MISSION
PlatForum is a peer-reviewed journal organized by anthropology graduate students. We accept anthropologically relevant submissions from all university and college students of British Columbia, on a Call for Papers basis. PlatForum strives to be a participatory publication offering an opportunity for students to participate fully in the peer-review, evaluation and publishing process.

The Editors seek scholarly contributions including articles, reviews, and field notes, covering diverse topics and issues from all four anthropology sub-disciplines: archaeology, cultural, physical and linguistic anthropology. Every attempt is made to publish PlatForum (ISSN 1492-4293) annually. General inquiries may be forwarded to: Managing Editor, PlatForum, University of Victoria, Department of Anthropology, Cornett Bldg, Room 214, P.O. Box 3050 Stn CSC, Victoria, B.C. V8W 3P5. Copyright 2005 by the University of Victoria Department of Anthropology Graduate Students. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form for by any means, electronic or mechanical, without written permission from the publisher.

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INTRODUCTION
The Editorial Team 2007-2008 welcomes readers to PlatForum (formerly Cultural Reflections), the journal published by Graduate Students in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Victoria. With this issue we celebrate ten years of publication and our debut under the new name and editorial direction. The change of name from Cultural Reflections to PlatForum signifies a shift in the journal parallel with new directions in the communication of anthropological knowledge and ideas:

**Plat** - to plait or braid

**Forum** - a public meeting place for open discussion, a medium for open discussion or voicing ideas

**PlatForum** - the braiding together of multiple perspectives while offering a public meeting place for discussion and debate

PlatForum is a part of a growing movement of journals that are transforming the way in which academics and members of the general public access and debate anthropological ideas and knowledge. We recognize the need for an open anthropological discourse, hence the transition from being a purely print-based publication, to one that embraces the web as an invaluable tool for open debate. This move facilitates dissemination of published PlatForum articles to a broader audience, while providing a platform for anthropological discussions relating to journal material. Ultimately, the online journal will provide readers with a constant source of dynamic anthropology, communicating ideas through an open editorial process and frequent online publication of articles.

The articles in this edition of PlatForum are varied in their scope and focus. Together they share a concern with being in the world and cover a wide range of applied and theoretical questions: modernity, representation, embodiment, health, exchange, landscape, and the ‘doing’ of anthropology in a globally interrelated political and economic environment. While journals are rarely read from cover to cover, the order of articles in PlatForum was created with these themes in mind. We invite readers to connect the specifics of each article to not just broader themes in anthropology but to their scholarly interests and passions.
We hope that the inaugural edition of PlatForum stimulates discussion and exchange of ideas. The publication of the online version of this journal in the near future will further facilitate this dialogue and enrich our understanding of both the breadth and depth of anthropology at the University of Victoria and beyond.
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postprandial paleontology

it arrives.

the moment of the day
when i just want to collapse

to give in
to Death a little

to say

“if you begin
with blankets
and a pillow

clean
starch-cold sheets,

i’m your man.”

Regarding the work
I have been driven of late to explore the crash-site of the post-modern, where, I suspect, the nascent shoots of re-enchantment may be discerned. This is one of a series of poems which seeks to illumine the remains--in this case the collapse of a weary technocrat at day’s end, set in a culture devoid of meaning. Centuries from now, what sense might an archaeologist make of these ever-diminishing cycles of meaning? Indeed, what sense can we make of them today?
MUSEUMS, POSTNATIONAL AND TRANSCULTURAL IDENTITIES IN AN ERA OF CULTURAL DISLOCATION

Abstract

In an age characterized by the massive scale interconnections and flows of people, it has been argued the notion of nationhood has become less adequate for explaining the identities of those who are more culturally and geographically fluid. This article seeks to explore how the museum, an anthropological enterprise traditionally premised on the notion of cultural difference, seeks to represent those identities which do are not so easily contained by coherent and discreet demarcations of culture and geography. The article argues that though the museum has roots in nation-state ideology and nation building, exhibitions such as African Worlds and the Transcultural Galleries, show that it is possible for the museum to articulate, represent and celebrate postnational, transcultural and hybrid identities through techniques that are fluid, ironic, reflexive, and emphasize identities in motion.

INTRODUCTION

Many authors have written of the role of the museum in not only representing but also constructing a sense of identity about people, culture and political order. As Macdonald (2003:1) notes, the birth of the museum is intimately linked to the late 18th century, a moment in which people in Western Europe saw the decline of the aristocratic order at emergence of the nation-state, epitomized by the French Revolution in 1789. Thus, as objects became released from the aristocratic and the private sphere into the public museum realm, the institution functioned as an emblem of the new national identity of the people (Macdonald 2003:1). As Benedict Anderson (2006) attests, these early museums do not simply reflect world changes in social and political organization, these museums also became institutions which sought to constitute and build national identity. Yet many scholars today maintain that identity is constructed dynamically both within and outside institutional frameworks (Macdonald 2003; Appadurai 1996; Bhabha 1994). Within this perspective, identity is actively negotiated and produced not only within but also beyond the fixed borders of the state. Scholars have called these identities postnational, transcultural, or hybrid: all three terms configure identity as more culturally and geographically fluid than that of nationalism (Appadurai 1996; Bhabha 1994; Caglar 1997; Israel 2000; Macdonald 2003; van de Veer 1997).

This shift in identity conception informs the concern of my paper. I seek to explore the ways in which museums accommodate these changes. Given that the museum has traditionally served to create and represent a sort of cohesive national identity and heritage, what sorts of challenges do museums face when the prevailing idea of national heritage starts to change? Appadurai talks about the ways in which linkages and interconnections have been made...
on a global scale, through different "-scapes" (Appadurai 1996). Through expanded media, technology, migration, economy and numerous other ways, our world has become more connected so that the idea of the nation has less currency than in the past (Appadurai 1996) as traditional borders and notions of locality are being challenged.

This paper not only seeks to explore how museums have in the past played a role in national identity but also how museums have reacted to these important shifts in identity. Given that the museum is a product of colonialism and the burgeoning nation state, how capable is the museum of expressing identities unbound from fixed national borders, and in what ways? I argue that despite these colonial roots, through various techniques as exemplified in the African Worlds and the Transcultural Galleries exhibits, it is possible for the museum to practice, articulate, represent and celebrate postnational, transcultural and hybrid identities.

MUSEUMS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: US VERSUS THEM
Museums articulate and construct identities in the past and today (Shelton 2003; Philips 2002). Ashley writes that museums do not merely function as repositories of material culture: they also work to form identities (2005:5). As has been documented by several scholars, in the late 18th century and into the 19th century, the emergence of museums, the nation, and the public were intimately bound (Macdonald 2003:1). Of course, not every institution executed its operations in the same fashion. Despite differences amongst art galleries, science and technology museums, and ethnographic and archaeological field museums, all contain features useful for the work of identity construction (Macdonald 2003:3). For the nation, the idea of having a culture provides a means of expressing distinctive identity. Objects and artifacts came to represent and signify the national culture: they were thought to "belong" to the nation. Thus, the nation’s culture was brought to the museum, and this was a way of creating a common history and identity (Macdonald 2003:2-3).

Not all museums were consciously concerned with the public and the dissemination of nationalist rhetoric (Macdonald 2003:4). That is, not all museums identified themselves as national museums with explicit nationalist agendas, and not all museums fit the description of ‘national’. However, even non-national museums carried the same identity rhetoric as national museums. As Macdonald suggests,
techniques of representing culture are inherently a part of the museum concept. It is these same practices which make possible the projection of national identity; for the logic goes that in order for it to be displayed and articulated, it must be coherent. Moreover, the expectations of coherency create a necessity to define, which lead to inevitable inclusions and exclusions within a simplified grand narrative.

In *Exhibition, Difference, and the Logic of Culture*, Tony Bennett offers clarification on the ways that museums communicate ideas to the public. Bennett refers to the museum as a “differencing machine” (2006:46), suggesting that as an institution, the museum encodes the world into knowledge, which is then internalized by viewers. However, what is particularly interesting is his choice of the word machine, which implies that the museum is an active site of production. Fred Myers, building on Bourdieu’s concept of the field of cultural production, supports this perspective, referring to the museum as an “exhibitionary field of cultural production” (Myers 2006:504). In other words, museological exhibition practices do not merely represent fixed cultures that are out there (or here, for that matter). Instead, exhibitions can be viewed as a process in which museums “cunningly recontextualize forms and practices, producing something new” (Myers 2006:505). As such, these inherent museological methods of representing culture often create identities in the process—that is, they are constitutive of the subjects that they seek to represent. In *Cannibal Tours and Glass Boxes: The Anthropology of Museums*, Michael Ames, a previous director of the Museum of Anthropology at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, offers an insightful insider’s perspective and study on the practice of ethnographic museology (Ames 1992). He writes powerfully that “anthropologists through their curatorial and research activities are actively contributing to the development of the phenomena which they are so busily collecting and studying” (Ames 1992:59). Moreover, the general public often demands and is rewarded with opportunities to consume the exotic and engage in “cannibal tours” may further encourage this development. What must perhaps be noted is that the very attempt to “represent” a culture may in itself be problematic.

At the same time, exhibitions rely on narrative construction through the overwhelming use of visuals. Museums impart educational take-home messages and authoritative interpretations and lessons about cultures, which implies that the creation of bounded identities is necessarily a part of the museum process. Lidchi reminds us that at the very least, ethnographic exhibitions are mere fictions woven from facts. However, she argues that the profound use of visuals in these projects creates a sense of literalness, which arguably “quickens their claim to be both evidence and truth” while underemphasizing the understanding the constructed nature of the displays (Lidchi 2006:95). Lidchi draws from a Foucauldian perspective, which emphasizes the role of visuals in making creating such authoritative knowledge. This perspective traces the history of visual displays in both science and popular traditions in a
particular “exhibitionary complex” (Lidchi 2005:95) which delights in the employment of visuals as tools of education and entertainment. Thus, with respect to the connections between nationalist museum practices, and bounded notions of culture,

national identities and national publics were also defined through difference from other nations and ethnic groups—the new world picture was one of discrete, spatially-mapped, bounded difference, something which would prove difficult for those who, according to this picture, were ‘out of place’ (such as migrants) or who found their values and cultural attributes depicted as less advanced or morally worthy than those of the ‘home team’ (Macdonald 2003:2).

Similarly, Benedict Anderson (2006) argues that the museum institution was one of the strongest institutions to instill nation-building ideology, along with the census and the map. Anderson (2006:163) argues that although the colonial era may appear anti-nationalist, in fact, nationalist ideology has its origins in colonial state practices and concepts. He argues that the map, the census and the museum were institutions that embody the way that the late colonial administrators thought of their domains (Anderson 2006:184). Colonial administrations imagined their domains as “total classificatory grids” (Anderson 2006:184), which could be applied to anything under the state’s control.

Moreover, the museum’s very endeavors to represent and essentially capture essences of cultures create bounded notions of cultures. Most contemporary ethnographic museums are classified by geographical locations with tangible boundaries; however, some scholars have put forth the argument that thinking of cultural identities in terms of physical geography must be rethought. For example, in her treatment of soundscapes and the cultural capital of sound, Julia Obert challenges scholars to detach themselves from the “visuospatial” which are part of the “cartographic phenomenon” (Orbert 2006:1). For Orbert, then, traditional scholarly tendencies to think of cultural identity as attached to certain geographies limits identity because of the necessary lines, territories and boundaries it draws.

CHALLENGES OF EXHIBITING POSTNATIONAL AND TRANSCULTURAL IDENTITIES

The museum can be thought of as cultural production which works to encode the world neatly into cultures and nations and thus creating fixed, finite identities, rooted in specific geographical locations. At this point, I would like to emphasize that although museums have been key institutions for nation-building and for the perpetuation of thinking of cultures and peoples as bounded entities, there is little reason to think that the museum had so much authority so as to be the only informers of this way of thinking. Indeed, I suggest that those who go to museums are not merely passive viewers of nationalist ideology; instead, viewers merely use the museums as one resource amongst many others (such as film, books, schools, amongst others) to construct
or stitch together a worldview. Authors such as Ashley seem to grant the museum an almost totalizing power for identity-formation. For example, she speaks (in particular) of the 19th century museum as:

a ‘monopoly of knowledge,’
a centralized structure of power, situated in an imposing city building, controlling the preservation of historical knowledge and identity of the dominant culture, and also world knowledge seen through the lens of the dominant culture (Ashley 2005:6).

While I would dispute this omnipotent portrayal of the museum, the museum is certainly a key player in the dissemination of national identity, and Ashley’s contention that the museum does have authority has salience; as an institution, the museum controls a narrative about what is worth conserving and the kinds of narratives deemed to be important. In addition, Ashley notes that the public expects museums to speak on matters of history and national identity (Ashley 2005:6), a point which recognizes the importance of museum-goers in the process identity construction. Though viewers today likely see the museum as one resource of information amongst others, it must not be forgotten that the museum existed and does exist amongst many other institutions that are also embedded in nationalist and modernist ways of thinking. The result is that only a few venues and resources for the subversive and the alternative exist. The creation of the stable, definable and coherent national body meant the implicit inclusion of certain forms of identity to the exclusion of others, fixing culture to geographical location. Shelton very effectively problematizes this type of museology and identifies it as a practice that:

allows museum displays still to distinguish stylistic categories, abstracted from historical considerations, and to present a picture of African peoples living in hermetically sealed and solitary isolation from each other, detached from trade, political and familial alliances, religious pilgrimage routes, and the vicissitudes of an inclement history responsible for massive forced resettlements (Shelton 2003:190).

In other words, classic exhibition models fail to represent the nuanced lived realities of people’s identities. Instead classic exhibits preserve stable identities and nations that are easier to order and think of than the alternative, transcultural and hybrid identities being experienced and lived out in today’s era of globalization.

The idea of the nation state is being challenged by what has generally been referred to as globalization (Bhabha 1994; Appadurai 1996; Macdonald 2003). Because a vast body of literature dedicated to the often-nebulous term “globalization” already exists, it would probably be futile to even attempt to define it here. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this article, I employ the term because it is a useful concept that generally refers to the massive scale interconnections amongst people,
ideas, and economies. While there has always been a movement of peoples around the world, Nico Israel (2000:10) argues that the essential difference of migration between earlier periods and the twentieth century is that of sheer scale. Likewise, Edward Said, characterizes our age as “the age of the refugee, the displaced person, [and] mass migration” (Said 1987:357). Israel (2000:10) citing statistics from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reports that between the year of 1951 (when the agency first started) and 1994, the number of refugees escalated from 1 million to at least 26 million in 1994. Global trends seem to indicate that these numbers are only increasing (Israel 2000:10). While this example is only one type of occurrence that has fostered and continues to foster global links, it demonstrates the extent, distribution and importance of viewing globalization as a process.

There has been much treatment on the effect of globalization on identity. While the pattern of increasing interlinkages between peoples and cultures are often viewed as a crucial dimension of identity globalized, most scholars argue that these exchanges cannot be described as creating dislocated peoples who simply replicate in another location the identities and cultural values of their homeland. Rather, it has been argued that a transformation of identity occurs so that such individuals feel in between cultures and occupy a neither here nor there, “interstitial third space” (Bhabha 1994; Desai 2004). I would go so far as to argue that in the case of those who have not literally moved from one geographic place to another, these communities are affected by the processes of globalization and identity transformation with the import and consumption of new goods and ideas.

These processes are what make it possible, for example, for a Canadian to eat sushi, a “traditional” Japanese meal, often accompanied by Mexican-grown avocados, while watching Canada’s national sport, hockey, on broadcast television. While this individual may not consciously feel hybrid, what is important to note is that the ability to do all of these things and still feel Canadian shows that hybridity is in the very makeup of identity of those who do not themselves shift geographies. Hence, while globalization is about the dislocations of peoples, it is also about the dislocation of culture: either can be anywhere. Thus, as Bhabha writes, “the very concept of homogenous national cultures, the consensual or contiguous transmission of historical traditions, or ‘organic’ ethnic communities—as the grounds of cultural comparativism—are in a profound process of redefinition” (Bhabha 1994:7). Importantly, he also continues, writing that “the very idea of a pure, ‘ethnically cleansed’ national identity can only be achieved through the death, literal and figurative, of the complex interweavings of history, and the culturally contingent borderlines of modern nationhood” (Bhabha 1994:7).

While I do not wish to deny the political and historical reality of the nation (moreover, it is clear that despite globalizing processes, assertion of the nation still holds much social and political currency), my aim is to problematize its certainty, factuality and homogeneity by emphasizing its constructed nature. Jigna Desai, in
her explorations of the South Asian diasporic film, notes that notions of the diasporic homeland are discussed with reference to a place of origin and a homeland. However, in considering diasporic peoples (she is particularly interested in what she calls the “Brown Atlantic”) Desai challenges us to reconsider the emphasis on the search for an origin or an essential identity in order to better understand the situation of those which occupy this disjunctured, in-between third space (2004:22).

Eliminating the diaspora’s relationship to the notion of a homeland “unfetters it from a permanent physical resettlement in favor of heterogenous connections to both the homeland to other diasporic locations” (Desai 2004:19). Like Desai, Bhabha argues that a theoretically innovative approach would be to focus on the productive moments that arise in this third, in-between space. A severance from the “origin” and an emphasis on the productive in-between spaces allows us to think of new, hybrid modes of identity. He encourages us to ask, “How are subjects formed ‘in between’, or in excess of, the sum of the ‘parts’ of difference?” (Bhabha 1994:2).

This sort of question poses serious challenges for museums, which seem to have emerged out of a different paradigm. Indeed, museums are confronted with the validity of their existence even more so in this globalized age. In addition to this challenge, if museums continue to exist, how should they exist in a way that effectively reflects postnationality, transculturalism and hybridity? How can the museum deal with these issues effectively not only at a conceptual level but also at the practical level of exhibiting? The next section will discuss the strategies of two exhibitions which deal with these questions.

**CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES: REPRESENTING POSTNATIONAL IDENTITIES**

Notions of postnational, transcultural and hybrid are challenging the traditional rhetoric of museums, which have played key roles in fostering notions of nation and national identity. With the onset of globalizing forces, the museum faces several challenges with respect to the way identity is represented and put on display. Next, I turn to a discussion of two examples and their provision of practical solutions for a philosophical and theoretical problem.

In *Where is ‘Africa’? Re-Viewing Art and Artifact in the Age of Globalization*, Ruth Philips (2002) provides an overview of three museum exhibitions which tried to tackle the problem of globalization. Philips, quoting a statement made by Cotter from the New York Times, writes, “Africa, whatever it is, is everywhere” (Phillips 2002:944). This statement very succinctly communicates the challenges of representation that museums face today - not only in regards to Africa but in regards to any identities or cultures which once seemed to be coherent but are now fluid across time and space. Quoting again from Cotter, Philips goes on to write, “It’s far more than just a continent. It’s a global diaspora, an international culture and a metaphor with fantastical associations for the West: gold, savages, ‘darkest,’ ‘deepest,’ liberation, devastation” (Phillips 2002:944). In light of such a statement, how can a museum, which seeks to define and represent, begin...
to practically approach questions of cultural identity?

The first example I discuss is *The African Worlds Exhibition* at the Horniman Museum. In 1995, the UK museum began to reconsider a new approach to best exhibit its ethnographic collection in the South Hall, which had originally featured the presentation of diverse cultures from all seven continents of the world. After much consideration, the museum decided to shift from a general to a specific focus on its African collection. In March 1999, the gallery reopened with *African Worlds* (Shelton 2003:182-183).

As part of planning for this exhibit, curators wanted to move away from traditional exhibition techniques, which portray material items within assumed natural settings (Phillips 2002). In order to deconstruct as much as possible what may seem natural, Anthony Shelton, then Chief Curator of the Horniman, relied on “aggressively industrial” (Phillips 2002:947) display techniques. For example, the purposive juxtaposition of these objects with asymmetrical and cubist-style cases serves to emphasize movement and relocation of ideas and objects into new contexts (Phillips 2002:947). The exhibition strived to achieve a postcolonial historical sensibility: thus, the placement of these objects in disruptive casing placed a further emphasis on the sense of alienation in the gallery.

Another way in which *African Worlds* attempted to portray the diasporic reality of Africa was through the involvement of Mrs. Beatrice Wusi, a Mende woman from Sierra Leone who is now working as a community worker in London. As a woman who was originally from Africa and now living in London, giving Wusi the space to talk authoritatively about African female initiation rites conveyed the message to viewers that Africa is just as much ‘here’ as ‘there’ (Phillips 2002:948-949). In my opinion, the technique of involving Mrs. Wusi demonstrates that Africa is not so much neither here nor there, but somewhere in between. In this sense, identity becomes a fluid, dynamic and unbounded entity which avoids hegemonic labeling, and thus allows more room for definition and self-construction. *African Worlds* attempted to respond to the limitations of 18th and 19th century nationalist models of museums and colonial ethnography, and to think more of postnational, transcultural diasporas. One method used by the exhibit curators to foreground this latter approach was to make clear to the audience that the exhibition considered not just the many different cultures in the continent of Africa, but also the worlds and identities of those Africans who had moved to places elsewhere as a result of moments in history such as the slave trade. *African Worlds* achieves this sense of movement and mutability through the provision of space in the form of text panels for the voices of members of the black community in London, describing their reactions to the objects which surrounded them (Shelton 2003:191). This helped reinforce to viewers that Africa is not simply bound to a place on the map.

The Transcultural Galleries at Cartwright Hall in Bradford, West Yorkshire also provides an example of how one art museum attempted to represent transcultural identities.
As Macdonald (2003) documents, the greater goal of the Transcultural Galleries was largely to provide a bridge between two conspicuous communities in conflict: the white English community and the non-white South Asian community. However, it should be noted that even within the white population and the non-white populations, there exist many different ethnic groups (Macdonald 2003:7). Nima Poovaya Smith, a curator in Bradford, was appointed to take care of the building up and display of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in The Transcultural Galleries.

In setting out to accomplish this task, Poovaya Smith recognized the dangers of museums to identify and create fixed communities, cultures and traditions (Macdonald 2003:7). The strategies used by Poovaya Smith draw from the post-colonial theoretical work of those such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, in order to project more fluid, transcultural and hybrid notions of identity to cut across traditional geographies (Macdonald 2003:7). One method used by Poovaya Smith attempted to overcome the challenges of static cultural representation was through the purposeful display of gold and silver material in her exhibits (Macdonald 2003:7-8). She did this because the use of these metals is an important medium for many artists in South Asia; however, the use of these mediums is important for non-South Asian artists as well (Macdonald 2003:7-8). Moreover, in the display of jewelry, Poovaya Smith also decided to display works of art not only created by those in the South Indian population, but by artists who drew inspiration from South Asian styles (Macdonald 2003:8), prioritizing a transcultural notion of identity despite some external criticism and objections.

As Macdonald (2003:9) documents, the galleries break from traditional spatial organization in museums. Cultures are not individuated into separate displays or along a grand historical narrative (MacDonald 2003:9). However, Poovaya Smith achieves this sense of fluidity while also maintaining a sense of organization. Instead of an objective taxonomy, Poovaya Smith’s conceptual vision for the organization of the museum is based on an intersubjective connection and flow, where connection is “conceptualized as a movement, as process, as creative agency” (Macdonald 2003:9). The exhibit is broken up into themes and traces the connections within that particular theme. For example, one section located within the water theme exhibits two paintings on the topic by non South Asians alongside a sculptural display of the South Asian ‘vessel of vitality’. The theme-based layout of the exhibit evokes transcultural connections that flow across and permeate neat geographical boundaries (Macdonald 2003:9).

**CONCLUSION**

Because the birth of the museum is in so many ways entwined with the birth of the nation state as well as a colonial worldview which sought to categorize peoples, globalization raises serious and difficult questions that the museum must address in order to cope with a form of identity that is starting to fade in favor of postnationalism, transculturalism and hybridity. A fundamental question
that arises, however, is if the museum is at all suitable as a medium with which to express these alternative forms of identities? If the museum is embedded in a nation-state ideology premised on the practice of exhibiting cultures as fixed and bounded entities, is it possible to exhibit transculturalism without falling to the dangers of defining these supposedly unidentifiable, in between and dislocated cultures? In other words, how does one locate – an act which essentially points at and stops – something in dislocation? This question is a pertinent one, given the critique leveled by Appadurai with respect to the limits of ethnography. Museums, like Appadurai’s critique of ethnographies as a mode of representation are reductive, inevitably imprisoning of their subjects as they “render them perpetually captive to the mode of thought that was used to represent them” (Lidchi 2006:95). What the African Worlds Exhibit and the Transcultural Galleries seem to imply is that museums are certainly capable of being more representative of postnational, transcultural and hybrid identities. Moreover, it seems a step in the right direction to articulate these types of identities, while at the same time recognizing the dangers of traditional museological practices.

Pieterse (2005) suggests that if there is any general guiding principle for exhibiting strategies in today’s globalized world, it is to abandon the premise of the discourse about the other. He suggests this for two reasons. First, as I have argued, coherent labeling of the national “us” versus the outsider “them” is being seriously refigured in an age of transculturalism and hybridity. Quite simply, nationalism and its inherent discourse on the other can no longer comfortably accommodate and express identities produced in a world of merging cultures and histories (Pieterse 2005:171). Pieterse’s second reason for the abandoning of the discourse of ‘the other’ is based on what he simply describes as “the epistemological and political arrogance of representing others” (Pieterse 2005:171). Moreover I suggest, moving beyond a mere recognition to a celebration of these ‘in between’ identities, as opposed to viewing them as marginal and unknown because they are more difficult to define. Instead, as Bhabha asserts, we can celebrate this identity in between because it allows for the possibility of a cultural hybridity that “entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy” (van de Veer 1997:94). Rather than imagining it as a site of objective knowledge and representation, it is hoped that the museum institution, as well as other cultural institutions for that matter, will come to be a place of creativity, innovation and experimentation that produces forever unfinished works and leaving its viewers with a sense of identity that is complex, fluid and constantly shifting.

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EMBODIMENT OF TRAUMA THROUGH PERFORMATIVE ACTS OF REMEMBERING

Abstract
Within the paradigm of embodiment, it is possible to ask how are bodies objectified without objectifying and internalizing bodily experience. In this essay, I attempt to bridge the mind and body dualism by problematizing different sites of expression of past traumas. Specifically, I explore some of the ways in which traumatic memory is embodied through performative acts of remembering in cases of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and dissociative amnesia.

INTRODUCTION
Memories raise epistemological issues about representations of history, experience, and authenticity, as well as ontological questions about origins of selfhood and individual identity. In anthropological theory, memory is sometimes represented as a tool for reproduction and reification of culture, or as a part of identity discourse (Antze and Lambek 1996:xxi; Cattell and Climo 2002:15). Furthermore, memory is central to bodies, embodiment, and the creation of meaning (Becker et al. 2000:320). Similarly, Antze and Lambek (1996:vii) treat remembering as a practice and a performative act that moves in and out of consciousness. At the same time as memory becomes a body projected into the world, it is increasingly objectified and its expression is shaped by particular social and cultural contexts.

In this way, memory is embodied but it should not be construed as only a personal, subjective experience (Becker et al. 2000:320). Instead, memory is both a phenomenological basis of identity and the instrument for identity construction (Antze and Lambek 1996:xvi). In other words, memories serve individuals to define who they are, and to understand and create a particular kind of self. However, the relationship between individual and collective memories is always ambiguous and recollection of past events that play into creation of self may, at the same time, challenge its unity. Individual and collective identities are determined by what people remember and what they can, or cannot remember. On the other hand, precisely because of this ambiguity, and because it spans across the multiple sites of recall and temporal dimensions of existence, memory allows individuals to re-create their selves.

The purpose of this article is to problematize particular sites of expression of traumatic memories by asking how is trauma articulated, embodied, and objectified in psychotherapy and in narratives of individual suffering. Here trauma refers primarily to types of emotional distress that are associated with recollection of past traumatic events. Specifically, I am interested in how performative acts of remembering past traumas play into creation of individual memories and how traumatic memories become expressions of collective identity. Throughout this text, I draw on the
body of knowledge in medical and psychological anthropology, as well as phenomenology and practice theory.

Initially, I explore some of the ways in which trauma is conceptualized in Euro-American philosophy and psychiatry, and how ideas about traumatic memory influenced traditional distinctions between mind and body, subject and object, and existence and being. From there I move into a discussion of how the embodiment of trauma might benefit from two theoretical orientations: the paradigm of embodiment by Thomas Csordas and Pierre Bourdieu’s discourse on practice and the notion of habitus. The paradigm of embodiment forces us to consider how “cultural objectifications, and objectifications of the self arrived at in the first place” (Csordas 1990:34). At the same time, body is viewed not as an object but as the subject and “as the existential ground of culture” (Csordas 1990:5). Similarly, Bourdieu’s (1990:53) notion of habitus as a system of generating and organizing practices that can be objectively adapted without presupposing their objective existence, offers a mediating point between material properties of bodies and phenomenological concerns for symbolic properties, which themselves become objectified once they are perceived (Bourdieu 1990:135). By treating body a site of both perception and practice, the paradigm of embodiment attempts bridging mind and body. In this way, traumatic memory, as a kind of bodily, emotional disruption may provide the “missing link” to transcend this duality (Schepers-Hughes and Lock 1987:28-9). Bodies of traumatized individuals are objectified and this results in victims’ feeling as if the mind and body act as separate and disjunctive (Winkler 1994:250). However, while trauma disassociates the cognitive and somatosensory of the bodily experience and perpetuates the mind and body dualism, from the perspective of embodiment, traumatic memory can potentially reconnect mind and body. In a similar way, Csordas (1990: 31) argues that trauma reinforces the unity of body and mind, creates a shared human existence, and expresses transcendence.

Finally, I connect the discussion about embodiment of trauma to a specific ethnographic account about the role of traumatic memory in cases of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and dissociative amnesia. In particular, I explore how the links between individual and past traumatic memories are connected through narratives of suffering and institutional discourse about the effective psychiatric treatment. Antze and Lambeck (1996:xvii-xviii) argue that narratives follow chronotopic conventions of time, place, and position, which are never obvious and controlled by an individual alone, but are shared with collectives, specialists in memory, and state officialdom. Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin employed the term “chronotope” (literally, “time-space”) to describe the process of compressing real historical time and space in literary texts and how generic properties of the term define and maintain distinctions between literary genres (Holquist 1981:84-5). In the same way, an investigation into how traumatic events break the flow of chronotopic narrative in particular contexts may expose the processes in
which memories of individual actors begin to be objectified. For example, in chronotopics of psychoanalytic therapy a patient is encouraged to express and accept his or her thoughts in order to understand them and accept them as his or her own (Antze 2004:103), in contrast to courtroom where narrative of a witness serves to expose a victim or a perpetrator.

TRAUMATIC MEMORY FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Memories are not exact reproductions of past events, but are narrative constructions that span the spatial and temporal scales of human existence. Memories are closely connected to emotions and are dependent on socially conditioned processes of recall and as such they are subject to distortions (Cattell and Climo 2002:13). Distortions may be caused by a number of factors including selective forgetting and remembering, amnesia, and trauma.¹ The concept of “traumatic memory” was developed in Western psychiatry and nineteenth century European neurology, which later culminated in Freudian psychoanalysis (Kenny 1996:152). The term “traumatic memory” was first coined by Pierre Janet, Freud’s contemporary, who posited that this condition occurred in people with weak nervous systems who, after an initial shock, become fragmented beings and sometimes lost control over their conscious will and presented themselves using multiple personalities (Kenny 1996:153).

In his study about the introduction of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to the discourse of Western psychiatry, Alan Young (1995:13-14) describes how traumatic memory emerged at the intersection of somatic and psychological streams of scientific inquiry.² The first diagnosed cases of trauma that included damage to neural tissue were described as caused by “railway spine accidents” or injuries to the spinal cord that were caused by frequent railroad accidents in nineteenth-century Britain. John Erichsen, the physician responsible for diagnosing and treating injuries and symptoms of railway spine accidents, reported three categories of patients according to the severity of ‘shocks’ and the visibility of damage to the neural tissue. Although symptoms in all of the cases appeared to be the same, some injuries were less visible than others and this invisibility caused a growing concern about individuals fabricating symptoms to receive compensation. Furthermore, Erichsen could not identify specific mechanisms that caused the symptoms, and even more importantly for the discussion about trauma and memory, he could not answer how a particular emotion, such as fear, produced effects that could amplify the consequences of physical trauma. At the root of the problem was the effort to find a single cause for trauma that was complicated further by attempts to separate the less visible psychological effects from the more visible physiological effects of trauma.

The “railway spine” was for the first time transformed into a syndrome by Jean-Martin Charcot who believed that patients were most likely suffering from “hysteria” which was caused by intense fear. In this way, Charcot moved away from somatic explanations and argued for a psychoneurological cause. In doing so, one could argue that that this explanation successfully distanced
the mind, along with the brain, even further from the rest of the body. Similarly, Sacks (1998:4) describes the inability of early neurologists to locate possible causes for the loss of speech function, or loss of memory and identity. He notes how all of the early attempts at treating the impairment of neurological function were based on the treatment of centers in the left hemisphere of the brain, while the “minor” right hemisphere that controls the sense of reality, or what was termed as “direct consciousness”, was systematically ignored. The reason for this was, once more, the apparent invisibility of specific syndromes that would correspond to lesions in the right hemisphere of the brain.

In the cases of traumatic memory, Young (1995:26) claims that the main difference between contemporary psychiatric nosology and historical accounts lies in the treatment of verbal memory and its relationship to forgetting. While Erichsen refers to “forgetting” as the loss of intellectual ability to perform calculations, or the ability to recall the spelling of common words, current psychiatric explanations place the “loss of memory” at the centre of the disorder. However, if Charcot’s, and later Freud’s, “hysteria” is replaced with a variety of symptoms that can leap from the unconscious into present memory, what connects current conceptualizations of traumatic memory to historical representations is the idea that psychic residues of past events are the primary cause of present suffering. Therefore, the existence of traumatic memory rests on the presence of memories about past events that are external to the self and are somehow beyond individual consciousness.

THE SEPARATION OF MIND AND BODY: MENTAL MEMORY AND MATERIAL SELF

The distinction between mental memory and material self implies a conventional separation between mind and body, and subject and object. Lakoff and Johnson (1999:16) argue that in Western philosophical tradition humans are granted with a “faculty” of reason that is treated as independent from perception and body. The separation of mind and body came to be known as a defining feature of Cartesian dualism. Descartes introduced a methodological distinction between two classes that constitute the human organism: tangible body and intangible mind (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:9). The only category that could be taken “on faith” was the intuited perception of the body-self. In addition, Descartes believed that mathematics was the only pure essence of reason and the single reliable form of knowledge (Descartes 1960:12). He further argued that the method for acquiring this knowledge should be based on the principles of geometry:

Those long chains of reasoning, so simple and easy, which enabled geometricians to reach the most difficult demonstrations, had made me wonder whether all things knowable to men might not fall into a similar logical sequence. If so, we need only refrain from accepting as true that which is not true … and there cannot be any propositions so abstruse that we cannot prove them (Descartes 1960:15).

The logic of Descartes’ rationalist
method is first to provide a statement of the problem and then to break it down into its component parts. After perceiving and understanding the idiosyncrasies of each individual part, the whole can be reassembled into its original form (Berman 1981:33). According to this reasoning, the act of perceiving component parts is in essence the same as the act of knowing the whole. In this way, given the faculty of reason, the act of thinking and perceiving in effect separates humans from the rest of the world and, although individual awareness about the body exists, the body is perceived as an object of the perceiving subject.

However, according to the evidence from cognitive science, this reasoning is flawed. Lakoff and Johnson (1999:17) explain that human reason and sense of reality are linked to body that is in constant interaction with the outside environment through its sensimotor system. In this way, human concepts are reflections of the outside reality, which interacts with the perceptual structures of individual bodies. Therefore, the creation of perceptual categories and their interaction with objects depends on the overall part-whole relationship, which is the basic principle of the Gestalt psychology. However, although it departs from the traditional postulate in Western philosophy that perception may inform reason while not being a part of it, this view does not move away from perceiving the end product, or an already objectified self and it does not solve the problem of separation between subject and object. Moreover, it can be argued that the persistent difficulty in breaking away from assumptions of the Cartesian legacy is most visible in the continuous absence of a more embodied language in Western philosophy.

On the other hand, as Geertz notes, constant epistemological re-evaluations may reflect a hidden concern that in the absence of objective knowledge, scientific descriptions might fall into a trap of extreme relativism and subjectivity (Geertz in Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:30). Similarly, Csordas (1994:7) notes how Cartesian dualism caused a kind of “ontologization of the distinction” in social sciences, as well as a growing tendency to blame the doctrine using a language of moral degradation. However, he further notes that although Descartes may be credited for his attempts to provide a methodological tool that would be free from the institutional grip of the Church, he alone should not be credited for the ways the Cartesian legacy became embedded in the Western philosophical tradition.

**METHODOLOGICAL BASIS: EMBODIMENT AND THEORY OF PRACTICE**

Within a paradigm of embodiment, it may be possible to mediate the subject-object duality by asking how bodies become objectified and by refusing to accept claims that in the process of self-reflection, individual bodily experience becomes internalized inside the body (Csordas 1990:36). Therefore, treating embodiment as practice is crucial in moving away from the object to the process of objectification. In this way, the paradigm of embodiment is linked to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and theory of practice.

Bourdieu (1990:52) argues that it is necessary to break away from the objectivist realism of the structure
and move toward the dialectic of practice, or from the opus operatum to the modus operandi. He continues that:

The theory of practice insists, contrary to positivist materialism, that the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded, and, contrary to intellectualist idealism, that the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions (Bourdieu 1990:52).

Habitus is a Latin word used to signify a “habitual or typical condition, state or appearance, particularly of the body”, while the embodiment of habitus is captured in the Greek word hexis which Bourdieu uses to describe “deportment, the manner and style in which actors ‘carry themselves’: stance, gait, gesture, etc.” (Jenkins 1992:74-5). The similarity between the two concepts reflects the central role of body in the conceptualization of habitus. Furthermore, Bourdieu treats habitus as “embodied history” that is “internalized … and so forgotten,” and as such is “the active present of the whole past of which it is the product” (Bourdieu 1990:56).

This definition is of particular importance to the discussion of traumatic memory because it addresses the unconscious content while at the same time giving individual practices a degree of autonomy in relation to the immediate present. As a result, through a focus on the logic of action” (Bourdieu 1990:56), it is possible to escape the duality that is concerned with already objectified and externally determined consciousness. In addition, it allows for the existence of different sites of objectifications of history, such as objectifications in bodies and in institutions, which although operating at the level of unconscious generate different forms of practical action. In the same way, in his paradigm of embodiment, Csordas recognizes the value in habitus because the concept moves away from considering only a collection of practices to include a focus on psychologically inculcated behavioral environment and on how it is systematically generated and organized by the “socially informed body” (1990:11). Furthermore, this conceptualization of habitus is important because objective conditions do not cause practices, nor do practices generate objective conditions. Therefore, habitus is at once the principle of generation of practices and the unifying principle of collective practices.

On the other hand, Ortner criticizes Bourdieu for his “heavy structural determinism” (2005:35). She continues that although Bourdieu’s concept of habitus seems to include a consideration of subjectivity in the sense of ‘feelings’, its main emphasis appears to rest on how it presents options and limits to the social actor. In other words Bourdieu’s notion of habitus leaves subjects either without, or with a limited intentionality. In contrast to Ortner, Jenkins (1992:72) argues that Bourdieu’s rejection of structuralism is evident in his constant advocacy for a shift in focus ‘from rules to practices.
On the other hand, Ortner’s critique of habitus, to an extent, parallels Jenkins’ claim that, by granting people with limited intentionality, Bourdieu effectively attempts to avoid the trap of treating conscious and deliberate intentions as sufficient explanations of people’s actions.

On another level, Ahearn argues that Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the recursive nature of habitus, which generates an infinite, but always constrained number of possible actions and individual perceptions, leaves no room for the concept of what she describes as “free will” (2001:118). At the same time, because of the limits it imposes on intentionality, habitus limits unpredictable social transformation and social change. Instead, it is embodied and cannot be transformed by voluntary intent alone. Ahearn’s critique is supported with Jenkins’ (1992:79) reflection on the ambiguous role of Bourdieu’s notion of dispositions in how the practices are produced. Furthermore, Jenkins, in the same way as Ahearn, continues with a critique of Bourdieu’s claim that habitus is ‘the site of internalization of reality and externalization of internality’ and states how this elliptical and unclear formulation does not solve the issue about the possibility for change at the individual or collective level. However, it has to be noted that, although overemphasizing past and discrediting conscious engagement, Bourdieu does address generative aspect of practices, instead of treating them as only deterministic.

As an alternative to Bourdieu’s insistence on inculcated nature of habitus Ahearn offers a practice theory of “meaning constraint” (2001:112). According to this perspective, analysis should not focus on definite interpretations of meaning but on performative events, such as a song performance or speech events. In this way, Ahearn foregrounds the possibility of a free will. This is particularly relevant for the discussion of how is individual trauma expressed and given meaning through performative acts of remembering past traumas and in particular contexts of recall.

**DIALOGUE WITH PHENOMENOLOGY AND PERCEPTION**

Focus on perception and the process of meaning creation is key to studies grounded in phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. Csordas (1990:6) argues that Hallowell should be credited for recognizing perception as crucial to self-awareness, which has an important role in the functioning of society and is one of the basic elements of human personality structure. Furthermore, through his methodological approach to perception and practice, Hallowell set the ground for the anthropological debate about the distinction between subject and object (Csordas 1990:6). As early as the 1950s, researchers criticize Western classifications of “mental behaviors” that do not include a consideration of particular “nonorganic” factors:

Man’s behavior is everywhere canalized, restricted, and defined by customary procedures that are imposed upon each new generation of human individuals in accordance with the demands of different culture patterns.
… Even perception itself and mental imagery are not free from the influence of culture patterns, nor are motor habits, gestures, the expressions of emotions, and the motivations of the individual (Hallowell 1956:22).

Hallowell’s treatment of “behavioral environment” as the central element in the process of structuring of individual experience is directly linked to Koffka’s works in Gestalt psychology. In *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, Koffka (1935:32) treats behavioral environment as a mediating link between “geographical environment” and behavior, or between stimulus and response. He argues that the question of how we know what behavior is cannot be answered without recognizing that it is grounded in a particular environment. When it comes to memory, Koffka argues that it allows individuals to determine their behavioral field. However, he could not explain how to account for the existence of behavior, including memories, which occurs outside of “direct experience” of the behavioral environment.

In this way, although providing important insights into mechanisms of perception, Koffka could not explain how particular experiences and perceptions survive over time. He continues how the complexity lies in the interaction of the physical and physiological fields, and the problem becomes even more obscure as “physiological field events take place which change the geographical field and thereby the physiological fields” (Koffka 1935:54). However, what is significant in Koffka’s work is that it calls for a psychology that is more context dependent and inclusive of particular social and historical circumstances.

Hallowell expanded Koffka’s work on behavioral environment and argued that although an understanding of what he called individual beliefs is of great relevance, the real importance lies in locating the source of people’s beliefs. In this way, he acknowledged that individual behavior is dependent on both to the constraints of the physical reality and culturally reified world, and provided a context in which the practice of meaning creation is carried out. However, according to Csordas (1990:6) although Hallowell referred to his approach to the study of perception as phenomenological, his study deals with the already objectified self. Furthermore, he did not address how the self is constantly being reshaped and objectified in different contexts. In other words, Hallowell’s phenomenology requires a more informed and explicit approach that would show that the process of self-objectification is precultural and existing before the analytic distinction between subject and the object.

On another, but related level, Merleau-Ponty’s work on phenomenology grounded in Husserlian philosophy, offers a counter point to studies that interpret embodiment in terms of cognitive and linguistic models of explanation (Lock 1993:137) and allows for a degree of intentionality and a preconscious understanding of the world (Csordas 1994:7). However, before Merleau-Ponty, Husserl argued that all knowledge should be grounded in “transcendental phenomenology” that would locate meaning from various
types of experience, from perception to knowledge formation (Smith 2007:12). Furthermore, he claimed that by focusing on deeper structures of consciousness, or the ways consciousness is directed toward and representing objects may provide an understanding of the role of intentionality.

For Husserl, phenomenology is “the science of the essence of consciousness” (Smith 2007:56) and consciousness, an act of something that is directed toward something and including an object within it. In his theory of intentionality he distinguished between “acts of consciousness,” or noesis and “intentional objects of consciousness,” or noema. According to this approach, the relationship between noema and noesis, or sensuous and intentional, is what creates the perceptual experience and may serve as an analytical tool in studies of consciousness and intentionality (Smith 2007:257-60).

What is relevant in Husserl’s phenomenology is an analytical distinction between acts of consciousness, its content, and object. Although he does not break away from the Cartesian separation between subject and object, his phenomenology is based on a kind of structured holism, and more importantly he makes an attempt to determine whether it is possible to perceive an object while at the same time directing the perception toward the mind (Smith 2007:57). In this way, by asking if it is possible to monitor our own experience through self awareness, he set the ground for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis of the ways in which experience is centered on consciousness of the body (Smith 2007:408).

On the other hand, Bourdieu (1990:25) is critical of phenomenological modes of knowledge that set out to reflect experience but cannot provide a description that goes beyond the social world, which itself appears as self evident and ‘taken-for-granted’. In contrast, Jackson (2006:323) argues that phenomenology is crucial to study of embodiment. He quotes Merleau-Ponty and Binswanger, who have argued that we should not reduce meaning to the status of sign, which does not have properties of an act. According to this conceptualization, body should not be treated as only a medium of expression and an object of understanding, but should be considered as interwoven with its living environment.

Similarly, in “Phenomenology of Perception”, Merleau-Ponty argues against Descartes’ cogito and describes body as a ‘setting in relation to the world’, and perception as an extension of the body projected into the world (Csordas 1990:8). He continues that:

Analytical perception starts from our experience of the world and goes back to the subject as to a condition of possibility distinct from that experience, revealing the all-embracing synthesis as that without which there would be no world. To this extent it ceases to remain part of our experience and offers, in place of an account, a reconstruction of it (Merleau-Ponty 2002:x).

In this way, Merleau-Ponty hints at the importance of the preconscious, or preobjective experience of the world
and with this allows for a degree of intentionality. Furthermore, he argues that “there exists a unity before the object … and intention is ‘lived’ as ready-made, or already there” (Merleau-Ponty 2002:xix). Therefore, by placing body in the world, he attempts to break away from the traditional distinction between subject and object. Furthermore, a phenomenology of embodied experience offers a possibility for an understanding of “body-as-subject” that is in constant interaction in the field of bodily existence (Jackson 2006:324). Similarly, in his footnotes, Csordas (1990:41) notes how Mauss predicted that embodiment might reconcile the duality of mind and body, and existence and being. At the same time, distinction between existence and being is central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and existential psychology, while in anthropology this falls in the domain of the separation between intentionality and previously established cultural forms.

In addition, Merleau-Ponty argued against the notion that holds that there is a point-by-point connection between stimulus and perception. Instead, he argues that people’s perception ends in objects, which are products of reflexive thinking. At the same time, on the level of perception there are no already existing objects, and individual bodies are simply “being-in-the-world” (Csordas 1990:9). Therefore, the perception starts in bodies and ‘ends in objects’ and the goal of phenomenology is to locate this preobjective “moment of transcendence” when perception begins. However, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology still places consciousness as opposite in relation to its objects and this separation may be mediated in the paradigm of embodiment.

In his paradigm for embodiment, Csordas combines what he describes as methodologically different modes of attention stemming from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and Bourdieu’s “dialectical structuralism” (1990:12). Therefore, this kind of approach draws both from the embodied lived experience in habitus and Bourdieu’s theory of practice, as well as from phenomenological concerns with perception and the influences of behavioral environment. In a similar way Rouse (2004:522) notes how most literature on embodiment considers a combination of processes, such as the influence of social structure, discourse, and signification practices as being central to the construction of self-awareness. Furthermore, she adds that through the acts of performance individuals may exert certain control in how their subjectivity is read by others. In this way, an approach that treats trauma and remembering as practice and as a performative act, which is grounded in phenomenology and serving as an instrument for construction of identity, may expose how in the process of objectification traumatic memory consolidates and transforms individual and collective identity.

**EXPRESSING TRAUMA**

Halbwachs (2006:48) claims that to exist, collective memory draws from a coherent body of people. However it is individuals who remember and there are as many collective memories as there are groups and institutions in society. He further speculates how the
only sphere of human existence that is not rooted in a social context is in people’s dreams (Halbwachs 2006:41). In addition, he makes a distinction between historical and autobiographical memory. He describes autobiographical memory as consisting of events that were experienced personally in the past. This type of memory, he claims, fades over time and intervals are lost altogether and may be brought back to awareness through fragmented associations (Halbwachs 2006:23). In contrast, historical memory is recorded in written and visual records and relived through different reenactments and commemorations. The temporal space that exists between periods of public commemorations and everyday life is filled by collective memory through different ceremonial acts, symbolic displays, or narratives. From this it follows how there is no real void in collective memory. In this way, Halbwachs outlines the full range of complex relationships between individual and collective performative aspects of memory. Even a simplified description of the relationship between different types of memory precipitates a contested field on which acts of remembering may serve to signify and objectify different identities.

Depending on a particular site of expression, performative acts of remembering past traumas play into creation of individual memories and may become expressions of collective identity. In the examples that follow, I focus on how is trauma articulated, embodied, and objectified in psychotherapy and in narratives of individual suffering.

Leder (1990:9) argues that clinical medicine is a hermeneutic science involved in interpretation of texts and narratives of suffering. In “narrative text” the story that is produced has three different authors: diseased body that is a site of incidents and injuries of the story, the patient who supplies the story in a coherent flow of narration, and the doctor who directs the flow of the medical discourse (Leder 1990:13). What is of particular interest here is the speech elicited from patient’s body and from his experiential narrative. This distinction echoes Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between body as lived-in-the-world and objectified body, in this case the object of the medical gaze. In the same way, Leder (1990:14) notes how in the “experiential text of illness” patients evoke the image of their lived-body. On the other hand, during a physical exam, this same body is transformed into an object of scientific gaze.

The critical moment in the process of transformation of the patient from subject into an object is when the physician’s lived body does the reading of the text, which contains the reified body of the patient. However, in the process of objectification of the patient, physician does not objectify his own body, but lives it out as an interpretive tool that is aided with medical training and the use of technologies that function as extensions to his body (Leder 1990:14) Therefore, in this context, the patient’s body is at the same time a subject from within his own body and an object from outside under in the scope of the medical gaze. Leder’s account parallels Merleau-Ponty’s argument that perception ends in objects. However, by only considering an already objectified body, the processes that make it objectified
remain invisible. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of the processes that play into creation of subjects and objects requires a move toward Bourdieu’s modus operandi. Traumatic memories in the cases of dissociative amnesia and PTSD challenge the distinction between subject and object and have a potential to reconnect mind and body.

TRAUMATIC MEMORY IN DISSOCIATIVE AMNESIA AND PTSD

Leys (1996:104) notes how the first cases of dissociative amnesia were termed as “male hysteria” and were found among the soldiers of the First World War. The symptoms of “male hysteria” included spasmodic convulsions, trembling of limbs, nightmares, depression etc. Furthermore, because individuals were unable to express emotions through speech they materialized into bodily expressions, or symptoms of dissociation and amnesia. The term “male hysteria” comes from Freud’s notion of “female hysteria” that was as well characterized with bodily expressions of “repressed” emotions (Leys 1996:104). In a similar way, Kenny (1996:163) argues that if a woman enters a therapy displaying patterns of traumatic disturbance characteristic of PTSD, she is more likely to be diagnosed with borderline personality disorder that is defined in the Diagnostic Statistic Manual (DSM) as a “pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins in early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts”. Kenny adds how this gender bias comes from the fact that women are more likely to be sexually assaulted than men. In his discussion of narratives of trauma Kirmayer (1996:174-5) contrasts accounts of victims of childhood trauma with the testimonies of Holocaust survivors. For the survivors of childhood sexual abuse it is usually hard to recall traumatic events, while for the Holocaust survivors it is hard to forget, but impossible to speak about their traumatic experiences. He continues how Holocaust survivors, who are mostly diagnosed with PTSD, are usually described as burdened with traumatic memories, but are unwilling to recall their stories because of the fear of the emotional pain, as well as because of the inadequacy of language to communicate the full extent of their experiences. In this way, the survivors are not able to provide a coherent chronotopic flow of narrative. On the other hand, survivors of childhood sexual abuse are described as being unaware of their traumatic experiences and because of that, they are diagnosed with dissociative amnesia. The somatic manifestations of traumatic memory are usually evident through symptoms of physical and emotional pain, numbing, substance abuse, lapses of memory, and changes of identity.

Kirmayer (1996:175) argues that differences in trauma are caused by different “landscapes of memory” which represent a metaphorical ground on which past traumas are remembered and create particular conditions for being-in-the-world. How these landscapes are organized is determined by both the significance attributed to particular individual and collective memories, as well as by what that can be drawn from “meta-memory”. Kirmayer describes this memory as a kind of template that conditions what
can be recalled and treated as a “true” memory. Similarly Antze (1996:10) describes how in a support group of people with dissociative amnesia, most of the everyday life is filled with collective exchange of shared meanings through recall of past events. In this way, it can be argued that performative acts of remembering past traumas that are expressed through narratives of suffering are dependent on cultural constructions of personal, as well as historical, or collective memory.

On the other hand, Kirmayer (1996:176) notes that contrary to popular conceptions, memories are not stored only as “snapshots” that are readily available for recall. Instead, what is recorded is selective and distorted through interpretation and semantic encoding. Once recalled, memories are shaped with re-interpretations and confabulations. Another common conceptualization is that memories are stored in a time sequence, which later fulfills the temporal convention of chronotopic narrative. However, memory for the timing of events is not usually linked to the images of the event. In contrast, the act of remembering, especially the narrative itself, offers the temporal sequence.

In addition to the effects of interpretation and confabulation, the recall and expression of memories is heavily dependent on particular sites of recall. In psychotherapy, the narrative reconstruction of past event depends on the recall of personal historical memory. Kirmayer (1996:176-8) describes the process of recall as consisting of at least two related segments: recall of declarative memory which contains what individuals know and what they have experienced, and recall through monitoring of how individuals react and interpret their reactions as signs that signify residues of repressed memories. This is significant, because in this way representations of internal states are not only direct verbal connections to past events, but also evaluations of how individuals interact with others in a larger social context. Antze (1996:10) notes how patients are in fact expected to relive the past events and through the process learn who they are. During the process they attain the identity of a survivor. Therefore, the particular context, or the site of remembering is the key determinant in what type of recall will be elicited from the individual. These sites may range from recorded testimonies and court proceedings to private acts of recall where memories are communicated through silence.

According to the theory of repression, the emotional impact associated with trauma makes these memories more deeply engrained than usual memories (Kirmayer 1996:179). However, the subsequent repression of meaning of trauma may lead its somatic aspects to persist even when visual memory is no longer available. This reflects a separation of sensory, emotional, and cognitive aspects of memory and a potential creation of different types of memories. Furthermore, this may lead memories to persist and intrude as recalls of traumatic events characteristic of PTSD. The psychiatric distinction between suppression and repression is in the first case described as a conscious effort to forget and in the second as unconscious. This distinction conditions different expectations of
how the acts of remembering should be expressed through different types of narratives.

Kirmayer (1996:181) notes that dissociative experiences are sometimes expressed as shifts in mental states, or in changes of voice, and in particular contexts patients move from one state to another, or from one memory to another. In these cases, narrative is dissociative and fragmented, because of focusing only on the traumatic event and having no associations to other parts of memory. He further adds, how dissociative narrative includes the convention of fragmentation, univocality or polivocality and time, which can be progressive, regressive, or stagnant (Kirmayer 1996:181). Reconstruction of narrative is complete only when it starts to resemble the collective, or “folk memory”, but Kirmayer concludes, as the landscape metaphor suggests, that the reconstructions of memory are “not so much managed as is lived in” (1996:182).

In the cases of Holocaust survivors, Kirmayer (1996:182) quotes a study by Langer who videotaped testimonies of number of individuals. The testimonies show a number of different expressions of memories including, deep memory, anguished memory, humili­ated memory, tainted memory, etc. He found that each of these forms has its own distinct expression and a particular way of relating and potentially disrupting ordinary memory. These testimonies provide different sites of recalls, as individuals do not have the time nor the opportunity for self-composition or reflection that they might have during personal interviews. Instead of dissociation, Holocaust survivors claimed to be suffering from anxiety, numbing, and depersonalization. They feel an existence of a different self at the time of the trauma from the self that exists at the present. This simultaneous existence of the two selves makes it difficult to link different narratives. Eventually, they are joined through pain and a memory of collective suffering, but the verbal recall cannot replace the full range of emotion.

CONCLUSION: BRIDGING MIND AND BODY WITH TRAUMA

Trauma victims may show dissociation or recurring memories of past traumas. By adding a social environment and an embodied dimension of body as being-in-the-world to psychological accounts of trauma, it is evident that narratives are constructed and constructing different identities and are at the same time individual and a collective practice. Specific sites of recall determine conventional flows of performative acts of remembering through narratives and influence what is regarded as relevant, how symptoms are interpreted, as well as determine what is socially acceptable to speak and what should stay outside the ‘folk memory’. Depending on the sites of recall, recurring memories will be experienced in different ways. As Kirmayer notes (1996:192), dissociative amnesia is an embodied experience that has the capacity for neurological function and to construct a coherent narrative, as well as the psychological capacity to show emotion and to fight pain and suffering and, most importantly, to share traumatic memories. Furthermore, the concepts of remembering, forgetting, and dissociation are all phenomenologically
distinct categories that shape how memory is perceived and understood. Therefore, memory may be treated as body projected into the world and as a site of both practice and meaning. It involves an engagement of material properties starting with bodies and phenomenological metaphors whose properties themselves become objectified. In this way, traumatic memory as an embodiment of emotional disruption transcends mind and body and becomes a site of shared existence.

NOTES

1. Pierre Janet has argued that narrative memories are always reconstructed and often distorted while traumatic memories are usually more accurate representations of past events (Young 1995:14).

2. Allan Young (1995:13) adds how the earliest entry “traumatic” in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1656 read: “belonging to wounds or the cure of wounds” and it was not until the nineteenth century that the term was extended to include mental injuries.

3. Descartes’ understanding of the body-self as an intuitive consciousness inherent to the human organism, is expressed in his dictum Cogito, ergo sum – I think, therefore I am (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987:9).

4. According to the principles of Gestalt psychology the whole can be broken into its component parts. However, an exploration of individual parts does not accurately represent the whole. One example of an analytical component unit is the concept of “basic-level categories,” which are distinguished from other (superordinate) categories by several aspects of individual bodies: mental images, gestalt perception, sensimotor apparatus, and knowledge structure. For example, the category chair is cognitively “basic” in the hierarchy furniture-chair-rocking chair (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:27).

5. Bourdieu refers to a “ceaseless generation of collective misrecognitions,” or the forgetting of history as doxa. He adds how doxa is a condition through which certain beliefs are outside the realm of reflection, taken to be self-evident and enacted through the dispositions of individual bodies (Ortner 2005:68).

6. Before Hallowell, Mauss suggested that all humans have a physical and spiritual body. However, according to Csordas (1990:7), although he attempted to bridge mind and body, subject and object, Mauss in fact reproduced it and this failed attempt is evident in his epistemological separation of la notion de personne as separate from les techniques du corps.

7. The idea of essence in consciousness evokes the first person character where all things experienced by an individual comes to be known and lived from his own perspective (Smith 2007:56). In some ways this resembles Descartes’ dictum – I think, therefore I am.

8. Smith defines Husserl’s noema as the “ideal content of the act of consciousness” and noesis as “intentional moment of experience” (2007:257-9).

9. However, Rouse (2004:515) is
careful not to claim a universality of the “agentive self”. In fact, she argues that cultural symbols that are made available in shaping how one’s subjectivity is read will differ from one individual to another, depending on their social status, and the role of race and perceived marginality.

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THE GIFT OF LIFE AND ALTRUISM
Organ Transplantation as Cultural Practice in the United States and Canada

Abstract
The term “gift of life” is used very often to describe the practice of organ transplantation. Through a closer investigation it becomes clear that the term is not simply a description of the practice, but it is used strategically to mask the disturbing aspects of the practice while encouraging the donation of organs. The article describes those unclear and often upsetting aspects, and gives some explanation of how the gift language can alleviate them. Lastly, the article analyzes the use of the gift language and the concept of altruism as a means of examining the unexpected meanings and relationships created among people involved in organ transplantation.

INTRODUCTION
Organ transplantation is often described as a “medical miracle” (Sharp 1995:357) since it can improve the quality of the lives of seriously ill patients, and can save the lives of those whose illnesses were considered incurable by previous biomedical technology. The term miracle also signifies techno-scientific progress since it is impossible to remove organs without the aid of biomedical technologies, such as a respirator and the transfusion of fluids, which maintain the functioning of the donor’s body. There is, however, another frequently used term in describing this practice in the United States and Canada; this is the gift of life, a metaphor which has a strong implication of altruism. The following statement from British Columbia Transplant Society provides an excellent example: “Give something valuable to a total stranger. It’s the greatest gift you can give – the gift of life” (British Columbia Transplant Society 2008).

Good and Good (1993:91) describe a similar situation where medical students, in the process of becoming physicians, are compelled to achieve two different ideals: competence, indicating the property of skills and knowledge, and caring, which is associated with the essential, non-technical, quality of humans. The juxtaposition of these two different values with respect to Western biomedical practice in part signifies “the struggle between technology and humanism” (Good and Good 1993:93). Not surprisingly, there are similar tensions inherent to the practice of organ transplantation. Not just a practice that saves lives, organ transplantation is also unnerving because it involves an otherwise culturally inappropriate behaviour: removing organs from one person and replacing them in another.

This tension reveals further questions about the relationship between altruism and transplantation: Why is the transplantation of organs talked about specifically in the light of altruism? Why does it have to be a gift, rather
than caring or helping?; Does the gift serve some purpose more adequately than other concepts?

In her study of surrogate motherhood, Ragone (1994) demonstrates that the notion of the gift of life reveals how surrogate programs work to disguise a violation of cultural norms. In other words, the gift metaphor masks the reality of reproductive labour for monetary gain, and normalizes surrogacy by suggesting the shared value of altruism. Following her claim, I argue in this paper that the gift metaphor has a similar effect in organ donation and transplantation in North America, more specifically in the United States and Canada. In particular, I argue that the gift language functions to obscure troubling aspects associated with the practice, and further that gift-giving complicates and creates new meanings and relationships. The discussion first examines the kinds of cultural and social confusions, ambiguities, and anxieties generated by the practice of organ donation and transplantation, and how the gift metaphor can function to assuage these concerns. Next, by considering definitions of altruism and the gift, I discuss how these notions appear in the practice of organ transplantation. Finally, I examine new meanings and relationships generated by this gift-giving practice.

**Ragone’s argument concerning the gift metaphor in surrogacy**

Ragone (1994:51-68) as part of a careful examination of surrogate mothers’ experiences, concludes that surrogacy provides an opportunity for a woman who holds traditional values about motherhood, reproduction and family, to attain a sense of autonomy and independence associated with paid employment, without threatening her traditional values. Nevertheless, surrogate programs and surrogates themselves are keenly aware that the practice of surrogacy conflicts with various cultural norms concerning motherhood, reproduction and family that are deeply embedded in North American society. Ragone (1994:58-59) argues that the gift metaphor, is effectively used to reiterate traditional ideas like the pricelessness of children, functions to normalize surrogacy by appealing to shared cultural values.

One such cultural norm is that reproductive work and family making should be the results of love, but not of the desire for remuneration, as one surrogate says, “The money wasn’t enough to be pregnant for nine months” (Ragone 1994:57). Here the emphasis underscores an assumption that surrogate pregnancy is enacted for reasons which cannot be compensated for with money. The framing of surrogacy as something more than a simple economic transaction appears throughout the language used by women in discussions about their involvement with the surrogacy process. Indeed, the word ‘gift’ is frequently used to describe the act of surrogacy. In one such example, a woman characterizes her reasons for becoming a surrogate as “want[ing] to do the ultimate thing for somebody, to give them the ultimate gift” (Ragone 1994:59). The use of the phrase “ultimate gift” underlines the perception of many surrogate mothers: they are interested in the act of selfless gift-giving, but not an economic gain.

Women also use similar language when they talk about other aspects of surrogacy. In particular,
the same expression, “to give them the ultimate gift” (Ragone 1994:59) is used by surrogates to describe the handing over of children to couples. Ragone (1994:41) suggests that parting with a child conflicts with traditionally accepted cultural norms which maintain that keeping and nurturing a child are the best expression of love for that child. However, as Ragone (1994:41) goes on to point out, the use of gift language nevertheless works to normalize this act by locating it within the realm of altruistic behaviour – of selflessly giving up a child for the happiness of someone else.

The gift language emphasized by Ragone’s work is shared by another area of medicalized exchange, organ donation and transplantation. As Ragone demonstrates, the gift language plays an important role in normalizing the practice of surrogacy. While surrogacy and the donation and transplantation of organs are profoundly different, they have striking similarities: in both instances, gift language, prevalently used throughout these practices, obscures and normalizes socially unacceptable aspects of the practice, by emphasizing the highly valued cultural idea of selfless giving.

Some facts about organ transplantation in the United States and Canada

The “medical miracle” began with a kidney transplantation in 1954 between identical twins, though the more sensationalized was the first human-to-human heart transplantation, performed by South African surgeon Christiaan Barnard in 1967 (Sharp 1995:358). As a response to the event, the need to develop new criteria of death was felt, and an Ad hoc Harvard Medical School Committee submitted a report to define brain death in 1968. After extensive discussion, the term was finalized in the Uniform Determination of Death Act in 1981 to mean the irreversible cessation of the “functions of the whole brain, including the brain stem” (Fox and Swasey 1992:61). In the United States, the National Organ Transplantation Act was signed in 1984, which made illegal the commercialization of human vital organs. The act was created in response to an incident that occurred in 1983 where Virginia physician H. Barry Jacobs established a kidney brokering company (Joralemon 1995:339). The commercialization of vital organs is prohibited in Canada as well (Lock 2002:47).

While the number of transplant patients on waiting lists has increased each year, the number of available organs has not. Although some organizations perceive this situation as evidence of a shortage in the supply of organs (British Columbia Transplant Society 2008), research points to other causes, namely a rise in patients. According to Harrison (1999:23), from 1991 to 1995 the number of Canadian persons waiting to have a transplant increased from 1,830 to 2,494. The number reached nearly four thousand in 2001 (Health Canada 2001). In the United States, the number is much higher; between 1988 and 1992, the number of Americans who were waitlisted increased from 14,742 to 27,000 (Harrison 1999:24). Currently, the number of the waitlist has risen to 98 thousand as compared to 23 thousand, which is the number of transplants performed from January to October in 2007 (UNOS 2008).
terms of the patient’s rate of survival, Health Canada (Health Canada 2001) claims that the one-year survival rate is 98 per cent for kidney transplant, 90 per cent for liver, and 85 per cent for heart transplant although the rate varies depending on organizations.

Ambiguities surrounding organ transplantation

There are several ambiguous and often disturbing aspects that people have to overcome in order to accept the idea of organ transplantation. First, in the majority of cases, the occurrence of transplantation depends on the death of a person, and this makes some people uncomfortable partly because in North America in general people seem to have a tremendous fear and denial of death. Lock (2002:201-203) argues that this fear and denial of death can be seen in two aspects, first, the individuals’ effort to fight against disease and death, and second, biomedicine’s preoccupation with defeating death. In the former, people are driven to battle against disease and death by employing all kinds of “health” practices, and avoiding “unhealthy” things; for example, a variety of vitamin and minerals are sold in every corner of the local grocery store; yoga classes are popular everywhere; provocative TV commercials repeatedly allege the harmful effects of smoking and urge us to take measures to quit this unhealthy habit. The idea that in order to fight against disease, one can strengthen one’s own immune system through utilizing various health measures, such as diet and exercise, is commonplace (Martin 1994). This articulates a North American belief that one can control nature, including one’s body, through utilizing technology, and that this self-control is virtuous. Kahan (1996:138-139) points out the moral aspect of this attitude in the United States where ideally all people are entitled to receive health care, but where one has to look after himself before claiming that right.

Muller and Koenig take Lock’s second assertion even further, stating that the goal of biomedicine is to save life using various kinds of technology, and describe this battle against death as “the conquest of death” (Muller and Koenig 1988:367). Nuland calls this obsession to cure disease “The Riddle of Disease” (1996:39). Through medical training, the objective of physicians shifts from the relief of a patient’s suffering to understanding the cause of the disease by looking at the patient’s malfunctioning parts. However, when death becomes inevitable, physicians may lose interest in patients because they now know the Riddle is unsolvable (Nuland 1996:42). The practice of organ donation and transplantation is based on this loss of interest in the dying patient and to some extent a feeling of futility (Lock 2002:376). The obsession to control nature, including the life and death of the human body, is definitely a significant factor.

The second ambiguity exists around the concept of brain death, the criterion of death used for the potential donor in the practice of organ procurement. Traditionally, death has been marked by the cessation of the heart, which stops virtually all functions of the body. Brain death, however, with the aid of a respirator, allows one to maintain the functioning of the heart, thus enabling the retrieval of organs. Here, the natural boundary between
life and death becomes ambiguous, and a grey zone is created: we are left with a person who is legally declared “dead” but whose physical body remains alive.

This situation of making a “living cadaver” (Lock 2002:1) is confusing even for professionals, the majority of whom have little problem identifying brain death with human death (Youngner 1996:46). Youngner (1996:46-47) describes how this confusion manifests itself among professionals by introducing a case where a pregnant woman is diagnosed as brain dead, and with massive medical assistance, delivered a healthy baby. In this instance, the woman’s hair grew for eight weeks, and she was bathed by a group of nurses, who routinely described the brain-dead mother as alive (Youngner 1996:46-47). One nurse describes this situation as follows: “Our job was to keep the mother alive until the baby was born” (Youngner 1996:47). In a similar example, a Canadian liver and kidney transplant surgeon comments on the ambivalence about brain death and the subsequent organ procurement:

we took organs out, and the resident was tired and wrote down on the chart that ‘the abdomen was closed and the patient was taken to the recovery room!’ That’s what we always write after ordinary surgery, of course. It was an honest mistake of a resident who’d been on duty for twenty-five hours in a row. But even so, if it had really been a cadaver in the mind of the resident, then I don’t think that mistake would have happened (Lock 2002:260-261).

Furthermore, Lock (2002:249) states that only six intensivists among thirty-two interviewed have made some form of initiative like signing a donor card to donate their organs. This shows that the idea of brain death is not yet entirely clear or comfortably accepted even among professionals.

This somewhat artificial death confuses not only professionals, but even more so the families of brain-dead patients. Since brain dead patients look as if they are alive, and show considerable physical movements, it is difficult for their relatives to accept that they are indeed “dead.” Sque and Payne (1996:1362) describe how confusing this is for donor families based on their study done in the United Kingdom. Although their research community is not North American, it is worthwhile to note that family members express confusion in comments such as: “I think that’s the worst bit, just seeing them laying there but still warm and looking as if he was asleep,” and “[i]t was interesting, that though that body was not physically stable but had some movement in it, was somewhat disorienting”(Sque and Payne 1996:1362).

The third problematic aspect related to death is the physical violation of the donor’s body; different people have different views about the body after death. Some show pragmatic views about the use of their own dead body and the donation of organs, saying, “The day I die, I would like to be cremated to avoid the worms eating me, and I will offer my organs [for transplantation]. Why would I leave...
them rot?” (Freidin 2003:66). Others associate the practice negatively with mutilation and the emptying of the body (Freidin 2003:67) as one person expresses: “[Organ ablation] sounds like a mutilation. To be quartered, to be cut up is worse when you are dead than when you are alive” (Freidin 2003:68). Donors’ kin also have different ideas. Sque and Payne (1996:1364) state that the donor’s relative may feel that the donor has already suffered so much from an untimely horrifying death and intrusive medical interventions and that organ retrieval is another source of suffering for the patient and thus seems unfair. The father of a brain dead patient commented on his concern about a post-mortem operation on his daughter: “I did not want her to be cut about. I didn’t want her to be injured. You see she was not injured in my eyes, because there was not marks. So anything done after that would be an operation and I couldn’t comprehend that too much” (Sque and Payne 1996:1364). Youngner (1996:49) states that it reminds people of another taboo subject, cannibalism. A Canadian physician interviewed by Lock (2002:254) describes his experience in the 1970s of how a transplant team “swarmed in” on the boy, who the physician was trying to save but eventually declared brain dead, in order to harvest his organs. For the physician, the team looked like they were cannibalizing the boy, which made him feel considerable revulsion.

Fourth, one of the important values constituting ideal personhood in North America is individual autonomy (Joralemon 1995:344). Having a transplantation may challenge the recipient’s sense of being an individual person in various ways. For some recipients, newly incorporated organs contribute to their sense of completeness of self. One lung recipient expresses this by saying, “I wasn’t myself before… I couldn’t wash my hair, eat, or even talk without quickly losing my breath. My brain couldn’t get enough oxygen, and so I couldn’t think straight” (Sharp 1995:372). Sometimes, organs are construed as biographical objects associated with a personal history and meanings. Therefore, for some recipients, organ transplantation is not the mere experience of gaining organs, but an experience of incorporating the donors themselves; some recipients feel that they have acquired the donors’ personal characteristics including personalities and even food preference. One transplant patient who received transplantation twice in the past describes this as follows:

I still think of it as a different person inside me – yes I do, still. It’s not all of me, and it’s not all this other person either… I never liked cheese and stuff like that, and some people think I ‘m joking but, but all of a sudden I couldn’t stop eating Kraft slices – that was the first kidney. This time around, the first thing I did was to eat chocolate (Lock 2002:323).

Joralemon (1995:338) argues that transplantation may take over the recipient’s sense of identity; matters like changes in lifestyle, surgical scars, everyday medication, and regular clinic visits constantly remind them that they are “not normal,” but surgically rebuilt and always at risk of
rejection or other illnesses. A transplant recipient describes his experience in the following manner: “I worry about infection. I worry about rejection. You walk on eggshells all the time. I look at the huge bag of pills I have. I look at myself, my body, all the bruises and bumps, the incision. You never forget” (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:37).

Also, many recipients feel a tremendous confusion about their identities in terms of health status. They are commonly referred to as cured and no longer disabled, and encouraged to “go back to work and get back into society” (Sharp 1995:374). While many recipients feel physically better than before the transplant, they likely face difficulties, one of which is finding employment since, as one doctor-recipient expresses it, they are often seen as unreliable employees. Although their life was prolonged by the transplantation, they are extremely vulnerable to infections because of the effect of immunosuppressant drugs, which suppress the occurrence of rejection. A woman who received a kidney transplant about 20 years ago and who has experienced various kinds of diseases including bone tumours, an uncommon type of cancer, and noticeable warts covering her skin. A relative of the recipient describes the situation as follows: “She’s almost like an AIDS patient, she gets sick so often…we like to say ‘she has a healthy kidney; it’s the rest of her that’s sick’” (Sharp 1995:374-375). These negative aspects of transplantation are rarely given attention and are rarely discussed by medical professionals or transplant organizations (Sharp 1995:375; Siminoff and Chillag 1999:39).

Moreover, according to Kirmayer (1988:57), the most important metaphor of biomedicine is that the body is a biochemical machine. Good and Good (1993:96) show that physicians-in-training hear this metaphor while learning the language about the body in anatomy, and develop the idea that the body is a machine. The idea of the body as a machine is compatible with the idea of organ transplantation since transplantation ideology claims that the human body has valuable parts that can be replaceable when they stop functioning (Sharp 1995:361). Accordingly, once brain death is established and the donation of organs is decided upon, the donor is no longer viewed as a person, but becomes a container of valuable organs. The total emphasis of care shifts from treatment of the patient to the maintenance of organs and bodily function. The following is the statement of a nurse who describes her discomfort with this situation:

> It’s almost as if you are more caring, and that just doesn’t feel right…we send tests for virology over by taxi, do an echocardiogram to see if they can use the heart, do X rays of the lungs, check on the kidneys. You do haematology, biochemistry, neurology, the lot (Lock 2002:253).

Finally, the practice of organ transplantation clearly shows aspects of the commodification of the body. A number of authors state that because of the development of the powerful immunosuppressant cyclosporine, rejection has become less problematic, and as a result the demand for organs has
increased, which in turn has made organs precious commodities (Delmonico and Scheper-Hughes 2003; Harrison 1999). This is consistent with the Kopytoff’s (1986) argument explaining the process of the commoditization in which something that originally does not have commodity value may later acquire the value as commodity, and it may or may not lose the value again. Organs go through a similar process where they have no commodity value originally, but later may become valuable for certain people who need them (Lock 1990:47).

In the United States, the first website mediated kidney transplant surgery took place in Colorado on October 27, 2004 (CBS News 2004). Through the mediation of the website “MatchingDonors” (MatchingDonors 2008), a 58-year-old psychologist received a kidney from a 32-year-old part-time photographer and food distributor. The recipient was reported to pay about US$5,000 to the donor for his lost wages and travel fees for his family. The donor claims that nothing more was paid, but commodification, in the sense that Kopytoff has suggested, of the donor’s kidney obviously took place, even though the donor left an altruistic comment about the website: “They’re allowing me to do something just good for this man” (CBS News 2004).

Traffic of human organs in the world is the most obvious, but the least discussed aspect of the commodification of the body. The website “liver4You” (Liver4you 2000) offers kidney and liver transplantation in ten days; it offers both living and cadaveric donors from US$65,000 to US$95,000 for kidney transplantation, and approximately US$130,000 for liver transplantation.

According to the website, their surgeons perform operations in the United States, the United Kingdom, or in the Philippines. Scheper-Hughes (2004:56-57) shows that in the Philippines, people who are willing to sell their organs are waitlisted. One unemployed man sold a foreigner his kidney at St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, a private hospital of the highest class in Manila, for US$1,200 in order to provide medical care for two of his children. Unfortunately his children died, so part of the money was used for their funerals, and the rest was used to buy consumer items including a radio/boom box. It is not hard for one to see the connection between what the website offers in the First World and the sale of organs in the Third World.

**How the gift metaphor reduces anxiety and loss**

Death is largely medicalized in North America where physicians have become the gatekeepers of death and dying. With their use of medical technologies, physicians have control over how and when people die (Muller and Koenig 1988:353). However, accidental death signifies a loss of control for both families and medical professionals not only because it comes suddenly, which allows the family no time to prepare for it, but also because there is nothing that biomedicine can do to reverse the prognosis. Considering the donation and transplantation of organs as the “giving of gifts” may help a person to regain a sense of control by turning the confusion into a heroic event, which transforms the apparently meaningless death into something worthwhile.
The loss that kin feels will never go away, but the idea that someone else received their relative’s organ suggests the transcendence of the person which may help in alleviating the grief (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:36), and overcoming the sense of violation.

The mother of a donor who died at the age of seven expresses how she was upset about seeing her daughter being subjected to intrusive medical procedure: “it was nonstop talking around us as they were testing, testing, taking blood…they kept coming and touching her and taking things from her…I was angry that they kept touching her” (Lock 2002:233). She further comments on how she had come to accept her daughter’s death: “I’m pleased, I’m finally pleased. If there is a little girl living thanks to Martha’s liver, then that’s wonderful…I suppose I do think a little bit that she is living on in those other kids” (Lock 2002:234).

For transplant surgeons, the gift metaphor may work in order to aid the overcoming of the sense of anxiety and ambiguity surrounding the death of the donor and the harvesting of organs by allowing them to see the procedure as “giving a gift of life” to others who will, in turn, be saved. At the same time, the idea of the “giving of life” may help professionals to reduce their feeling of violating the body (Lock 2002:254). One transplant surgeon says, “[a] child has died, but I can make a difference,” and another surgeon articulates, “the only thing that kept me going with the procurement was the thought that someone was going to benefit from this, even though it was a tragic event” (Lock 2002:259-260). These comments clearly express what the gift language can offer.

The gift metaphor, coupled with the practice of anonymous donation, seems to function to discourage donor’s family from searching out and interfering with recipient’s life, although, as will be discussed below, this is not always effective. Furthermore, by emphasizing the voluntary aspect of altruistic giving, as the account of the Internet-mediated transplantation indicates, the metaphor diverts people’s attention away from the socioeconomic hierarchy and inequality existing in the flow of organs from the poor to the wealthy, and from the Third World to the First World. Moreover, the “gift of life” serves to suppress concerns about the commodification of the body clearly existing in the practice by emphasizing aspects of altruism and the public good. Also, by proclaiming it a gift rather than a commodity, the practice of organ transplantation can remain a sacred, heroic act, rather than a profane commodification of body-self (Belk 1990:141).

**THE CONCEPT OF ALTRUISM AND THE GIFT – ORGAN DONATION AS GIFT GIVING**

The Oxford English Dictionary defines altruism as “devotion to the welfare of others, regard for others, as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or selfishness,” and the gift as “something, the possession of which is transferred to another without the expectation of receipt of an equivalent; a donation, present” (Oxford English Dictionary 2000). Gift giving in contemporary North America has a strong implication of altruism. Considered to be a selfless act, as the definition of the gift suggests, it is used interchangeably with the term “present.” Marcel Mauss (1990),
however, argues that gift exchange is ultimately the making of a social relationship, which entails various obligations such as giving, receiving, and reciprocating. An example of this can be found in Maori law, where a gift given to someone is considered to possess *hau*, the “spirit of the things” (Mauss 1990:11) of the giver, and therefore, should be somehow returned. Failure to do so causes hostility since it is considered to be the rejection of a social connection. To give somebody something is to give somebody a part of oneself, and to receive something from somebody is to receive part of somebody. Therefore, the rejection of the gift is equivalent to the rejection of the giver (Mauss 1990:11-12).

Murray (1987) points out that the gift metaphor has an intended function to promote social solidarity, which is threatened in a capitalist system such as North America where human relationships are regulated mostly by the market economy. Correspondingly, Joralemon (1995:344) makes an explicit claim that advocates of the gift ideology in the practice of organ donation bring the practice in line with cultural ideals highly valued in American society. In particular, the expression of caring and generosity to others, including total strangers who are facing difficult situations such as natural disasters, without expectation of any return (Joralemon 1995:344). The gift language thus enforces North Americans to contribute to the community and to the public good (Joralemon 1995:344).

This is seen clearly in contemporary North America where, together with the preoccupation with one’s health and battling disease, people are expected to support and often donate time and money to various health causes. Phone calls asking for a donation of money from health organizations such as the Heart and Stroke Foundation, and race events organized by those groups are common examples. Similarly, Friedman (2003:3) explicitly asks for support for the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation and for the donation of organs in the journal, *Policy and Practice of Public Human Services*, presenting his personal account of how his son came to receive a lung transplant. The following is his message: “As you search for that perfect gift for a loved one this holiday season, please also consider the most precious of all gifts, even if it’s for a total stranger” (Friedman 2003:3).

However, the giving of a gift to a stranger sounds peculiar since, as Mauss claims, the gift implies the making of social relationship, and to be able to do so, a stranger has to be known. It would seem that charity defined as “[b]enevolence to one’s neighbours, especially to the poor; the practical beneficences in which this manifests itself; almsgiving” (Oxford English Dictionary 2000), more appropriately describes “giving to a stranger.” Interestingly, Ohnuki-Tierney (1994:241) argues that the current practice of organ donation more closely resembles charity than gift giving. This is because the practice, partly because of anonymous donation, lacks any social relationship, which is the most important aspect of gift giving. The fundamental difference between charity and organ donation is that in charitable giving, the objects are alienable from the giver, whereas donated organs are not (Ohnuki-
Taking these arguments into account, it is clear that the gift metaphor complicates the practice of organ donation and transplantation by highlighting two different values. On the one hand, the proponent of the gift ideology in organ donation seeks charitable donation in which donation is anonymous, with no expectation of reciprocity involved. The conflict here is that organs are not neutral items that can be disposed of easily by the donor’s relatives, who most likely make the decisions. On the other hand, the proponents claim that it is a gift exchange which implies that the object is a valuable entity with personal meanings attached to it, thus generating potential for obligation and social connection. This creates a concept that charity cannot render, which is that the donor can continue living in another person. Therefore, although current organ donation discourages participants to develop social relationships, the language of the gift is so effectively used that it creates the potential for obligations. Accordingly, then, participants of the transplantation actively seek out the possibility for social relationships.

In the next section, I discuss various obligations associated with gift giving including the obligations to receive, to reciprocate, and to use the gift appropriately, which are often complicated by confusion surrounding the question of the nature of the gift. Organ transplantation is not an exchange between two individuals, because in the process, the donation of organs is usually decided by the donor’s kin, the transplant coordinator’s mediation is usually necessary, and the skills of medical professionals are also mandatory. Therefore, recipients may find themselves in a situation where multiple givers demand some kind of reciprocity. Later, I will show how the “giving of organs” is not simply the outcome of an individual decision based on altruism but is filtered through existing social values and hierarchy.

ORGAN DONATION AS GIFT GIVING – NEW MEANINGS AND RELATIONSHIPS

Koenig (1988) argues that the technological imperative in biomedicine, a strong preference for the latest technology, occurs when the use of new technology becomes standardized, which further leads to the moral imperative, where the use of the technology becomes a moral obligation in the treatment setting. Since organ transplantation has become commonplace with the development of cyclosporine, professionals tend to view the practice as standard. In tandem with the gift ideology, the obligation to receive is highlighted. The decision of the patient not to have a transplant is viewed as unnatural and even pathological, and is thus disregarded, sometimes causing conflict. This conflict is evident in a description by Lock (2002:310-314) regarding the case of K’aila Paulette who died at eleven months of age from a serious liver disease.

Carefully considering possibilities of K’aila’s survival and quality of life after transplant surgery, his parents decided not to give him the liver transplantation (Lock 2002:310-312). This apparently upset the medical professionals who understood this decision as the “neglect of a child.”
the failure to provide the child with essential care, and the case was taken to court (Lock 2002:314). According to Siminoff and Chillag (1999:40), medical professionals view transplantation as a contract between the patients and themselves. This gives rise to the idea among medical professionals that if the first transplant fails, retransplantation is the only option. Therefore, when the patient refuses to have a retransplant, it is almost viewed as betrayal. One health care professional expresses disbelief about the decision of a recipient who refused retransplantation: “He is forty-six, he should give it a whirl. Why doesn’t he want to? Meanwhile we spend thousands of dollars working him up. Nobody bothered to ask him if he wanted it or not” (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:40).

In many cases, organ transplantation depends on someone’s death. Despite being encouraged to think of it as a gift, the connotations inherent in the procedure make some people uneasy. For example, Siminoff and Chillag (1999:37-38) describe the difficulty faced by a patient who needed a second transplantation. While waiting for the second transplantation as an inpatient, hoping “his” organ would soon arrive at the hospital, he realised that he was “waiting for someone to die” (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:37), which gave him a tremendous feeling of guilt. This feeling sometimes evolves into an overwhelming feeling that one cannot reciprocate such a significant “gift,” a situation Fox and Swasey describe as the “tyranny of the gift” (Fox and Swasey 1992:40). Even if they desire to give back in the same way, organ donation is not an option for them because their organs are not suitable for transplantation due to their use of steroid and immunosuppressant drugs (Sharp 1995:375). They may write letters to the donors’ kin but because of the anonymous donation and the mediation by the transplant organization, the recipients often do not know if their letters are received (Sharp 1995:370). Some recipients get involved with volunteering, including public speaking and distributing donor cards at shopping malls, to fulfill their desire to reciprocate (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:39).

As stated above, organs are biographical objects that carry meanings and have histories for the relatives of both recipients and donors. However, conflicts occur because recipients and donors often have very different ideas about the types of biography attached to transplanted organs. Encouraged by professionals to consider the organ as a “gift,” the recipients may view the new organ as their own, but the donor’s kin may have a different idea. Donors’ kin, influenced by the idea that their loved one continues to live in the recipient’s body, a notion the gift metaphor actively promotes, may search for recipients, and try to establish “kinship” with them. However, the relative success of these attempts depends on the willingness of both parties to break the barrier of anonymity and establish kinship ties with one another.

Sharp (1995:376) describes a situation where two men who exchanged organs in a domino heart-lung transplant, where one person received a cadaveric heart-lung transplant and his original heart was transplanted into the other man, became friends and now refer themselves as “brothers.” However, if establishing
Kinship is the wish of just one side of the party, this causes an uncomfortable situation. Ralph, a recipient of lung transplantation, expresses his confusion about his donor’s widow, who seems to consider him more than a recipient, even telling Ralph personal matters such as her remarrying with her husband’s best friend: “She wants to get together sometime, but I don’t think I want to meet her, though. She thinks that her husband lives on in me; but I feel uncomfortable about that – I feel they are my lungs now” (Sharp 1995:376).

Murray (1987:32) argues that the concept of the gift entails the idea that it has to be used in a manner that the giver approves of, as opposed to the commonsense contemporary North American view of the gift where the gift does not involve such obligations. This is evident in a situation where living donors may claim ownership of their donated organs, and try to interfere with the recipients’ behaviour in order to protect “their” organs. For example, Sharp (1995:371-372) describes the feeling of frustration of a transplant patient who received her brother’s kidney. After the transplant, she says, her brother considering the kidney is still his, has been determined to stop her smoking (Sharp 1995:371). In her family, everybody except her refers to the transplanted kidney as her brother’s even though the transplantation occurred more than ten years ago (Sharp 1995:371).

Professionals, who consider the transplant operation as the giving of life, may also stand on the side of the giver, and pressure recipients to use the gift appropriately. The following is a comment by a recipient of a liver transplant who had a struggle with a health care professional who tried to exert control:

The [health care professional] asked me what I had eaten for my last meal… I had some cheese pie, some meat pie. The [health care professional] said, “We didn’t give you this liver so that you could ruin it clogging your arteries.” This is a gift? A gift? (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:40).

The same patient also complains that the health care professional asked her if she wore a seat-belt, saying, “We didn’t give you a liver so that you could drive home without a seat-belt and waste the liver” (Siminoff and Chillag 1999:40).

The gift metaphor further complicates the situation because of the advocate’s misguided assumption of the nature of the gift and the act of giving. Lock (2002:318) asserts that the use of the gift metaphor functions to reinforce the idea that donation is an individual choice, which corresponds to one of the cultural ideals that North Americans value, that is, the individual right to discard one’s possessions when one desires. This is evident in the description of a new registration system to become a donor in British Columbia. Based on this system, after the death of the individual who has registered as donor, a copy of the registration form may be presented to the person’s relatives as proof of the decision, which apparently “removes the burden and onus of making a difficult decision at an already difficult time, from a grieving family” (British Columbia Transplant Society 2008).
The problem here is that people who sign donor cards may not value their own dead body, but the truth is that the people who usually decide to donate are the closest relatives, and they take the death of their relatives differently.

Similarly, Lauritzen et al. (2001:32) argue that the gift metaphor is founded on the notion of autonomous and individual decision making, which equates signing the donor card with the actual donation. In practice, however, the donation and the subsequent transplantation occur after going through many processes. For example, professionals stand as gatekeepers and decide who can become givers and receivers. Therefore, one’s desire to become a donor is not always sufficient. Fox and Swasey (1974:11-13) describe a case where a mother’s zealous desire to donate her kidney to her son was almost turned down because her motivation, judged by the fact that she was the mother of nine other children and that she implied to the social worker that she intended to use the donation to assume a dominant position in her marriage, was viewed by physicians as not entirely altruistic.

Moreover, since it is not charity but the gift which entails various obligations and expectations, as was stated above, the decision to donate is most likely influenced by ideas about who should receive the gift, which is largely shaped by existing ideas of social worth and hierarchy. According to Lock (2002:345-346), when a hospital in Alberta changed its position and accepted Terry Urquhart, a Down Syndrome patient, to their waitlist for a lung transplant, the hospital staff received many angry phone calls by people threatening to tear up their donor cards if they kept wasting organs by allocating them to mentally impaired individuals. This shows that the decision to donate is strongly influenced by ideas about who deserves the gift, which are shaped by existing social values in North America where people with disabilities or mental conditions are associated with little social worth.

Furthermore, the choice of the individual to donate is complicated by the choices of other parties. Since medical professionals may consider themselves life givers and assume the task of gatekeepers in the practice, their choices have a tremendous impact on the distribution of the gift. The American Medical Association maintains that a patient’s social worth should not affect the selection of transplant candidates (Kutner 1987:29). Correspondingly, an organ transplant organization, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), explicitly states that organs will be distributed/allocated “fairly, efficiently, and effectively” (UNOS 2008) based on a combination of factors such as the length of the time for being waitlisted, tissue types, and whether the potential recipient is a child. However, Kutner (1987:29-30) claims that the current criteria of recipient selection is based on the success of transplantation, meaning the high probability of transplant survival, and therefore excludes some segment of the population, such as patients with mental, emotional, familial, and probably financial problems because they are viewed to be less likely to comply with the treatment regimen, thus reducing the probability of success.

This tendency is clearly
recognized in a proposal by House and Thompson II (1988:535) suggesting that psychiatric evaluation of the patient is helpful in order to detect less ideal candidates with psychiatric risks, such as severe mental retardation and personality disorders, which may hamper the successful transplantation, and their rather contradictory statement that any form of discrimination should be avoided. Moreover, according to Eggers (1995), in the United States, there is significant difference in the likelihood of being accepted to a waitlist and to receive organ transplantation based on patient ethnicity. For example, from 1988 to 1992, after one year of renal failure, Euro-American patients (22.7 percent) were nearly four times more likely to receive a kidney transplant than African American patients (six per cent). Kutner (1986:30) also states that her study in Atlanta revealed that African American kidney patients (49 percent) were much more likely than Euro-American patients (36 percent) to claim that nobody had mentioned the possibility of transplantation. These African American patients were less likely to have completed twelve years of education, and more likely to be out of a job than their counterparts. This discrepancy may partly be rooted in the physician’s idea that a low level of education would affect the patient’s ability for compliance (Kutner 1986:31).

**CONCLUSION**

As organ transplantation has become a standard medical practice, the shortage of organs has been perceived as a crisis. The metaphor of the gift of life has been popular because it is easy to understand, and therefore it is thought to be an effective means to increase donations while obscuring the ambiguities surrounding the practice. However, Siminoff and Chillag (1999:41) claim that while the metaphor seems to work to educate the public about the need for donation, it is not necessarily effective in increasing the actual rate of donation. Surveys have revealed that even though the majority of Americans know about organ donation, and many of them are willing to donate their organs at death, in 1994 less than half families agreed to donate when asked. For this reason, Siminoff and Chillag (1999:41) further suggest the use of an alternative slogan, “Share your life, share your decision,” because this slogan does not connote any obligations, but instead highlights the importance of group decision making regarding donation while encouraging it at the same time. The slogan, by reducing the potential for obligations associated with the “gift,” may effectively decrease the burden of the recipients. However, it does not address the aspects of social control and inequality clearly existing in the practice of organ transplantation.

Annas (1988:621) points out that the practice is full of paradoxes, one of which is that as increasing numbers of older and sicker patients are now accepted as candidates for transplantation, fewer younger and healthier people die owing to increased safety measures like the use of seat-belts. As a result, the shortage will continue to rise, and organs will become increasingly precious items. In that case, it will not be surprising to
see tighter social control and increased inequality in the procurement and distribution of these precious objects based on the existing social hierarchy. Does this mean that these problems are inherent to the practice of organ transplantation? If this is the case, the metaphor of “altruistic giving” will continue to serve the purpose of obscuring these problems which trouble many North Americans who place a high value on the fundamental equality of all human beings.

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EXCHANGES – THE GIFT, PLACE AND ETHNOGRAPHY
Images and Text from Field Research in the Visayan Philippines

Abstract
In this article I entwine together discursive strands – ethnography as exchange and the role of place in these substantive practices are used in presenting and discussing the visual and textual dimensions of fieldwork conducted in the Central Philippines. I present three photographs as a means through which knowledge is formed and informed by the visual and textual process of doing ethnography in the context of Mauss’ theory of the gift. Through ethnographic practice these strands knit together a network of places in time and space. These manifestations, constructed through the power of resistance and domination, serve as a potent reminder that as anthropologists we must analyze our own cycle of exchange and its links to ethnography and the world at large.

PRELUDE: ODE TO A FOOTNOTE
A footnote is often considered of less importance than the body of text it references. However, the article you see before you has its humble beginnings as a footnote in a paper I wrote for a graduate course in anthropological theory.1 The footnote, emerging out of a discussion of Mauss’ The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies,2 pondered the implications of the work for ethnography as a practice. In the subsequent semester, I took a course3 which through its emphasis on articles discussing current trends throughout varied topics pertaining to cultural anthropology and ethnography gave me the impetus to follow up on the footnote and to extend my thinking about Mauss’ work in The Gift.

What follows is my working out of the confluences and contradictions between The Gift and current trends in ethnography with reference to my own ethnographic experiences recorded in textual and visual form.

INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE SCENE
After the 1980s with its concomitant crisis in representation, anthropology witnessed a number of theoretical shifts that reshape the study of space and place (Gupta and Ferguson 1999:2-3). This crisis raised the spectre of colonialism, questioned ethnographic claims to authoritative knowledge and reviewed the traditional modernist dualisms by which ethnography translates ‘the other’ into an apparently willing subject (observer/observed, traditional/civilized, objective/subjective, self/other) (Asad 1986; Ingold 1993). While much of the critique seemed new at the time, in reality however, it echoed earlier and in fact, ongoing questions about practice regarding the very what and how of ethnography. In the 1970s, a decade before the ‘crisis’, Keesing (1974:93) argued that culture be viewed as lived and practiced in the everyday world.

During the same era, Godelier (1978:764; 766) suggested that the
analysis of culture meant querying the usual separation between the material and the symbolic as explainable solely in their own terms. Likewise, a decade later Wolf (1988:752-753) argued that culture functionally unbounded required a perspective of continual interaction across boundaries.

As a part of recognizing interaction, ethnography witnessed a move to include the material, whereby objects, places and practices became the emphasis rather than the traditional human–centered focus. Moreover, this meant that any a priori assumptions could be abandoned and researchers could “follow how a given element becomes strategic through the number of connections it commands and how... it lose[s] its importance when losing its connections” (Latour 1998:website).

In keeping with Marxist and feminist critiques, these shifts not only open up for analysis the social, political and historical processes through which contingent “cultural territorializations” (Gupta and Ferguson 1999:4-6) become emplaced but also move away from etic functionalist or structuralist cultural and spatial wholes. In avoiding grand scale narratives, this smaller frame of analysis thus contributes to more significant wholes, situating knowledge by exploring its subjectivities (Haraway 189:1991). Place–making in this approach is “conceived less as a matter of ‘ideas’ than of embodied practices that shape identities and enable resistances” (Gupta and Ferguson 1999:6). These perspectives place ethnography in the global world, exploring particular practices and the unbounded dimensions of culture (Kearney 1995:557), the role of capitalism in that dispersal (Nash 1981:408) and a merging of modernist dualisms, particularly that of the subject and object (Marcus 1995:99-102). The ethnographic project thus becomes an emergent boundary–crossing endeavor, a project not simply immersed in culture but as a recursive and socially–engaged cultural production (Marcus 1995:99). Ethnography in this framework opens up a reflexive examination of contingencies and constraints without giving way to exotic frisson (Wolf 1990:588), in which ethnographers deal with the ‘big’ questions (Nader 617:2001), questions of power – social, political, economic – and how these conditions are experienced and negotiated.

In her introduction to the 1990 translation of Mauss’ The Gift, Mary Douglas suggests that The Gift has in general, been neglected as a tool for analyzing exchange (1990:xvi). Douglas’ statement with respect to the emphasis of this paper, is only partially correct. The Gift and the theories therein continue to be used and debated to this day as a means of analyzing the social contract of exchange between people, things and ideas in a broad set of ethnographic contexts (Godelier 1999; Hart 2001; Herrmann 1997; Howell 1989; Mazarella 2003; Miller 1987; Pertierra 2006; Snellinger 2005; Weiner 1985). If anything, the extended play of Mauss’ theories in these works demonstrates the longevity and importance of Mauss to anthropology and the anthropological practice of “us[ing] the work of our predecessors to raise new questions” (Wolf 1990:588).

Exchange, for Mauss (1990:5), is a ‘total social fact’ that takes place not only between individuals but between
collectivities. In the Durkheimian\textsuperscript{6} sense of the term, “exchange...is the way that human beings reconcile their individuality with belonging to others in society” (Hart 2001:website). An exchange then, is never disinterested but negotiated and reciprocated within a social, symbolic, political and economic system (Mauss 1990:5-6) that links together individual and social, institutional, magical, religious and moral realms (1990:5-12).

Further, the links forged through reciprocal exchange are produced not only through movable objects, but through social events in which the economic is but one element (Mauss 1990:5). In Mauss’ perspective then, exchange via reciprocity is substantively bound up in social practice (Bourdieu 1990; Snellinger 2005:32). Ethnography then, is a profoundly economic activity when taken in the context of transactions, reciprocity and exchange.

In clarifying the comparatively widespread salience of Mauss’ thoughts on exchange, I should note that Douglas does accurately characterize, however inadvertently, a certain neglect, which this article addresses. This is the relative paucity of analysis relating The Gift to ethnography itself. By this I mean not exchange in ethnographic settings but rather, ethnography as an exchange. The “difference which makes a difference” (Bateson 2001:459), is in thinking of ethnography as a dynamic system, not as a singular panoptic gaze, but one in which the ethnographer is only one participant of many in an embodied and contingent exchange. Using three photographs from my ethnographic research in a community in the Central Philippines during April and May of 2005, I examine place and exchange as part of the ethnographic process.

Visual culture\textsuperscript{7} much like ethnography, occupies a proliferate yet contentious space; despite its ubiquity, “anthropologists have never quite known what to do with the visual” (MacDougall 217:2006). Anna Grimshaw, noting the troublesome nature of visual work offers a parsimonious and crucial distinction between the “anthropology of the visual ... [and the] visualization of anthropology” (2005:199). Grimshaw’s approach outlines two potential methodologies to decenter the ‘objective gaze’ so effectively problematized by Donna Haraway as the “god–trick of seeing everything from nowhere” (1991:189). The first approach studies the visual anthropologically, and is often based in discursive, language–based analysis predicated on analytically separating the visual into component parts: the what and the how of presentation (Grimshaw 2005:200).

The second approach Grimshaw (2005:199) advocates, employs a reflexive ethnographic process in which knowledge is produced and takes shape within that process While Grimshaw characterizes these approaches as “two distinct constellations” (2005:199), she also locates a more crucial question: how these approaches might form and inform one another within the same project? Grimshaw highlights a ‘situated’ view of ethnography “as a set of practices linked to a critical stance toward questions of culture and identity [involving] the play of the familiar and the strange” (Grimshaw 2005:200-201).
The Scene(s)
What exactly is being exchanged through the ethnographic process presented here? If we understand that the ethnographic process is a form of exchange whereby the ethnographer is a participant in and generator of meaning then within this process generally and my research in particular, we can understand place as central dimension of exchange in the ethnographic process. Constructions of place play a central role in how people think about and perceive group identity (Rodman 1992:641-642). In this sense, “place is the fundamental means by which we make sense of the world and through which we act” (Sack 1992:1). Place then, in the anthropological sense as developed by Margaret Rodman, is a physical location which is socially constructed through “lived experience” (1992:640-641), one that is multilocal and multivocal. A single place may evoke multiple voices or perspectives, as well as multiple locales in time and space. This brings me to the first photograph (Figure 1).

Imagine yourself in an impoverished community, near Bacolod City, on the Island of Negros in the Central Philippines. You are there as a research assistant, and it is 31 degrees Celsius, hot, and you are jet–lagged like you’ve never been before. This is where I am on April 17, 2005. On that day, we met with some of the members of the women’s community organization KASAKI, and after talking they insist on buying me a pop. Choosing a Sprite, I wondered how I might be able to convince them to let me pay for it. Thinking it over, I decide against that plan, realizing that when a gift is offered, it should not be denied. With the pop finished, they ask, “Why don’t we walk around the community you can see where things are?” On the tour, thankful for airy and washable flip–flops, I negotiate wooden planks over the waste–water canals that run around the periphery of the houses. We stop momentarily at the water pump, it’s a busy morning and many people are there gathering water for washing clothes, dishes and bathing.

Figure 1. Bata (kids) at the bay–bay (ocean).
Photo by author. © 2005
With senses heightened from lack of sleep, there is an onslaught of smells and the sounds of karaoke music playing, and of all things, the instantly recognizable vocalizations of Canadian pop singer Celine Dion wafting through the paths between the houses.

After walking through several narrow pathways densely lined with houses there is an opening, one last wooden plank to negotiate and the group of us are at the bay–bay (ocean). There is a bit more breeze here, and several fishing boats pulled on–shore; wide and stout double outriggers. Although it’s already noon, it’s too late for fishing, an activity that occurs much earlier in the day. One of the women from KASAKI, Violy points to a house which, due to erosion from wave action is very close to the water. “That’s ‘Nay (short form of nanay, or ‘mother’, a term of respect) Lydia’s house. She will have to move soon, or move the house, the water is just too close especially in storms or the rainy season.” The house is very familiar, and I quickly realize I’ve seen it before in a group photos from a field visit in 2004, images that I catalogued as part of my research assistantship months previous to my arrival in Bacolod. Remark ing on how much the of the land has been eroded in just one year, I ask, “A photo,” I say, nodding towards the house, “Can I take a photo to show how much soil has washed away, how close the house is to the sea?” “Sure, it’s okay,” says Violy. Looking for my camera, there is a brief pause while I organize everything and try to focus in the bright sun. All of a sudden children gather in the viewfinder, jostling, laughing and gesturing. “Are you one of the Canadians?” “Will you take our picture?” When the photo is over, the kids disperse almost as quickly as they arrived, back to swimming, playing and talking with each other.

In this way, in photographs, as in the purok (neighbourhood), place is multiply exchanged and negotiated by adults and children. Both children and adults note that crowding, general pollution, flooding, a lack of basic infrastructure like sewage systems or garbage pick–up, and the use of the area until 2002 as a location to dump city of Bacolod garbage, make the purok (neighbourhood) a less than ideal place to live. However, adults and children differ in their perspectives about the bay–bay (ocean), and these differences often center on the activities and practices associated with place. Adults consider the bay–bay (ocean) a dangerous place, in part because children are a distance away from the watchful eyes of parents, and because the ocean is often unpredictable and unsafe. Children however, while acknowledging the need for caution, speak with great pleasure and exuberance about the bay–bay (ocean) as a favorite place where they swim and have fun with their friends. The bay–bay (ocean) is also a home place, underscored by increasingly tenuous living conditions. Elders in the community remember the bay–bay (ocean) as a place where natural resources were once abundant, in contrast to the growing pollution of the environment and dwindling size and number of fish and shellfish. This social memory is counter posed with the memory of the bay–bay (ocean) before the crowding, the garbage and the pollution.

These subjectivities create
multiple dimensions of place: the purok (neighbourhood) as it is remembered juxtaposed against the present day and as one differently negotiated and constructed by children and adults. There is also the connection between locales or nations in this one place, of Canada and the Philippines and in the exchange of those group identities, of anthropologist and a group of children. At the same time, my place as one of ‘just observing’ was rightfully usurped. Rather, I was observed by participants who returned the gaze and in turn requested my participation. This set of relationships to place is the moment recorded in the photograph not the house.

*The Gift* suggests that exchange belies an interested but negotiated and reciprocal transfer of things and actions (Mauss 1990:5) within a social, symbolic, political and economic system (Mauss 1990:5-6). Place, socially constructed and juxtaposed is a part of the exchange occurring in this ethnographic practice—as we talk and walk throughout the purok (neighbourhood), Violy points out new houses, old houses, houses rebuilt in new locations. She talks of the changes of the past year and who lives where, the locations that flood. Place in this sense is one of negotiating poverty and pollution but also of community as a shared and lived experience. Here, place through social connections is tied to community identity, not as one that is bounded and static, but in constant ebb and flow. These practices of informal talking and walking which was repeated on several occasions over the time I was there, and within them a blending and exchanging of subject and object, observer and observed took place, a “mutual ontology between giver and receiver” (Pertierra 2006:322). In addition, these practices link Violy’s position as a knowledgeable member of the community to her particular sense of place in relation to her family and other people in the purok (neighbourhood) and the KASAKI organization.

One of Mauss’ theories of exchange, due to the obligation to give, receive and to repay (Mauss 1990:13-14; 39-41) or the full–circuit of reciprocal exchange, maintains that the gift is inalienable; metonymically linking the giver to the receiver in relational terms. The tension between the social relationship and the material object found here, is clarified by Mauss (1990:10-11) and Werbner’s (1990:267-268) distinction that gifts objectify a social relationship and personify an inalienable quality or spiritual value imparted through the spirit of the giver. As Miller (1987:92) points out, through human projection the gift is the frame which inculcates an internal moral order. From this perspective, an internal moral order merges the social and the material and renders the object and the subject mutable and partible. Mauss writes,

>a tie occurring through things, is one between souls, because the thing itself possesses a soul, is of the soul. Hence it follows that to make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself....[t]o retain that thing would be dangerous and mortal.... [because] the thing given is not inactive...it seeks to return to its place of origin (1990:12-13 emphasis mine).
Within this vantage, there is no complete disjunction between people and things, a premise supported by Howell, who asks “what are all these people exchanging if not some part of themselves as participants of a relationship” (Howell 1989:428)?

The neighbourhood of *Purok Dagat*, as a place and at once a physical reality and a much more abstract ‘thing’ also merges the categories of subject and object. In the ethnographic exchange of communicating about place, and to an extent becoming a part of that place through social means, one might assume that place is indeed inalienable. Yet, while place relationally embodies the social connections between objects and persons, and between persons and persons, it is arguable that any one place is being freely exchanged for another in any substantive way. Weiner (1987:224) clarifies this relationship when she suggests that exchange occurs in reciprocal manner, but one that is hierarchical and often carefully controlled through distributive mechanisms, or ‘keeping while giving’. This brings me to the next photograph (Figure 2).

This image was taken as part of a walkabout in which Violy described locations used by the city for dumping in different years, and without her keen understanding of place as a physical reality, keeping the different dumping areas separate as they occurred throughout the years was very difficult. During a conversation about the increasing number of households in the community, and where new houses were being built considering the lack of space in the much of the *purok* (neighbourhood), Violy said, “Most of the new places are near where the city was dumping in 2001.”

Knowing that the city used the area as a dumpsite for city garbage, and that certain areas were used in certain years, but without a concrete sense of where these places were exactly, we asked Violy to take us on a tour of the different dumping locations. Through the tour I gained a much better sense of where dumping had occurred, and when and how quickly people were moving into these areas.

As we walked, we revisited the *bay–bay* (ocean), where the most recent garbage had been dumped, in 2002. Next, we wound our way through several interconnected narrow pathways which opened up onto a road which is one of the boundaries of the *purok* (neighbourhood). As we walked along the roadway, Violy nodded towards the houses. “*Sigay*” (pronounced seegay, meaning ‘okay’)
“This is where they are building now. There are many houses that have been built over the last year or two.” Just as she spoke I noticed a man carrying mixed cement in a bucket towards a house with a concrete block frame. The youth in the photograph is mixing the cement, getting it ready for use as mortar between the blocks.

There are three points I wish to discuss regarding this particular image, place, exchange and ethnography. If you look at the picture closely, there is little evidence of the garbage from 2001. Nearly all of it has been covered, in part by the gravel roadway, but mainly by the houses that line the entirety of the road. Not only that, residents have gone out of their way to beautify their yards through the use of plants. There are plants in large pots and in the ground at the perimeter of houses. The plants are of utility, people young and old alike described the plants as being nami (beautiful) and making the community a nice place to live. Youths talked of hauling water for plants, tending small vegetable patches and harvesting tree–fruits, and locations with plants as places they like to be.

While these practices underscore actions which are preferred, many residents do not have either the money or room required to purchase or grow plants. This stems out of issues related to poverty and access to land. As Morrell (1987:253) points out, it is the degree of poverty which acts as a near permanent trap which only few Filipinos manage to surmount. Over half of urban populations through the Philippines live in poverty, and wealthy landowners make up a slim two percent of the population, and additionally thousands travel or migrate to cities as closer to 80 percent of rural populations live in poverty.11 People owning land in the purok (neighbourhood) receive a break on their taxes from the city when the area was used as a dumping ground, yet residents are also expected to pay rent for the land on which their house is built. Residents often face evictions with out much recourse should landlords choose to evict them, which occurs frequently (pers. comm. Lisa Mitchell, April 20, 2005). One resident told us while we were there that she had recently been told to move and in the process had lost all the cement bricks she bought to create the foundation on that section of land. Working to make ends meet is a joint effort shared by multiple and often intergenerational family members residing in the same household, for whom the loss of even a few cement bricks is substantial.

In this context, the land is itself is viewed in competing ways. Descriptions of gardens, caring for them as well as the dynamic combination of utility and aesthetics, through the landscape are viewed as a gift. Place–making activities are in reciprocal engagement with the land, through trees, gardens or with plants in pots, and people view these as an important dimension of their community. This perception and the physical, material presence of gardens are contradicted and challenged by the view of the city and landowners. Land is construed in this case as owned, a commodity which forms a part of familial holdings and places of wealth distanced socially, economically and politically from the purok (neighbourhood). Building on Weiner’s (1987:224) characterization, place here is less ‘keeping while giving’
and more plainly just ‘keeping’.

The difference here is in the expectation of the obligation to repay: to put back into the landscape what is socially–construed as valuable. A central aspect of gift–giving is delayed repayment:

For Mauss, the essence of the gift was that it should not be reciprocated immediately. It would be impolite to return it at once, since this would constitute a canceling out of any interdependence created by the act of generosity and therefore no basis for projecting the relationship into the future (Hart 2001:website).

The perspective of Hart is in keeping with Bourdieu who writes,

The lapse of time that separates the gift from the counter–gift is what allows the deliberate oversight, the collectively maintained and approved self–deception, without which the exchange could not function. Gift exchange is one of the social games that cannot be played unless the players refuse to acknowledge the objective truth of the game (1990:105).

What I do not yet know is if landowners view allowing people to rent the land as a gift.12 This is a possibility given recent work which considers that “Philippine society still operates on the basis of gift exchange” (Pertierra 2006:321). If this is the case, gifts operate as a form of social control; those who are able to give are always already superior requiring “excessive obeisance” (Pertierra 2006:321) from inferiors. During my stay, as Mitchell also notes (2006:332-333) many middle and upper class residents of Bacolod spoke of the poor as just that, as lacking the moral values, skills and knowledge necessary to succeed in life rather than noting how systemic inequalities might constrain opportunities for poor people.

Unlike Marxist authors who view gifts as “innocent” (Bloch and Parry 1989:9-10), the obligatory nature of gifts in the Maussian project demonstrates an understanding of gifts as a decidedly contaminated category. In keeping with this perspective, Mauss (1990:5-6; 40-46) suggests that giving gifts does not occur within the framework of universal equality, but rather gifts and the obligation to repay them are predicated on acknowledging the existence of asymmetrical relations (Douglas 1900:ix).

As Hart points out, “[i]f we don’t return the gift in kind, then we must defer to the giver....[t]he surprising fact of giving therefore is that the gift generates social inequality” (2001:website). This inequality is dynamic and part and parcel of the asymmetrical obligations to give and receive; the act of repayment provides a marker of social equality or social symmetry. Never being able to repay would then create a long–term asymmetry. In terms of ethnographic practice, place is thus of substantial importance. People think about, relate to and make places in landscapes, and the ways in which this is related to questions of social inequality, domination and resistance. What this suggests is that gifts take on meaning
through the process of exchange, and those meanings are context dependent or located and negotiated through place and time.

While Mauss used the opposition between gifts and commodities in a romanticist manner predicated on civilized and primitive, capitalist and pre–capitalist, class–based versus kin–based, he did so as a theoretical and social commentary of the times in which he lived. The Gift was written in the turbulent years following World War One, and as a socialist Mauss I believe, sought in his writing to reconfigure a new moral order out of the morbidity and chaos of those times. In contrast with the modernist standpoint, which proposes an innately progressive ‘economic man’; an autonomous and rational actor (read capitalist) who acts to maximize scarce resources within a natural or ‘free–market’, The Gift pointedly positions Mauss as both anti–utilitarian and anti–formalist.

Another dimension of exchange important in the Maussian project includes total prestations. For Mauss a “[t]otal prestation [involves]... rituals, marriages, inheritance of goods, legal ties and those of self interest, the ranks of the military and the priests – in short everything is complimentary” (Mauss 1990:6). What makes this a total prestation is not only the obligation to give, receive and to repay but,and this is key for Mauss, a sense of social solidarity. He writes, “[t]here is total prestation in the sense that...the whole clan contracts on behalf of all, for all that it possesses and all that it does” (Mauss 1990:6 emphasis mine; cf. 1990:39–46). Mauss’ ideation of total prestations is important; they are particular yet all–encompassing.

There are two aspects of note in Mauss’ concept total prestations. The first is methodological and linked to what Mauss terms “total social facts” (1990:78). Total prestations are systems of exchange, and the actions of people, objects and events in turn make up a totality, or generalizable statements which in turn may be thematically compared on the basis of similarity and difference (1990:78–79). Inherent in Mauss’ methodology is an understanding that societal groups are not simply functional wholes, but rather an integrated and contingent system in flux to be studied multiply as political, social, economic, legal, moral and aesthetic (1990:79). The second aspect inherent in Mauss’ notion of total prestations is meant to guide the reader into social activism and common interest. He writes:

[w]e see it already functioning in certain economic groupings and in the hearts of the masses, who possess, very often better than their leaders, a sense of their own interests, and of the common interest. Perhaps by studying these obscure aspects of social life we shall succeed in throwing a little light upon the path that our nations must follow, both in their morality and in their economy (Mauss 1990:78 emphasis mine).

For Mauss, to study the world and the people in it, is as Keith Hart suggests, a vocation—research and writing that is existentially and politically motivated (2003:website). With this I turn to the next and final photograph (Figure 3).
Originally, I was going to incorporate a photograph from the last day of my stay in the Philippines, taken from the back of a jeepney (local public transport) on the outskirts of Bacolod City. That photo is of miles and miles fields taken up with sugar cane. Good for a discussion on the need for land reform, I thought. Then, when I got to this section I couldn’t add it in; despite the overwhelming disparity between wealthy and impoverished, I didn’t want to configure the situation as hopeless – dire perhaps, but not hopeless. My end point is not simply the rich are staying rich, that there is no prospect for social change, for a common interest as Mauss puts it. I chose to include this particular photograph instead, because it is an example of potentially sustainable development taking place in a purok (neighbourhood) nearby to the one in which I was working.

The Urban–Agri Demo Area, as it is called, is located not on the edge, but more centrally in Bacolod City. Our guide to the project, JP, studies at a university in Bacolod and as a requirement for his education program, he works with a community development organization Balayan an NGO that operates out of the university. This project uses a small vacant lot donated by a landowner as a pilot composting and garden project. Taking a three pronged approach to kitchen and solid waste, the project has initiated a composting program which engages nearly 40 percent of the purok (neighbourhood). Using donated coconut shells from local businesses, the program recycles the ‘furry’ outer layer of the coconut shell, producing coir (pronounced choir), used in making a rich soil base for growing orchids. The composted kitchen waste is used on the gardens, which to date have generated some produce but the overall output is low. JP noted that while they have tried to sell the produce at local markets, sales have not been good. During our visit, the garden was very small, containing several rows of basil, used to repel insects and a few squash and ornamental plants.

Unlike the prospect of a community garden, the sale of coir is a reasonably lucrative business, as JP told us and as the sign suggests. The success of this part of the project assist other areas of the project. The third prong of the program is to collect from within and outside the purok (neighbourhood) single–serving drink containers made of strong but flexible plastic. A group of women, who have proclaimed themselves the basura (garbage) queens, collect these drink containers and take them apart, wash them, and sew them into reusable bags of all shapes, sizes and uses: lunch
bags, shopping bags, backpacks and small handbags. These bags are making the rounds of local product fairs, with some interest, although as JP told us the main interest thus far remains outside the Philippines, in Europe and North America. “Many Filipinos are not as interested, they think, why would I buy this when I can buy something new? So we are trying to convince them,” he said, smiling.

This third image, unlike the two discussed previously, refers to a set of exchanges within the fieldsite of Bacolod, rather than an exchange between myself and the fieldsite. As a locally-developed project working on issues of that has met some goals and is working towards others, the Urban–Agri Demo Area suggests practices for residents of poorer puroks (neighbourhoods) to work together in tandem with community development and research projects. While the land is only donated for as long as the owner wishes, meaning that the project could be cut short and has no guaranteed location, the project has manifested a use of land in the common interest. That the landowner was willing to let the land be used for free, in combination with the other attributes, reconfigures place as bound up in social relationships and therefore socially constructed. The project is not a community garden in the sense that I know community gardens, only a few people garden there and families are not growing food to eat themselves. Nor could the project simply be repeated in the purok (neighbourhood) in Bacolod where I worked. First, there is very little unused land to make a community garden space and second, there is the issue of much of the community being built on or near dump-sites. However, the Urban–Agri Demo Area offers a perspective on land and place based on the social contract of gifts based on reciprocity that merges and overlaps with commerce – rather than strictly dichotomized and separate categories. The overlapping of these categories questions the traditional distinction between commodities as “manufactured products intended for market exchange within the capitalist mode of production...while gifts are socially engaged and a binding force in society” (Herrmann 1997:911).

Ethnography as an exchange constructing place, is a powerful tool in locating disjunctures regarding community identity and competing practices and ideas about the landscape. Importantly, ethnographers themselves are placed within this equation, not as spectators outside the process, but participants engaged in an interested exchange while examining the political and economic dimensions of everyday life. Capitalist alienation and mass production cannot be denied, but through the study of every day ethnographic exchanges, it is possible to argue that hegemony is never complete. As Mazarella writes, if anthropology has emerged from the so-called crisis of representation that dominated the field...it has not been through some miraculous act of theoretical parthenogenesis. Rather, it has been through the recognition that the cultural politics of ethnographic practice are not so cleanly separable from the cultural politics we take as our object
of study. This recognition offers us the foundation for a reactivation of the critical force... [ethnography] as a locally rooted, globally minded and politically productive project of understanding (Mazarella 2001:61 emphasis mine).

In keeping, with Mazarella, Mary Douglas, writes: “[i]f we persist in thinking that gifts ought to be free and pure, we will always fail to recognize our own grand cycles of exchanges, which categories get to be included and which get to be excluded from our hospitality” (Douglas 1990:xv).

**FINAL THOUGHTS: ETHNOGRAPHY PAST AND FUTURE**

It is perhaps fitting that ethnography be touted as a process of generating and producing, political, economic and social awareness—ethnography did get its start alongside economic anthropology in Malinowski’s fieldwork on exchange in Melanesia. Unlike earlier concatenations of the field process of the late–20th century, Malinowski privileged the experiential dimension of knowledge, or participatory observation. Thus, as Grimshaw notes, Malinowski’s “ethnographic understanding emerges from experience, bodily and sensory as much as from observation and intellectual reflection” (Grimshaw 2001:53).

While the task of ethnography here remains revelatory, through the ritual dimension of the field, it also “disrupts the conventional separations of self and other, the subjective and the objective, the particular and the universal” and is more than simply ‘looking’ (Grimshaw 2001:55). Nevertheless, Malinowski characterizes life in the Western Pacific as a functional whole, timeless, a–historic and primitive (Grimshaw 2001:44), a life fit for explication, publication and consumption, not for co–participants, but as a resource for the western and mainly academic world. The exchange between ethnographer and ethnographee thus began and ended with participatory observation.

Not long after the 1922 publication of Argonauts of the Western Pacific (hereafter shortened to Argonauts), Marcel Mauss incorporated Malinowski’s work into his ruminations on gift exchange in The Gift. In Argonauts, Malinowski focused on how the exchange brought about by the kula ring functioned to meet the needs of Trobriand society (1920:97-100).17 Faced with the extent and depth of exchange, and in an effort to differentiate types of trade, Malinowski painstakingly categorized gifts by their level of altruism and concluded that “practically nothing was given freely” (Douglas 1990:vii-viii) except those gifts given man to wife (Mauss 1990:73). As Douglas suggests in her introduction, Malinowski “evidently took...[to the field] the idea that commerce and...gift[s] are two separate activit[ies]” (Douglas 1990:vii). Mauss, most likely would have come to the same conclusion, just from the other side of the same coin—he would have likewise surmised that through gift exchange nothing was given freely.

While the links between the ethnographic past and the ethnographic present cannot be severed, we can, through what
Bourdieu termed participant objectivation, attending to lived experience and a knowing subject, as well as the “social conditions of possibility – and therefore the effect and limits – of that experience and, more precisely of the act of objectivizing itself” (2003:282). This article uses Mauss’ theories of exchange in The Gift as a heuristic device for examining ethnography and place within the context of my own ethnographic experiences. While the data I presented often challenged these theories, this does not mean that Mauss’ theory of the gift is no longer necessary—on the contrary, it is more salient than ever. We may pay tribute to Mauss as individuals and anthropologists by analyzing our own cycle of exchange and its links through ethnography to the world at large.

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NOTES
1. Anthropology 500, a method and theory course taught by Dr. Hülya Demirdirek at the University of Victoria.
2. Originally, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies was published in the Annales Sociologique in French in 1923-24 under the title of Essai sur le don. For brevity, I shorten the title to The Gift in the remainder of this article. Although there are a few different translations in English of The Gift, I will be referring throughout this text to the 1990 version.
3. Anthropology 501, taught by Dr. Peter Stephenson at the University of Victoria.
4. It is possible that these questions actually lead to the crisis in representation. Or at least feed the constant kula of critical reflexivity that circulates through anthropology.
5. This salience within ethnographic analyses is a perhaps ironic testament to Mauss’ sensitivity to the reality of everyday lived experience, despite never ‘doing’ ethnographic fieldwork himself (Fournier 2005:4).
6. As Marcel Fournier (2005:3) suggests, it is hard to talk about Mauss without mentioning his uncle Durkheim.
7. By visual culture I mean the production, consumption and circulation of any image (photographs, drawings, diagrams, or maps) or visually-based event (theatre, museum exhibits, musical events).
8. When I say we, I mean myself and Dr. Lisa Mitchell, the lead researcher on the project on which I worked. The term KASAKI, the name of the women’s group is an abbreviation of Kababaehan Sa Kinabukasan Incorporated, meaning ‘women together’ in the local language Illongo.
9. While there is the critique of vision as a positivist way of knowing the world (Grimshaw 2001:44), how does one adequately convey smell as part of the haptics of place?

10. Pseudonyms are considered a part of hiding one’s identity in the Philippines and is associated with criminal behaviour. All participants wanted their real names to be used, as they want people to know about the hitsura (situation) they experience in their community. Likewise the name of the women’s group, KASAKI. However, the name of the neighborhood given in this article, Purok Dagat, is a pseudonym used to protect families from the very real perils of eviction and relocation.

11. This information is from the following website: http://www.everyculture.com/No-Sa/The-Philippines.html

12. I should note here that Negros is known as the ‘sugar bowl’ of the Philippines, due to the intensive agricultural practices of growing sugar cane, which started with Spanish colonization in the 1600s. As soon as you travel outside Bacolod City, there are miles of cane fields. This takes up most of the useful and arable land, and is of course owned by wealthy families with little interest in land reform. So, it is in the interest of the wealthy that they would view the poor much as a patron would a client.


14. This definition of formalism is paraphrased from the definition of the definition at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_anthropology.

15. In the Visayan regional dialect, Bisaya, balay means house, and balayan means group of houses. Community, neighbourhood and place are connoted in naming a community development NGO Balayan.

16. In conversation with Mitchell about the garbage early on in my involvement with the research, I remember asking if it would be possible to just clear away all the landfill. I hadn’t realized at that point that the area had been used for several years, and was as she said invoking the Geertzian metaphor, “It’s garbage all the way down.” In other words, this landscape parts of the landscape is literally constructed out of garbage – removal means taking away the very landscape on which the neighbourhood sits.

17. The kula is a bi–circular inter-island exchange system which placed trade–objects in constant foment throughout the islands.

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Interaction, Connection
The Ecology and Zoonotic Transmission of Parasites

Abstract
Parasites affect their hosts in many ways, and when the effects are deleterious, they become factors in the conservation not just of non-human primates, but humans as well. The us–them division made by humans with regards to other primates is not honoured by parasites. This paper discusses many of the common vectors of interaction between human and wild non-human primates, with an aim to illustrate the deep interconnection between all primates on this basic level. When considering the health of nonhuman primates, it behooves us to keep in mind that this is an issue of human health as well.

Introduction
The sensitivity of parasites to change in the environment and ecology of their hosts and the ease of parasite transmission between different species of primate positions parasites as an excellent indicator of change. The complexities of interaction between humans other animals and the environment run so deep that fully understanding the scope of these relationships will likely prove near-impossible. However, we can pay careful attention to developments and cues as they appear and use these to inform policy regarding the management of human and nonhuman primates.

Anthropozoonotic transmission is an issue of mounting import to conservation efforts aimed at nonhuman primates; as human (Homo sapiens) populations expand and as the mobility of humans increases, the habitat of nonhuman primates becomes increasingly intruded upon and put to human use, and wild nonhuman primates are brought into frequent contact with parasites spread by humans. While the traditional dangers to primates such as hunting and habitat destruction remain topics of great concern, it is my intent to address a less obvious corollary; that these, and other activities creating points of contact, direct and indirect, between human and nonhuman primates, act as avenues for parasitic exchange, and that this is an issue of relevance both to human and nonhuman primate health.

Of primary importance among the issues raised by transmission is the risk to the health of human and nonhuman primate populations. The impact on human health planning is apparent when looking at other animals as reservoirs for disease and infection, as in Ebola virus outbreaks, which in Africa often spread from monkeys and apes to humans (Le Guenno et al. 1999; et al. 2004). The risks to nonhuman primate health and the impact on animal conservation planning are heavily tied to the actions humans take in coming into contact with nonhuman primates. And, though actions such as logging and hunting have negative effects on wild primate populations...
both in and of themselves and in encouraging parasite transmission or altering the effects of parasitosis, it is often the case that humans undertake these actions to ensure their own survival. Though many parasites shared between human and wild nonhuman primates are of primary concern in the tropical, often impoverished countries where transmission occurs, increasing globalization and deterritorialization makes the sharing of parasites such as the HIV and Ebola viruses between primates a pressing, global concern.

**Basic information and key assumptions**

‘Parasite’ is broadly defined as any organism living in or on a host, encompassing viruses, bacteria, fungi, and protozoa as well as the more usually thought of (nematodes, cestodes, trematodes) and arthropods (ticks, etc.) (2006). Due to the close genetic relationship between human and nonhuman primates and the relatively similar set of bodies to inhabit, parasites are easily exchanged back and forth (Gillespie 2006:1130). Viruses and bacterial infections endemic among humans can be potentially devastating in other primates, as observed in captivity when nonhuman primates have exceed a 90 percent mortality rate upon exposure to influenza, tuberculosis, chicken pox, or measles (Jones-Engel et al. 2001a:171).

The rate of exchange between human and nonhuman primates will likely continue to increase proportionate to the increase in contact. Contact is facilitated by any number of behaviours and activities, including habitat reduction and fragmentation, bushmeat trade, ecotourism, and field research. In particular, the current methods of conservation, which seek to address issues of funding in addition to the protection and preservation of endangered or at-risk wild primates, rarely account for parasitic infection and the deleterious effects thereof (Chapman et al. 2006a:120); ecotourism brings humans and human products into contact with wild nonhuman primates, and reserves (concomitant to deforestation) force groups into confined areas, where outbreaks of infection can be devastating (Le Guenno et al. 1999). Additionally, conservation efforts often overlook the human realities behind actions harmful to wildlife; while illegal timber-trade and the poverty that makes bushmeat a necessity are rightfully the targets of demonization, impoverished loggers and consumers or hunters of bushmeat are not.

Parasite transmission is used here to refer to the passing of parasites between individuals or populations with different intensities or types of infection/infestation, with subsequent measurable change in either (or both) individuals or populations. Crucial in mitigating the impact of harm caused by such change is understanding which human parasites are transmittable and how they are transmitted to nonhuman primates. Epidemiological data collected from areas where contact between human and nonhuman primates occurs will help to describe the kind and extent of pathogen exposure and better understand the routes of transmission (Jones-Engel et al. 2001a). Ultimately, the prevention of epidemic outbreaks due to zoonotic and anthropozoonotic transmission is the reason for studies of this nature.
Interaction
It has been established that patterns of parasitic infection and the effects of parasitosis are impacted by contact, direct and indirect, between human and nonhuman primates (Gillespie 2006; Grossberg et al. 2003; Hahn et al. 2003). However, these effects are not demonstrably universal, or even well understood in most cases. Though contact and change do correlate, it is sometimes unclear what the outcome is or whether it is an issue for concern. There are often simultaneous benefits and disadvantages in the individual health of those primates involved in contact, and the level of benefit and disadvantage brought on by the same sort of contact varies greatly across species. For example, though logging will, in the long term, prove to be harmful for both the humans engaged in it and the nonhuman primates living in the areas being logged, the use and sale of timber is, in the short term, tremendously helpful for humans, and the edge habitat created fosters improvement in the health of some wild species (Plumptre and Reynolds 1994:639; Chapman et al. 2005:141).

It is important to study parasitic infection for this reason: In order to plan human and nonhuman primate health to best advantage, an understanding of how to manage contact in each particular situation is needed. Understanding of the effects of contact can be gained by studying groups of the same primates living in adjacent territories, and measuring the variance in parasite load and species hosted associated with variance in contact with humans. When such comparisons are made, they highlight the parasitological effects of human–nonhuman primate interaction. The topics discussed under interaction are centred on examples of such comparisons.

NONHUMAN USE OF HUMAN PRODUCTS
Crop raiding
Nonhuman primates often steal human crop foods. Cultivated plants are bred for size and greater nutritional value, making them an attractive alternative to labour-intensive foraging. When crop plants become the focus of a wild primate group’s diet, the group’s habits change, showing a marked difference from the pattern common in wild-foraging allopatric groups. These changes of habit bring the crop raiding groups into contact with humans and domesticated animals like dogs, as well as potentially increasing their vulnerability to predators (et al. 2003). Further, the impact of changes in nutritional intake, behaviour, and interaction with humans as a result of crop raiding varies across different taxa of parasites (Weyher et al. 2006:1524-1527).

In Nigeria’s Gashaka Gumti National Park, Weyher et al. (2006) studied groups of olive baboons (Papio anubis) engaged in varying levels of crop raiding. Comparisons between a troop focused on crop raiding and a wholly wild-foraging troop reveal an obvious connection between diet/foraging behaviour and parasite interaction (Weyher et al. 2006:1527). Wild-foragers had more helminth parasites while crop raiders had acquired the Balantidium coli protozoan, and had an overall higher number of parasites (Weyher et al. 2006:1524-1525). The stomach worms and whipworms found in the wild-foraging groups were
likely picked up in the course of eating insects functioning as intermediate hosts for these helminths, with which the crop raiding group failed to come into contact as a result of the change in their diet and daily routine (Weyher et al. 2006:1528). The crop raiding troop had a significantly higher mean output for *B. coli* and showed as well a higher parasitic species richness, with nine species recovered compared to the seven recorded for the wild-foraging individuals (Weyher et al. 2006:1519). This is attributed to the increased contact with anthropogenic pathogens in cultivated areas; *B. coli* is extremely common in humans living in tropical areas (Weyher et al. 2006:1528), and its spread only to the crop-raiding group is suggestive of anthropozoonotic infection.

As in this example, more time spent eating starchy foods and less time spent foraging resulted in fewer arthropods being eaten and hence fewer helminth parasite infections occurring. Though other parasites are taken in due to increased human contact, and though these may have equally undesirable symptoms to those parasites being avoided, it is generally the case that primates eating cultivated crop foods have a nutritional advantage over wild-foragers, and thus often have greater immunological fitness and more effective immune responses (Chapman et al. 2006b).

In and around the Gashaka Gumti National Park, 96 percent of farmers report crop damage caused by wildlife in their fields (Ross and Warren 2006:408). The two top ranked problem animals of the 30 listed were tantalus monkeys (*Cercopithecus aethiops tantalus*) and baboons, with corn crops, the main food source of people in this area, being the number one target and receiving the most damage (Ross and Warren 2006:408-409). The damage in such cases as this can be extreme, with the loss of entire season’s crops being reported by some farmers (Ross and Warren 2006:409). In and around the Budongo Forest Reserve in Uganda, 73 percent of farmers report problems with nonhuman primates and more than 79 percent name baboons as the most destructive of all crop-raiders (Tweheyo 2006:407). Crop raiding of this intensity creates entirely understandable resentment in agricultural and horticultural communities, focused not only on the primates responsible for the damage, but by extension anything seen to be encourage the presence of wildlife, like restrictions on harming nonhuman primates, and park or reserve workers (Ross and Hill 2006:404).

In Sulawesi, Jones-Engel et al. (2001a) found that among the wild Tonkean macaques (*Macaca tonkeana*) in their study area daily ranging through coconut and banana plantations and small farms was common, and the monkeys were disliked by villagers due to their crop raiding. Farmers in villages near the macaques drove them away by throwing stones at them, allowing dogs to chase them, or by trapping them. Due to the resource conflict and subsequent contact between humans and monkeys, the wild macaques in the study area were exposed to the same parasites and pathogens as the pet macaques kept in villages (Jones-Engel et al. 2001a:174). Crop raiding is, in particular, an area of contest in the realm of nonhuman primate use of human resources; in communities farming crops, raiding
is often associated with other uses of human resources, such as coprophagy and garbage eating.

**Coprophagy**

Coprophagy is a behaviour common in many animals as a mechanism for maximizing the nutrition taken from food; vitamins, proteins, amino acids, minerals and trace elements are all excreted before being effectively absorbed (Grazyk and Cranfield 2003). The consumption of excreta containing these nutrients is an effective method of reprocessing; this is the pattern among coprophagous ruminants and monogastric herbivores (Grazyk and Cranfield 2003:58). With regards to wild nonhuman primates, the generally accepted theory is that rather than serving a nutritional purpose, coprophagy signals dietary deficiencies in proteins, amino acids and vitamins (Fish et al. 2007). Parasites transmitted directly via faecal ingestion (as opposed to indirect, vector born or intermediate host-using parasites) benefit from coprophagic behaviour, and the inherent potential of infection is great (Grazyk and Cranfield 2003).

Although coprophagy as an adaptive strategy has benefits that have outweighed the risk of parasitic infection, the recent increase in the accessibility of human waste may prove to alter the balance of risk and gain. Because much, if not all, research looking into primate coprophagy and correlations in parasitosis lacks time-depth, there are no definitive answers on the long-term consequences of the consumption of human and domesticated animal faeces by wild-living nonhuman primates. The effects of developments like ecotourism and greater human settlement adjacent to wild habitat will become clearer in the coming years, but in the present we can gauge the short-term outcomes of this form of coprophagy by comparing cases of allopatric groups of wild nonhuman primates engaged in differing levels of human waste consumption. It is changes in the parasitic load and the hosted species richness that are most readily seen in the short-term, and which can act as indicators of any future issues.

In Madagascar’s Beza Mahafaly Special Reserve, ring-tailed lemurs (*Lemur catta*) have been observed consuming the faeces of humans, and to a much lesser degree those of cattle and dogs (Fish et al. 2007; Loudon et al. 2006a). Groups of ring-tailed lemurs from the reserve frequented the nearby camp of Malagasy reserve staff families and researchers, interacting with humans and foraging in the open latrine traditional to the Mahafaly (Loudon et al. 2006a). The camp-foraging groups had greater loads of endoparasites than wild-foraging groups, and in particular were found to have two species of nematodes with oral transmission routes; the faecal analyses of Verreaux’s sifaka (*Propithecus verreauxii*), which were arboreal, generally avoided interaction with humans, and were not observed engaging in coprophagy, revealed no parasites (Loudon et al. 2006a).

The food source provided by human waste is important in the survival of older and dentally impaired group members, and in seasons of low food availability (Fish et al. 2007:2,4). The lemurs were initially attracted by discarded food in the camp before beginning their coprophagous behaviour (Fish et al. 2007:3) – this is
much like the cycle occurring in Africa, where baboons and other monkeys are first attracted by crops and then move on to raiding rubbish bins and urban areas.

Human-habituated mountain gorillas (Gorilla gorilla beringei) in the Virunga Mountains of east and central Africa and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest, Uganda, have been observed engaging in coprophagy, by which 71 percent of helminths found in captive and wild gorillas can be directly transmitted (Graczyk and Cranfield 2003:60). The gorillas in Graczyk and Cranfield’s 2003 study ranged from within Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda, inhabiting the forests of the Virunga volcano chain. Adult gorillas in this area engage in autocoprophagy and allocoprophagy, and have been observed doing so since the 1980s. With these gorillas, coprophagy is considered normal—a method of acquiring beneficial gut microbes which aid in the digestion of plant material, and supplementing proteins and amino acids (Graczyk and Cranfield 2003:58). Populations of mountain gorillas in the study area have been habituated to humans to facilitate management and as a side effect of increasing ecotourism in the area; the gorillas experience contact with guards, poachers, tourists, veterinarians, and researchers (Graczyk and Cranfield 2003:59).

Changes have been observed in the intestinal parasitofauna of the gorillas; the phylogenetically-specific and co-evolved relationships between species and their microbes are delicately balanced, and a change such as the introduction of human microbes to the gorilla intestinal tract is instantly visible in faecal examination (Graczyk and Cranfield 2003). Ongoing and increasing human contact with naturally coprophagous species has the potential to become a difficult issue to navigate; ecotourism, as discussed below, encourages an influx of often careless people into wild habitat (Grossberg et al. 2003:40), and the presence of human hunters, reserve workers, and researchers will increase the amount of human waste in the environment as well. When coprophagous nonhuman primates come into contact with human waste, the equilibrium with their parasites changes, as does their exposure to new parasites to which their resistance may be low.

Garbage eating

Yellow baboons (Papio cynocephalus) and olive baboons in the Amboseli National Park region of Kenya have adapted to the influx of tourists, taking advantage of the garbage generated by tourist lodges and the associated settlement of lodge staff families (ahn et al. 2003).

In this area, there are wild-foraging troops and troops focused on eating lodge-produced garbage. Members of the garbage-foraging group at Amboseli had higher levels of gastrointestinal and Streptopharagus nematodes than nearby wild-foraging groups (Hahn et al. 2003:272;276); the antibiotic resistant bacteria is suggestive of the effects of eating tourist waste and refuse, as human tourists in Africa are likely to have, and be full of, antibiotics. The garbage-foraging group experienced a drop in Physaloptera nematodes (stomach worms), which was not experienced by the wild-feeding group, likely due
to their change in diet and daily path course (Hahn et al. 2003:276). The shift in nematode species may likely be due either to exposure to different intermediate host arthropods (the lodge-centred group could be encountering cockroaches in the garbage) or to a change in the number of arthropod hosts encountered (Hahn et al. 2003). In this case, it is clear that changes are occurring, and the presence of antibiotic resistant bacteria seems a likely cause for concern. However, as in much research concerning the effects of tourists and ecotourism, the time-depth necessary for judging repercussions is lacking.

Consuming human products and wastes can provide free-ranging primates with significant nutritional benefits, resulting in the decrease of parasitic infection intensity. Increased nutrition helps the immune system defend against pathogen attack. Conversely, raiding crops, foraging in dumps, and engaging in coprophagy may have epizootological costs due to the increased risk of disease transmission, directly from humans and indirectly via transmission through bodily waste, food, rubbish, and domesticated animals. Further, in raiding crops and foraging for human products, nonhuman primates become pests, sometimes encountering hostility from the humans affected by these activities.

NONHUMAN PRIMATES AS HUMAN RESOURCE

Bushmeat

Bushmeat is the flesh of forest mammals, as well as some reptiles and birds (Fa et al. 2003). It is a cheap supply of protein in regions where meat from domesticated animals is both scarce and costly (Fa et al. 2003). Wealthier individuals typically report hunting, butchering, and eating about half as much bushmeat, suggesting bushmeat’s status as an inferior substitute for the meat of domesticated animals (Wilkie 2006), but wealth is scarce and no alternatives readily present themselves. Simply stopping the trade of bushmeat is impossible, and it is with this reality in mind that we focus not on the end of the bushmeat trade, but the conditions of bushmeat consumption and circulation, and the health status of the animals hunted.

Common across west and central Africa is the overhunting of forests near villages, and the subsequent depletion of wildlife stocks (Wilkie 2006). Particularly in the Congo basin countries of Central Africa, bushmeat is an important supplement to the dietary protein of human populations—in many countries, mass malnutrition would occur if this resource were no longer available (Fa et al. 2003:71). In a survey across West and Central Africa, primates made up 12 percent of all hunted animals (Fa et al. 2005:167). Primates are relatively conspicuous; most are group-living and active during the day, and some are ground-dwelling, making them a good return of meat for hunting time invested (Chapman et al. 2006a). The hunting and butchering of nonhuman primates in Africa causes outbreaks of the Ebola virus and HIV (Chapman et al. 2005; Wilkie 2006) and the monkeypox virus (LeBreton et al. 2006) in humans. As well, contact between hunters and nonhuman primates, and the presence of nonhuman primate bodies in markets and villages, increases the potential for the transmission of other kinds of
A common thread in the most recent conservation literature is public education in areas of bushmeat harvesting (Monroe and Willcox 2006; Wilkie 2006). Understanding whether there exists the perception that hunting, butchering and eating wild animals is a legitimate health risk is important in this, because it may prove that the risk is deemed sufficient to merit a change in behaviour (Wilkie 2006). It is suggested that studies looking at the zoonotic transmission of viruses and other parasites may result in an increase in concern for public health, and even a reduction in unsustainable hunting practices (Wilkie 2006). Estimating the number of contact events that may or must take place for zoonotic transmission to occur and thereby become established in a human population is key to making any real inroads to convincing people dependent on bushmeat that it is a legitimate risk to the public and to themselves individually. Wilkie suggests that, if the probability of transmission is one in two hundred contacts with bushmeat, “it is an acute public health risk and may be perceived as a personal risk by individual hunters, butchers, traders and consumers” (2006:370). However, if the risk is one in five hundred thousand it is, while still a concern, unlikely to inspire a change in behaviour even to the extent of taking precautions (Wilkie 2006:371).

The legitimate need for bushmeat should not be confused with a failure to perceive the risks of parasite and disease transmission or the severity thereof; more likely is that the alternatives (malnutrition, starvation) are less preferable. Too often conservation efforts ignore the realities of poverty in favour of demonizing those who hunt, sell, and buy the flesh of wild animals, and because hunting bushmeat in part circumvents the need for increased aid in many areas, it may be ignored by those whose concern is with the poverty experienced throughout east and central Africa. Public health education seems at this time to be of little help in avoiding zoonotic infection and the hunting of endangered or at-risk species, like the apes, because the perception of risk from bushmeat pales when compared to the risk of going without. Though new research into disease transmission is heralded by conservation organizations as a concrete, persuasive new thread to be integrated into campaigns, the real issues are of food supply, poverty, and the corruption of governments and enforcement agencies (Chapman et al. 2006A:117; Monroe and Willcox 2006:368).

**Taboos against eating and/or harming**

The converse issue to bushmeat is when people, due to their beliefs about the primates local to them, have taboos against eating and/or harming them. Much of the research on this subject concerns how these taboos play out when people do not defend their resources from the culturally protected primates. Those in agricultural areas are put at a disadvantage due to crop raiding, as is the case in Indonesia, where Balinese Hinduism extends protected status to long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) (Loudon et al. 2006b). In Thailand, Thai Buddhism prohibits the harming of local macaques, and Buddhist temple compounds provision
macaques and provide a safe refuge for the animals, attracting and maintaining a population which, when away from the temple, are killed both for meat and because they are pests that destroy crops (Aggimarangsee and Brockelman 2005). Temple sites in Kathmandu, Nepal, are also home to groups of macaques; Jones-Engel et al. (2006b) suggest that there is a need for public health and primate management strategies focused on the reduction of contact at temple sites, based on their findings indicating a heavy rate of zoonotic and anthropozoonotic transmission of patently harmful parasites at temples.

Nonhuman primates are often exempt from harm in areas where they are included in local cultural stories. The Mahafaly Malagasy around the Beza-Mahafaly Special Reserve in Madagascar have an myth describing how ring-tailed lemurs and Verreaux’s sifaka are all descended from two quarrelling wives who, while fighting, became a ring-tailed lemur and Verreaux’s sifaka respectively (Loudon et al. 2006a). The Mahafaly do not harm the ring-tailed lemurs and sifaka living in the area, and, as described above, groups of ring-tailed lemurs make use of the camp and village, foraging among the garbage and open latrine areas, and stealing food from livestock as well as eating crops (Loudon et al. 2006a). The ring-tailed lemurs carry many socially transmitted ectoparasites including ticks and scabies (Loudon et al. 2006a:63), and it is likely that humans, dogs and livestock in the area are affected.

In Indonesia and Japan, monkeys are nuisances even as they function as tourist attractions. In these cases, there may be prohibitions preventing irate locals from harming the animals, which subsequently makes them a greater nuisance as they beg more and become aggressive (Fuentes 2005:893). In contexts generating interactions with tourists, the behaviour encouraged of nonhuman primates (approachableness, interest in humans) can quickly escalate into unwanted behaviour (aggressiveness, doggedness) (Fuentes 2005). Overly aggressive individuals, for instance, may be terminated in such situations, turning what was, for the nonhuman primates, initially a beneficial situation into a risky one. In all contexts where interaction is encouraged and nonhuman primates are socialized to expect food or other resources from humans, the transmission of parasites and rapid changes in host-parasite ecology can become a major problem for both the nonhuman primates and the humans with which they come into contact.

ANTHROPOGENIC ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

Logging and edge

Changes to natural habitats can have any number of serious consequences, including alteration to host–parasite interactions (Chapman et al. 2005). Given this, there is a surprisingly small amount of research devoted to looking at the links between prevalence of infection, parasite species richness, and logged habitat. This is likely to change, as the issue of anthropogenic environmental change, and logging in particular, is of increasing importance to conservationists, and to researchers whose study areas are increasingly surrounded by, or made
up of, logged habitat. Tropical forest management policies and practices are anthropocentric and capitalistic, based on serving the goals of a powerful minority of people (Struhsaker 1997:2). The impact of changes in the host–parasite ecologies of both human and nonhuman primates are unlikely to be factored in to such management systems.

Logging, forest fragmentation and edge habitat are all closely related issues. Forest fragmentation is often the direct result of logging, which creates edges. Edge-zones occur around forest fragments. As loggers produce warren-like road systems into the forest, they open up both forested and deforested areas to a range of large and small-scale economic interests—ranchers, miners, bushmeat hunters and slash-and-burn farmers (Lawrence 2001:4-5). As logging opens the forest in Africa, it is more likely that people collecting wood for fuel, rather than loggers, will come into contact with primates; in the Kibale region in particular, wood is the sole energy source for the vast majority local people, and 90-95 percent of all wood consumed is for fuel (Struhsaker 1997:316). There are many aspects of logging, fragmentation, and edge that increase the points of contact between human and nonhuman primates, and change parasite species richness and the effects of parasitosis.

Chapman et al. (2005) censused primates in logged and unlogged areas of Kibale National Park, Uganda. They found that selective logging and the resultant forest fragmentation changed dynamics in the gastrointestinal parasite infection of local primate populations, both human and nonhuman. Rcolobus (Piliocolobus tephrosceles), blue monkeys (Cercopithecus mitis), redtail monkeys (Cercopithecus ascanius) and grey-cheeked mangabeys (Lophocebus albigena) were all negatively affected by logging, while black-and-white colobus (Colobus guereza) appeared to do well in some disturbed habitats. Black-and-white colobus, like ring-tailed lemurs, are considered a ‘weed species,’ (Chapman et al. 2006b:404; Loudon et al. 2006a:65) that is, they are adaptable and opportunistic, able to take advantage of the benefits present in new habitats like edge zones.

Somewhat to the contrary, a 1994 study by Plumptre & Reynolds found that in Budongo Forest Reserve, which is just a few hundred kilometers away from Kibale National Park, blue monkeys and redtails as well as black-and-white colobus were more abundant in logged than in unlogged areas. This particularized variation between populations of the same species exposed to edge makes it difficult to assess what general changes could be implemented to benefit a given forest interior species. What these results suggest is a need for population-specific and in-depth studies regarding edge aversion. The implication this holds for policy-making is daunting.

**Edge habitat**

Defined in Lehman et al. as “the penetration (to varying depths and intensities) of conditions from the surrounding environment into the forest interior” (2006:293), edge habitat can be natural or artificial (as when edge is the result of logging), and is often a zone of heightened contact between human and nonhuman primates. Ubiquitous of human disturbance in particular, edges can affect nonhuman
primates (and other forest animals) in a number of ways, which vary greatly according to species. Heightened contact between nonhuman primates and humans, as well as domesticated animals, occurs in edge zones, as do alterations in the abundance of food resources and the species of parasites encountered by primates (Chapman et al. 2005:139,141). Edges may enhance the access of wild nonhuman primates to agricultural crops, which often decreases the intensity of parasitism (Weyher et al. 2006:1527-1528). Conversely, edges can increase dietary stress in wild-feeding species (populations, or individuals), reducing the effectiveness of the immune system and affecting resistance to parasitic infection (Chapman et al. 2006b:405; Wasserman et al. 2006:112).

Chapman et al. (2006b:401-402, 405) found that edge-inhabiting red colobus and and-white colobus in Uganda had a higher of individuals with multiple infections than those from the interior of the forest. The prevalence of specific parasites also varied between edge and forest interior groups. Nodular worms, which can be quite harmful, were 7.4 times more prevalent in red colobus on the edge than in those in the forest (Chapman et al. 2006b:401). Black-and-white colobus experience less severe infections than the red colobus, likely because they engage in crop raiding, while red colobus do not (Chapman et al. 2006b:404). The higher proportion of individual black-and-white colobus with multiple infections, despite the nutritional benefits received from crop raiding, suggest that with this species patterns of parasitic infection are more closely tied to interactions with humans in edge zones than immunological stress. Several of the parasites infecting the colobus have the capacity to cause considerable problems when the individual load is heavy; two species of stomach nematodes in particular can cause ulcers, dysentery, weight loss, and death (Chapman et al. 2006b:407).

The forests of Madagascar have been reduced by 80-90 percent from their original size, and are now highly fragmented (Lehman et al. 2006:294). The high edge-to-interior ratio of Madagascar’s forests is highly relevant to the health and population densities of various species of lemurs across the island, as lemurs are susceptible to a number of edge effects (Lehman et al. 2006:296-297).

In Lehman et al.’s 2006 study on lemur responses to edge in the Vohibola III classified forest, brown mouse lemurs (Microcebus rufus) and Milne-Edwards’ sifaka (Propithecus diadema edwardsi) exhibited positive edge responses including higher densities in edge habitat, while greater dwarf lemurs (Cheirogaleus major) exhibited negative edge responses, occurring at lower densities in edge areas. Lehman et al. (2006:297) hypothesize that the negative edge response of the greater dwarf lemur may be due to the increased ambient temperature experienced in edge habitats, which could potentially inhibit torpor as has been demonstrated in other small lemur species.

The positive edge responses of brown mouse lemurs and Milne-Edwards’ sifaka may be related to increased food abundance or quality in particular edge habitats (Lehman et al. 2006); positive responses may prove detrimental to these lemurs.
due to overhunting by local people or increased contact with fuel wood harvesters or domesticated animals like dogs. These factors may, in fact, contribute to the lower densities of greater dwarf lemur in edge areas (Lehman et al. 2006:296).

Insight into the edge responses of different species may help us to arrive at an understanding of how some species survive, or even flourish, after dramatic changes occur in their habitat. It seems increasingly to be the case that many species are not influenced to any great extent by forest fragmentation; Lehman et al. (2006) found that eastern wooly lemurs (Avahi laniger), lesser bamboo lemurs (Hapalemur griseus griseus), and red-bellied lemurs (Eulemur rubriventer) exhibited neutral edge responses, seeming essentially unaffected by forest fragmentation or alteration in forest matrix conditions. However, Lehman and Wright (2000:23-25) found that in the region immediately north of Vohibola III, snare traps for lemurs were in close proximity to the forest edge. The increased contact between humans and lemurs via trapping is encouraged by the prevalence of edge, and the higher densities in these areas of brown mouse lemurs and Milne-Edwards’ sifaka will likely prove detrimental regardless of any increased resource accessibility.

Reserves and parks
Animals are often found in unnaturally high concentrations in reserves, which are frequently surrounded by settled land (Leroy et al. 2004:388-389). When hosts live in isolated pockets, total parasite species richness, across helminths, protozoa and viruses, can become low (Altizer et al. 2007:311). When the level of constant background infection is low, wild primates may become more susceptible to virulent infections. Likewise, evidence has recently been presented suggesting that in isolated reserve populations of lemurs in Madagascar, genetic health and variation is low (Morelli and Louis 2007:194); if this is a common or pernicious trend in nonhuman primates, it will likely become an issue of great importance in conservation plans.

Outbreaks of viruses can rip through a clustered reserve population with devastating speed and mortality, as has been the case in Africa, where upon introduction of the Ebola virus to populations of reserve gorillas death rates climb to 91 percent (Bradbury 2007:9). The death rates for Ebola among nonhuman primates are staggering, particularly when considering the comparatively few human deaths (1,200) that are known to have been caused by Ebola (Bradbury 2007:9). The much lower risk to humans likely factors into the poor results from many public educations campaigns suggesting the dangers of contact with bushmeat.

Of note also is the issue of resentment among communities surrounding reserves; crop raiding reserve primates frustrate farmers, and being barred from the wood source presented by reserve and park forests frustrates those engaged in the timber trade or needing fuel wood (Struhsaker 1997). In areas where local people have been unable to access the resources of forests, subsequent disintegration of regulation or enforcement may result in a deluge of abuse; in Uganda, agricultural trespass, timber and wood theft, and poaching occurred
in reserves subsequent to a collapse of governmental law enforcement (Struhsaker 1997:320). As reserves and parks increasingly become the most significant sites of resources in many landscapes, particularly in the tropics, the wild animals within them will come under intense anthropogenic pressure; susceptibility to parasitic infection under such circumstances will increase, as will the rate of exposure to human-borne parasites, as will, finally, the zoonotic transmission of parasites. As humans force their way into wild nonhuman primate habitat, they will infect and be infected.

In all cases, evidence of the impact of anthropogenic changes to the environment generally fails to signal a definitive patterning to the transmission of parasites, or the ways in which primates respond. While the importance of parasites to primate populations is clear, understanding, as Chapman et al. put it, “the interplay between alteration of ecosystems and disease transmission probabilities” (2006b:398) is thus far beyond the scope, or scale, of the research being done. Given the reality of human-to-nonhuman primate parasite transmission, and of the influence land clearance has on the interactions between primates and their parasites, it is of great consequence that our understanding of these dynamics increase. Nonhuman primate conservation and human health planning will not be effective without such understanding.

**Conservation planning**

Parasites and hosts generally coevolve into equilibrium (Altizer et al. 2007), and as the examples in this paper show, shifts in the balance can trigger changes of various magnitudes, the most intense resulting in unmanageable parasitic infection and population decline. Conservation of at-risk or endangered wild species is likewise a matter of balancing benefit and detriment; ecotourism, for instance, can be simultaneously helpful and harmful to nonhuman primates. Concerns regarding the impact of tourists have been growing as reports surface of ecological change coincidental with ecotourism.

Tourists bring with them unfamiliar parasites, and as discussed above, cause both directly and indirectly an increase in the waste and garbage accessible to primates. Direct contact between humans and nonhuman primates is, as discussed above, a tourist draw in and of itself, common in Japan, and in Indonesia, where Balinese monkey temples are the site of constant contact and back-and-forth parasite transmission and infection (Fuentes 2006). Likewise, Grossberg et al. (2003:49) found that the presence of tourists can be costly for black howler monkeys (Alouatta caraya) in Belize; by responding to tourists with increased vigilance, foraging time is wasted, and other activities requiring visual attention are neglected. Human presence and provocation encourages howlers to descend to the ground, putting them at risk of predation and increasing the likelihood of parasite transmission with humans.

Graczyk and Cranfield (2003:59) suspect, likewise, that changes in intestinal helminth and protozoan parasite assemblages in gorillas habituated to humans for the purposes of facilitating ecotourism are due to anthropozoonotic transmission.
Further, as discussed above, viruses common in humans—measles, influenza—can be devastating in wild nonhuman primates (Jones-Engel et al. 2001), and ecotourists are likely unaware of their potential to harm primates in this manner. While ecotourism can be deleterious to primate health, international pressure combined with income from tourism may impact practices like unsustainable hunting and logging. Generally, ecotourism may make harm against primates on a local level more conspicuous and potentially bad for business.

Conservation is a difficult issue. It has been suggested that combining development plans with wildlife conservation plans is a poor choice, as when international agencies sever development aid, the conservation aid packaged with it is cut as well (Hart and Hart 1997:308). However, this underlies the interplay between development and wildlife conservation; it is development that creates sustainable practices, particularly in areas where people eke out a living by making use of the resources that conservationists are trying to protect.

An integrated approach, combining poverty alleviation and conservation, is successfully in place at a number of primate field research sites in Africa. Aid to alleviate local rural poverty is included in the funds of the site, bypassing the many cracks for money to fall through that are built in to more official international channels (Reynolds 2006:220). This more grass-roots approach from research primatologists may be useful in establishing a new case-specific paradigm of aid management.

**CONCLUSION**

In looking at the zoonotic and anthropozoonotic transmission of parasites we develop a new sense of the deep connectedness of all primates. As well, we might think of humans and parasites as conceptually similar; the ecological relationships that necessarily develop through interaction with either are a strong force for change and morbidity. As the most widespread, populous, and environmentally influential primate, humans must, like parasites, find some way to balance our current demands on other primates and our shared habitat with the demands of our own species’ future survival. Just as a well-adapted parasite lives or dies by its host, humans live or die by the sustainability of our practices. By looking at parasites as a barometer of our impact, we might forestall the decline of other primate species, and ultimately, the decline of our own species; it is political and economic stability that will be the lasting solutions to issues of animal conservation, rather than the designation of more ‘protected’ areas and enhanced anti-harm regulation for endangered species. Though the destructive cycles in which we find ourselves with other animals and the environment may eventually be broken free from, we can begin by repeating those cycles at a gentler pace.

The immediate needs of human and nonhuman primates are increasingly at odds, and will continue to be so until satisfactory solutions to the contests over space and resources are found. Ideally, these solutions would not privilege either group, humans or nonhumans, over the other. However, as humans are in the position of power, and make up the majority of primates
worldwide, it falls to the human desire for the continued presence of other primates to keep those primates alive.

NOTES
1. As in Graczyk and Cranfield (2003): human-to-other transmission (rather than the broader ‘zoonotic’ which does not strictly state directionality, though it carries the connotation of other-to-human).

2. Speaking in the long term; the short-term effects of logging or increased contact with humans (as when stealing garbage and making use of other human products) can be beneficial for individual groups of nonhuman primates. Some species flourish in edge habitat, for instance, even as increasing edge habitat heralds shrinking forests and the inevitably negative long-term consequences thereof.

3. More commonly, roundworms, tapeworms, and flukes (Fleisher 2006).

4. Balantidium coli (B. coli) is the largest protozoan found in humans; it causes colitis (essentially, colon ulcers) and can have a variety of unpleasant symptoms such as fever and bleeding (Garcia 1999).

5. The consensus with regards to captive nonhuman primates is that behavioural problems such as boredom are the cause of coprophagy. However, this is generally in reference to zoos, where a dietary deficiency explanation is less likely (Graczyk and Cranfield 2003).

6. It is not uncommon for individual members of wild nonhuman primate groups to vary in their willingness to engage in crop raiding; it may be that more aggressive individuals, or even more overall aggressive groups, are more likely to pursue this alternate resource (Sapolsky 2006).

7. Many smaller species of lemur enter a daily state of torpor to inhibit energy expenditure (Strier 2003).

8. Though the Mahafaly, as mentioned above, generally do not hunt lemurs, other Malagasy ethnic groups do (Loudon et al. 2006a), though possibly only on an occasional basis (Lehman et al. 2006).

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CULTURAL LANDSCAPES CONCEPTUALIZED
A Cross-disciplinary Genealogical History

Abstract
In the past twenty years, archaeological analyses of cultural landscapes have appeared with increasing frequency, and are currently being applied to all types of societies, from small-scale fisher-gatherer-hunters of the Northwest Coast to the complex empires of the Inca and Maya. This concept, however, is ambiguous inasmuch as few archaeologists clearly define what they mean when they discuss a cultural landscape. In order to resolve, or at least unpack, some of these ambiguities, I trace the intellectual genealogy of this idea from its first introduction into English through its divergent and convergent histories in both geography and archaeology. The diversity of approaches to landscapes in archaeology today is a product of this history, and as the term becomes increasingly relevant in First Nations communities, it is important for archaeologists to understand the historical antecedents of this idea.

INTRODUCTION
Archaeologists have often adopted theories from other disciplines without comprehending all the various nuances of how these theories were generated in the first place. Although it is neither necessary nor desirable for archaeologists to explore the complex genealogical history of the concepts they use in every circumstance, it is nevertheless an important endeavour to step back from time to time and reflect upon the origin of an idea. With this in mind, I trace in this paper the intellectual history of an idea that has become a significant part of archaeological analysis in the past two decades: the concept of a cultural landscape.

The landscape concept has a long history in archaeology as part of the way researchers analyze the relationship between sites on the physical landscape, but “it has only been in the past decade or so that landscape has emerged as an object of theoretical reflection within the discipline” (Thomas 2001:165). Archaeology has only recently adopted the concept of a cultural landscape from geography and applied it to studies of past societies, leading some to claim that landscape archaeology is still in its infancy (Fisher and Thurston 1999:630). The idea of a cultural landscape has been successful in diverse disciplines because it inherently bridges the nature-culture divide and provides a way to undermine this dichotomy (Knapp and Ashmore 1999; Layton and Ucko 1999). The term cultural landscape has undergone a number of significant changes since its inception into the social sciences in 1925 and has been subject to critiques of both positivism (Norton 1989) and post-modernism (Cosgrove 2000b). Its flexibility, ambiguity and inclusivity have allowed it to endure and adapt to this criticism. From the adoption of cultural landscape as a form of World Heritage site to the increasing use of the concept to describe the
reciprocal relationship between First Nations communities and the physical environment, this term is more relevant and more widely used than ever before.

In this paper, I follow the development of cultural landscape through the social sciences, with a particular focus on how, where and why it was adopted into archaeological thought. One of the difficulties with this analysis is that a unified definition of a cultural landscape is lacking, as it has been defined in a multitude of ways through time (Godsen and Head 1994). However, I will work from what I consider the range of current meanings of cultural landscape as employed by archaeologists. The process of constructing the intellectual history of an idea as complex and multifaceted as cultural landscape involves three important steps, which are: (1) discussing how the term first came into being at a particular historical moment; (2) tracing the evolution of cultural landscape in geography and the parallel theoretical developments in archaeology; and (3) identifying when cultural landscapes took on the meanings and applications that they currently have in archaeology today.

Landscape Defined

In a recent review of the concept of landscape in archaeology, Anschuetz et al. identify four foundational ideas for the “landscape paradigm” (2001:160-161): (1) landscapes represent cultural systems interacting with natural environments; (2) landscapes are created as places through cultural activities, beliefs and values; (3) landscapes contain all human activity; and (4) landscapes are dynamic and represent the cognitive map of a community.

Feinman (1999), writing slightly earlier, presents a different yet interrelated discussion about what he terms the “three tenets” of the landscape approach: (1) a study of the natural environment guided by social science research questions; (2) a recognition that the relationships between humans and their environment is historically situated and dynamic, shaped by human action and cultural perception; and (3) a realization that the human environment is a product or construction of human behaviour (1999:685). In the same section of Antiquity, Fisher and Thurston avoid a list of tenets or premises but instead emphasise the scope of what they term a “landscape archaeology” – which is “a broad, inclusive, holistic concept created intentionally to include humans, their anthropogenic ecosystem and the manner in which these landscapes are conceptualized, experienced and symbolized” (1999:630).

Knapp and Ashmore (1999) share a similar view in recognizing that “a landscape embodies more than a neutral, binary relationship between people and nature, along any single dimension... space is both a medium for and the outcome of human activity” (1999:8). In discussing the usefulness of the ambiguity of the landscape, Godsen and Head echo this idea, stating, “landscape is more than the stage setting for human action... landscapes are both created and creating” (1994:114). Ayres and Mauricio note that “archaeological landscapes represent a distinct form of cultural landscape because they develop over long periods of time” (1999:298),
an idea which is also found in the work of Tim Ingold, who emphasises the impossibility of separating the concept of landscape from that of time, as landscape is relational and experiential (Ingold 1993:154).

A few themes arise from this multitude of definitions that are important in understanding why the concept of cultural landscape is so attractive to archaeologists. First, the idea of cultural landscape implies a cultural process (Hirsch 1995:5; Ingold 1994:738) and represents a dynamic and changing relationship either between experiences of place/space or humans/environment, depending on the theoretical approach of the author. Time and place are inherent in cultural landscapes, making them compelling to archaeologists concerned with change through time in a particular place or places. Another theme of cultural landscape as constructed through human action, in which cultural landscapes are created primarily within the social world of a particular culture at a particular time.

Perhaps the most compelling reason that archaeologists have been drawn to this concept is the fact that it is inherently holistic, encompassing many other types of archaeological data such as sites, households and artifacts. During the 1980s and 1990s, archaeology was criticized for viewing cultures merely as adaptive systems and ignoring the role of the individual in the past (Hodder 1992). A cultural landscape perspective allows humans to be active agents in their relationships with the physical environment, instead of passive bystanders adapting to geomorphological and environmental changes.

The Birth of “Landscape” and “Culture”

There are two recognized sources for the origin of the word ‘landscape’, and represent aspects of either the physical land (Landschaft) or a sense of perspective in painting (Landschap). The first term is German and was adopted in England during the Middle Ages to refer either to an area inhabited by a group of people or to the land controlled by a lord (Daniels 2000a) and simply represents the concept of “area” or “region” without any aesthetic or visual connotations (Cosgrove 1985:56). The usage of landscape to refer to property had nearly disappeared in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century when landschap, from Dutch, entered the English language, primarily through landscape painters (Hirsch 1995). Landschap and Landschaft were combined, and ‘landscape’ came “to refer to the appearance of an area, more particularly to the representation of scenery” (Daniels 2000). It was not until the word landscape was combined with another etymologically complex term, namely culture, that cultural landscape was born.

Conceptual roots of the culture can be traced back to cultura, originally from Latin, and in its earliest uses, it was “a noun of process” (Williams 1972:87) usually referring to cultivation. In French and German, however, the word came to be synonymous with ‘civilization’. Tylor’s definition of culture in Primitive Mind (1871) established the anthropological meaning of the word and was adopted primarily from German (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:11). His definition remains relevant – “that complex whole
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (1871:1). Many later definitions have drawn upon or reworked these ideas, but Tylor’s conception of culture stands up as one of the major forces in how culture has been considered since.

**DIVERGENT DISCIPLINES, DIVERGENT LAND**

Archaeology and cultural geography both came into being in the intellectual atmosphere of late nineteenth century Europe, primarily as sub-disciplines of a larger field of study – anthropology and geography respectively. The specific focus of this paper – the term cultural landscape – also traces its roots to the intellectual framework of the burgeoning social sciences at the turn of the nineteenth century. Carl Sauer, who was the first to employ cultural landscape as a concept in English, wrote his seminal work in response to a debate between two major schools of though – the first was the school of Anthropogeographie headed by Friedrich Ratzel in Germany, which gave the environment a primary role in shaping human experience, and the second was the geography that was developing in France under Paul Vidal de la Blache (Atlin 2007; Norton 1989). Buttimer (1971:28) notes that the Durkheim school of sociology developed at this time and likely influenced this particular debate, since Ratzel considered society from a biological standpoint and Durkheim considered society in terms of collective consciousness. In geographical circles, Ratzel and his colleagues were interested in the ecological relationships between humans and their physical environment, a point of view that was not shared by French geographers who forcibly rejected environmental determinism (Atlin 2007:428; Norton 1989:35). Sauer, an American geographer, argued that the true realm of geographers was the cultural landscape, although he recognized the natural environment as a significant force in human culture (Cosgrove 2000b). His monograph, *The Morphology of the Landscape*, formed the basis for cultural landscape as an area of study within geography in North America.

In his monograph, Sauer sought to define the “nature of geography” (1963:313). He argued the three primary fields of inquiry in geography should be the study of the physical environment, the study of humans as subject to the physical environment, and the study of habitats of the earth (Sauer 1963:316). Further, Sauer defines landscape as “a land shape, in which the process of shaping is by no means thought of as simply physical…it may be defined, therefore, as an area made up of a distinct association of forms, both physical and cultural” (1963:321, emphasis mine). Sauer’s explicit recognition of both the human and the natural aspect of the landscape was a major leap that was made in a dynamic intellectual context. In his presentation of the landscape as a land shape, Sauer connected the idea to its etymological roots as a way of viewing (Cosgrove 1985), although he distinguished between the landscape as “an actual scene viewed by an observer” (Sauer 1963:322) and the broader idea of a general geographical landscape. The natural landscape, according to Sauer, can be considered
as the physical earth before it is touched by human action, and is to be known by the “totality of its forms”, including topography and climate (1963:337). The cultural landscape, on the other hand, is the transformations of the natural landscape by humans – since man “by his cultures... makes use of the natural forms, in many cases alters them, in some destroys them” (Sauer 1963:341). The natural landscape, therefore, was the medium for cultural factors to create cultural forms, and “supplies the materials out of which the cultural landscape is formed” (Sauer 1963:343). One of the important features of Sauer’s presentation of the cultural landscape as the object of study for geography is his implicit assumption that a physical, natural landscape existed as a tabula rasa and that cultural natural landscape was where “culture” was imposed upon “nature” (Cosgrove 2000b). An emphasis on the visual is another important aspect of his argument, as the visible forms of the landscape as modified by humans were the objects of geographical study. These aspects of his paradigm came under fire during the “new geography” of the 1960s and the 1970s as well as during the post-modern critique of the 1980s and 1990s. Regardless of later challenges, The Morphology of the Landscape remains a brilliant synthesis of a number of ideas about culture, landscape, and geography that were developing at the time on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Before Sauer defined cultural geography as the study of cultural landscapes, a foundation for the use of landscape in archaeology was being developed in Europe and North America, for “as long as archaeologists have studied the human past, they have been interested in space, and, consequently, in landscapes” (Knapp and Ashmore 1999:1). Archaeology developed through an increasing interest in biological and cultural origins of humankind in the second half of the nineteenth century, along with the recognition of a deep antiquity of humankind (Trigger 1989:148).

Ideas of diffusion and migration in culture change developed out of geography in Germany and were brought over to North America through the works of Franz Boas (Trigger 1989:151), who trained as a physical geographer under Ratzel and turned to anthropology later in his career. Archaeologists in Britain in the early twentieth century worked jointly with geographers to develop distribution maps, whereby archaeological remains could be located in relation to geographic features (Anschuetz et al. 2001; Crawford 1922). These distribution maps worked within the prevailing ideas of environmental determinism and allowed early archaeologists to examine culture change in relation to environmental changes. As this technique became more sophisticated, archaeologists began to use geographical patterning of archaeological remains to understand concepts of ethnicity (Trigger 1989). It was during this period that archaeologists began to focus their analysis on defined areas, following the work of Pitt Rivers in England (Thomas 2001).

Geographical interests on the part of archaeologists were also evident in North America, where fascination with the mounds of the Southeastern United States was foundational
to the development of systematic archaeological practices. As greater concern for chronology and culture history rose in the early twentieth century, the geographic distribution remained central, when migration and diffusion were the two primary means for understanding both change through time and space (Norton 1989:12-13; Trigger 1989). However, unlike most geographers of the time, anthropologists and archaeologists considered diffusion and migration to be two distinct processes (Norton 1989:105). The genealogical connections between anthropology, archaeology and geography are foundational to all three disciplines, although anthropology and archaeology have generally borrowed more than they have given (Earle and Preucel 1987).

The early periods of both geography and archaeology were characterized by the “natural science” approach that explicitly focused on classification and categorization, not interpretation (Wagstaff 1987:2). Although interested in human activity, neither discipline developed any social theory, choosing instead to focus on physical evidence (Norton 1989; Wagstaff 1987). In the 1940s and 1950s, archaeologists began to move beyond simple artifact classification and historical reconstruction to the study of settlements and aspects of human patterns over the physical landscape. This shift was tied into developments in both anthropology and geography. Sauer, at Berkeley, was intellectually close to Kroeber, who was developing his ideas about the superorganic character of cultural development at the time (1917). Kroeber’s ideas resonated in geography, particularly his division “between social processes and biological or organic processes” (Norton 1989:15 after Kroeber 1917:169). Subsequent neo-evolutionary developments brought the idea of cultural ecology into anthropology (Steward 1936), where culture and the environment were linked in a functional relationship. Human ecology was also being explored during the same period in cultural geography (Thornthwaite 1940), akin to but distinct from cultural ecological approaches in anthropology.

Even though cultural and human ecology explore the functional relationship between humans and the environment, neither explicitly uses a landscape approach. Archaeology, on the other hand, adopted these materialist concepts and applied them to the study of settlements (Trigger 1989:279-282). Steward engaged in archaeological research, using settlement patterns in the Southwest to discuss the relationships between culture and environment (1937), which inspired Willey’s study of the Viru Valley in Peru (1953), the first major work that can be classified as settlement archaeology. Willey moved beyond simple classification by discussing how “settlement patterns are… directly shaped by held cultural needs [and] offer a strategic point for the functional interpretation of archaeological cultures” (1953:1). Settlement pattern archaeology became widespread after this time, with a number of settlement surveys carried out in the 1960s and 1970s (Adams and Nissen 1972; for discussion see Anschuetz et al 2001:169) and became a favoured method by the New Archaeologists, discussed further below. In China, K.C. Chang expanded on these ideas by pioneering studies on
different scales of analysis in settlement studies – the household, the local group, and the community (see Chang 1958, 1967). Methodologies that focus on how people live on the landscape have endured through a number of different paradigms in archaeology and have direct implications for the later adoption of the concept of cultural landscapes into the discipline. The importance of these ideas in this discussion is that they set the stage for the next major revolution in both disciplines – the rise of the “new” and the turn to positivism.

NEW GEOGRAPHY, NEW ARCHAEOLOGY: NEW LANDSCAPES?

In the 1960s, new approaches to landscape analysis arose in both geography and archaeology (Trigger 1989; Wagstaff 1987:26-360). This particular time was one of increasing interest in the social sciences, following the tremendous growth of university departments post-WWII. Geography moved towards a deductive, positivist methodology, where specific hypotheses were formulated and tested through statistical analysis and other quantitative methods (Wagstaff 1987:27), leading this to be called the “quantitative revolution” (Burton 1963, in Earle and Preucel 1987:503). Cultural landscapes became secondary to the positivistic spatial analyses that were paramount during this time (Norton 1989:44), as the environment, not culture, was the focus. Both physical and human geographers downplayed the importance of history in their work, leading to what was perhaps its largest intellectual break from archaeology as a discipline. Tilley (1994), in the introduction to his phenomenological consideration of the idea of landscape, notes that during this period, both geographers and archaeologists dealt with abstract space, not human space – “space as container, surface and volume was substantial inasmuch as it existed in itself and for itself, external to and indifferent to human affairs” (1994:12-13). This represented a significant break from the Sauerian ideas of the cultural landscape.

The ‘New Archaeology’ was born in 1959, with Caldwell’s article in Science. Caldwell identified a shift in archaeology from questions of when and where – the focus of the culture history paradigm – to questions of “cultural processes and situations” (1959:304) and interpretation. He cites examples of a growing concern for ecology and settlement patterns of indicative of this paradigm shift – landscape remains a major concern. This article was followed three years later by Binford’s Archaeology as Anthropology (1962), where he presented the idea that culture should be studied through various systems – social, ideological and technological (1962). For Binford, generating hypotheses and testing them against past human behaviour was the way to understand culture (1968). Material remains, according to Binford, reflected all three cultural systems, and therefore the goal of archaeological inquiry was “to be understood in terms of many causally relevant variables which may function independently or in varying combinations” by examining patterns of material culture (1965:205). One of the major data sets against which to test these hypotheses and examine these patterns were regional analyses of
settlement systems. Spatial analysis as a methodology for understanding past cultures continued to develop into the idea that came to be known as processual archaeology. In fact, much of Binford’s work (notably 1980, 1982) was concerned with studying a concept very similar to Sauer’s cultural landscape, although with a particular focus on change, process and adaptation. As Anschuetz et al. observe, “[settlement] studies contribute varied insights into the diversity, the complexity, and the dynamic interdependence upon humans’ technological structures, their social, political and religious organizations, and the physical environments in which they live” (2001:171) – in other words, cultural landscapes.

The Sauerian-defined cultural landscape remained intact in cultural geography until the late 1970s, when the discipline began to experience “stirrings of dissatisfaction” (Wagstaff 1987:29). Wagstaff, discussing both archaeology and geography’s involvement in the cultural landscape discourse, notes three major sources for this dissatisfaction – a realization of the weaknesses of statistics, a re-evaluation of positivism and the hypothetico-deductive method, and a recognition that the study of modern patterns was not diachronically valid (1987:30). Explicitly discussing cultural geography as a sub-discipline, Norton makes a break between pre-1970 and post-1970, particularly in terms of methodology and the need to “reinstate human intentionality, humans and culture into geography” and into the landscape (1989:42). This eventually led to the adoption of new ways of understanding the landscape, including Marxism (see Olwig 2002; Smith 2003), structural geography and the study of social and symbolic landscapes, associated with the British school (Darvill 1999; Thomas 1993).

In archaeology, a similar although again slightly later development was taking place. Drawing from both the theoretical and methodological changes in geography, as well as anthropology and sociology, scholars within the discipline began to question some of the foundations of processual archaeology (Earle and Preucel 1987; Hodder 1982). Dissatisfied with the study of cultures as adaptive systems, archaeologists began to look towards other theories to explain sociocultural interaction, power relationships, inequality and human agency. As archaeologists began to look beyond processualism, a new space opened for cultural landscapes to be integrated into archaeological analysis, especially as this concept was being redeveloped in geography.

**LANDSCAPES CONVERGED**

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the social sciences as a whole were coming under the influence of postmodernism. Post-processual archaeology was the particular manifestation of “the appropriation of post-structural thought and critical theory by archaeologists” and the interaction of archaeologists with post modernity (Patterson 1989:556). One of the most significant challenges of postprocessual archaeology in relation to the adoption of a cultural landscape as a unit of analysis was the critique of objectivity. History and culture were conceived of in broader terms, which allows for an exploration of the interrelationships between these two constructions.
(Patterson 1989:558). Interest in the human experience and subjectivity led some archaeologists to look beyond their discipline for new theories and ideas.

Cultural geography began to evaluate the idea of landscape from a humanist perspective, as studies began to focus on landscapes as politically, historically and socially constituted (Cosgrove 2000a). Livingstone (1992) challenged the dichotomy of nature and culture as epistemic categories. Other geographers began to realize that humans were active agents in the formation of both culture and nature. One of the major figures in this reconsideration of the Sauerian landscape was Cosgrove (1984;1985), who recast the history of landscape in relationships to production and capitalism in Europe (1985). Landscapes became politicized realms with human actors creating culture, place and self within humanized space (Tilley 1994). The fluid, dynamic and subjective aspects of landscape negotiation and creation became the focus (Schein 1997). Cultural landscapes were no longer the result of culture working through the medium of nature to create forms – they were complex, flexible, and constructed through social and political interactions. At this intellectual juncture, with the reformulation of cultural landscape in geography and the post-processual critique in archaeology, archaeologists drew upon a long tradition of adopting ideas from their colleagues in geography. It was at this time that cultural landscape, in its new form, became integrated into archaeological research.

In the 1990s, there was a proliferation of landscape studies in archaeology, with two of the most significant being Bender’s edited volume *Landscape: Politics and Perspectives* (1993a) and Tilley’s *A Phenomenology of Landscape* (1994). Both of these authors are from Britain, where interest in new cultural landscapes was most readily adopted, due to a long history of collaboration between geographers and archaeologists. Bender’s volume contains discussions of how landscapes are political, especially as related to memory and colonialism, with contributions from archaeologists, anthropologists and geographers. Although conceptually new, many of the units of analysis employed by the contributors to this volume have long histories in archaeology – spatial analysis (Bender 1993b), monuments (Tilley 1993) and the division between public and private space (Bodenhorn 1993). Tilley’s work draws on phenomenological constructions to analyse landscapes as subjects:

People and environment are constitutive components of the same world, which it is unhelpful to think of in terms of a binary nature/culture distinction. In the perception of the world and in the consumption of resources (utilitarian or symbolic) from that world of meanings embodied in environmental object are drawn into the experience of subjects (Tilley 1994:23).

Tilley uses the Heideggerian concept of “dwelling” to understand the human experience and transformation of space to place (1994:13). Not all
archaeologists have taken the study of cultural landscapes to this abstract of a level. To return to the varied definitions of landscape presented earlier in this paper, there is a continued emphasis on the environment as an important part of the study of landscapes in what has come to be known as landscape archaeology. Current work emphasises a variety of cultural landscape approaches such as monuments and ritual landscapes (Bender 1993b), mortuary analysis (Buikstra and Charles 1999) and the relationship between cultural identity and landscape (Basso 1996).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The current applications of cultural landscapes in archaeology reflect its diverse histories, as there are elements in landscape analysis that remain staunchly empiricist (Dooley 2006), as well as those that present cultural landscapes as perception and little else (Tilley 1994). Cultural landscape as a concept has deep intellectual roots as well as an ongoing influence in archaeology, both in academic and increasingly in political realms. Archaeological research on cultural landscapes continues to have close ties with other disciplines, particularly geography, as new mapping technologies adapted from GIS have allowed archaeologists to create much more complete pictures of past landscapes, both from a physical and cultural perspective. Within North America, the term cultural landscape is currently being employed by First Nations communities as part of rights and title claims, as they argue that their connection to place goes beyond mere functional use or modification of the physical land. For many Aboriginal groups, the landscape is a container for knowledge, a teaching tool, and a spiritual or sacred place (Basso 1996).

Cultural landscapes, therefore, are inherent to the worldview of many Aboriginal communities. Archaeologists have begun to work with these communities to try to access the cultural landscapes of the past and to connect the past with the present. This approach requires an understanding of where the term originates, because although the structuring of space in the past created a built environment that can be studied, finding meaning in those landscapes often requires a more nuanced approach, grounded in theory and non-material sources (Cutright-Smith 2007:15). The exploration of past cultural landscapes benefits from collaborative relationships with living descent communities, and research into past landscapes can contribute to the political issues faced by Aboriginal communities today.

On a world scale, cultural landscapes are now a category of World Heritage sites as defined by UNESCO, as the term “embraces a diversity of manifestations of the interaction between humankind and the natural environment” (WHC 2005 in Aplin 2007:433). Mapping projects and traditional use studies both refer to cultural landscapes as part of the living heritage of First Nations in Canada and the United States, and are used to argue for the protection and perseverance of large tracts of land beyond individual archaeological sites around the globe. Understanding the intellectual genealogy of this concept can enhance our use of a term that can otherwise have different meanings to different researchers. Some authors have claimed that landscape archaeology is
still in its infancy (Fisher and Thurston 1999:630), but as we have seen in this paper, it has a long and complex history, only partially excavated here. It is a usefully ambiguous concept, as succinctly presented by Gosden and Head:

The thread that binds geography, archaeology and anthropology together around the theme of landscape is the notion of history that can be derived from it. The concept of landscape stretches between the physical shape and properties of the land to the human use and conceptions of that land, bringing together themes that are vital to an understanding of human history and which would normally remain separated (1994:116).

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DRAWING POWER
Conflict Between Western Cartography and Indigenous Illustration

Abstract

The way people represent land through visual and symbolic means communicates values that are deeply entrenched in their culture. This article looks at the values embedded in Western cartography as well as those in rock and body painting and tattooing of the Nlaka’pamux. The article also explores the power structures that are inherent in the production and performance of each visual representation. It also examines the power structures that result from the use of these two uniquely developed symbolic representations of lands between culture groups.

INTRODUCTION

Maps, like other methods of representing landscape, are fabricated within the cultural value systems of their creators. This culturally relative knowledge can make visual representations of land unrecognizable to outside societies. The way a society portrays territory reflects its relationship to the land as well as its cultural values. It is important to contrast Western cartographic traditions with Indigenous illustrations, such as those of the Nlaka’pamux (or “Thompson”) from the Fraser River Canyon, Thompson River, and Nicola Valley of southern British Columbia (Figure 1). Doing so reveals two incompatible power structures that have sustained conflict since the time of first encounters. Information on Indigenous illustrations discussed in this paper comes from Teit’s early 20th century research with Indigenous informants in the Thompson area. In this paper I will show how different eco-cultural relationships held by local Indigenous peoples and recent colonizers shape a set of unique symbolic imagery that can be analyzed in relation to conflicting power dynamics enacted over time between groups. The understanding and acceptance of these cultural differences may prove useful in working towards a respectful relationship.

HOW WESTERN CARTOGRAPHY DRAWS POWER

Certain realities are revealed about a group’s culture through the content, style, and use of their portrayal of landscapes. The essence of Western cartography demonstrates the Western value of order and “putting everything in its place.” Cartography builds from a notion of “boundary” which is marked either in the content of the map or by the physical product itself.1 “Boundary” emphasizes a value of separation such as in the relationship of Westerners to ecology. This disconnection is also apparent in a map’s ability to be mass produced in a factory and therefore in its capacity to be removed from original context. The value of objectivity2 that is prevalent in Western science is also portrayed by the culture’s value in the reproducible character of maps.
What cartographers choose to visually portray in their depictions of a landscape is a result of enculturation—an engagement with the values of a certain worldview. For example, the fact that Western maps commonly plot resources that can be commoditized, such as: roads, rivers, lakes, elevations, and natural resources is because these aspects of landscape are valued in this culture. Content, and its careful selection, is explicitly connected to concepts of power. Some historical maps of British Columbia prove that power can be effectively derived through its selective lack of content. The cartographer of one map in particular chose to omit any reference to Indigenous occupants or villages in order to paint the picture of open land (“Terra Nullius”) that was “available” for European settlers and American prospectors.

As colonization expanded and contest of lands and resources increased, the exertion of power was not so passive. Alfred Waddington, in his map entitled Sketch Map for the Chilcotin War (1863), emphasized selective events and places that served to “other” the Ts’ilhgot’in nation. The racist image that resulted was of the Ts’ilhgot’in as “rebels, indiscriminately murdering law-abiding Europeans” (Brealey 1995:146).

Cartography became a means “not only to express the will towards, but [to] actually serve to create, real territorial control” (Brealey 1995:141). Maps served to figuratively enclose Indigenous people within a politicized and colonial worldview and were then applied, in the reservation map style, to physically contain their living and dwelling activities. Cartography in this case drew a new practice regarding actual land use. Maps strengthened the notion that Indigenous people were living within European owned land and under foreign law rather than the reality of the reverse.

These reserve maps often fostered a power inequality by plotting the land as an entity apart from its surroundings. “Creating” new territories assigned colonizers further authority while simultaneously stripping Indigenous people of any power that could be gained from their sense of meaning, history, and knowledge embedded in the ancestral lands. Reserve maps were further manipulated by Western newcomers to gain power, or more accurately, to separate people from place and weaken Indigenous solidarity. Emphasizing certain spaces could make an area of reserve land appear larger than it actually was. This technique was employed to take advantage of Indigenous People in what is now called British Columbia. This manipulation was experienced by Willie Munro, a member of the Zeht Reserve, and is documented in the Royal Commission transcripts:

This Reserve that I ... talk about is very large, but there is very little of it that is fit for cultivation. It is a pretty big piece on the map, but it is only a small piece that I can cultivate, and the rest is all sidehills. And you are not able to run the water to it; and there is a little bit of a place which is above, outside the Reserve (Lytton Agency:249).

Though the mapped land was a large
area and may have appeared generous, the land was obviously not all useable. This situation either demonstrates the general idea that Westerners appreciate quantity before quality which is valued more so by Indigenous people or that there was an attempt to cede quality lands away from Indigenous groups towards Western agrarian communities. As both groups must understand the value of land area in relation to usefulness and productivity, this situation, as explained by Willie Munro, may be another example of attempted manipulation via maps.

**NLAKA’PAMUX BODY ILLUSTRATIONS AS SYMBOLIC VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF LAND**

Indigenous forms of representing land in a socially meaningful way contrast from that of Western cartography and are intimately connected to the value systems performed by each group. For instance, it was popular for the *Nlaka’pamux* bands to represent landscape by way of tattooing and body painting. These practices quickly lost their popularity with European contact. The last generation of “Thompson” people with first-hand knowledge of these practices acted as informants to James A. Teit (1930) who documented their meanings.

**Nlaka’pamux Tattoos**

Cultural tattoos of the *Nlaka’pamux* were simple geometric drawings that signified such things as: an earth line, a mountain range, a river and its bank, a cliff, a lake, crossing of trails, a sweat house, the sun, the moon, a rainbow, tracks, stars, a cloud, a flower, snakes, woodworms, a bark canoe, a bow, a paddle, a fir branch, human figures, and animal figures (Figure 2). Many of the illustrations denote the figure in context such as “snake going over the ground,” “woodworm boring in a log,” “moon in his house,” or “clouds crossing each other” (Teit 1930:412-413). The known meanings of facial tattoos (Figure 3), which are straight or curved lines on the face, are sparse. However, Teit documented that they can denote such things as “rain coming from the sky,” “eagle’s tail,” “rainbow,” and “sun rays” (1930:410).

**Nlaka’pamux Body Painting**

Face and body painting is not dependent on certain figures as in tattooing, but on the application of different colors to meaningful areas of the body (Teit 1930:419). Patterns of color in certain areas, however, are interpreted to denote similar things to tattoos such as clouds, lakes, loons, cliffs, valleys, mountains, the moon, the sky, etc. (Figure 4). The interpretations of most of the facial paintings include context such as “cloud resting on a lake,” “loon on the lake,” or “rays of light penetrating through cloud” (Teit 1930:421). Color symbolism is an important aspect of interpreting meanings in the paintings.

Face and body painting were part of the ritual dances that were performed at numerous ceremonials. Most people had their faces painted red which generally signified “goodness” or “life” or “self” among other meanings. Some warriors would use black paint which had opposite meaning to red. It meant “evil,” “death,” and “enemy” (Teit 1930:419). Chiefs as well as some men and women would distinguish themselves by wearing perpendicular
stripes on their face which was made by wiping some paint off with their fingers. Chiefs were always red while men and women sometimes alternated colors. A dancer’s facial designs such as those specific to the ghost dance (Teit 1900:350) were open to various interpretations. Informants described one design (Figure 5, top left) as meaning “clouds and rain, rays descending from above, something good or beneficial descending, such as health or something prayed for. The extension to the ear may show that it has some reference to hearing” (Teit 1930:424).

POWER IN INDIGENOUS ILLUSTRATIONS

Reasons for participating in body tattooing are similar to those for engaging in face and body painting. These practices visually depict land but not as their goal. Tattoos and body paintings act as ornamentation to attract the opposite sex; records of a particular event or ceremony; and are intimately connected with puberty and the acquisition of guardians (or spirits) to ensure success, health, or protection (Teit 1930:406). They are inseparable from the dances, dreams, religious beliefs, and ideas of power in the lives of the Nlaka’pamux people.

The dances and their particular painting designs were believed to invite power into the band. Dream designs seemed more personal in nature. These designs resulted from the advice of a guardian spirit to carry out a certain body painting. The goal of such experiences is to protect, heal, or empower the subject.8

Men and women made rock paintings during puberty ceremonies in addition to during other important life experiences such as depicting the hunt, vision quests, etc. Pictographs made by women commonly include fir-branches, cross-trails, lodges, baskets, and figures of men. These are found on boulders and small stones. Men paint figures of animals, birds, fish, arrows, fir-branches, lakes, sun, thunder, and figures of women onto rock on cliffs, in canyons, and near waterfalls. These areas are believed to have high energy and are thus where Nature’s power and knowledge are concentrated. “Wilder” locations are commonly chosen for paintings because the Nlaka’pamux people believe that they can absorb this energy through the paintings (Corner 1968, Teit 1896). Similarly, rocks that are shaped like animals or worn into unique formations are often thought to be metamorphosis beings and are painted to obtain power from them or their spirits.

Rock paintings are created to record significant events in the puberty ceremonies of adolescents and in the everyday lives of adults. Sometimes they denote the specific location of where a significant event took place. The symbols of animals, guardian spirits, and natural phenomena are such things that are painted if they’d been seen or obtained. Making rock paintings is believed to ensure long life, protect those who painted them, and strengthen powers that were obtained during ceremonies (Teit 1896, 1900, 1930). Paintings of human figures might represent a desired marriage partner while a painting of a basket or an arrow might represent a wish to be a proficient basket maker or hunter. The Nlaka’pamux believe that the realization of these wishes is dependent
on the careful selection of the location of the painting.

**Indigenous Representations of Land and Cultural Values**

Tattooing and painting practices, included among what I call “Indigenous illustrations,” visually represent land in an interpretable way. Like Western cartography, they serve to illuminate culturally constituted meanings. Indigenous illustrations are integrated into all aspects of Nlaka’pamux life in the same way that the Nlaka’pamux people themselves are an inseparable part of the land. This union of ecology and culture is reflected in the Nlaka’pamux visual representations of land. The content that is represented in both media (tattooing and painting) shows that ecology is of major value and that its connection to culture is significant. Furthermore, Nlaka’pamux people represent land and environment through tattoos and paintings directly on their bodies as well as on objects that are a permanent part of their land. Indigenous illustration, therefore, is a borderless entity. As is most evident in rock pictography, value is spread beyond the drawings themselves and onto the “canvas,” the landscape, which reflects the Nlaka’pamux perspective that connection to place is equally important to the visual work itself.

Nlaka’pamux illustration demonstrates their value in social cohesion. This is seen in many instances such as paintings with the goals of protection, health, and desire for marriage partners. Social cohesion is reinforced directly through the practice of tattooing and painting as it is a broadly participatory activity that is carried out daily.

**Power as Culturally Constituted Product Symbolizing Land**

These cultural realities help in exploring the power structure in the Nlaka’pamux way of life. In this framework, power is drawn through personal experience and the value of interconnection with the land. With every tattoo or painting, an individual is expressing a personal connection with power. Contrary to cartography where the dominant power dynamic is drawn between culture groups, power in the Indigenous framework, as illustrated by Teit’s research is more commonly individually expressed. The varying power-creating techniques of these two cultures are the result of their differences in values that are portrayed through their experiences with and representations of land.

The making of maps and illustrations as well as their content and how they are used demonstrate different kinds of desired power. Western maps and Indigenous illustration are created very differently. Western maps are fabricated by selecting certain content that is meaningful to emphasize a particular group-oriented goal or idea. In this process, the vision portrayed, and therefore the power gained, is not complete and therefore not entirely forthright. Certain rock paintings of the Nlaka’pamux, however, are a layered accumulation of the ceremonies, visions, and records of different people who have been empowered through the process. In this way, meaning and power are cumulative.

The content, or what is shown in these two representations of land, is presented through two different points of view which produce two different power dynamics. Indigenous paintings
are of a “lived in” or horizontal point of view and depict landscape laterally. The sky is often portrayed in paintings and tattoos to denote context and dimension to the drawn figures. It helps to depict an experienced vision of the land. Likewise, power is constructed to function in a horizontal, non-imposing manner. Western maps, on the other hand, are of a “bird’s eye” or vertical point of view where sky is not depicted at all and landscape is valued as a vision from above. This omniscient and controlling position echoes the dominating and hierarchical power exerted by foreign colonial government at this time.

**CULTURALLY RELATIVE USES OF POWER**

Each culture employs its vision of land for gaining power but for different reasons. The use of these representations is therefore culturally relative. As mentioned previously, Western maps are often manipulated to exert ownership and boundaries onto a landscape. Maps as discussed here act as ideological weapons for one cultural group to gain power and domination over another. Indigenous tattooing and painting as I’ve explored them through Teit’s documentation are also used to gain power but more often for the advancement of oneself within an intra-group social context rather than inter-group domination. It is evident that these illustrations draw power by way of being employed for protecting, healing, recording significant events, and proclaiming desires. Both Indigenous and Western symbolic representations of land are used to attain certain desires or goals. It is these goals and the actual mean to accomplishment which contrast immensely.

**Participation and Interpretation**

Participation and interpretation are two ideas that further contrast the ways that power is created in Western cartography and Indigenous illustrations. While maps create limited power by excluding participants, Indigenous illustrations can strengthen a broad range of individuals by encouraging many different interpretations. The McKenna/McBride Royal Commission transcripts demonstrate how cartography’s power is employed through exclusion. During several interviews, such as between Mr. Commissioner Shaw and “Antoine” (below), an Indigenous person was asked to locate an area on a map and he/she was unable to. “Mr. Commissioner Shaw: Can you show us on this map where this piece of land is that you have been cultivating? Antoine: No; I don’t understand the map” (Lytton Agency:271).

It is not only the Indigenous community, however, that was excluded in the utilization of maps: “Mr. Commissioner McKenna: Could it be possible for you to locate the 160 acres that you recommend? Agent H. Graham: On the ground it would, but not on the map. I have been up there and I know the place” (Lytton Agency:493).

As Western maps attempt to be objective, there is no room for interpretation; therefore, only those who understand how to read Western maps have the power to participate in their use. The Nlaka’pamux however, valued community participation in tattooing and painting. Since the illustrations were personal and open
to different interpretations, everyone could participate and gain power from the symbols in different ways.

**Varying Notions of “Distance”**

A central theme that contrasts Western cartography and Indigenous illustration is that of “distance” i.e. separated boundary vs. close connection. Western cartography punctuates the cultural value of detachment while Indigenous illustration highlights an emphasis on “connection.” “Distance” in cartography is demonstrated by the process in which maps are made as well as by the actual product itself. Active participants, in the construction of a map, are exclusive to a group of specially trained people - cartographers. It is not necessary for the community to be involved. Furthermore, Western maps depict an area of land from a removed or “bird’s-eye” position. The end product- a commoditized map- can be easily reproduced by machinery which further distances people from the process. It can then be quickly distributed to various regions around the world. The sense of distance that is manifested in the practice of cartography is mirrored in the design of Western power structure. In this design a few select and empowered individuals meet at a centralized location to make decisions that will affect a broader group. Countries that employ democratic governments therefore abide by a governing method and power structure that is propelled by “distance.”

Indigenous illustration, on the other hand, cannot even be discussed as a practice or as a product without making reference to its connections with other significant aspects of life. The fact that power is drawn through the context of the products furthers this idea that power of the Nlaka’pamux is drawn not only from the illustration itself, but from how it relates to the land in which it rests. To the Nlaka’pamux, achieving power is largely an individual endeavour, but is dependent on the participation of the whole community. Strength in this organization cycles between individual and group to create a web of power. These connective proponents of body painting and tattooing demonstrate a system of power contrary to the objectification of lands that Western cartographic methods employ.

**CONCLUSION**

Conflict between these two groups has in part been marked by their incompatible power structures in regards to people-land relations. In my initial exploration of the relationship between Western cartography and Indigenous use of illustrations, it appeared that the former was a hierarchical structure enacted between culture groups while Indigenous illustration was a system of individualistic focus. When exploring the resulting power dynamics, however, Western cartography proves to be more individually biased while Indigenous illustration embodies group cohesion. In this analysis I became aware that one of the dominant Western expressions of power during the contact period discussed was drawn from rewriting landscape using cartographic methods. Indigenous power was evidently drawn directly from the landscape. As Westerners altered the landscape by using maps as means to apply a hierarchical ordering of space, they reconstituted the once balanced web
of power created by Indigenous People such as the *Nlaka’pamux*.

**FIGURES**

Figure 1. Map of Thompson Indians (Teit 1900:166).
Figure 2. Interpretation of Indigenous Tattoos (Teit:1930:411-14)

1) earth line
2) snakes
3) woodworm/snake/rattlesnake
4) snake going over the ground/snake tracks on the ground
5) mountains
6) arrowheads/mountains
7) arrowhead
8) arrow
9) mountains/woodworm boring in a log/borings of a woodworm
10) river and its bank
11) tracks
12) string of dentalia and beads
13-14) stars
15) cloud
16) lake/mountain pond
17) ring/wheel
18) ring/sweat house
19) sun
20) moon
21) moon and halo/moon in its house
22) moon
23) hill/mound/rainbow/earth line
24) rainbow/rock/cliff
25) rainbow
26) woodworm/borings of the woodworm
27) grizzly bear/bear foot/bear tracks
28) tipis
29) lake/lake and shore
30) crossing of trails/the cardinal points/log across a stream/clouds crossing each other/star
31) star
32-33) morning star
34) meaning unknown
35) flower
36) root digger
37-40) meaning unknown
41) marked bone used in the lehal game
42) stones used by adolescent youths when sweat bathing
43-44) meaning unknown
45) bow
46) bark canoe
47) paddle
48) fir branch
Figure 3. Interpretations of Indigenous Facial Tattoos (Teit 1930:410).

M) rainbow  
C) eagle’s tail/rays  
N) rain coming from the sky

Figure 4. Facial Paintings of Nlaka’pamux (Teit 1930:Plate 5).
a) Lower part of face from nostrils down red, rest of face blue. Across the brow from temple to temple two parallel red stripes inclosing about six red dots. The hair above the ears daubed with red. This design is said to represent a headband, probably of loon skin. The blue is a cloud and the red a lake (possibly meaning cloud resting on a lake). A variation of this painting had yellow instead of blue. In the latter case the design on the brow might not be a representation of a headband but a symbol of the loon itself (possibly the loon on the lake or on water). The red might then stand for the earth or a cliff near the lake. Used by men (Teit 1930:421).

c, c’) The right side of the face red, including the side of the nose and excluding the nose. On the brow and chin the painting extended a little to the left. Some said it represented the “moon,” while others suggested a “lake” or a “gulch” as the probably meaning. Used by men (Teit 1930:421).

d) The forehead and temples above the eyebrows red, or in other cases yellow. Painted blue, it meant the sky or a large cloud. Painted yellow or red, it stood for a large mountain. Used by men (Teit 1930:421).

e) Lower part of face to level with mouth red. From it on the left side four vertical lines in the same color extending to a little above the level of the nostrils. On the right side four similar lines in yellow (sometimes in blue). This painting represented the earth or a valley with trees. According to one person the lines might also mean cliffs. Used by men (Teit 1930:421).

f) Both sides of face red from eyes down, excluding nose, mouth, and chin. Four to eight horizontal stripes scratched out of the paint on both sides. Some say this painting signifies rays of light penetrating through clouds (shining out of the clouds). Used by men” (Teit 1930:421-422).

Figure 5. Facial Paintings of Nlaka’pamux (Teit 1900:350).
A man wounded by a grizzly bear was instructed by his guardian how to paint in order to make the wound heal quickly. He placed the figure of a bear in yellow on the back, with the head toward the left shoulder, where the principal wound was. Streaks of red paint were drawn with the finger tips. They were arranged irregularly, most of them vertical and covering the whole face, and the left side of the body down to the hips including the upper left arm. This represented blood or blood flowing (Teit 1930:428).

NOTES

1. “Boundary” is shown in the formatting of Western maps in the choice to represent such things as ownership (“who owns what”) or geography (“land vs. water”). International border lines are usually clearly demarcated on Western maps. These arbitrary boundaries further demonstrate the separation between people and geography/ecological systems. See short story “Borders” (1993) by Thomas King

2. I refer to objectivity as the goal of science, where scientists strive to prove theories by separating the experiment from all other biases.


4. Peter O’Reilly’s Plan of the Bella Coola Indian Reserves, Coast District 1889.

5. The Royal Land Commission was a group that was formed by the Dominion government to designate reserve land for Indigenous populations in British Columbia. They relied on maps and their colonial power to further their own mandates. The McKenna/McBride transcripts (1912-1915) are records of dialogue between commissioners and Indigenous people to negotiate land ownership.

6. An earth line is a straight, horizontal line; a mountain range is a wavy or zigzag line with a straight line touching the bottom of the wavy line; a river and its bank is three parallel lines with the middle one thicker than the others; a cliff is an arched line resembling an inverted U; a lake is two concentric circles; crossing of trails is two crossed lines; a sweat house is a large circle with two crossed lines inside; the sun is a circle with four radiating lines, one opposite the other, which may or may
not have a dot inside; the moon is a circle with a line across it; a rainbow is a line forming a half circle with its ends pointing toward a straight line, and may also mean ‘hill’ or ‘mound’. See Figure 1 for illustrations and interpretations of tattoos. For further explanations of tattoo designs see Teit (1930: 411-415).

7. A color’s inherent meaning is based on what figure it indicated as well as where on the body it was applied. Red indicated “goodness” and was said to be expressive of life, self, existence, friendship, success, blood, heat, fire, light, and day. Brown had this same significance. Black is red’s opposite and denoted evil, death, coldness, darkness, night, and the underworld. Yellow depicted the earth and whatever was connected with it such as grass, trees, vegetation, stones, soil, and water. Green was rarely used but was said to be more strictly an earth color. Blue was a sky color and was used to depict the sky, the upper world, clouds, or sometimes sun, moon, stars, lightning, and rainbows. White was a spirit color and stood for ghosts, the spirit world, the dead, skeletons, bones, and sickness. Gray had these meanings as well.

8. Some of the dream designs documented by Teit (1930:428-429, Plate 8) include: the body painting of a sick man as instructed by his guardian spirit in order to become well (Figure 6). Another was in order to heal a grizzly bear wound whereas another painting was to protect a man from harm after he dreamt of giants.

9. It is an interesting point that in the language of the Nlaka’pamux, Nleʔkepmxcín, there isn’t a word for “environment,” “nature,” “art,” or “music.”

10. In my research I did not encounter data on Indigenous practices to employ power over another Indigenous group. I do not deny that this happens, but the purpose of this paper is to focus on the relationship between power dynamics of Indigenous People and Westerners.

11. A more frequent occurrence, however, is that when a commissioner asked, the interviewee was able to show a specific area on a map. This is undoubtedly because the Indigenous community understood that they must use the commissioners’ tools to gain land. This need is underlined by this statement by Mr. Commissioner Carmichael to Joe Brown: “[i]f you will let us know where you want the land, we will consider the question. Can you show us on this map where the land you want is?” (Lytton Agency:263).

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ANCIENT SETTLEMENTS ON THE HARRISON RIVER
A Salishan Gateway Between two Regions

Abstract
This article documents nearly three years of investigations concerned with locating, mapping, and analyzing the spatial configuration of residential pithouse and plankhouse features in Chehalis territory. We propose that the Chehalis people organized their houses and settlements along a four kilometer stretch of the Harrison River in order to control socio-economic activities occurring within their territory. We provide theories borrowed from the disciplines of human ecology and cultural ecology and document ethnohistoric, ethnographic, and oral historical evidence to show that the Chehalis occupied a key locale on the Harrison-Lillooet interaction corridor. The Chehalis’ role in this trade and navigation corridor linking the coast and interior was that of economic middlemen.

INTRODUCTION
Located along the banks of the Harrison River in southwest British Columbia, the traditional territory of the Chehalis First Nation is situated at a strategic point along the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor (Figure 1). This natural corridor connects two distinct ecological zones and culture areas, the Pacific Northwest Coast and the North American interior Plateau. Archaeological discoveries along the central Harrison River from 2005-2007 have yielded 11 separate villages (Sanders and Ritchie 2005; Ritchie 2007). Chehalis’ settlement design shows a pattern of intensive pithouse, plankhouse and burial mound distribution that covers both banks of the Harrison River, as well as mid-river islands, stretching four continuous kilometers. The ‘aggregated community’ at Chehalis represents the largest known clustering of pithouses in the entire Northwest coast culture area.

This paper will explore several lines of evidence that support our hypothesis that the ancestors of the contemporary Chehalis people oriented their settlements on the Harrison River to monitor resource use and trade at this central node within a major transportation corridor (Sanders 2006). Ethnographic literature documents strong trade relations between the Chehalis and their Coast Salish neighbors on the Fraser River and the Gulf of Georgia, as well as with their Interior Salish neighbors to the north (Duff 1952; Hill-Tout 1905; Teit 1906).

The Chehalis were seen as ‘middlemen’ for trade and exchange during the early historic period and into the contemporary ethnographic era. Data from our ongoing archaeological survey support these observations and indicates that the community of Chehalis maintained a position of socio-economic advantage in the region up until the historic period.

To test our hypothesis of Chehalis’ precontact control over one of the most practical transportation corridors linking coastal and interior...
populations, we investigate evidence from archaeological, ethnohistorical, ethnographical, cultural ecological, and geographical sources. Interestingly, both the ethnographic record and archaeological literature pertaining to the Northwest Coast and interior Plateau emphasize human interactions occurring along the Fraser River. To date, a paucity of data exists for the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor. Our paper is primarily concerned with how the Chehalis community arranged their residential structures and settlements to best control socio-economic activities along this section of the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor. Central to this inquiry is whether or not the separate villages at Chehalis operated as a collective, and how becoming an aggregated community of villages may have allowed them to consolidate their control. It is our interpretation that the intensive distribution of houses along the banks of the Harrison River in Chehalis territory arose, in part, from an emergent trend in long distance trade and interaction. This alternative trade route to the Fraser River has significant implications for the larger socio-economic sphere of interregional interaction between zones.

In attempting to understand the importance of the Chehalis’ role in the interregional interaction sphere, we have borrowed the “gateway community” model from human geography (Burghardt 1971), and the “ecological and cultural edges” model from cultural ecology (Turner et al. 2003). Both models have been devised to help analyze complex relationships
between groups of people occupying “key locales” or “zones” towards an economic benefit. The “gateway community” model states that “large and important settlements” (Hirth 1978:35) control key geographical locales. Chehalis is an ‘edge community’ as defined by Turner et al. (2003) because it has access to many different zones of species abundance and is exposed to diverse external cultural influences. Richard Stoffle of the University of Arizona (pers. comm. 2006) points out that “such edges in nature and society are key places to study the processes of social and natural change” – be they ecological, socio-economic, or socio-political. This dovetailing of interdisciplinary evidence helps to explain the archaeological record at Chehalis, where the spatial patterning and configuration of houses suggest a strategy for monitoring and controlling a wide range of socio-economic activities along the Harrison River.

Chehalis’ traditional territory is vast and ecologically diverse. It centers on the Chehalis and Harrison Lakes and Rivers, but encompasses many smaller rivers and streams, mountains hosting diverse forests, and extensive marshlands. The Harrison River is the largest tributary of the Fraser River and hosts a significant percentage of the total number of salmon in the Fraser system (Kew 1992). Other desirable fish such as trout and sturgeon are also abundant in the waters of the Harrison. Both ends of the four kilometer settlement zone (where the Chehalis River feeds into the Harrison River in the south and where Morris creek feeds the Harrison in the north) are bounded by vast marshlands teeming with a wealth of avian species and edible water resistant plants. Expansive forests with diverse tree species provided the Chehalis with more than enough wood and other products for their own industry, plant food, and medicine. The mountains and surrounding lowlands is a refuge for many of British Columbia’s mammal species. Each of these resources is readily accessible from the main Chehalis settlements on the middle Harrison River.

THE HARRISON-LILLOOET INTERACTION CORRIDOR – A SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSPORTATION ROUTE

The Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor connected the community of Chehalis with populations situated on the coast and interior Plateau through a series of waterways that were navigable by canoe. This natural transportation corridor is comprised of a nearly continuous network of rivers and lakes including Gulf of Georgia, Fraser River, Harrison River, Harrison Lake, Lillooet River, Lillooet Lake, Birkenhead River, Gates Lake and River, and Anderson and Seton Lakes (Figure 1). A short portage (<5 km) was necessary for groups navigating the section of this route between Birkenhead River and Gates Lake. However, Poole Creek runs nearly the length of this section and would have assisted in the portage. Not surprisingly, the “Birken” Lillooet have a traditional place name for this route, Qulpautlen (qulpualt meaning ‘to haul a canoe over the ground’) (Hill-Tout 1978:100-103; See also Figure 2 of this article).

ETHNOGRAPHIC HISTORY AND CHEHALIS CULTURAL IDENTITY

The Chehalis benefited from socio
cultural traditions, knowledge, technologies, resource exchange and marriage partners from both the coast and interior Plateau without being directly connected geographically or politically to either. The cultural identity of Chehalis has long been of interest to anthropologists, starting with Boas (1895) in the late nineteenth century (Cole 2001:149). This interest continued with the work of Charles Hill-Tout (1905), Wilson Duff (1949, 1952) and most recently Chehalis Heritage Advisor Gordon Mohs (2003).

The decision by the Chehalis not to join the Sto:lo tribal council of amalgamated bands during the present era speaks partly to the contemporary socio-political dynamic stressing independence and autonomy, but also has deep historical significance. The community of Chehalis is somewhat of an enigma in that they are both geographically and culturally ‘isolated’ from their Coast Salish, Sto:lo neighbors to their south (distributed along the banks of the Lower Fraser River), and their Interior Salish, Lower Lillooet neighbors 72 km to the north (at Port Douglas).

**CHEHALIS’ REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS**

The Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor offers insight into a socio-economic and political dynamic, stressing interregional interaction between ecological and cultural zones, rather than emphasizing separation between these two distinct regional interaction spheres (see Hayden and Schulting 1997:79).

Wilson Duff (1952:95) pointed out that “the Chehalis commonly exchanged wives with the Douglas,” a practice suggesting extensive trade relations. In contrast to these alliance relations, their neighbors, the Douglas and the Yale, were not on trading terms during the historic era as they were engaged in some of the last warring feuds to continue in the Salish territory (Duff 1952:96). In fact, while Chehalis’ close trading partners the Douglas are mentioned as also having warring relationships with the Tait, and Lower Thompson (Duff 1952:96), nowhere in the literature are the Chehalis considered a nation given to intense conflict and especially to warfare. Hill-Tout (1978:101), referring to congregations of visiting bands frequenting Chehalis territory during the fishing season, noted that “sometimes disturbances and fights would occur, but the Chehalis were a strong and populous tribe and seem to have been able to more than hold their own with their visitors”. These socio-political dynamics between interior Plateau and coastal cultures suggest the edge community of Chehalis acted as mediator in economic affairs.

**NAVIGATING THE HARRISON-LILLOOET AND FRASER RIVER ROUTES**

The Harrison-Lillooet route to the interior has long been known to be important because the Fraser Canyon route was so difficult to navigate. For instance, in stressing the dangers of navigating the Fraser Canyon, Simon Fraser wrote, “I have been for a long period in the Rocky Mountains, but have never seen anything equal to this country. I cannot find words to describe our situation at times… we had to pass where no human being should venture” (1960:96). The Hudson Bay’s plans to
use the Fraser River as a transport route were abandoned early when, in 1828, Governor Simpson descended the river and deemed it “nearly impassible” (MacLachlan 1998:10, 17). Another reference to the treacherous waters of the Fraser Canyon came from Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) clerk, A.C. Anderson who wrote, “at the higher stages of the water, they [the waters] present a difficulty almost insurmountable” (1858:6).

The ethnohistoric evidence from the 1858 flood of gold miners seeking access to the interior Plateau supports the preference for the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor to that of the Fraser River. For instance, local historian Sleigh, notes the “most popular route to the upper gold fields went right through Harrison Indian territory: up Harrison River and Lake, on along a hastily constructed trail to Lillooet Lake, and then via Anderson and Seaton Lakes to Lillooet” (1990:16). Ultimately, it was the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor described in this paper that was chosen by the HBC for human and cargo transportation to the gold fields of the interior, thereby constituting British Columbia’s first ‘highway’ (see B.C. Archives).

The Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor model is supported by the fact that groups of both cultural and ecological zones, and particularly the coastal groups, showed a ‘climax’ adaptation that preferred almost at all costs travel by boat than foot (Duff 1964:41; Arnold 1995). In the Gulf of Georgia and Fraser River regions, canoe transport was essential for the movement of large numbers of people and quantities of goods across vast distances. Duff’s (1952:16) interpretation concurs that the navigability of the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor “made travel northward into the Lillooet country an easy matter from a physical point of view”. He also suggests that hostile relations between the Upper Stalo tribes and the Lillooets acted as a cultural barrier inhibiting interaction, lending credence to the ‘Chehalis-as-middlemen’ theory.

An abundance of ethnographic and ethnohistoric evidence suggesting knowledge and utilization of this interaction corridor by First Nation groups occupying its territory should come as no surprise. In 1858, A.C Anderson produced a hand-book that included a map proposing potential routes to the gold fields in the interior. His support for the Harrison-Lillooet route was based heavily on the recommendations of ‘Indian’ informants (1858). On his map shown below (Figure 2), Anderson explicitly documents the ‘Indian Trail’ connecting the upper Lillooet River to Anderson Lake.

In 1861, when construction on the Harrison-Lillooet road was already underway, R.C. Mayne traveled the Harrison-Lillooet route and remarked on how “considerable quantities of goods were brought up the river in canoes…from Port Douglas to Port [Lillooet]” (1861:219). It was the local ‘Indians’ who had the experience and were able to navigate the river, albeit at certain times of year (1861:219).

A more comprehensive look at the possible phonetic continuities between place names throughout the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor could reveal a shared route identity in the memory of groups ‘wayfinding’
(see Golledge 1999) between the coast and interior Plateau. For instance, bits of evidence on place names were provided to men from the Hudson’s Bay Company which has the Harrison and Lillooet Lake and River systems as Pinkslitsa, and Anderson and Seaton Lakes on the other end of the interaction corridor as Pishalcoe and Peselive. Our hope is that future toponym studies may flesh out further signs of common language usage for different geographical segments of this corridor, confirming that the people who utilized it considered the individual sections part of a larger whole.

THE CHEHALIS AS ECONOMIC MIDDLEMEN

In keeping with the models and thesis proposed within this paper, the Chehalis were strategically positioned as an edge community, negotiating interaction between two larger culture groups who did not always get along. From the perspective of Duff, writing over half a century ago, “[t]he Chehalis of the Harrison were the only Sta:lo group on friendly terms with the Lillooets, and it is probably through them that any cultural influences from the north have penetrated into Sta:lo culture” (1952:16). This description of interaction reveals the effects achieved by a “gateway community” controlling a strategic geographical node towards an economic advantage. The Hudson’s Bay Company also noted that the Chehalis were the logical group to trade with during the early trade era (1820’s–1830’s), as it was through them that trade with neighboring groups

Figure 2. A. C. Anderson’s 1858 map showing the ‘Indian Trail’ between the upper Lillooet River and Anderson Lake.
occurred (Sleigh 1990). This position of economic centrality is expressed by Sleigh (1990:15) who states that once the Upper Lillooets began trapping for the fort, they were not permitted to trade directly, and so sold their furs to the Lower Lillooets who then sold again to the Chehalis.

In a sense, the boundaries of the Chehalis’ traditional waters were both fluid and concrete at the same time. For example, as stewards of these territories they monitored their highly regarded fishing locations strictly. However, simultaneously, the complex interconnections between families, corporate groups, and bands engaged in intercommunity marriages, and trade and exchange relationships extended rights to ‘outsiders’. Chehalis’ contemporary rights to waters outside their own territory on the Fraser River speak to a heritage of negotiating efficacious trade relations with neighboring groups.

In order to appreciate the intensive network of economic interaction Chehalis attracted by occupying this key locale, it is useful to draw on a quote from Hill-Tout that indicates “[t]he settlements or territories of the Chehalis were regarded with envious eyes by the surrounding tribes…so famous indeed was their territory for its plentiful supplies of salmon that outside tribes from long distances used to come every salmon season and pay the Chehalis a kind of royalty to be permitted to fish in their waters” (1978:100-101). Long time Fraser Valley historian Daphne Sleigh draws a similar conclusion from her research, stating, “[t]he village of Chehalis was quite extensive in size, for they were a large and prosperous people because of their famous fishing grounds, where tribes from up and down the Fraser River would congregate during the salmon season, paying some kind of royalty to do so” (1990:7).

A ONCE THRIVING COMMUNITY
The affluence of the Chehalis was not immune to instability, and the diseases contracted prior to and during the contact period exacted a severe toll on the Chehalis (Boyd 1990; Harris 1994). Importantly, information used by Duff (1964) in his population census for First Nations bands in British Columbia came at a time when native communities throughout the province had already been severely affected by diseases originating with contact. Nevertheless, at this juncture (1963) of post-episodic socio-cultural distress, the Chehalis numbered 325 members, more than any other of the 27 Sta:lo communities (Duff 1964:27-52).

While the archaeological record (discussed below) of Chehalis is only now beginning to assist in the reconstruction of settlement patterning through residential house features, the oral history of Chehalis speaks of a thriving community in the thousands (pers. comm. Willie Charlie 2005; James Leon 2005; Gordon Mohs 2005). The ethnographic evidence presented above also portrays the Chehalis as a once populous group able to manage all the affairs of the Harrison River by sheer presence and numbers (Hill-Tout 1978:100-101; Sleigh 1990:7).

ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE HARRISON-LILLOOET INTERACTION CORRIDOR
To examine Chehalis’ influence upon the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction
Corridor, we apply three scales of analysis: the village, the aggregated village community, and the region. It is our contention that the spatial patterning of residential features on the landscape reveals economic motivations related to monitoring and controlling the Harrison River. Only now, after recent intensive archaeological survey and mapping projects are we able to evaluate the patterning of houses along the Harrison River (Sanders and Ritchie 2005) and compare it to the Fraser River (Schaepe 2006).

Settlement data along the Harrison-Lillooet Corridor reflects the pattern presented within the “gateway community” model. It is significant that the known settlements are located at key locales, but none are nearly the size of those along the central Harrison River. Archaeologically, the only documented village sites we are aware of on the Harrison-Lillooet Corridor are the five ancestral to the Chehalis along the shores of Harrison Lake (pers. comm. Charlie 2007), Port Douglas (pers. comm. Douglas Hudson 2007), Nequatque village on Anderson Lake (pers. comm. Michael Blake 2005 and visited by Sanders 2005), Seton Portage (Derek Wales 1974) and Seton River and Lake (Stryd 1974).

A preliminary survey of the south shore of Anderson Lake by Sanders also showed that the area was a significant travel route, as evidenced by multiple pictograph sites. We argue that the paucity of data showing for this area to date is in part a reflection of the type of research that has occurred in the region, represented by a patchwork of small-scale investigations stemming from consulting archaeology while more involved archaeological research in southwest British Columbia remains Fraser River-centric. For instance, in Teit’s account of the Lilooet Indians he documents settlements distributed frequently along the corridor between the north end of Harrison Lake and the Fraser Canyon (1906:196-198). Although current evidence does indicate that villages and strategic posts exist at key locales throughout the corridor, much more research is needed in order to fully comprehend the distribution of settlements along the Harrison-Lillooet Corridor.

While the frequency of non-local materials in the archaeological record from the Scowlitz site does not reflect intensive trade, it does reflect complex trade relations with far away territories along the Pacific Coast and from the interior Plateau as far away as Idaho (Blake 2004). This evidence lends credence to our hypothesis that the Harrison River was involved in a series of extensive interregional trading networks cross-cutting distinct ecological and cultural zones.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE HARRISON RIVER VALLEY

Context and Survey

The archaeological record of the Harrison River suggests a long-term, continuous occupation by the ancestors of the Chehalis people who inhabit the territory today. The main Chehalis settlements are located 12 km upriver on the Harrison River from its confluence with the Fraser River, and 125 km from its outflow into the Gulf of Georgia, southwest British Columbia (Figure 1). Despite early anthropological interest in the area (Boas 1895; Hill-Tout 1978;
Duff 1953), very little was known archaeologically about the Harrison River Valley until recently, and little remains known for the Harrison-Lillooet Corridor. The summer of 2005 heralded the first archaeological survey, mapping and test excavation project carried out within traditional Chehalis territory (Lepofsky et al. 2005; Sanders and Ritchie 2005).

The Harrison River offers a more conducive geography for investigating archaeological visibility of precontact settlement orientation along waterways than elsewhere in the lower Fraser Valley. Although other areas may have been as intensively occupied, evidence from these locations is lacking due to postcontact residential and industrial development including vast tracts of agricultural lands. As a result, settlements along the Harrison River discussed in this paper provide invaluable archaeological evidence for extensive occupation, social organization and interaction unequaled by any other currently known locale in the Northwest Coast. During our survey, we noted that settlements often had a range of features, including pithouses, plankhouses, burial mounds, cultural depressions and earthenworks (Sanders and Ritchie 2005). The presence of both plankhouses and pithouses at settlements on the Harrison River visibly demonstrate how the Chehalis community had influences from both coastal and interior culture areas.3

Our regional survey focused along the banks of the Harrison River bounded by Morris Creek to the northeast and the Chehalis River to the southwest (Figure 3). In total, we have documented eleven settlements within our four kilometer project area (Sanders and Ritchie 2005; Ritchie 2007). The distribution of pithouses along the northwestern bank of the Harrison River is virtually continuous between Morris Creek and the Chehalis River (Figure 3). Numerous sloughs running perpendicular to the Harrison River provide natural boundaries to distinguish between settlements. These slough channels also served as excellent spawning habitats, places to keep canoes out of the main channel and a desirable location to collect marshland resources.

Mapping
Settlements on the Harrison River range considerably in size, between eighteen residential features. Settlements also differ in the composition of features and their arrangement on the landscape. All of the settlements that have the full suite of archaeological features described in the regional survey zone share the same general pattern of plankhouses in the centre of the village facing the water, pithouses immediately flanking them, and cultural depressions and burial mounds further back from the river’s edge. This past year, Ritchie, with assistance of the Fraser Valley Archaeology Project, and the Simon Fraser University field school, mapped three settlements, Hiqelem (Figure 4), Government Island, and to its west the seasonally flooded little Government Island. The John Mack Slough site (Figure 5) was mapped by Sue Formosa, Michael Blake and the University of British Columbia field school in 2005 (Schaepe 2007).

Between these maps and others created by the authors in 2005, we can see the internal arrangement of
Figure 3. Area showing territories surveyed during the 2005 summer field season and follow-up surveys in the fall and winter of 2005-07. This map shows the general settlement pattern along the Harrison River in Chehalis territory. The high degree of monitorability following from the near proximity of pithouses to the Harrison River should be noted.

settlements on both banks of the Harrison River and on mid-river Islands (Figure 3). Total station mapping has allowed us to look at precise spatial relationships between features at the site and also between features and landforms. The most remarkable culturally modified landscape on the Harrison River is Hiqelem. In what has been thousands of years of intensive occupation at this location, its inhabitants have built-up and modified the landscape to such a degree that it is no longer prone to flooding - unlike any other settlement on the river. In some places this terracing is two meters above sterile deposits. Creating a surface map from the data points we collected at Hiqelem allows us to see the entirety of the built landform along with all of the see see associated archaeological features (Figure 4). Construction material is derived from utilized rocks that crack when they have been heated (fire altered rock).

Excavation and Contemporaneity

Very few of the pithouses or plankhouses along the Harrison River have been dated; archaeological inquiry only began three years ago and a chronological sequence for the
settlements or the features has not been established. However, judging by landform analyses and temporal indicators such as burial mounds, many of the sites had contemporaneous components. Six of the settlements have mortuary features behind the house features suggesting a degree of contemporaneity between 1600-1100 BP (Lepofsky et al. 2000; Thom 1995).

In 2005, several radiocarbon samples were extracted from two separate pithouses at Hiqelem and a single housepit at John Mack Slough (Lepofsky et al. 2000). The dates from two houses at Hiqelem show a long-term occupation at the site which was likely continuous judging by the consecutive hearth deposits in the stratigraphic profiles. Housepit 1 dated between 1090 +/- 40 BP (1070 – 940 cal BP; Beta 208884), and housepit 4 dated between 550 +/- 40 BP (540-460 cal BP; Beta 208883) (Lepofsky et al. 2005).

![Figure 4](image)

**Figure 4.** Map showing the complex, multi-component site of Hiqelem located on IR6 in the extreme northeast zone of the regional survey. (Map used with permission of the Fraser Valley Project).
Subsequent testing of housepit 1 at Hiqelem by Sanders and Heonjong Lee yielded a date of (1090+/-40 BP Beta 32268) from only 22 cm below the surface. This evidently reflects the rapid accumulation of deposits (namely fire-altered rock) in the housepit because the previous date of the same approximate age was from 48 cm below the surface.

These samples from Hiqelem were taken mid-stratigraphic sequence, between 22 cm – 48 cm when cultural layers and anthropogenic soils are still present at 120 cm below the surface (high water levels prevented us from extracting a sample from the earliest occupation layer). Based on historic materials found in other pithouses at Hiqelem, the site has been occupied up until the historic period. Temporal evidence from radiocarbon dating, combined with the depth of deposits suggests that the settlement has been intensively inhabited for a much greater time than the present dates reveal.

The site of John Mack Slough is much different than Hiqelem as it is located on the Harrison River floodplain and subject to seasonal flooding. The only date recovered from a housepit at John Mack Slough places the feature during the protohistoric era (pers. comm. Schaepe 2006). Based on a suite of ethnographic and ethnohistoric knowledge, it is assumed that this date does not accurately reflect the actual antiquity of the settlement. As no excavation of burial mounds were conducted in Chehalis territory, the antiquity of burial mounds flanking the house features can be measured using proxy information from nearby archaeology of this feature class. At least some component of the site, or an earlier manifestation of it would likely date between 1600 and 1100 BP as reflected in the well documented burial mound complex 12 km to the south at Scowlitz (Lepofsky et al. 2000), making it contemporaneous with Hiqelem. Most of the larger settlements have burial features which provide a minimum antiquity; some sites, in
addition to Hiqelem and John Mack Slough also show continued use of the site until very recently. The Billy Harris settlement has been inhabited within living memory (pers. comm. Charlie 2007), and the settlements of Wilson Duff #1 and DhRl-T8 have uncharred wood associated with structural remains. It is our contention that the settlements on the Harrison River have a high degree of occupation overlap in accord with the continuity of landscape use available in the ethnographic and archaeological evidence.

CHEHALIS SETTLEMENT ANALYSIS

Inter-settlement Perspective

Due to the number of non-local groups visiting Chehalis territories to engage in diverse interregional trade and exchange relationships, it is reasonable to expect that the Chehalis devised certain organizational strategies to monitor and control the river. Archaeological data suggests that the Chehalis were able to monitor their entire section of the river from settlements and/or natural promontories.

Six of the eleven villages have at least one pithouse strategically orientated on jutties protruding into the Harrison River at different slough channels. These ‘sentry’ pithouses provide the best viewscape of the Harrison waterway and allow for close monitoring of transportation activities on the river without having each pithouse lining its banks. We suspect that members of these houses would have been responsible for alerting other community members of immanent danger, notification of safety, the need for alliance, and other responses.

Plankhouses also line the river and were built in prominent locations near the front of the settlements. In addition to the plankhouses we knew about at Hiqelem, John Mack Slough, Billy Harris and Wilson Duff #1 from our 2005 survey, we have recently found that plankhouses extend nearly 150 continuous meters along Government Island (DhRl-T7) and across the front of Little Government Island (DhRl-T8). These plankhouses are in prominent locations at settlements on both sides of the Harrison River as well as on mid-river islands. Unlike pithouses, plankhouses do not blend into the natural landscape; rather, their presence at the front of all of these settlements makes a loud statement. The Chehalis controlled access along the Harrison River and everyone who traveled its course knew it.

Monitoring of activities in the area would also have occurred from high vantage points along the river. The physiography of the area is conducive to such phenomenon, with numerous of these promontories having been located; the most strategic of these is Lho:legwert (DhRl 2), a natural promontory nearly one hundred meters high. Located at the northeastern portion of IR5, where Morris Creek meets the Harrison River (Figure 3), this barren granite cliff marks a natural geographical pinch-point along the Harrison River that separates the northern ‘canyon’ section with the wider, habitable southern section. From this location, a large section of the Harrison River corridor can be viewed (Figure 6).

During the historic period, Hill-Tout (1978) describes the Chehalis people as being united under a grand Chief with lesser Chiefs for every village or family group. Working under
the model that the Chehalis people acted as a cohesive whole towards a collective benefit, we believe the overall settlement design at Chehalis proves strategic for controlling and managing this section of waterway and territory. The distribution of spatially distinct ‘micro-villages’ of dispersed populations and resources creates an extreme challenge to any potential incursions or raids. Without a ‘central place’ in which to attack, but interconnected in terms of distance and accessibility with which to unite rapidly, the community of Chehalis was well oriented on the landscape for offence or defense alike.

CHEHALIS SETTLEMENT ANALYSIS

Inter-regional Perspective

According to Hirth (1978:42), his Mesoamerican example of Chalcatzingo was one in a “series of scattered gateway communities” for which long distance trade with the Gulf Coast may have been conducted. In contrast to this “multiple gateway case” with a dendritic hinterland, the physiography and archaeology of Chehalis territory and the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor indicate that Chehalis holds a strategic monopoly position to this natural corridor. In this case, access points to the interaction corridor are limited to a finite number of ‘gateways’; trade at Chehalis and along the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor has little competition outside the Fraser River system.

We have argued that the spatial arrangement of the settlements comprising the aggregated village community at Chehalis reveal a design well suited to monitoring and controlling the movement of people and goods. Other sites along the Fraser system, such as Xelhalth, show a different pattern (Schaepe 2006). These sites seem to suggest a strategy of economic interaction different than that at Chehalis, tending to be more ‘defensive’, than ‘offensive’ in design. We agree with both Duff (1952) and Kidd (1968) who suggest that villages located up high from the river are “situated so as to avoid attacks”. In so doing, these communities decrease their ability to influence activities occurring on the river in comparison to communities monopolizing the near-shore landscape of an extensive stretch of waterway.

Historic documentation and anthropological literature research shows there are no analogous settlement clusters to the Chehalis villages within the social sphere utilizing the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor. This may in part be a function of a lack of site preservation in more developed areas, or lack of survey, but it can certainly also be attributed to the physiographic setting. The Chehalis have a relatively narrow channel to monitor, with habitable banks on both sides of the Harrison River and mid-river islands, whereas the lower section of the Fraser River (East Chilliwack to the Georgia Straight) is too wide and has too many channels for one group to effectively monitor. The canyon section of the Fraser River (Hope to Lillooet) has navigational hazards which would necessitate a different approach to controlling traffic. This is not to say that extensive trade and the attempt to influence it did not occur along the Fraser River – it did, it is merely to
suggest that physiographical constraints dictated the cultural response of Fraser River groups and others who visited. No single community held an influence over the Fraser River in the same manner Chehalis did with the Harrison River.

CHEHALIS AS A “GATEWAY COMMUNITY”
We have adopted the ‘gateway’ model from human geography (see Burghardt 1971) as per Hirth’s archaeological application at Chalcatzingo in Morelos, Mexico (1978). However, unlike Hirth’s interest in the relationship between interregional trade and the emergence of internal social inequality within a community, our analysis of Chehalis settlement history is more suited to a discussion on interregional hierarchies between communities. Community hierarchy, as it applies to the theme of developing social complexity, is beyond the scope of this paper, though we believe the development of socio-economic hierarchical relations between communities can emerge from a group’s ability to effectively manipulate its physiographic location and the resources obtained from its immediate environment and through trade.

The Chehalis fit the “gateway community” model in relation to the larger nexus of socio-economic interaction within the coastal-interior Plateau sphere. Accordingly, Hirth’s model is used as an analogy to help explain the archaeological pattern of settlements at Chehalis along the Harrison River. Hirth (1978) argues that economically powerful communities established large settlements along natural transportation corridors for the purpose of controlling commerce. His descriptions of “politically complex groups” located at “natural corridors of communication” and critical passages between areas of rich resources and production (1978:37) are analogous to the type of interaction dynamics proposed between Chehalis and groups traveling along the Harrison-Lillooet Corridor. Chehalis’ position of economic advantage is due to its
position on a trade and transportation corridor that is also one of the wealthiest salmon bearing rivers in the world (Kew 1992).

The aggregated community of Chehalis is compatible with Hirth’s gateway model in that it is oriented geographically to maximize management of trade in a variety of exotic resources between at least two disparate socio-cultural and ecological zones. Evidence exists of trade in exotics between zones from surface finds discovered during our regional survey and from recent excavations at Chehalis, in addition to the extensive research at the Scowlitz site (Blake 2004; Lepofsky et al. 2000), located only 12 km down the Harrison River from Chehalis. Furthermore, Hirth argues that these communities arise in response to high levels of demand or supply for ecology specific resources at socio-cultural, ecological, or technological interfaces. This paraphrase highlights the strength of dovetailing Turner’s et al. (2003) model of ecological and cultural edge communities. The “edge community” of Chehalis is oriented at an ecological and socio-cultural interface where people from coastal and interior Plateau zones interact.

CHEHALIS AS AN “EDGE COMMUNITY”
The Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor offers access between two unique ecological zones. One of the greatest benefits to this long-distance transportation network lies in its ability to connect people and their resources across vast tracts of territory. We argue that Chehalis is an “edge community” as defined by Turner et al. (2003) because the people have access to many different zones of species abundance and are exposed to diverse external cultural influences through trade and exchange.

Edge ecologies are species-rich transitional zones formed where two distinct ecological zones meet (Turner et al. 2003). Chehalis is also an “edge community” in the sense that it is a cultural transition zone where “two or more cultures converge and interact” (Turner et al. 2003:439). Edge communities are often successful because they have access to such a wide variety of economically important resources throughout the year, encouraging a “greater capacity for flexibility” (Turner et al. 2003:439).

Highlighting the attributes of socio-cultural resilience, Turner et al. state, “human communities benefit from association with and exploitation of ecological edges”, and furthermore “societies seek to expand their use of ecological edges” (2003:442). We agree with this assessment and believe that the distribution of settlements on the Harrison River reflects the Chehalis’ desire to effectively utilize and control the local ecology and the flow of resources from outside their ecological zone, making them a cultural edge community.

SUMMARY
We have argued that the Chehalis occupied a strategic physiographic position and managed this natural advantage by orientating their houses on the landscape in an effort to best control the southern end of the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor. Ethnographic and ethnohistoric documents validate claims that the Chehalis people had strong
bonds through intermarriage and trade with neighboring groups in the past as they do today.

In this paper we have presented the Chehalis community as ‘on the edge’ between distinct ecological zones and also as an edge community, situated in a cultural transitional zone between the coast and interior Plateau (Turner et al. 2003; Stoffle and Stoffle 2007). Edge communities have a natural advantage because they benefit from an abundance of natural resources as well as from knowledge, technologies and foreign resources through trade, interaction and intermarriage.

We also adapted the geographical model of “gateway communities” (Burghardt 1971; Hirth 1978) to explore how economic relationships form between long distance exchange partners with respect to control over “key locales”. Applied to the geographical context of the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor, it is clear how through the close governance of their wealthy salmon spawning grounds, and by monitoring access to the Harrison-Lillooet Interaction Corridor, the Chehalis were organized so as to benefit from economic activities occurring within their territory.

The archaeological data from the Harrison River provides the necessary material record for discussing Chehalis’ role within the dynamic interregional interaction sphere between populations from coastal and interior Plateau zones. After mapping the settlements, we believe that the Chehalis had a cohesive strategy for close stewarding, monitoring, and controlling socio-economic activities along the Harrison River. We also propose that archaeological data from the Harrison River in southwest British Columbia could have important implications for understanding the emergence of complex, interregional socio-economic strategies of hunter-fisher-gatherer societies elsewhere in the Northwest Coast and beyond.

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NOTES
1. No further references will be made to this source as this article is a revision of Sanders’ 2006 Honours Thesis written for the University of British Columbia Anthropology Department.
2. All images and maps are the work of the authors unless cited otherwise.

3. The authors recognize that evidence for the geographical origins of pithouse technology remains inconclusive, but work from the historic understanding within the discipline that this technology was perpetuated in transitional zones like the Fraser Valley by interior Plateau influences.

4. This AMS radiocarbon date was obtained with support by the fund of Long Term Research Program of Mokpo National University, South Korea.

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ANTHROPOLOGY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
Collaborators in Neoliberal Imperialism

Abstract
Shrouded in fear and secrecy, the “Global War on Terror”, with its foundation firmly planted in the politics of neoliberalism, has created an ideal atmosphere for the reengagement of anthropology in counterinsurgency and warfare in the twenty-first century. As the neoliberal ideology of “choice” normalizes this participation, the usefulness of anthropological knowledge has been rediscovered by the military who have begun overt recruitment of anthropologists into the intelligence community. This paper will examine the historical background and present day realities of anthropological collaboration in counterinsurgency, highlighting its similarities and differences. Most importantly, the implications of such involvement by the discipline will be discussed, raising questions about academic freedom, as well as the ethics and morality of anthropological participation in warfare and counterinsurgency.

INTRODUCTION
Anthropology has had an ambivalent relationship with the “warfare state” and counterinsurgency for almost one hundred years. In both WWI and WWII, a number of anthropologists willingly contributed to the war effort, while in the counterculture decade of the 1960s, anthropologists funded by the Pentagon conducted secret counterinsurgency research for CIA operations in Chile and Thailand (Gusterman and Price 2005:np). The 1980s ushered in neoliberalism and its ideological rhetoric of personal freedom, individual responsibility and choice (Harvey 2005:23-5). Neoliberalism, combined with the current political climate of fear and insecurity invoked by the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), has created an ideal atmosphere for the reengagement of anthropology in counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century.

Military and intelligence agencies have rediscovered anthropology as a potentially valuable counterinsurgency tool. Of most interest is fieldwork, cultural anthropology’s core methodological principle. A practice that combines linguistic fluency with an ability to build rapport in unfamiliar situations through “cultural immersion” is very appealing to the military (Gonzalez 2007:B20). Overt recruitment of anthropologists is replacing the secrecy of the past as anthropologists once again enter the mainstream of the intelligence community in Canada and the United States, raising questions about the ethics and morality of anthropological participation in warfare and counterinsurgency.

DEFINITIONS:
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GWOT
Counterinsurgency and the GWOT are nebulous, yet highly charged terms. Following the events of September 11, 2001 the U.S., under the leadership of
the Bush administration, took a course of action that has had far-reaching global consequences. Realizing that the 9/11 attack opened up a business opportunity in the Middle East, the administration seized the moment, reinforced fear in an environment already heavy with anxiety, and fabricated the so-called “war on terror,” later expanded into the GWOT. This new war, not unlike the Cold War of the 1950s, polarized issues of religion, national values, and morality through propagandistic rhetoric generated by government and its media collaborators. As opposition mounted in Iraq to the American invasion, the American media began to refer to the War in Iraq as a “counterinsurgency.” However, what does this term mean, and more importantly, what does it imply?

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as: “military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries.” But in this situation, who are the guerrillas or revolutionaries, often referred to as “insurgents”? Corporate media usually imply that “insurgents” are engaged in guerilla warfare against legitimate governments, which may sometimes be correct. However, more often than not insurgents are fighting against governments that have been created by military coups or Western sanctioned (and assisted) powers. In the Iraq War, the “insurgents” are engaged in guerillas warfare against a government created by the Americans and the GWOT. In this instance, the definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency have been inverted, transforming anthropological participation in counterinsurgency into a collaborator of war—just another gun for hire.

ACADEMIC COLLABORATION

Many Canadian and American universities are now directly and indirectly contributing to intelligence work through a variety of means including: research funding, specialized university centers, and scholarship programs (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). In Canada, the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS) at Carlton University in Ottawa is directly linked to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), endorsing Carlton’s acceptance of a university role in government security operations and subsequently in counterinsurgency (CCISS 2002:np). American scholarship programs like the Pat Robinson Intelligence Community Scholars Program (PRISP) and the National Security Education Program (NSEP) offer lucrative, full university scholarships for social science graduate students in the disciplines of anthropology and foreign languages. Acceptance is based on the condition that students, after pursuing the study of “cultures” or foreign languages, agree to work for American intelligence agencies after graduation for a stipulated period of time (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). Furthermore, the identity of students in the Intelligence Community Scholars Program (ISP) is concealed and universities are not informed about the status of these student “spies in our midst” (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). Scholarship programs like PRISP and ISP, now in their third year of operation, are problematic for two primary reasons: 1) “debt bondage” locks in students after they graduate, with “draconian penalties” for students who
renege on their contracts with the CIA; and 2) the aspect of secrecy undermines the “open circulation of knowledge” on university campuses, while unlocking the doors once again (as in the Cold War) to university collaboration in warfare through these clandestine scholarship placements (Gusterton and Price 2005:np). Although the recipients of these scholarships remain hidden to universities at the present time, with neoliberalism becoming more entrenched in our society everyday, that secrecy, which is no longer a necessity in anthropological recruitment into the intelligence community, may also fade away in academia.

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Finally, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) is itself implicated in counterinsurgency. Although there are vocal individuals within the association who have expressed their opposition to participation in counterinsurgency, the AAA has maintained a position of silence on the GWOT. It has remained silent about the damage that this “long war” has inflicted on the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the impact the war is having on academic freedom and dissent (Price 2004:353). The association has even been openly supportive of the counterinsurgency through a posting of a CIA job recruitment ad in several of the AAA journals in October 2005. Only after considerable discussion and complaints within the association, were the ads eventually withdrawn (Gonzalez 2007:B20). In the United States, anthropologists are working openly in the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the CIA. The Chief Strategist in the Office for Counterterrorism in Washington and editor of the Military’s Counterinsurgency Manual at the present time is Australian born David Kilcullen, a Lieutenant Colonel with a PhD in Political Anthropology (Kilcullen 2006:111).

In Canada, CSIS recruits social science graduates on many university campuses, often through Career Fairs. In the winter of 2007 and 2008, CSIS recruitment posters could be found throughout the University of Victoria while both CSIS and the Canadian Armed Forces Recruiting Centre operated a booth at the 2008 Career Fair on campus (University of Victoria 2008:29-30). In addition, in February 2008 CSIS held information sessions at the University of Victoria for students interested in becoming agency Intelligence Operators. The sessions were conducted during school hours using classrooms in the MacLauren and Cornett buildings. MacLauren houses the education faculty and the school of music, while Cornett is home to the departments of anthropology, geography, political science, psychology and sociology.

The AAA’s Statements on Ethics – Principles of Professional Responsibility (PPR) outlines a code of ethics for the discipline of anthropology. First and foremost in that code, is an emphasis on the responsibility to, and protection of the people studied by anthropologists:

In research, anthropologists' paramount responsibility is to those they study. When there is a conflict of interest,
these individuals must come first. Anthropologists must do everything in their power to protect the physical, social, and psychological welfare and to honor the dignity and privacy of those studied (AAA 1986:np).

This “responsibility to the public” suggests that anthropologists also have an obligation to the public, to whom they owe “a commitment to candor and to truth in the dissemination of their research results and in the statement of their opinions as students of humanity” (AAA 1986:np). The Statement on Ethics further outlines anthropology’s responsibility to the discipline, its students, their sponsors and one’s own and host governments. The 1971 Code of Ethics emphasized integrity, open inquiry, and responsibility in engaging in ethical and honest research that reflects a “concern for the welfare and privacy of informants” (AAA 1971:np). When the PPR was drafted in 1971, the AAA’s general position on clandestine and secret research under the section “Responsibility to the Discipline” was:

a. Anthropologists should undertake no secret research or any research whose results cannot be fully derived and publicly reported; and

b. Anthropologists should avoid even the appearance of engaging in clandestine research, by fully and freely disclosing the aims and sponsorship of all research (AAA 1971:np).

By 1984, this emphasis on public accountability began to dwindle. Gerald Berreman sums up the revisions made to the Principles of Professional Responsibility as marking an era of a “new Reaganethics” within the AAA (Berreman 1991:311-314). David Price characterizes these alterations, which took place in the Reagan era of deregulation and privatization, as a shift in the responsibility of the ethical review process from the association (AAA) to the individual (Price 2000:26). Laura Nader argues that these changes to the Code of Ethics primarily served to protect academic careers at the expense of the people they studied (Nader 1997:np). A mere decade later, in 1995, ethical responsibility was further loosened. At the completion of the AAA’s Ethics Commission Review it was concluded that:

the committee on ethics had neither the authority nor the resources to investigate or arbitrate complaints of ethical violations and would no longer adjudicate claims of unethical behavior and [would instead] focus its efforts and resources on an ethics education program’ (AAA 1995:np).

Ethical dilemmas and debates have not been absent in anthropological research, the Tierney/Chagnon “Darkness in El Dorado” dispute over Chagnon’s work with the Yanomamo in the Amazon in the 1960s being one of the main controversies (Slutka 2006:271). But according to Berreman: “in its twenty year history, the Committee on Ethics has pursued only one case …to the
Executive Board, and no case went any further than that” (Berreman 1991:308).

As a result of revisions made in the 1980s and 1990s the current AAA’s *Code of Ethics* no longer contains prohibitions against espionage or clandestine research. Cracks in the ethical code are intensifying with recent anthropological participation in counterinsurgency operations and the GWOT. The presence of anthropologists on the team of the Department of Defense’s newly created pilot project in Iraq, the 2007 Human Terrain System (HTS) provides a recent example of this participation (Gonzalez 2007:20). The *Code of Ethics* now functions to enable, and even encourage, the engagement of anthropologists in military intelligence work if they so desire, bringing a whole new meaning to the field of “applied” anthropology. Rather than being a moral, ethical or practical question, participation in counterinsurgency operations has simply become an issue of individual responsibility, one left to the neoliberal “choice” of individual academics. Recent anthropological participation in counterinsurgency demonstrates that current research has benefited not only from the fractures in the *Code of Ethics* but also from the culture of fear brought about by the GWOT.

**COLONIALISM AND WORLD WARS**

Upon close examination of the history of the discipline, the association of anthropology and counterinsurgency is hardly new or recent. Described by Kathleen Gough in 1968 as the “handmaid of colonialism” and the “child of Western imperialism,” anthropology has had a long and controversial involvement in warfare for over one hundred years—practically since its conception as a discipline in the early nineteenth century. American Anthropologist, Montgomery McFate, writing in the Military Review in 2005, explains the utility of such involvement: During the 1900s, knowledge of the anthropological variety “was frequently useful, especially in understanding the power dynamics in traditional societies” (McFate 2005:28). Not surprisingly, colonialism provided the framework and the funding for anthropologists such as Bronislaw Malinowski and E.E. Evans-Pritchard to conduct their fieldwork. While these early anthropologists certainly aided the development of exploitative colonial regimes around the globe, their intent remained one of presenting the ‘native view’ to administrators and policy makers of the day in the name of better governance.

Although often profoundly damaging, this early work was not explicitly connected to war efforts. The intentionality shifted in both WWI and WWII when numerous anthropologists willingly contributed both overtly and covertly to the war effort. During World War I, a number of anthropologists worked as secret agents, including Sylvanus Morley, the Harvard-trained archaeologist best known for directing the excavation of Chichén Itzá (McFate 2005:25). While some may have deemed these covert actions allowable and even necessary, it is important to note that oppositional voices have been raised against anthropology’s participation in counterinsurgency from the beginnings of the discipline.
Franz Boas was one of the first outspoken opponents to anthropological support of warfare, when in 1919 in a letter to The Nation, he expressed a largely unpopular point of view condemning any kind of anthropological participation in the war effort as being unethical and damaging to the discipline’s reputation. In this letter, Boas argued that unlike the soldier, diplomat, politician and businessman who “may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies,” the scientist must be held accountable for such actions (Boas 1973:51-2). In addition to distinguishing science as patently accountable, Boas brought attention to the actions of four unnamed American anthropologists claiming that they had abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in Central America during the First World War (Price 2000a:24). Boas strongly emphasized that for the scientist [anthropologist]:

The very essence of his life is the service of truth. A person, however, who uses science as a cover for political spying, who demeans himself to pose before a foreign government as an investigator and asks for assistance in his alleged researches in order to carry on, under this cloak, his political machinations, prostitutes science in an unpardonable way and forfeits the right to be classed as a scientist (Boas 1973:51-2).

As a result of his protests, the AAA censured Boas, a move that effectively removed him from his position on the governing council (Price 2000a:24). All four of the accused spies, whose names are now known, Samuel Lothrop, Sylvanus Morley, Herbert Spinden and John Mason were all present at the annual AAA meeting when this disciplinary action took place and all but one of these men voted for Boas’s censure. John Mason, the anthropologist who did not vote for this motion, later wrote an apologetic letter to Boas, explaining that he had spied “out of a sense of patriotic duty” (Price 2000a:24).

The disciplinary action taken by the AAA in 1919 against Boas sent a message to anthropologists like Morley, Spinden and Lothrop (who continued his military intelligence career into the Second World War) that “espionage under cover of science in the service of the state was acceptable” (Price 2000a:24). As a result, these same issues have surfaced and have been suppressed by anthropologists in all of the military conflicts that have taken place since WWI (Price 2000a:25-6). In writing about anthropology’s historical participation in warfare, David Price, like Boas, also distinguishes between two types of anthropological participation - covert and overt counterinsurgency. Price asserts that while the majority of anthropologists produced work for government intelligence agencies openly during World War I, a minority worked in intelligence under false pretenses (Price 2000a:25). Samuel Lothrop, for example, used the facade of managing non-existent archaeological excavations in Peru as
a cover for his espionage activities in Central and South America in WWII (Price 2000a:24-5).

Cooperative and eager anthropologists continued to contribute directly and indirectly to warfare research during World War II. In the U.S., numerous prominent anthropologists worked for agencies such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the CIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of War Information, the Ethnogeographic Board and the Military Intelligence Division (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). Ruth Benedict’s story of Japanese culture ‘at a distance,’ later published as *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946), has the dubious distinction as being “the most famous anthropological contribution to the war effort in WWII” (Gusterson and Price 2005:np).

Yet at times anthropologists have demonstrated regret about their complicity in warfare while others “expressed bitterness at the ways their contributions were ignored or used in ways against their will” (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). Margaret Mead and her husband Gregory Bateson worked for OSS and Special Forces during WWII. Mead produced pamphlets for the War Office as well as assisting “the OSS to establish a psychological warfare training unit for the Far East” (McFate 2005:31). Bateson conducted intelligence analysis in Burma where he “designed and produced ‘black propaganda’ radio broadcasts intended to undermine Japanese propaganda in the Pacific Theatre”; and later worked with the CIA developing “experimental psychological warfare initiatives, including mind-control research” (McFate 2005:30-31). After the war, Bateson expressed regret about his intelligence work with OSS, primarily because of the harm that had been inflicted upon the native peoples in the areas where intelligence work had been carried out (Price 2005:3). Even during World War II, a war widely sanctioned and accepted by the general public, there were anthropologists like Laura Thompson who were concerned that anthropological participation in the war effort was “transforming anthropologists into technicians for hire to the highest bidder” (Price 2000a:25).

**THE COLD WAR, McCARTHYISM, PROJECT CAMELOT AND THE THAILAND CONTROVERSY**

The controversial entanglement of anthropology with counterinsurgency gathered momentum during the beginnings of the Cold War in the mid 1940s into the 1950s—this time the war was against Communism. To facilitate the goal of the Cold War, the containment of communism at all cost, the U.S. established a number of agencies to exercise its global power, and in 1947 the executive agency known as CIA was created (McCoy 1990). In order to conduct its crusade against communism, the CIA was willing to construct alliances with anyone or any group who could help their campaign. The agency offered employment to a number of anthropologists who had contributed to the war effort during WWII, thus paving the way for engagement in the decades to follow. David Price explains the far-reaching relationship between anthropology and the intelligence community in his article, *Anthropologists as Spies*
In the following decades [after WWII] there were numerous private and public interactions between anthropologists and the intelligence community. Some anthropologists applied their skills at the CIA after its inception in 1947 and may still be doing so today. For some of them this was a logical transition from their wartime espionage work with the OSS and other organizations; others regarded the CIA as an agency concerned with gathering information to assist policy-makers rather than a secret branch of government that subverted foreign governments and waged clandestine war on the Soviet Union and its allies. Still other anthropologists unwittingly received research funding from CIA fronts like the Human Ecology Fund (Price 2000:25).

The war against communism was in large part responsible for McCarthyism, which according to Price was “part of a long, ignoble American tradition of repressing the rights of free association, inquiry, and advocacy of those that would threaten the status quo of America’s stratified political economic system” (Price 2004:2). In Threatening Anthropology (2004), David Price discusses the impact of this tradition on anthropology, beginning in the 1920s with the FBI surveillance and investigation of anthropologists suspected of ties to the Communist Party (Price 2004:15). The FBI, under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, continued its surveillance of social scientists and academics for the next twenty years, culminating in the McCarthy witch-hunt trails of the 1950’s.

Price argues that “committed social activism” by anthropologists, such as fighting against entrenched racial prejudice in American society, and not their Communist, Marxist or Socialist connections was what attracted the most intense scrutiny from the FBI and the McCarthy congressional committees (Price 2004:2). Through his extensive use of archival material and 30,000 pages of government documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, Price provides a thorough analysis of the repercussions of the witch-hunts, demonstrating that the atmosphere of fear and censorship during the McCarthy era impacted anthropology far beyond the lives of those who lost their jobs. Anthropology was a threat to the policies and practices of McCarthy era politics. Price powerfully describes anthropology’s “threatening” position:

When practiced properly, anthropology is a threatening science. Its dictums of equality and its distinct view of stratification threaten claims of legitimacy and dominance; but in the mid-century its critique of the abuses of race in contemporary society was a direct threat to America’s status quo (Price 2004:29).

McCarthyism transformed anthropological theory and practice. Social activism, focused on domestic
systems of inequality and injustice was stifled, while scholarship that examined the basis of hegemonic power was curtailed (Price 2004:349). Cold War communist hysteria and the subsequent suppression of social activism laid the foundation for the clandestine counterinsurgency research that took place in South America and Southeast Asia in the counterculture decade that followed.

Anthropologists, funded by the U.S. government, provided direct and willing participation in secret research projects in the 1960’s - Project Camelot in Chile (1964-1965) and the Thailand Controversy (1961-1969) (Wakin 1992:1-2). Project Camelot was a social science research project “whose objective was to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world” (Wakin 1992:27). The Thailand Controversy involved the participation of anthropologists in secret counterinsurgency operations designed to defeat the growing communist-led insurgency in Thailand. Employed by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) under the U.S. Department of Defense, social scientists worked to actively spread counterinsurgency practices in Thailand. As well as involvement in Thailand, APRA was active in Vietnam and was responsible for the application of the first use of defoliants in Vietnam (Wakin 1992:96). However, this was also a time of increasing student activism. And in 1970, documents were sent to the AAA Ethics committee chairman Eric Wolf and board member Joseph Jorgensen by the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) implicating American social scientists in counterinsurgency operations in Thailand (Wolf 1970:26).

As details of this secret collaboration (funded by the US government and organizations such as the Ford Foundation) were made public, anthropology fell into disgrace (Gusterson and Price 2005:np). The Ethics Committee conducted an inquiry that resulted in the creation of a code of ethics for the discipline of anthropology by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) – Statements on Ethics – Principles of Professional Responsibility (PPR) in 1971. Section two, of the PPR, Responsibility to the Discipline stated that:

a. Anthropologists should undertake no secret research or any research whose results cannot be freely derived and publicly reported; and
b. Anthropologists should avoid even the appearance of engaging in clandestine research, by fully and freely disclosing the aims and sponsorship of all research” (AAA 1971:np).

For a number of years, the 1971 version of the PPR encouraged anthropologists to distance themselves from the military, from war, and even from an analysis of war itself (which may have been a disservice to political anthropology). Following the events of 9/11 and the subsequent GWOT, ethical guidance and the application of ethical rules of conduct were truly needed. Unfortunately, additional amendments
made to the AAA’s *Code of Ethics* in the 1980s and 1990s, combined with a shift of focus from adjudicating claims of unethical behaviour to education, further weakened the influence of the organization.

**ANTHROPOLOGY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY TODAY**

The counterculture activism of the 1960s and 1970s drew attention to the question of professional ethics and in the process discredited and stigmatized anthropological involvement in military intelligence operations for a short time, but anthropologists today, finding themselves located in a political atmosphere of patriotism and propaganda similar to that of the two World Wars, are slowly being lulled into participation in counterinsurgency operations orchestrated by the United States. This time, their engagement is very much out in the open.

The neoliberal sociopolitical ideology of “choice” and “personal freedom” has diminished the ethical questions around participation in counterinsurgency and the need for secrecy. Although U.S. scholarship programs connected to the intelligence community remain cloaked in secrecy, recruitment into organizations like CSIS and the CIA are today much more visible and acceptable, now a “career choice” rather than a moral or ethical decision. According to Gonzalez and Price, anthropology has recently been described as a “counterinsurgency related field” in employment advertisements by one of the top 10 US defense contractors (Gonzalez and Price 2007:np).

While today’s political environment has a strong undercurrent of the Cold War atmosphere of paranoia and fear, it also mirrors the patriotic climate of the publicly sanctioned two World Wars, which justified warfare and spurred participation by social scientists. As the current war in Iraq and conflict in Afghanistan sinks further into chaos, the U.S. administration, aware that its military actions have been ineffective, is looking for other strategies to win its war. Included in these strategies is the vigilant and open recruitment of anthropologists and other social scientists into the military intelligence community. McFate and Kilcullen, working within the intelligence community in the U.S., are promoting the connection between a successful counterinsurgency and an understanding of other people and cultures. McFate, whose dissertation in cultural anthropology focused on the British counterinsurgency policy in Northern Ireland, advised the military that: “Successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture. This cultural understanding must be thorough and deep if it is to have any practical benefit at all” (McFate 2005:37).

In his article in the *Military Review*, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Kalev Sepp cites the work of the American cultural anthropologist Lucien Pye during the 1950’s Malayan Emergency as research that helps to understand how to develop successful “operational practices” in counterinsurgency (Sepp 2005:10). The military now refers to the understanding of the socio-cultural environment of the population as one of the “best practices” in counter-counterinsurgency operations.

Practical experience and research indicate six major factors that make intelligence in counterinsurgency different than in other forms of warfare. First and foremost, intelligence in *counterinsurgency is about people*. Commanders must understand the host nations people and government, the people involved in the insurgency, and the conditions driving the insurgency. They must have insight into the perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and decision-making processes of individuals and groups. These requirements are the basis for collection and analysis efforts (Teamey 2006:24 emphasis mine).

Numerous articles in military magazines urge the acceptance and recruitment of more anthropologists and other social scientists into the war effort. The U.S. Cultural Operations Research Human Terrain System (HTS) has been recruiting social scientists, including at least one anthropologist, to serve as cultural advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gonzalez 2007). The purpose of the HTS team is to collect “local population knowledge” and disseminate and explain that knowledge to combat troops (Gonzalez and Price 2007:np). In Canada in 2002, Carlton University in Ottawa established the Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (CCISS),5 “the only university centre in Canada dedicated to research in Intelligence and National Security Studies” (CCISS 2002). CCISS trains students for future employment in intelligence with CSIS, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the RCMP Criminal Intelligence Directorate, and the Intelligence Division (J2) of the Department of National Defense/Canadian Forces (CCISS 2002:np). It is not known how many anthropologists now work in counterinsurgency in the United States and Canada.

**SECRECY, PROPAGANDA AND NEOLIBERALISM**

Secrecy in intelligence gathering and recruitment, imperative to anthropological involvement and intelligence work from the 1930’s to the 1960’s, is no longer an issue. In terms of the collection of intelligence data, Kilcullen explains the changes that have taken place in intelligence gathering for modern counterinsurgency:

Secret intelligence is often less relevant than information which is not classified by any government, but is located in denied areas…in modern counterinsurgency, where there is no single insurgent network to be penetrated but rather a cultural and demographic jungle of population groups to be navigated, ‘basic intelligence’ – detailed knowledge of physical, human, cultural and informational terrain based on a combination of open
source research and ‘denied area ethnography’ – will be even more critical (Kilcullen 2006:11 emphasis mine).

Secondly, the need for secrecy in recruitment is fading rapidly due to the successfully embedded propaganda campaign of the “war on terror” that is permeating popular consciousness. Utilized by corporate media, propaganda is a highly effective tool of social control. Along with increased control over what the public sees in respect to war footage, various forms of popular culture, (including music, film and television), endorse and promote patriotism and the hegemonic goals of the U.S. while demonizing “the other,” all under the guise of entertainment. References to “terrorism,” “the war on terror” and the War in Iraq are casually inserted into the background storylines of highly popular television programs such as CSI, South Park and WWE (World Wrestling Entertainment). The Toronto Globe and Mail and CBC’s hip infotainment program, The Hour, bring viewers personal stories from “the Mission in Afghanistan” and interviews with returned Canadian soldiers. On another level, big budget Hollywood films like the Bond and Bourne franchises glamorize terror, torture and espionage. Popular culture thus transforms the GWOT and the War in Iraq into just another part of acceptable, but exciting everyday life. Through this constant hum of propaganda, counterinsurgency and intelligence operations are normalized and glamorized, subconsciously connected to notions of progress, development, employment and consumerism.

Citizens in the U.S. and Canada are being encouraged once again to embrace patriotism and believe that the “war on terror” is a just and essential war. This propaganda implicitly reinforces the idea that any and all involvement in counterinsurgency is acceptable and even desirable. While it is clear that the military and the intelligence community have recognized the value of “cultural knowledge” in counterinsurgency and are doing their utmost to recruit social scientists, the implications of anthropological participation in these counterinsurgency operations are very disturbing.

**CONCLUSION: OPPOSITION AND RESISTANCE**

Perhaps this is a time when anthropologists should reconsider the issues raised by some of the anthropologists writing in the 1960s-1970s. Kathleen Gough in 1968 asked why anthropologists had not “studied Western imperialism as a social system or even adequately explored the effects of imperialism on the societies [they] studied” (Gough 1968:405). Anthropology has remained reluctant to shift its gaze to issues of state-systems, power and warfare. According to Krohn-Hansen and Nustad, writing in *State Formation - Anthropological Perspectives*: “This lack of focus on the modern state has weakened our discipline. It continues to undermine anthropologists’ capacity to deal satisfactorily with important forms of power and politics in the contemporary world” (Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005:21).

The GWOT and the counterinsurgency are extending the
militaristic and corporate tentacles of US neoliberalism into other areas of the globe. Not surprisingly, many question the legitimacy of these actions and anthropology’s participation in them. In an article posted in May 2005 on the online site, *Savage Minds: Notes and Questions in Anthropology*, the author “Oneman” stated that: “The bottom line is that the needs of anthropology and the needs of military action are radically at odds. [Anthropologists] like McFate are arguing for an enlightened tyranny, but a tyranny nonetheless” (Savage Minds 2005:np). Writing in the 1970’s, Joseph Jorgensen and Eric Wolf express the ethical dilemmas facing contemporary anthropologists very clearly:

Behind an appeal, a research grant, a consultant's fee, an appeal to personal vanity or to patriotism, is a government that may well use the knowledge gained to damage the subjects among whom it was gathered. Perhaps this is the grimmest lesson of all the events of the past years: many a naive anthropologist has become, wittingly or unwittingly, an informer (Jorgensen and Wolf 1970:30).

Yet this emphasis on political naivety misses the additional problem of self-censorship. Describing her McCarthy era student days as a time of “living in a fog,” Laura Nader, explains how self-censorship prevents engagement in social activism: “anthropology’s intersection with politics is made invisible through processes of ‘mind colonization,’ whereby anthropologists learn how to dissociate their past and present actions from embedded political events” (Nader 1997:141). The political climate of the GWOT is generating the same kind of fog, a colonization of the mind and self-censorship in which confusion is erasing clarity and ambiguity is replacing activism. If anthropologists continue to engage in actions that covertly and overtly support the war on terror and counterinsurgency, anthropology - the “child of imperialism” - is in danger of evolving into the adult partner of neoliberal globalization.

Contemporary anthropologists must join with the whistleblowers of thirty years ago – the counterculture student activists and anthropologists including Gough, Wolf and Jorgensen, along with current anthropological activists including academics, practicing anthropologists and students and promote alternatives to this partnership. Active engagement and collective action are required. As stated by David Price: “theory without action is only theory. Activism is important because it is action” (Price 2004:349).

Fortunately, dissent exists today against anthropological collaboration in warfare as it has in past decades. David Price, Roberto Gonzalez, Hugh Gusterson and Laura Nader represent a growing number of anthropologists who are concerned about the escalating militarization of anthropology. In a recent 2007 article in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Gonzalez discusses the purpose behind the accumulation of anthropological data by the military:

The fact that Kilcullen and
others are eager to commit social-science knowledge to goals established by the Defense Department and the CIA is indicative of a new anthropology of insurgency. Anthropology under these circumstances appears as just another weapon [italics added] to be used on the battlefield — not as a tool for building bridges between peoples, much less as a mirror that we might use to reflect upon the nature of our own society (Gonzalez 2007:20).

Opposition to contemporary anthropological involvement in counterinsurgency is coming from individuals within professional organizations, media and online publications, and through newly formed networks. In 2005, as a result of debates and opposition within the discipline on this issue, the AAA created a special nine-member commission, the Commission on the Engagement of Anthropologists with the US Security and Intelligence Communities, to “investigate the issues, ethics, and methodological concerns regarding the engagement of anthropology in military and security communities” and provide a report to the AAA Executive in November 2007 (AAA 2007a:np). Committee members include: James Peacock, Chair, (University of North Carolina), Robert Albro (American University), Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (Rhode Island College), Kerry Fosher (Dartmouth College and Syracuse University), George Marcus (University of California, Irvine), Laura McNamara (Sandia National Laboratories), David Price (St. Martin’s University), Monica Heller (University of Toronto), and Alan Goodman, ex-officio (Hampshire College) (AAA 2007a:np). Unfortunately, the outcome of the committee report completed in November 2007 is vague, reflecting neoliberal attitudes of personal responsibility. According to the AAA’s website, The Executive Summary states that:

The Commission recognizes both opportunities and risks to those anthropologists choosing to engage with the work of the military, security and intelligence arenas. We do not recommend non-engagement, but instead emphasize differences in kinds of engagement and accompanying ethical considerations. We advise careful analysis of specific roles, activities, and institutional contexts of engagement in order to ascertain ethical consequences. These ethical considerations begin with the admonition to do no harm to those one studies (or with whom one works, in an applied setting) and to be honest and transparent in communicating what one is doing (AAA 2007b:4).

Lacking confidence that the AAA Commission would take a strong position on anthropological participation in counterinsurgency, a small group of individual anthropologists created another avenue of opposition to counterinsurgency. In
the fall of 2007, eleven anthropologists formed the Network of Concerned Anthropologists, an independent ad hoc network whose intention is to “promote an ethical anthropology” that rejects involvement in any counterinsurgency operations in the “war on terror” (NCA 2007:np). According to their website the NCA believes that:

Anthropologists should not engage in research and other activities that contribute to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or in related theatres in the ‘war on terror’. Furthermore, we believe that anthropologists should refrain from directly assisting the US military in combat, be it through torture, interrogation or tactical advice (NCA 2007:np).

The eleven founding members of the network who include: Catherine Besteman, Andrew Bickford, Greg Feldman, Gustaaf Houtman, Roberto Gonzalez, Hugh Gusterson, Jean Jackson, Kanhong Lin, Catherine Lutz, David Price and David Vine have all agreed to a Pledge of Non-participation in Counterinsurgency “not to undertake research or other activities in support of counterinsurgency work in Iraq or related theatre in the ‘war on terror,’ and [they] appeal to colleagues everywhere to make the same commitment” (NCA 2007:np).

Anthropologists must keep up the pressure on their professional organizations, including the AAA, to take a strong position on the GWOT in order to protect the freedom of inquiry. There is no neutral position on this question. A silent or neutral position is still a position, one that implicitly supports the counterinsurgency. Instead of silence or complicity, David Price stresses the urgency of the present situation and emphasizes that “anthropologists must join the voices speaking out against the war on terror’s threats to the world’s indigenous peoples, the threats to academic freedom, and threats posed by intelligence agencies to our life, liberty, and inalienable rights” (Price 2004:353). Collectively and individually, anthropologists must continue to speak out against the growing militarization of the discipline and promote alternatives to this collaboration: an outright refusal to participate in counterinsurgency operations of any form, and a shift in focus to analysis and critique of the power behind the counterinsurgency – the corporate state and global imperialism of the twenty-first century.

NOTES
1. The Cold War refers to the conflict between the two superpowers of the era—the US and the Soviet Union, who gradually involved their allied satellites in this political standoff, not unlike the “Coalition of the Willing” in the GWOT.
2. The “Thailand Controversy” specifically refers to the controversy surrounding the AAA’s ad hoc Mead Committee Report (chaired by Margaret Mead), which was released on November 19, 1971. The report contested an earlier public denunciation of anthropological involvement in
warfare and argued for the legitimacy of anthropological participation in counterinsurgency. These views were debated and rejected at the AAA's Annual Meeting that November of 1971 (Watkin 1992:2).

3. Dr. Sepp is an assistant professor at the Department of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

4. The Malayan Emergency was a communist insurgency in Malaya that took place from 1948-1960. The insurgents were eventually defeated through the use of new “jungle tactics” (counterinsurgency) and the disruption of their supply network (Oxford Reference Online 2005).

5. At the present time there no other Canadian universities that offer a full program in Intelligence Studies and only a few offer any undergraduate or graduate courses in Intelligence Studies (CCISS 2002:np).

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