

Page 15: “Lenin is the *only non-Jew* among the people’s commissars; he is, so to speak, the Russian storefront of a Jewish business ...”

2 “The Folkish Idea of the State”

Page 62: “A feeling of duty to the state on the part of the individual citizen may only be demanded if the state also recognizes and carries out its duty to every individual citizen. In other words, the idea of state socialism must take the place of the Marxist idea. This results in the definition of National Socialism as social justice for all levels of the German people, without regard for status ...”

II.B Dietrich Eckart (“Jewishness in and around Us”)

Page 23: “To repeat once again, and yet again, the most important thing up to now: *in the Jewish religion the belief in spiritual life after death is completely lacking ...* where immortality dwells, longing for the eternal and renunciation of the temporal must continually reemerge, that is, the negation of the world must continually reappear. And that is the meaning of the non-Jewish peoples; they are the *preservers* of the negation of the world, of the idea of an existence after death ...”

II.C Joseph Goebbels (“National Socialism or Bolshevism!”)

Page 76: “...the Russian soviet system does not endure because it is Bolshevik, because it is Marxist, because it is international, but because it is national, because it is Russian. No tsar ever grasped the Russian people in its depths, in its passion, in its national instincts as Lenin has. He gave the Russian peasant what Bolshevism always meant to the peasant: freedom and property. In this way he made the most indigenous group, the peasants, into the real supporters of the new system.”

II.D Gregor Strasser (“Thoughts about the Tasks of the Future”)

Page 89: “*And yet it is not enough to change a system, to replace one economic system by another – necessary above all is a CHANGE OF SPIRIT! The spirit which is to be overcome is the SPIRIT OF MATERIALISM!! We must achieve an entirely new kind of economic thinkingWe have to learn that in the economy of a people it is not profit, not gain, which are important – but only satisfying the needs of the members of this people!! We have to learn that the ideas ‘world trade’ – ‘balance of trade’ – ‘export surplus’ are ideas of a declining epoch which have in the end reduced themselves ad absurdum, because they violate the eternal law of organic life and were [not born] out of the soil.*”

Military Considerations were Dominate in the Creation of Yugoslavia

I Quotations from Margaret MacMillan, “Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World”

Page 115: “Trumbić can have few illusions about how the Serbians saw the process of bringing together the different peoples. As one Serbian government official told him cheerfully, there would be no difficulty in managing the Bosnian Muslims. The Serbian army would give them twenty-four hours – no, perhaps even forty-eight – to return to the Orthodox faith. ‘Those who won’t will be killed, as we have done in our time in Serbia.’ Trumbić gasped. ‘You can’t be serious.’ ‘Quite serious.’”

Page 117: :On December 1, 1918, Prince Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The name itself was a problem: non-Serbs generally preferred ‘Yugoslavia’ because it implied a true union of equals. Serbs wanted a name that enshrined the central importance of Serbia ... an American military observer wrote in the spring of 1919, ‘While the Government officials all take pains to protest that the Serbs and Croats are one people, it is absurd to say so.... The Serbs are soldier-peasants; the Croats are passive intellectuals in tendency.’ Alexander took an oath of allegiance to the constitution of June 28, 1921, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the most important day in Serb history.”

Page 122: “Geography forced Italy to think seriously about the Balkans Italian nationalists did want any other power to achieve dominance in the Balkans, whether a Bolshevik Russia or a new South Slav state.”

Quotations from Stevan Majstorović, “Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia: Self-management and Culture”

Page 18: “The idea of a common state where all these small nations would live freely and equitably and where they would jointly protect their autonomy is very old, dating back to the ninth century On the one hand, it is an expression of the profound aspiration of these nations to free development, and on the other, it reflects painful historical experience. Many aggressors, from the earliest to the most recent times, saw the region settled by the southern Slav nations as an important element in their strategic and political goals Desirous of conquering the Balkan Peninsula, which was the principal link with Asia and the Middle East, all military aggressors used the same motto – *Divide et impera*. They endeavoured to put the national, ethnic and denominational diversity of the Yugoslav peoples ... in their service of their political goals, fostering individual national cultures at the expense of others, and instigating religious antagonism.”

Yugoslavia and its Others, 1921-2000

Relative Population Size (RP), Relative Income (RY) and Relative Income per Capita (Ry)

A Relative Population Size and Relative Income Compared to Germany, Italy and the USSR, 1921-2000

Yugoslavia's Level as Percentage of Level for Other Country (%)						
Period	Population (RP)			Income (RY)		
	Germany	Italy	USSR	Germany	Italy	USSR
1921-1930	21.3%	34.3%	8.4%	7.0%	14.0%	n.e.
1931-1939	23.0	36.4	8.5	6.7	14.2	5.8%
1947-1950	23.6	34.2	9.0	9.4	16.4	5.5
1951-1960	24.6	25.6	8.8	7.9	13.9	4.9
1961-1970	25.3	36.7	8.3	8.5	14.2	5.4
1971-1980	26.7	37.7	8.2	10.6	16.5	6.6
1981-1990	28.3	39.1	7.9	11.7	16.9	7.3
1991-2000	27.7	39.5	7.7	6.5	9.1	7.1

B Per Capita Income in the Successor States to Yugoslavia (Bosnia = BO; Croatia = CR; MA = Macedonia; SL = Slovenia; SE = Serbia/Montenegro) Relative to That for Yugoslavia as a Whole = 100, 1991-2000

Percentage of Average Per Capita Income for Yugoslavia as a Whole					
Period	BO	CR	MA	SL	SE
1991-95	59.9%	135.6%	82.4%	270.9%	72.4%
1996-2000	65.4	153.5	74.8	298.8	59.1

Yugoslavia and its Others, 1921-2000 [Continued]

C *Relative per Capita Income Compared to East European Countries (A = Albania; B = Bulgaria; C = Czechoslovakia; H = Hungary; P = Poland; R = Romania; SEE = Average for Seven Eastern European Countries) and the USSR, 1951-2000*

Level of per Capita Income in Country or Region Relative to per Capita of Yugoslavia = 100 (Percentage of Yugoslavia's Level)								
Period	A	B	C	H	P	R	SEE	USSR
1951-1955	67.1%	124.2%	223.7%	173.6%	161.2%	86.5%	141.8%	185.9%
1956-1960	62.9	118.8	217.7	157.3	144.8	82.4	133.0	176.9
1961-1965	58.5	124.2	192.2	149.2	127.3	77.1	122.6	153.3
1966-1970	54.8	129.8	180.4	144.3	123.8	81.1	120.2	151.1
1971-75	49.5	118.1	156.9	123.4	117.7	77.9	111.3	132.3
1976-80	42.3	110.0	141.2	111.9	108.2	73.7	103.6	117.7
1981-1985	38.4	101.0	131.2	105.3	88.2	66.0	93.2	106.3
1986-1990	39.3	98.4	137.3	108.1	89.4	63.2	93.6	111.2
1991-95	50.7	132.4	193.2	146.9	133.5	77.2	77.2	127.8
1996-2000	59.0	119.6	202.2	156.5	160.0	74.3	74.3	96.9

Source: Various tables in Maddison (2006).

Titoism

I Problems with the Soviets Predate the 1948 Split with the Soviet Union

I.A From Adam B. Ulam, "Titoism and the Cominform"

Page 20: "In 1937 Josip Broz-Tito, at the age of forty-five, moved into the leading position in Yugoslav Communism. He had literally to step over the bodies of many of his predecessors, in full knowledge that the political life-span of the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was, as a rule, very short and unpleasant. His predecessors had either been liquidated or had led a wretched existence, abused at every occasion, intermittently thrown out of then readmitted into the Party Had he not been a Communist fanatic in 1937, Tito could not have helped knowing that any major shift in the policy of the Comintern or the liquidation of one of his Russian protectors was likely to mean for him the fate of Milan Gorkich or Sima Markovich."

Page 26: "What was the attitude of the Yugoslav Communists toward the destruction and partition of their state? On June 22, the confusion between patriotism and Communism disappeared. When Soviet Russia was attacked, they could fight as Communists and also as Yugoslav patriots. But how about the period from April 6 to June 11? The Communists were able to boast long after the events that they took up arms in defense of their country *before* the German attack on Russia. They were able to resent, especially after their break with Moscow in 1948, any insinuation that their fight had been for Soviet Russia and not for Yugoslavia."

Page 99: "The possibility of a split with Moscow must have been faced by the regime, at least in 1948, not as a political maneuver faced by the regime which would bring allies to Yugoslavia and concrete economic and military help, but as a step, which if it proved irrevocable, would pit this small and backward country against the enormous powers of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites with no chance of help from the outside world."

I.B From Milovan Djilas, "Tito: The Story from Inside" [Translated by Vasilije Kojić and Richard Hayes]

Page 26: "At the time of the Soviet purges, the Comintern designated Tito as the head of the Yugoslav Communist Party. It was after Milan Gorkić, the Secretary of the Party, had been arrested and Yugoslav emigration to the U.S.S.R. had been reduced Later Tito said of that time: 'I made no friends among the factionalists, I minded my own business, and I was careful about what I said, particularly in rooms with telephones.' "

II Branding After 1948

II.A From Milovan Djilas, “Tito: The Story from Inside” [Translated by Vasilije Kojić and Richard Hayes]

Page 61: “Unquestionably, the Soviet assault on Yugoslavia in 1948 inflamed Yugoslavia’s and Tito’s ambitions in the Balkans and toward other national democracies ...”

Page 74: “..the concept of self-management was born from the struggle against Stalinist tyranny and from visions of a true democratic socialism. Self-management legalized criticism of the bureaucracy. It also suppressed bureaucratic wilfulness. And it solidified gains toward a free-market economy.”

II.B From Milovan Djilas, “The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System”

Page 5: “Hegel claimed that the absolute monarchy in Prussia was the incarnation of the idea of the Absolute. The Communists, on the other hand, claim that they represent the objective aspirations of society The monarchy did not think quite as highly of itself as the Communists do of themselves, nor was it as absolute as they are.”

Page 37: “Everything happened differently in the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries from what the leaders anticipated. They expected that the state would rapidly wither away, that democracy would be strengthened. The reverse happened. They expected a rapid improvement in the standard of living – there has been scarcely any change in this respect and, in the subjugated East European countries, the standard has even declined.”

Page 79: “The Communist government very rapidly becomes a small circle of party leaders. The claim that it’s a dictatorship of the proletariat becomes an empty slogan.”

Page 131: “The conviction of the Communist leaders that they were on the path to the creation of absolute happiness and an ideal society grew in proportion to the growth of their power. In fact, they do identify themselves with society and its aspirations. Absolute despotism equates itself with the belief in absolute human happiness, though it is an all-inclusive and universal tyranny.”

II.C From Stevan Majstorović, “Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia: Self-management and Culture”

Page 45: “Multinationality in Yugoslavia is an anthropological, cultural and historical feature of the population and at the same time, the fundamental political principle underlying the Yugoslav community. Yugoslavia is organized as a multinational country, and not as a centralized state in which the same statehood would be of greater importance than the fact that one belongs to a particular nation. All nations

and nationalities enjoy equal political and cultural rights and bear the same responsibility to the community.”

II.D From William Zimmerman, “Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia”

Page 22: “It will not surprise readers to learn that for those Yugoslavs who opted for Tito against the Cominform the answer was that socialism in the U.S.S.R. was deformed. As a result, one had to distinguish socialism in Yugoslavia, ‘state capitalism’ in the Soviet Union, and capitalism in the West.”

Page 27: “The clash with Djilas notwithstanding, what all the Yugoslav leaders – Tito, Bakaric, Kardelj, Rankovic, Boris Kedric, and Djilas – were doing in the 1950s was looking for ways to mark Yugoslav communism from the Soviet model. The ‘gimmick,’ as one astute Yugoslav expressed it to me, which they found was workers’ control through self-management. Out of self-management, moreover, flowed several core doctrinal notions and a general premise, i.e., to replace the internal mobilization strategy prevalent between 1946 and 1949 with a more conciliatory policy toward society much of what came to be thought of as Titoism emerged, all of it closely linked conceptually to self-management. The command economy with mandatory planning was replaced by indicative planning and market socialism, and the vanguard role of the YCP [Yugoslav Communist Party] was abandoned. Instead, the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY) ... was mandated to serve as ‘an ideological and political leading force’”

Page 76: “By the late 1960s, the Yugoslavs had raised the notion of open borders to the level of state policy along with market socialism and self-management, of what was distinct and positive in the Yugoslav socialist variant and an element that set off the Yugoslavia from the Soviet model.”

Page 132: “The Cominform attack on Tito in 1948 put an abrupt end to Yugoslavia’s alignment with the Soviet Union. Forced to choose between alignment and national independence, Tito and most of the Yugoslav leadership and most of the citizenry opted for independence. That independence did not translate immediately into nonalignment. For a short while Yugoslavia stood isolated from all the great powers.”

II.E From Dennison Rusinow, “The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974”

Page 50: “Djilas’s account of the genesis of the idea of self-management is suggestive. Soon after the Yugoslav Party was expelled from the Cominform, he says, he started ‘to re-read Marx’s *Capital*, but this time ‘with much greater care, to see if I could find the answer to the riddle of why, to put it in simplistic terms, Stalinism was bad and Yugoslavia was good.’ “

Page 63: “The Soviet system of planning was abandoned. In its place the Yugoslavs introduced annual ... ‘Social Plans,’ which at the enterprise level were no longer directive and compulsory, but indicative. The new planning system was based on the setting of ‘basic proportions’, through which the State would continue to plan and control the general and basic parameters of economic growth.”