Fifteen African countries comprising NePAD’s Implementation Committee* will recommend to the founding meeting of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, July 2002, a set of commitments, obligations and actions that constitute the essentials of good governance.

_The Democracy and Political Governance Initiative_ (DPGI), as it is currently called, will be the basis for deciding which countries participate, and to what extent, in NePAD. The DPGI addresses a strategic issue for Africa: the need for new norms, more effective regional and international institutions, and greater political will to prevent severe abuses of power within states while not undermining those sovereign rights and responsibilities that help maintain peace and security among states. Political decisions will ultimately rest with NePAD heads of state, presumably according to recommendations from an African Peer Review Mechanism (APR), described below.

NePAD’s founders recognize that Africa’s greatest handicap is the prevalence of weak states that lack the capacity, resources and/or will to provide adequate security for their citizens, to be effective regional partners, and to deal with the new forces of globalisation. Promoting good governance and holding governments more accountable for their domestic behaviour is, in Nelson Mandela’s term, “democratic realism.” It is essential for preventing the deadly conflicts that have ravaged much of Africa, overcoming poverty, achieving sustainable development, and dealing with a growing list of national and transnational problems, including terrorism, refugees, criminal cartels, environmental degradation, and other threats to regional security. The DPGI thus should be seen as the linchpin for the entire NePAD process.

Never before have so many prominent and diverse African countries shown such concerted interest in finding was to help themselves and their neighbours to become politically capable partners. Assuming the draft DPGI accepted at the March meeting of NePAD’s Implementing Committee gets formal AU endorsement and strong support from Western and other donors, it has the potential to transform Africa’s international relations and may one day be seen as the most important advance in African self-determination since decolonisation.

* NePAD has a five member Steering Committee, South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt, which together with the following ten others comprise the Implementation Committee: Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome et Principe, Ghana, Tunisia, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Most members do not yet meet the standards of the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative they have so far supported, and assembling this group was complex and delicate diplomatic challenge, which achieved geographic balance while excluding less deserving applicants.
It is no secret that South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki, is the architect of NePAD. It is a role that might be compared to the one Kwame Nkrumah’s played in promoting Pan African unity forty years ago. Both leaders emerged out of liberation struggles, with ‘seek ye first the political kingdom’ an apt aphorism for their missions in life. In leadership style and substance, however, the two leaders are very different. Nkrumah’s main concern was who would govern Africa. Aside from his presumed personal ambitions, he reflected a Pan Africanist liberationist tradition dating back to the 1880s. Mbeki is at the forefront of a new wave of Pan Africanism, with the central question not who but how will Africa be governed.* Those promoting NePAD longer worry about liberation but integration, equity rather than freedom, globalisation not isolation, and human rights and security before sovereign rights and state security.

Nkrumah failed to achieve his goals for Ghana and Africa. Is Mbeki’s vision any more plausible? It is, of course, too early to know. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, remains a consensus-based association of sovereign states. What Nkrumah had hoped would become a continental movement is still a very weak alliance. The AU aspires to become a community similar to the EU, with a parliament, single currency and economy, and continental court. But that is at best a distant dream. NePAD offers another route to the same end, more incremental, cumulative, and conditional for those who chose to participate.

Mbeki, Obasanjo and other proponents of NePAD seek formal and unanimous approval for any Plan of Action from the AU. This is seen as necessary to give NePAD legitimacy and to avoid the deep intra-African splits marked the founding of the OAU. All African countries are potential members of NePAD, but only those willing – though not necessarily able – to meet its good governance standards will be included. NePAD aspires to become a “club” with membership “fees” and “privileges” set by a peer review process, presumably run by members of the Implementing Committee. No one knows whether this can or will work but given Africa’s problems most African governments appear willing to give it a try.

To improve prospects of success, this Pan African experiment – for the first time – seeks backing from the West. This appeal is not made in name of compensation for past wrongs. Mbeki knows well Africa’s weak states are the legacy of colonial rule that transferred the trappings but not the traditions of democratic rule, a situation made worse during the Cold War, when political alignment internationally was more generously rewarded with financial assistance than democratic development domestically. Rather than looking backward, proponents of NePAD stress its importance as an investment that will benefit Africa and the world.

From the outset, Mbeki has sought for Africa what he has tried to do for South Africa, pursue a foreign policy that “walks on two legs.” Whereas all previous Pan African initiatives were launched in Africa and exclusively for Africans, Mbeki chose first to showcase his Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP), the little changed precursor of NePAD, at the 2001 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

*I am grateful to Dr Chris Landsberg for this point, which he is developing in a forthcoming essay on the five waves of Pan Africanism.
The plan then received the backing of the G-8 at last year’s Genoa summit. And only then did the OAU give its unanimous approval, in principle, at their 2001 summit in Lusaka. Along the way NePAD has acquired a Chair, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, the fifteen nation executive committee, and a secretariat based at the Development Bank for Southern Africa between Pretoria and Johannesburg and headed by Mbeki’s economic advisor, Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu.

NePAD cannot succeed if left only to governments and intergovernmental organisations. Support from civil society and the private sector, within and beyond Africa, will be vital, especially in the development, implementation and monitory of the DPGI. All donors – bi-lateral, multi-lateral, and non-governmental should view the DPGI as a potential target for assistance and as a source of guidance/criteria in setting country priorities for all other NePAD projects and programs.

The next section of this paper summarizes the commitments, obligations and actions that are expected of NePAD members. A brief description of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) follows. Several immediate political issues affecting the advancement of NePAD are then considered. A concluding section suggests how the Centre for Global Studies and State of the World Forum (CFGS/SWF) project might contribute to its advancement.

**DPGI Commitments, Obligations and Actions**

The version of the DPGI accepted by the NePAD Implementation Committee at their March summit in Abuja contains twelve commitments and obligations and lists 20 actions to be taken.

To improve the chances that all members of the African Union will feel politically compelled to adopt the initiative, DPGI drafters shrewdly inserted a preamble to remind African governments that most have signed and ratified six regional and seven of already existing formal instruments that most have already signed. Most lack enforcement provisions but because their aims already enjoy the formal backing, DPGI backers expect that most governments will be reluctant to challenge something derivative of established instruments.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union tops the list. Among its objectives under Article 3 are to “Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” and “Promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter…and other relevant human rights instruments.” In what is also regarded as a small but significant step the Article 4 (h) grants the AU the right to “intervene in a Member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes genocide and crimes against humanity.” The first step in implementing this provision has already been taken, following adoption in 2000 of the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government. The OAU has since imposed sanctions, for the first time in its history, against two members -- Ivory Coast and Comoros – with positive effect.

The initial twelve commitments and obligations accepted in Abuja will no doubt appear to many sceptics as further widening the gap between promise and
performance of African countries in areas of human rights and democratisation. If donor agencies, public and private, can find ways to use these as framework to guide their funding priorities, and if they become the focus for grass-roots political mobilization in support of NePAD across Africa, prospects that these commitments and obligations will influence policies in African capitals will likely improve. They include:

- To demonstrate and exercise the necessary political will to keep to the core values, commitments and obligations of NEPAD and of the aforementioned legal instruments.
- To empower people and institutions within civil society to ensure an active and independent civil society that can hold government accountable to the people.
- To adhere to the principles of a constitutional democracy, the rule of law and the strict separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary.
- To promote political representivity, thus providing opportunities for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment.
- To ensure the periodic democratic renewal of leadership, in line with the principle that leaders should be subject to fixed terms in office.
- To ensure freedom of expression, inclusive of a guaranteed free media.
- To ensure the effective participation of women, minorities and disadvantaged groups in political and economic processes.
- To ensure impartial, transparent and credible electoral administration and oversight systems.
- To combat and eradicate corruption.
- To ensure a dedicated, honest and efficient civil service.
- To establish oversight institutions providing the necessary surveillance, checks and balances, and to ensure transparency and accountability by all layers of government.
- To protect and ensure respect for universal human rights and the African human rights system (noted above).
- To create and strengthen institutional capacity to ensure the proper functioning of democratic institutions and instruments.

The twenty actions called for in the current DPGI draft are also very broad, with a few surprises, and deserve close scrutiny by governments and non-governmental organisations as the basis for deciding how to implement NePAD:

- Develop clear standards of accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.
- Strengthen and empower national, sub-regional and regional institutions, mechanisms, instruments, and processes that protect democracy and promote good governance. If required, constitutions, treaties, charters and human rights instruments should be reviewed and strengthened at national, sub-regional and regional levels to ensure compliance with the principles of democratic good governance.
- Strengthen the separation of powers to ensure the necessary checks and balances to restrict the potential for the encroachment and abuse of executive powers.
Parliaments must be empowered to fulfil their functions and the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. Strengthen oversight institutions that provide the necessary surveillance systems, checks and balances.

- Ensure the successful establishment of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) envisaged in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Utilise the PAP and sub-regional Parliamentary Fora in strengthening the role of Parliaments in Africa.
- Develop appropriate measures to ensure that the interests of outgoing Heads of State and Government are catered for.
- Implement the OAU Decisions taken over the years to promote stability and development, e.g. the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World.
- Support capacity building of institutions, groups and individuals at all levels and in all spheres of national life (political, social, economic, infrastructure, managerial and administrative), with particular attention to women and minorities. Build capacity in terms of the training and functioning of institutions and at the technical level, e.g. professional support staff. Strengthen the capacity of the public service to ensure dedicated, honest and efficient service.
- Reassess OAU and sub-regional election monitoring procedures.
- Establish and revitalise independent national electoral commissions (IECs) with powers to publicly publish their own reports and to manage elections.
- Ensure the independence of the judiciary and the efficient functioning of the administration of justice at national level, and provide resources and capacity for judicial reform to promote the rule of law and access to justice and to strengthen criminal justice systems. Build the capacity of African states to set and enforce a legal framework, as well as to maintain law and order.
- Involve all sectors of civil society in policy formulation and implementation processes and provide for civil society representation at sub-regional and regional institutions, especially with regard to the structures of the new AU and the PAP.
- Develop national, sub-regional and regional instruments dealing with corruption.
- Promote the appointment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights in Africa within the AU along the lines of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- Strengthen human rights institutions at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.
- Support the Charter, African Commission and Court on Human and People’s Rights as important instruments for ensuring the promotion, protection and observance of human rights. Examine a series of reforms to improve the effectiveness of the Charter system, including amendments to the Charter, and strengthening the Commission and the Court of Human and People’s Rights.
- Ensure the successful establishment and functioning of the African Court of Justice envisaged by the Constitutive Act of the AU. In this regard, resolve the issues surrounding the relationship between the envisaged African Court of Justice and the African Charter, Commission and Court of Human and People’s Rights in the context of the transition from the OAU to the AU. Resolve the issue of the status, or not, of the Charter, Commission and Court of Human and People’s Rights in the AU.
- Support the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
- Ensure commitment for the work of the UN Commission on Human Rights.
• Make the Charter system part of the curricula of the different universities of Africa, with a view to educating future lawyers and judges in the promotion and development of an African body of jurisprudence. Improve conditions for the emergence of indigenous African human rights jurisprudence.

• Ensure consistent support for and expansion of the OAU position on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, including assisting in returning undemocratic regimes to constitutional order and expanding the yellow card/red card principle further to include patently undemocratic and unconstitutional behaviour, as well as gross violations of human rights by governments in power.

The list suggests how intrusive NePAD could become in seeking to transform African countries into politically capable partners. There no doubt will be political resistance to such actions in specific circumstances by many African states. Decisions on who to respond to country actions, within Africa and among donors, are likely to be tentative, inconsistent, and often confusing. But this list does offer an important starting point. It also indicates the need for a division of labour among different types of donors and in deciding appropriate mixes of implementing instruments. Setting and then adequately funding levels of support sufficient to be effective add to the new challenge of dealing with NePAD. Governments are likely to remain the main implementing actors for most of the items. Civil society locally and transnationally can play crucial roles in monitoring and evaluating performance, as well as helping to build the human and supporting institutional capacity that will be required.

**African Peer Review**

The most innovative and politically problematic element in the DPGI is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Cynics assumed this idea would be stillborn but surprisingly it has continued to gain support from African countries actively supporting the NePAD process. At the Abuja summit in March the only recommendations to the NePAD secretariat regarding the DPGI was to strengthen and clarify the APRM. Peer review will attract much international attention, especially among public, private and multilateral donors considering how to condition levels and priorities of their assistance in accordance with NePAD standards. To operate effectively it will need the voluntary compliance of member countries, including a willingness to tolerate substantial regional involvement in their domestic affairs. Chances of success for such a politically sensitive and path breaking diplomatic experiment obviously would be enhanced if public and private donors, as well as foreign investors willingly and substantially reward good behaviour.

African peer review would serve six purposes that involve a learning process for participating countries:

- Enhance African ownership of its development agenda.
- Identify, evaluate and disseminate best practises.
- Monitor progress towards agreed goals.
- Use peer review to enhance adoption and implementation of best practices.
- Ensure that policy is based on best current knowledge and practices.
- Identify deficiencies and capacity gaps and recommend approaches to addressing these issues.
NePAD participating countries will be expected to “define a time-bound program of action” for meeting their commitments and obligations based on the framework outlined above. These would necessarily be tailored to the particular “historical experiences, socio-economic circumstances and stages of development” of each African state. In discussing how the APR would work, proponents of NePAD suggest that distinctions would be drawn among those countries that are adhering to DPG standards, and therefore qualify for “enhanced partnership status,” those that lack the capacity to meet those standards but are trying to do so and therefore merit assistance as “aspiring partners” and those that are derelict and can will be denied NePAD benefits.

The DPGI is vague about how and by whom the assessments would be done. But President Mbeki has been clear that the countries must that self-reviews would be unacceptable. In response to a reporter’s question about this April 7, 2002 he mentioned South Africa’s controversial policy on HIV/AIDS (which a recent high court ruling suggested amounts to a denial of human rights and is thus at odds with NePAD standards). Mbeki said that it would be wrong, under currently envisioned NePAD procedures, for South Africans to be part of any such review.

Current thinking among NePAD countries about how the APRs might be conducted could turn to existing sub-regional, regional and international bodies in gathering necessary information on country performance, including the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) African Governance Report, which has been recently tested in twelve countries. Another idea is to establish country missions comprising eminent Africans selected by participating Heads of State and that could include retired judges and recognized academics, who would be sent to individual countries to engage government and civil society stakeholders. These missions would operate independently, much as international election observers have increasingly been allowed to function in often very difficult circumstances. The African Union’s High Commissioner for Human Rights could coordinate the compilation of country reports, although this proposed office has not yet been established.

Assuming governments agree to be evaluated, or if NePAD heads of state receive credible reports of severe human rights offences or other offensive behaviour, what action would be taken. At this stage the only meaningful OAU precedent has been the so-called yellow and red carding of states experiencing unconstitutional changes of government. In the case of a ‘yellow card’ (analogous to the warnings given to players committing offences in football) a country is put on notice that its membership in the organisation will be suspended unless reverts to constitutional governance. A “red card” means immediate suspension.

Significantly, the DPGI proposes broadening this sanction to include “patently undemocratic and unconstitutional behaviour.” It is not clear what criteria will be used and the current proposal stipulates that Heads of State will decide on appropriate measures on a case-by-case basis and that all reports of their findings will be made public.

Finally, the DPGI assume that the country monitoring and review process will be used by countries for self-improvement and that international donor nations will be prepared to provide major incentives (political, social and economic) so that
democratising countries will have the means to meet their commitments and entrench their achievements. In this regard, the rewards for progress in good governance should be quickly apparent, not only in terms of technical and material support, but also in increased market access, debt relief, and across the range of NePAD Action Plan sectors, as most appropriate for the particular needs and capabilities of each member country.

**Current Political Issues Affecting NePAD’s Adoption and Implementation**

There are major short and medium term issues that could accelerate or derail adoption and implementation of the DPGI and, by extension, the entire NePAD project.

In the current crisis in Zimbabwe has been characterized as a NePAD ‘deal breaker.’ How could the NePAD be taken seriously when African leaders appear willing to tolerate such wanton abuse of human rights and democratic values by and increasingly autocratic and brutal incumbent regime? The suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth on the unanimous recommendation of Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo and Prime Minister Howard has helped to calm some of the most critical comments about the NePAD’s stillbirth. In fact, Zimbabwe may become a positive test for the fledgling APR process.

Following the rejection of the constitutional referendum and controversial parliamentary elections in 2000, Zimbabwe threatened to polarize South Africa along racial lines and/or destroy an already divided Southern Africa Development Community. Zimbabwe’s African neighbours faced difficult choices as they sought to promote both stability and democracy in Zimbabwe. Much as the US long opted for the “stability and reliability” over the uncertainties of promoting democratic transformation in a host of African clients during the Cold War, Western support for NePAD has been severely tested by African policies that preferred to tolerate abuses of power by Mugabe, the ‘devil’ they knew. The Commonwealth, with its substantial Western element for now salvaged the situation, proving the value of a tacit North-South partnership in promoting democratic values in Africa. At the same time, the follow-on engagement South Africa and Nigeria in actively trying to broker a compromise between Zimbabwe’s two power centres may yet, with the backing of SADC, facilitate a process that will eventually validate the ideals of the DPGI. Internal talks resume 13 May and just before the first highly contentious round adjourned the two envoys, ANC secretary-general Kgalema Motlanthe and the eminent Nigerian economist and international public servant, Adebayo Adedeji, managed to secure an agreement to consider necessary constitutional reforms, ways to restore the rule of law, and the possibility of holding fresh elections. With strong financial backing from Britain and other Western, the threat of greater sanctions, and vital political encouragement from African countries – especially SADC-- mass violence that a truly horrendous complex emergency could be prevented.

Meanwhile, other Southern and Central African tests of the incipient DPGI/APR loom.

South African brokered marathon talks appear close to launching a regionally supervised process of reconciliation and reconstruction in the war torn Democratic Republic of the Congo. This could have positive spill over effects for Uganda and
Rwanda, two countries that despite their domestic and foreign policy negatives are members of the NePAD Implementing Committee. Burundi is another test of APR that may finally be consolidating domestic peace. Regional pressures can also play a vital and constructive role in building peace and national integration in finally ending Angola’s thirty-year civil war. Lesotho’s weak domestic institutions are about to be severely tested in national elections that could become a major southern Africa test for NePAD/APR and the increasingly dysfunctional political institutions of Swaziland may well be yet another test for SADC and NePAD.

The politics of NePAD leadership are also problematic. South Africa, as partnership’s main inspiration and champion, has been an essential selling point for Western countries that since the end of the Cold War have sought ‘regional solutions for regional problems.’ Yet South Africa, with an economy equal to the combined GNP of 46 of the 47 (minus Nigeria) sub-Saharan African countries appears to be viewed suspiciously by many of its smaller partners. For NePAD to have regional legitimacy its membership had to be broadened and South Africa has skillfully widened the circle to the 15-member Implementation Committee. But in the process the credibility of NePAD standards – especially the DPGI standards have been compromised.

Mbeki has succeeded in preserving the DPG element as the cornerstone of this new strategy of building Pan African Unity and a more politically balanced relationship with the West. A close inspection of his Millennium African Recovery Program, the New African Initiative (that combined the Senegalese/francophone Omega Plan), and the current version of NePAD show almost no dilution or downgrading of the democracy and human rights elements. But many smaller states appear to feel threatened, notably the large number that lack democratic traditions or inclinations. Libya, Zimbabwe, Kenya and other OAU/AU members excluded from the Implementation Committee could also seek the role of spoilers when NePAD’s Plan of Action with the DPGI is tabled for approval at the July AU Summit in Durban. A strong endorsement from the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, with the promise of gearing future and rising assistance to NePAD, will be essential for Mbeki’s defence of the DPGI.

Prime Minister Chrétien’s assurances that Africa will remain the second of three G-8 main agenda items in Kananaskis, regardless of current developments in the Middle East/Persian Gulf, or other crises, are important. The tone of G-8 discussions and resolutions regarding NePAD will also have important political repercussions in Africa. In the debates over the future of NePAD during the Zimbabwe presidential elections an impression was created in Africa that the US and several other major G-8 members viewed NePAD as essentially a punitive instrument to punish African countries that failed to meet their democratic standards. NePAD’s African advocates cannot be seen as merely extensions of Western influence. Not allowing repressive countries from gaining access to NePAD benefits is penalty enough at this stage. Rather it is important for the G-8 to been seen to offering incentives in a program where other African states remain the primary gatekeepers.

It is, of course, this issue of who is allowed into or excluded from the NePAD club that poses the trickiest diplomatic and political challenges for South Africa and the very few other automatic qualifiers. This process is bound to be politically difficult and can only be tested, over years of tough bargaining among Africans and in their
dealing with public, private, and multilateral donors. Having NePAD endorsed by the OAU/AU, but not at the price of selective conditional entry and continued membership, is Mbeki’s most urgent diplomatic challenge as he assumes the AU chair and remains NePAD’s putative Godfather.

**How Might the CFGS/SWF Project Help?**

Because of the strategic importance of the DPGI to the overall success of NePAD, any agency seeking to become “an active and critical partner” should make governance a key element in whatever aspect of NePAD engages their particular interests. These contributions could be in the areas of monitoring, research and analysis, project support, capacity building, and public education and advocacy.

The DPGI should be carefully studied and monitored, both in terms of its internal dynamics and how effectively it is implemented. Much of the work envisioned under the DPGI must be left to governments. But non-governmental actors have a big role to play in early warning, assuring accountability, and enhancing the effectiveness and implementation. The peer review process will likely be riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies, and slow to act.

Independent monitoring and assessments will be a vital function for groups such as CFGS/SWF. This is a practice well established in the human rights field and with regard to elections. But NePAD and the DPGI suggest the need for a much broader and diverse monitoring function. This cannot and must not be limited to the performance of African governments. Donors also have to be held to account much more fully and critically if NePAD is to work. Too often African governments have undertaken politically risky structural adjustment and other reforms and found promised external assistance was not as quick or substantial as they had been led to expect.

A second way to help is to provide direct and indirect support for the DPGI. CFGS/SWF should have its own DPG strategy, both immediate and long-term. The DPGI must be seen as democracy itself, an open ended non-linear process that will be fraught with problems but must remain vital and relevant for the success of the rest of the NePAD experiment. CFGS/SWF should carefully assess the commitments, obligations and actions to be taken in the DPGI to see how donors can assist those responsible for carrying out this initiative. The DPGI should also become an integral part of all other assistance efforts, as criteria for deciding how to target assistance across all NePAD sectors. All candidate CFGS/SWF projects, for example, should have a ‘DPG impact statement’ as part of their proposal and judges should be sensitive to this deciding what to approve.

The NePAD’s small secretariat welcomes proposals for items to be included in the African Plan of Action and for suggestions regarding implementation strategies and best practices. Contact addresses and numbers for NePAD staff and other pertinent information about the evolving plans and programs can be found at their excellent web site: [www.nepad.org](http://www.nepad.org). CFGS/SWF might want to consider visiting the NePAD secretariat, or possibly seconding a staff member for an extended period of time to ensure that the fifteen projects are in sync with NePAD’s operations and that project lessons and results are effectively disseminated through the NePAD network.
Both the NePAD secretariat and the G-8 Kananaskis secretariat have been receiving large numbers of NePAD project ideas. Canadian staff reportedly is sorting through more than 600 proposals. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority have to do with the economic, social, environmental, and other sectors where development agencies have been operating programs for decades. Indeed, much of the NePAD main document reads as though drafted by the United Nations Development Programme. By contrast, very little fresh thinking and proposals have been received to advance the core preconditions for sustainable development, namely respect for human rights and good governance – political and economic – as called for under the DPGI. If initiatives such as the one being launched by CFGS/SWF can support viable projects in the DPG area then the value added may be much greater than more conventional development work. DPG projects may be politically difficult and risky but they are also generally less costly than work in other sectors.

All friends of NePAD should undertake programs to educate the public on its development and implementation, especially with regard to the DPGI. After all, NePAD is much more than a partnership between African governments, or between them and international donors. Most importantly for its success are the partnerships between governments and the citizens they purport to serve. Open debate about sovereign and individual rights and obligations will be vital to NePAD’s success.

So far African – much less international – publics are almost totally unaware of NePAD. As academics and other opinion leaders have learned about NePAD’s formation there has been a small but growing chorus of complaints that it is too ‘top-down’ and elitist. Realistically, NePAD cannot take-off without solid initial political support from African heads of state and, in turn, the G-8 and other major donors. AU endorsement will be essential for NePAD’s legitimacy, especially if it not to be perceived and criticized as a tool of Western influence. In building public awareness and support, however, care must be taken not arouse unrealistic expectations, particularly regarding the prospects for huge new flows of ODA and FDI to NePAD countries. National and regional workshops on NePAD should be launched immediately after the Durban AU summit, but public education, as NePAD itself should be seen as a long-term, multi-level effort. The CFGS/SWF plan to promote widespread elite and public understanding of its 15 projects is very important and could become a model for others to follow.

Public education campaigns should occur at all levels, local, regional and global. NePAD’s chances of success will be enhanced if pro-African constituencies can be mobilized in donor countries. African governments should be encouraged and assisted to become more active and capable in international lobbying efforts. This should not be left to those in the Diaspora who are often the most outspoken but not always well informed about the latest important policy changes underway back home. There is also a need to link African and major international developments, that will be of mutual benefit to both Africans and the major external powers. The current global war against terrorism presents both risks and opportunities in this regard. The DPGI can be rightly cast as the best long-term way to eliminate the breeding grounds of terrorism and, therefore, should give NePAD strategic appeal to the US and other donors. But as during the Cold War, there is a danger that perceived short-term imperatives to counter terrorists will be used to justify new forms of intervention or
alliances of convenience with anti-democratic local forces. NePAD countries therefore have the added incentive of reaching out and bringing less democratic neighbours up to NePAD standards to promote regional peace and development and lower the risk of unwanted external intervention in the campaign against terrorism.

Finally, capacity building must be central to all NePAD undertakings, not only the education and human resource development element of the Plan of Action. In all sectors Africa countries need more and better-trained personnel. All projects should be designed and evaluated not only in terms of “tangible” results but also in terms of the human and institutional capacity that has been created to help entrench any immediate gains and to continue problem-solving in that sector. Finding new and creative ways to encourage trained Africans remain in Africa, and those in the Diaspora to return is a shared concern of all NePAD members and G-8 leaders that must be given greater practical expression in NePAD projects, including those sponsored by CFGS/SWF. Here again, significant discernible progress in advancing the DPGI will create conditions conducive to repatriation of skilled Africans.