

Violent versus Non-Violent Political Protests

A Case Study from the American Civil Rights Movement

Juan Pablo Mendez Campos

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Supervised by Dr. Rob Gillezeau
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Dr. Merwan Engineer, Honours Co-Advisor
Dr. Chris Auld, Honours Co-Advisor

Abstract

There was considerable tension during the American Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s between peaceful and more aggressive protest. Within this context, I test whether peaceful protests were more effective at achieving civil rights policy concessions than violent protests. This analysis finds that non-violent political protests had a positive impact on the enactment of fair private housing and public accommodation legislation. Conversely, violent protests had a negative impact on the enactment of fair private housing, public accommodations, and fair employment legislation.

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1. Introduction

The United States have a long and difficult history surrounding the use of political protests. Large public marches, boycotts and other forms of protest have been and continue to be used by individuals and groups that want to voice their opposition to government policies. For instance, within the last fifteen years the United States has witnessed major political protests including the marches against the Iraq War and, more recently, the massive nation-wide protests following the election of Donald Trump as President. In particular, protests and demonstrations motivated by issues of race have been and continue to be a defining element of American sociopolitical context. Historically, the Civil Rights Movement was the largest race-focused protest movement in the United States. However, despite the prevalence of protesting as political tool, the question remains whether such actions are helping participants reach their intended goals. In other words, have protests actually worked or have they simply served as an emotional release for frustrated populations?

Historical examples appear to illustrate the fact that, yes, protests have resulted in major victories for the participating groups. For example, historians and academics have recognized that the public protests and marches organized by the suffragette movement in the early twentieth century were a defining element of the movement's success in the continued struggle for women's equality (Du Bois, 1997, 18; McCammon et al, 2001, 50; Parkins, 1997, 39). The 1969 Stonewall riots in New York City are recognized as the primary instigating factor in the establishment of the LGBT rights movement as a mainstream political cause (Armstrong and Cragg, 2006, 724; Nelson, 2015, 2). Similarly, the protests of the American Civil Rights movement were also key in achieving institutional change. One of the primary goals of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders was the legal protection of racial minorities in the United States against unjust discrimination, which was attained, to an extent, in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 following years of civilian unrest. Yet, while the importance and power of protests are largely accepted, there exists strong political, philosophical, and moral debate on the efficacy and admissibility of different protest tactics.

The division can be roughly drawn between proponents of violence as an acceptable and necessary tactic and those that adhere to purely peaceful means. For example, within the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King, Jr was the major proponent of non-violent resistance while other leaders, such as Malcolm X, supported more aggressive forms of protest in response to the threats aimed at the African American population. Presently, advocacy for both types of civil resistance

continues to play a major role within American activism. A recent example would be the Black Lives Matter protests that spread throughout the United States in response to the killings of unarmed African Americans by police (Foran, 2015; Lee et al., 2016). While controversial, this movement was successful in attaining various political and policy victories by engaging primarily in nonviolent civil resistance tactics (Barber, 2016; Capecchi, 2015; Revesz, 2016). For example, support for Black Lives Matter was key in voting out prosecutors accused of racism in Chicago and Cleveland who had previously enjoyed popular support (Swaine, 2016). Moreover, the movement successfully pressured the federal government to eliminate the transfer of military-grade equipment to local police forces and forced the investigation of claims of racially motivated violence by police throughout the country (Foran, 2015). Yet, there have also been notable instances of violence that have come to be associated with the movement, such as the 2014 Ferguson riots.

While the long-term effects of these recent acts of civil resistance have not been fully understood, a parallel can be made between them and the protests that took place during the 1950s and 1960s as part of the American Civil Rights Movement. Both were race-based movements that sought to address issues of institutionalized racism. Moreover, both are movements that employed both violent and nonviolent tactics of civil resistance in order to have their grievances recognized by the government and society. It is clear that the Black Lives Matter movement is a continuation of the same struggle that civil rights leaders confronted in the mid-twentieth century. As a result, it is important to understand how and why the Civil Rights movement was successful in instigating institutional change in order reach a better understanding of the impacts of current social movements.

It is important to note that the legislative and social victories of the civil rights movement continue to affect the United States' socio-political fabric. Yet, it remains unclear exactly what role violent and nonviolent protests had in achieving these victories. The specific protest tactics used during the movement have been well documented and, as a result, research has been conducted on the historical impact of these protests on American society. However, the pertinent literature is largely silent on the comparative effects of violent and nonviolent race-related protests on the legislative outcomes of the Civil Rights movement.

This paper seeks to answer that question. Specifically, the aim is to further understand what the comparative impacts of violent and nonviolent protests were on the enactment of state-level race-based anti-discrimination legislation in the United States. Using available protest and state legislation data, this paper seeks to understand the comparative effects of violent and nonviolent

protests on anti-discrimination legislative outcomes, focusing on the periods immediately preceding and during the Civil Rights Movement. This analysis finds evidence to indicate that peaceful protests had a significant and positive correlation with the successful enactment of state-level anti-discrimination legislation. Specifically, the largest positive effect from non-violent protests is found to be on the enactment of legislation pertaining to private housing. Moreover, non-violent protests are also found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the establishment of public accommodation legislation.

Violent protests, on the other hand, are found to have large, negative and statistically significant effects on the enactment of fair private housing legislation and fair employment commissions. These findings are important because they illustrate two facts: that non-violent civil resistance appears to have been more successful than violent protests in achieving policy victories through legislation for civil rights leaders and that not all policy areas were impacted in the same way by protest tactics. This knowledge can be employed in the analysis of current civil resistance movements in the United States. Specifically, these findings establish a framework through which protests can be organized effectively by social movements; protest tactics can be differentiated by the target policy area instead of using the same tactics in an attempt to enact change in a variety of policy areas.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Protests

The twenty-year period between 1950 and 1970 saw the large scale mobilization of African-Americans throughout the United States in protest against racially discriminatory laws. Protests occurred in virtually every major city in a variety of forms, from small-scale sit-ins to massive marches through the boulevards of Washington, DC. The initial protests began following the landmark Supreme Court ruling in *Brown v Board of Education* [1954]. Building on the momentum of that major legal victory, the leaders of the then-nascent Civil Rights movement attempted to gain further legal concessions through the use of non-violent protest methods. Various individuals took part in peaceful protests that spurred larger movements of non-violent resistance against racially discriminatory laws, for example Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott.

Later, Martin Luther King Jr, promoted the idea of the greater efficacy and moral superiority of non-violent tactics of civil resistance on a larger, national scale taking his peaceful movement to the steps of the White House during the March on Washington in 1963 in which an estimated 200,000 people participated. However, during this time other competing figures emerged within the Civil Rights movement who challenged Dr. King's leadership. In 1964, Malcolm X came to be regarded as a major alternative leader within the Civil Rights movement with the notable distinction that Malcolm X believed in the necessity for violent resistance (Cone, 2001, 173). As is demonstrated in table 1 of the appendix, the emergence of Malcolm X as a major voice within the movement coincided with a large increase in violent protests by African-Americans.

This entire twenty-year period in American history has been the topic of study for a variety of academic disciplines due to the fact that it was a period of exceptionally large and active citizens' movements. For example, focusing on violent protests, one of the most significant contributions to the relevant literature within an economic framework is the research conducted by William Collins and Robert Margo. Their two papers introduce the first substantial improvement on the identification of the impacts of violent protests by using rainfall as an instrumental variable on the incidence of protests. Focusing on the United States, Collins and Margo find that communities that experienced violent race-related civilian uprisings during the 1960s (predominantly African-American communities) subsequently experienced decreased property values throughout the 1960s and minimal increases in value throughout the following decade (Collins and Margo, 2004, 18). Furthermore,

regarding labor market effects, Collins and Margo find preliminary evidence to indicate that violent race-related protests had “negative and economically significant” effects on African-Americans’ employment and wage earnings both in the short run (1960-1970) and in the long run (1960-1980) (Collins and Margo, 2004, 23). Also within an economic framework, a recent paper by Rob Gillezeau and Jamein Cunningham finds that violent protests had a positive short-run and long-run impact on the incidence of killings by police in the United States, with racial minorities bearing the brunt of this impact compared to white populations (Gillezeau and Cunningham, 2017).

In political science, Doug McAdam and Yang Su find evidence to indicate that violent protests (i.e. those which caused destruction of property) against the United States’ military involvement in the Vietnam War had a significant positive effect on the proportion of congressional votes for anti-war measures between 1965 and 1973 using time series analysis (McAdam and Su, 2002, 696). Within the same academic field, a recent paper by Emiliano Huet-Vaughn attempts to answer a research question similar to the one proposed in this paper. Specifically, Huet-Vaughn seeks to understand the causal effects of violent protests on the likelihood of policy concessions in France (Huet-Vaughn, 2013). Borrowing from Collins and Margo and using a weather-related instrumental variable approach, the author finds that violent protests, particularly those in which there was destruction of property, had a large negative effect on the likelihood of policy concessions in the short-term (Huet-Vaughn, 2013, 29). Additionally, a research paper by Omar Wasow finds that spatial proximity to violent race-related protests was significant in determining the county-level Democratic and Republican Parties’ vote share for both state-level and federal elections by using rainfall as an instrumental variable on protests (Wasow, 2015, 42). Specifically, Wasow found that proximity to violent protests caused significant decrease in the Democratic Party’s voter share (Wasow, 2015, 41).

Within the scope of non-violent civil resistance, important work has been done by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan. Using a novel dataset called NAVCO (Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes) and employing a multinomial logistic regression (MLR) model, Chenoweth and Stephan test the incidence of success for violent and nonviolent civil resistance. They find that non-violent resistance was six times more likely to succeed against a repressive government than violent resistance and that non-violent resistance movements benefit more from ‘internal pressures’, such as defections from the regime, than violent resistance movements (Chenoweth and Stephan, 20, 2002). In addition, another paper on nonviolent resistance in Latin America by James Franklin employs time series analysis to protest data from seven countries and finds that nonviolent protest has a positive impact

on policy concessions by repressive regimes (Franklin, 709, 2002). Moreover, Franklin finds that different types of nonviolent resistance, in particular occupations (i.e. sit-ins) and hunger strikes offer the highest possibility of policy concessions while at the same time decreasing the threat of violent repression by government forces (Franklin, 712, 2002).

Given the scope of this literature, it is evident that the relevant research has yet to clearly identify the comparative effects between violent and nonviolent policy outcomes within a single comprehensive study. This paper seeks to accomplish just that. However, it is important to note that, as the literature suggests, the relative impacts of violent and nonviolent protests on successful outcomes depends largely on the governmental structures and political culture of the country in which they take place. Consequently, the results of this study must be understood as an insight into the role that violent and non-violent protests play within the context of the United States, narrowly, and in liberal democracies, more broadly, as opposed to an overarching commentary on protests in general.

2.2 Civil Rights Legislation

This period was also one in which African-Americans achieved a number of significant legal and policy victories at both the federal and state levels. As previously noted, the Civil Rights Movement as it is known today is generally said to have begun following the Supreme Court ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* [1954] which found racial segregation in schools to be unconstitutional. Following this and the subsequent civilian movement, the federal and state governments were forced to recognize establishing racial discrimination and address it in policy. At the federal level, the most significant pieces of legislation that outlined protections against racial discrimination were the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The first of these pieces of federal legislation prohibited discrimination based on race, colour, religion, or national origin in public accommodations that took part in interstate commerce, public schools, and state and municipal governments. The Voting Rights Act, which was signed the following summer, ended discriminatory voter limitations, such as mandatory literacy tests, that were used to unfairly target African-Americans and other minority groups. Lastly, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act, was the last major piece of legislation that came out of the Civil Rights movement. It was intended to be an expansion of previous civil rights legislation by banning discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of housing.

Similar anti-discrimination bills were also passed at the state-level following the lead of the fed-

eral government and the Supreme Court. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some states had already enacted laws to ban discrimination by race in public accommodations (Lerman and Sanderson, 1978, 239). However, most states only passed their own legislation banning discrimination based on race in public accommodations after the enactment of 1964 law. Yet, it is important to note that the scope of the state-level laws differs somewhat from that of the federal laws. For example, in Minnesota, in the case of *Roberts v. United States Jaycees* [1984] the state court ruled that private clubs (which had been exempted from the federal law) were in fact required to comply with anti-discrimination measures (New York Times, 1984).

3. Empirical Strategy

This paper estimates two empirical models by GLS. The first is a general model estimating the impacts of same-year protests and the sum of protests during the preceding five years on the enactment of civil rights legislation. The second is a five year lagged model offering further insight into the impacts of these protests on legislation enactment.

3.1 Data

This research uses two datasets in its analysis: the Ethnic Collective Action in the Urban United States dataset created by Susana Olzak and Elizabeth West, and the Correlates of State Policy Project dataset created by Marty Jordan and Matt Grossman.

The Olzak and West data set includes entries for over two thousand protests, both violent and non-violent, that occurred in the United States from 1954 to 1992. For the purposes of this paper, the set was limited to the years 1954-1975 which was the period immediately before, during, and following the major components of the Civil Rights Movement. Each protest entry contains information on the size of the protest, the date and location, the scale of violence (based on a scale from 0 to 5), the main ethnic group behind the protest, the reason for the protest (i.e. the main grievance which motivated the protest), the number of injured participants, and any subsequent action taken by protesters following the conclusion of their protest. Using this information, the data was aggregated by state and by year into either violent or non-violent groups and the size of the protests was similarly averaged by state and by year. Moreover, only protests initiated by African American groups and those which had anti-discrimination or pro-desegregation as their main claim were used in this analysis. Violent protests are defined as those in which there is either property damage, injured participants, the threat of violence, or visible weapons held by protesters. This corresponds to the data where a non-violent protest is defined with a value of zero and a violent protest is any entry with a value greater than zero. Summary statistics are presented in Table 11 of the appendix. On average in the sample period there were nearly six times as many non-violent protests than violent protests.




Figure 1: Number of Protests in the U.S. by Year

The Jordan and Grossman data set includes an extensive compilation of state-level legislation by state, by year, and by policy area from 1900-2016. This dataset offers the variables of interest for this research paper. Specifically, the dummy variables for legislation in three main policy areas: anti-discrimination laws in public accommodation post-1964, fair employment laws, and anti-discrimination laws in private housing. As with the protest data set, this policy data was limited to the specific time period of 1954-1975.

3.2 Methodology

This paper employs a panel analysis of both violent and non-violent protests on the incidence of civil rights policy concessions by year and by state. Two empirical models were estimated. The first, a general of the effects of political protests was estimated by GLS as follows:

$$Y_{s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 V_{s,t} + \beta_2 S5V_s + \beta_3 NV_{s,t} + \beta_4 S5NV_s + \beta_5 S + \beta_6 T + \beta_7 X_{s,t} + \epsilon_{s,t}$$

$$\epsilon_{s,t} = \alpha + \rho_1 \epsilon_{s,t-1} + v_{s,t}$$

Where $Y_{s,t}$ is a policy dummy variable in state s and year t , $V_{s,t}$ is a matrix of a the sum of violent protests per state s per year t , $S5V$ is a matrix of the sum of violent protests in state s over the five years prior to the enactment of the legislation. Similarly, $NV_{s,t}$ is a matrix of a the sum of violent protests per state s per year t , $S5NV$ is a matrix of the sum of violent protests in state s over the five years prior to the enactment of the legislation. $X_{s,t}$ is a matrix of other explanatory variables including per capita income, population, protest size, protest duration, and a time trend, and S and T are state and year fixed effects. Our coefficients of interest in this analysis are β_1 β_2 , β_3 and β_4 . The AR(1) process for the error term was used to correct for autocorrelation in the error term arising from the nature of the data used in this analysis.

This second lagged model was also estimated using Generalized Least Squares:

$$Y_{s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 V_{s,t-n} + \beta_2 NV_{s,t-n} + \beta_3 S + \beta_4 T + \beta_5 X_{s,t-n} + \epsilon_{s,t-n}$$

$$\epsilon_{s,t} = \alpha + \rho_1 \epsilon_{s,t-1} + v_{s,t}$$

Where $n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$ and is a five-year lag. Following the first model, $Y_{s,t}$ is a policy dummy variable in state s and year t , $V_{s,t-n}$ is a matrix of a five year lagged variable of the sum of violent protests per state s per year $t - n$, $NV_{s,t-n}$ is a matrix of a five year lagged variable of the sum of non-violent protests per state s per year $t - n$, and $X_{s,t}$ is a matrix of other explanatory variables including per capita income, population, protest size, protest duration, state and year fixed effects, and a time trend, and S and T are state and year fixed effects. Our coefficients of interest in this analysis are β_1 and β_2 . The AR(1) process for the error term was used to correct for autocorrelation in the error term arising from the nature of the data used in this analysis.

4. Results

The results for the lagged analysis indicate that violent and non-violent political protests had significant impacts on the passing of state-level civil rights legislation. However, the results differ significantly by policy area. The most important results of this analysis pertain to fair private housing legislation. The first, more general model, is used in order to understand the impacts of violent and non-violent protests on policy concessions within a larger scope. The sum of the preceding five years is meant to give a clear picture of the political momentum that such movements may have and the impact that that momentum can have on legislation. The second lagged model is used to offer a more clear picture of the impacts that protests over individual years have on policy concessions due to the fact that policies take long periods of time to go through the legislative systems individual states.

The results from the general empirical model for fair private housing legislation presented in Table 1 of the appendix demonstrate that violent protests the year of enactment had a large, negative and statistically significant impact on the enactment of such legislation. Similarly, the sum of violent protests over the five years before enactment had a notable, negative statistically significant impact. Conversely, the sum of non-violent protests over the five years preceding the law had no statistically significant impact on the enactment of these laws.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results for fair employment laws before 1964 and after 1964, respectively. The only noteworthy result from this analysis is that protests did not have any impact on the enactment of pre and post-1964 fair employment legislation. The coefficient of the sum of non-violent protests in the preceding five years is found to be statistically significant for both, however, it is small enough to be considered negligible in both cases.

Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results for public accommodations laws before 1964 and after 1964, respectively. In this case, the sum of violent protests had a negative and statistically significant impact on the enactment of pre-1964 legislation while non-violent protests had no significant impact. In the case of post-1964 legislation, violent protests had no significant impact. Conversely, non-violent protests during the year of enactment are found to have a small, positive, and statistically significant impact. The sum of non-violent protests in the five years preceding the legislation had a positive and statistically significant impact, but the coefficient is small enough to be considered

negligible.

Results from the lagged model offer greater insight on the impacts of political protests. As demonstrated in Table 6 of the appendix, non-violent protests one year prior and three years prior to the enactment of fair private housing legislation had positive and statistically effects on the enactment of such legislation. Conversely, violent protests on the year of enactment, two years prior, and three years prior had large, negative and statistically significant effects on the enactment of this type of legislation.

Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate the results for fair employment laws before 1964 and after 1964, respectively. For laws before 1964, neither violent nor non-violent political protests are found to have any statistically significant impact. Similar results are presented for post-1964 fair employment laws where neither violent nor non-violent political protests are found to have any statistically significant impact on the enactment of this legislation.

Tables 9 and 10 of the appendix demonstrate the results for pre and post-1964 public accommodations laws, respectively. Violent protests one year and two years preceeding the enactment of this type of legislation are found to have negative and statistically significant impacts while non-violent protests are found to have no statistically significant impact. For post-1964 public accommodations laws, neither violent nor non-violent protests are found to have any statistically significant impact.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

The results of this analysis reinforce previous findings from the relevant literature: that non-violent political protest in the Civil Rights Movement was not just an alternative to violent protest, it was a more effective means through which to attain change in the law and government policy. Particularly, it was non-violent protests, such as those led by Martin Luther King Jr, which positively impacted some of the important legislative outcomes that occurred as a result of the Civil Rights movement. From these results, we find that non-violent protests which occurred in a given state in the year of civil rights enactment, increased the chances of such legislation existing by between 1.1 and 2.5 percent. Conversely, while the coefficient estimates for violent protests were found to be largely insignificant, it is important to note that nearly all of them are negative, including those that are found to be significant; we find that violent protests decrease the chances of a civil rights policy concession by between 4.7 and 12.2 percent.

These findings are significant because they illustrate the comparative effects of violent and non-violent protests on policy concessions. Collins and Margo already found that violent political protests had detrimental short and long-term effects on African-Americans' housing markets and job markets. Rob Gillezeau and Jamein Cunningham found that violent protests resulted in increased killings of African-Americans by police. Part of the purpose of this research was to ask if violent protests were at least effective in helping a movement attain its goals despite these massive pitfalls. Evidently, the answer is no; violent protests, at best, have no significant impact and, at worst, are detrimental to the movement's goals. However, this is not to say that non-violent protests are a silver bullet to discrimination. As is presented in this paper, the effectiveness of such protests depends on the policy area.

The disparity in findings between policy areas suggests that while non-violent protests (in the forms of boycotts, sit-ins, or marches) served as an effective tool to oppose discrimination in facets of life that are generally observable, they may not have been equally impactful in targeting other areas in which discrimination occurs behind closed doors. These protests had a larger impact on issues of public accommodation and housing perhaps because they are policy areas that are more visible to the public. For example, a white property owner who refuses to rent to African-American tenants would find it difficult to hide this discriminatory practice from the community-at-large. Similarly, a restaurant owner who refuses to serve African-Americans would have to do so explicitly

without the ability to hide this practice from common knowledge. Consequently, large marches and public demonstrations may have effectively targeted and been motivated by such blatant instances of racism.

However, the same may not hold true for instances of racial discrimination in employment. Unlike property owners and restaurateurs who discriminate against customers, employers who discriminate against African-Americans in hiring practices do so outside of the public scope; they have the benefit of being able to hide discriminatory employment practices behind any number of excuses that may go largely unquestioned. As a result, communities affected by these practices may not be able to target their protests as effectively as they may have been when dealing with other sources of discrimination. Perhaps different forms of citizen engagement may benefit these areas of discrimination.

In conclusion, there are a few points which bear highlighting. First, it is important to realize that the benefits of a certain piece of legislation banning racial discrimination can be subtly undone with subsequent policy changes. For example, despite the enactment of fair voting legislation during the Civil Rights movement, discriminatory practices such as limiting the number polling stations, decreasing the number of days for early voting, or voter ID laws continue to disenfranchise African-Americans and racial minorities today (Graham, 2016; Hebert and Lang, 2016; Lartey, 2016). The analysis presented here does not mean to address the question of the current state of institutionalized racism in the United States which undoubtedly exists. Rather, this analysis simply seeks to understand the impacts that different protest tactics had on the enactment of Civil Rights legislation.

Second, the results of this paper are not to be taken as a wholesale endorsement of non-violent protests in any and all cases. The results found herein pertain to the specific context of the United States, particularly within the sociopolitical context of the mid-twentieth century. While they do offer an insight into similar movements that exist today (such as Black Lives Matter) and the ways in which they may concentrate their efforts more effectively through protests, the world has seen many instances of such movements that have failed in the face of oppression. This is meant to be a commentary primarily on the social reality in the United States, specifically, and in liberal democracies, generally.

Third, it is important to consider the context in which these results have been found. Perhaps, in a political system that is predicated on ideas of ‘order and rule of law’, non-violent protests, by definition, will be more effective than violent protests simply because they will be legitimized by the state. Conversely, violent protests may be systematically at a disadvantage because by virtue of

being violent, these events constitute an existential threat to the state in its role as the legitimate holder of the monopoly of violence. This begs the larger question, which has been the focal point of postcolonial literature, of whether it is actually possible to transform an oppressive state from within or if it is necessary to dismantle it. Advocates of the latter do not have to look far, particularly in the United States where racist violence and the systemic oppression of people of colour, particularly African-Americans, continues despite the legal and policy victories of the Civil Rights movement. While the data provided here may serve some function in explaining our current sociopolitical reality, it is necessary to consider whether such a reality is truly one in which non-violent protest serves a transformative function or, rather if it serves to reinforce inherently oppressive discourses and institutions.

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Appendix

Table 1: Regression Results for Fair Private Housing Laws

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	-0.1082*** (0.0297)	0.0039 (0.0076)
Sum Previous 5 Years	-0.0582** (0.0236)	0.0236 (0.0050)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0869

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 2: Regression Results for Fair Employment Laws Pre-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	0.0007 (0.0147)	-0.0025 (0.0037)
Sum Previous 5 Years	-0.0081 (0.0116)	-0.0045* (0.0025)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0920

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 3: Regression Results for Fair Employment Laws Post-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	0.0015 (0.0154)	0.0037 (0.0039)
Sum Previous 5 Years	0.0099 (0.0123)	0.0046* (0.0026)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.2639

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 4: Regression Results for Public Accommodations Laws Pre-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	-0.0256 (0.0222)	-0.0077* (0.0057)
Sum Previous 5 Years	-0.0312* (0.0171)	-0.0041 (0.0036)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0252

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 5: Regression Results for Public Accommodations Laws Post-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	0.0112 (0.0238)	0.0081 (0.0060)
Sum Previous 5 Years	0.0258 (0.0257)	0.0019 (0.0042)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0774

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 6: Regression Results for Fair Private Housing Laws

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	-0.1220*** (0.0326)	0.0108 (0.0083)
1 Year Lag	-0.0721* (0.0379)	0.0148** (0.0075)
2 Year Lag	-0.0897** (0.0391)	0.0125 (0.0079)
3 Year Lag	-0.0765** (0.0384)	0.0246*** (0.0078)
4 Year Lag	-0.0593 (0.0372)	0.0058 (0.0074)
5 Year Lag	-0.0338 (0.0311)	0.0013 (0.0067)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0229

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 7: Regression Results for Fair Employment Laws Pre-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	-0.0012 (0.0163)	-0.0026 (0.0041)
1 Year Lag	-0.0090 (0.0188)	-0.0039 (0.0037)
2 Year Lag	-0.0222 (0.0194)	-0.0051 (0.0039)
3 Year Lag	-0.0272 (0.0190)	-0.0023 (0.0039)
4 Year Lag	-0.0177 (0.0185)	-0.0023 (0.0033)
5 Year Lag	-0.0014 (0.0155)	-0.0055 (0.0034)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.047

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 8: Regression Results for Fair Employment Laws Post-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	0.0009 (0.0176)	0.0036 (0.0043)
1 Year Lag	0.0091 (0.0198)	0.0042 (0.0039)
2 Year Lag	0.0333 (0.0204)	0.0051 (0.0041)
3 Year Lag	0.0301 (0.0301)	0.0017 (0.0041)
4 Year Lag	0.0190 (0.0195)	0.0031 (0.0038)
5 Year Lag	0.0024 (0.0162)	0.0055 (0.0035)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.047

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 9: Regression Results for Public Accommodations Laws Pre-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	-0.0335 (0.0246)	-0.0096 (0.0062)
1 Year Lag	-0.0518* (0.0281)	-0.0051 (0.0056)
2 Year Lag	-0.0508* (0.0287)	-0.0033 (0.0058)
3 Year Lag	-0.0372 (0.0281)	-0.0045 (0.0058)
4 Year Lag	-0.0098 (0.0275)	-0.0083 (0.0054)
5 Year Lag	-0.0179 (0.0234)	-0.0001 (0.0051)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0238

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 10: Regression Results for Public Accommodations Laws Post-1964

	Violent	Non-Violent
Base Year	0.0205 (0.0267)	0.0076 (0.0067)
1 Year Lag	0.0432 (0.0315)	0.0018 (0.0062)
2 Year Lag	0.0313 (0.0328)	0.0022 (0.0066)
3 Year Lag	0.0207 (0.0323)	0.0016 (0.0065)
4 Year Lag	0.0034 (0.0309)	0.0056 (0.0061)
5 Year Lag	0.0189 (0.0254)	-0.0003 (0.0055)
	n=334	R-sq (Overall): 0.0787

Coefficient estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical significance denoted as * significant at ten percent, ** significant at five percent, *** significant at one percent. Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).

Table 11: Summary Statistics

	Violent	Non-Violent
Mean	0.2069	1.5074
St. Dev.	0.6566	3.2989
Total No. in Sample	84	612

Data sources: Olzak, S. and West, E. (1995); Jordan, M. and Grossman, M. (2016).