Terrorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug dealers, traffickers in women and children, and the modern pirates of intellectual property all operate through global networks. So, increasingly, do governments. Networks of government officials – police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators – increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime and address common problems on a global scale. These government networks are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century. But they are under-appreciated, under-supported, and under-used to address the central problems of global governance.

Consider the examples simply in the wake of September 11th, 2001. The Bush Administration immediately set about assembling an “ad hoc coalition” of states to aid in the war on terrorism. Public attention focused on military cooperation, but the networks of financial regulators working to identify and freeze terrorist assets, of law enforcement officials sharing vital information on terrorist suspects, and of intelligence operatives
working to preempt the next attack have been equally important. Indeed, the leading expert in the “new security” of borders and container bombs insists that the domestic agencies responsible for customs, food safety, and regulation of all kinds must extend their reach abroad, through reorganization and much closer cooperation with their foreign counterparts. And after the U.S. concluded that it did not have authority under international law to interdict a shipment of missiles from North Korea to Yemen, it turned to national law enforcement authorities to coordinate the extraterritorial enforcement of their national criminal laws. Networked threats require a networked response.

Turning to the global economy, networks of finance ministers and central bankers have been critical players in responding to national and regional financial crises. The G8 is as much a network of finance ministers as of heads of state; it is the finance ministers who take key decisions on how to respond to calls for debt relief for the most highly indebted countries. The finance ministers and central bankers hold separate news conferences to announce policy responses to crises such as the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998. The G20, a network specifically created to help prevent future crises, is led by the Indian finance minister and is composed of the finance ministers of twenty developed and developing countries. More broadly, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) emerged in 1984. It was followed in the 1990s by the creation of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and a network of all three of these organizations and other national and international officials responsible for financial stability around the world called the Financial Stability Forum.

Beyond national security and the global economy, networks of national officials are working to improve environmental policy across borders. Within NAFTA, U.S., Mexican, and Canadian environmental agencies have created an environmental
enforcement network, which has enhanced the effectiveness of environmental regulation in all three states, particularly in Mexico. Globally, the EPA and its Dutch equivalent have founded the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, which offers technical assistance to environmental agencies around the world, holds global conferences for environmental regulators to learn and exchange information, and sponsors a website with training videos and other information.

Nor are regulators the only ones networking. National judges are exchanging decisions with one another through conferences, judicial organizations, and the Internet. Constitutional judges increasingly cite one another’s decisions on issues from free speech to privacy rights. Bankruptcy judges in different countries negotiate mini-treaties to resolve complicated international cases; judges in transnational commercial disputes have begun to see themselves as part of a global judicial system. National judges are also interacting directly with their supranational counterparts on trade and human rights issues.

Finally, even legislators, the most naturally parochial government officials due to their direct ties to territorially rooted constituents, are reaching across borders. International parliamentary organizations have been traditionally well-meaning but ineffective. But today national parliamentarians are meeting to adopt and publicize common positions on the death penalty, human rights, and environmental issues. They support one another in legislative initiatives and offer training programs and technical assistance.  

Each of these networks has specific aims and activities, depending on its subject area, membership, and history. But taken together, they also perform certain common functions. They expand regulatory reach, allowing national government officials to keep
up with corporations, civic organizations, and criminals. They build trust and establish relationships among their participants that then create incentives to establish a good reputation and avoid a bad one. These are the conditions essential for long-term cooperation. They exchange regular information about their own activities and develop data-bases of best practices, or, in the judicial case, different approaches to common legal issues. They offer technical assistance and professional socialization to members from less developed nations – whether regulators, judges, or legislators.

In a world of global markets, global travel, and global information networks, of weapons of mass destruction and looming environmental disasters of global magnitude, governments must have global reach. In a world in which their ability to use their hard power is often limited, governments must be able to exploit the uses of soft power – the power of persuasion and information. Similarly, in a world in which a major set of obstacles to effective global regulation is a simple inability on the part of many developing countries to translate paper rules into changes in actual behavior, governments must be able not only to negotiate treaties but also to create the capacity to comply with them.

Understood as a form of global governance, government networks meet these needs. As commercial and civic organizations have already discovered, their networked form is ideal for providing the speed and flexibility necessary to function effectively in an information age. But unlike amorphous “global policy networks”, in which it is never clear who is exercising power on behalf of whom, these are networks comprised of national government officials – appointed by elected officials or directly elected themselves. Best of all, they can perform many of the functions of a world government – legislation, administration, and adjudication, without the form.
A Networked World Order

To see these networks as they exist, much less to imagine what they could become, requires a deeper conceptual shift. Stop imagining the international system as a system of states – unitary entities like billiard balls or black boxes – subject to rules created by international institutions that are “apart from” and “above” these states. Start thinking about a world of governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. States still exist in this world; indeed, they are crucial actors. But they are “disaggregated”. They relate to each other not only through the Foreign Office, but also through regulatory, judicial, and legislative channels.

Seeing the world through the lenses of disaggregated rather than unitary states allows leaders, policymakers, analysts, or simply concerned citizens to see features of the global political system that were previously hidden. Government networks suddenly pop up everywhere, from the Financial Action Task Force (a network of finance ministers and other financial regulators) taking charge of pursuing money launderers and financers of terrorism to the Free Trade Commission, a network of trade ministers charged with interpreting the NAFTA, to a network of ministers in charge of border controls working to create a new regime of safe borders in the wake of September 11th. At the same time, it is possible to disaggregate international organizations as well, to see “vertical networks” between national regulators and judges and their supranational counterparts. Examples include relations between national European courts and the European Court of Justice or between national U.S., Mexican, and Canadian courts and NAFTA arbitral tribunals.
Equally important, these different lenses make it possible to imagine a genuinely new set of possibilities for a future world order. The building blocks of this order would not be states but parts of states: courts, regulatory agencies, ministries, legislatures. The government officials within these various institutions would participate in many different types of networks, creating links across national borders and between national and supranational institutions. The result could be a world that looks like the globe hoisted by Atlas at Rockefeller Center, crisscrossed by an increasingly dense web of networks.

This world would still include traditional international organizations, such as the UN and the WTO, although many of these organizations would be likely to become hosts for and sources of government networks. It would still feature states interacting as unitary states on important issues, particularly in security matters. And it would certainly still be
a world in which military and economic power mattered; government networks are not likely to substitute for either armies or treasuries.

At the same time, however, a world of government networks would be a more effective and potentially more just world order than either what we have today or a world government in which a set of global institutions perched “above” nation states enforced global rules. In a networked world order, primary political authority would remain at the national level except in those cases in which national governments had explicitly delegated their authority to supranational institutions. National government officials would be increasingly enmeshed in networks of personal and institutional relations. They would each be operating both in the domestic and the international arenas, exercising their national authority to implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and representing the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonizing national laws and regulations, and addressing common problems.

Global Impact of Government Networks

Government networks can provide the structure of a new world order, but how do we know that they actually have or will have any impact on addressing the problems that the world needs to solve? How do they or will they contribute to increasing peace and prosperity, protecting the planet and the individuals who inhabit it?

Three ways in which government networks currently contribute to world order are: 1) by creating convergence and informed divergence; 2) by improving compliance with international rules; and 3) by increasing the scope, nature and quality of international
cooperation. Kal Raustiala, a young legal scholar and political scientists, has demonstrated ways in which government networks lead to “regulatory export” of rules and practices from one country to another. The result can be sufficient policy convergence to make it possible over the longer term to conclude a more formal international agreement setting forth a common regulatory regime. Soft law codes of conduct issued by transgovernmental regulatory organizations, as well as the simple dissemination of credible and authoritative information also promotes convergence. Promoting convergence, on the other hand, can also give rise to informed divergence, where a national governmental institution or the government as a whole acknowledges a prevailing standard or trend and deliberate chooses to diverge from it for reasons of national history, culture, or politics.

Government networks also improve compliance with international treaties and customary law. Vertical enforcement networks do this explicitly and directly by providing a supranational court or regulatory authority with a direct link to a national government institution that can exercise actual coercive authority on its behalf. Equally important, however, are the ways in which technical assistance flowing through horizontal networks can build regulatory or judicial capacity in states where the spirit is willing to enforce international legal obligations but the infrastructure is weak.

Finally, government networks enhance existing international cooperation by providing the mechanisms for transferring regulatory approaches that are proving increasingly successful domestically to the international arena. Most important is regulation by information, which allows regulators to move away from traditional command and control methods and instead provide individuals and corporations with the information and ideas they need to figure out how to improve their own performance
against benchmarked standards. This approach is gaining popularity in the United States, is increasingly prevalent in the EU, and is being tried at the UN. Government networks create regional and even global transmission belts for information that can readily expand to include as many nations as can usefully participate. In addition, government networks are the ideal mechanism of international cooperation on international problems that have domestic roots, as they directly engage the participation and the credibility of the individuals who must ultimately be responsible for addressing those problems.

Given what already exists, imagine what policymakers and opinion leaders around the world could create if they began looking through the lens of the disaggregated state and decided to recognize government networks as prime mechanisms of global governance, using existing networks and creating new ones to address specific problems. First, they could harness the capacity of government networks for self-regulation, drawing on the examples of private commercial networks that succeed in enforcing “network norms” against cheating or other undesirable behavior. If government networks existed not only to address specific regulatory, judicial and legislative problems but also as self-consciously constituted professional associations of regulators, judges, and legislators, they should be able develop and enforce global standards of honesty, integrity, competence, and independence in performing the various functions that constitute a government.

They could socialize their members in a variety of ways that would create a perceived cost in deviating from these standards. But they could also bolster their members by enhancing the prestige of membership in a particular government network enough to give government officials who want to adhere to high professional standards ammunition against countervailing domestic forces. Just as international organizations
from the EU to the Community of Democracies have done, government networks could condition admission on meeting specified criteria designed to reinforce network norms.\footnote{\textsuperscript{9}} A particular advantage of selective strengthening of individual government institutions this way is that it avoids the pernicious problem of labeling an entire state as bad or good, liberal or illiberal, tyrannical or democratic. It focuses instead on performance at a much more micro-level, recognizing that in any country and in any government different forces will be contending for power and privilege. It is critical to support those who are willing to practice what they preach in both their own laws and their obligations under international law.

At the same time, these networks could be empowered to provide much more technical assistance of the kind needed to build governance capacity in many countries around the world. They could be tasked with everything from developing codes of conduct to tackling specific policy problems. They could be designated interlocutors for the multitudes of non-governmental actors who must be engaged in global governance as they are in domestic governance. Vertical government networks could similarly be designed to implement international rules and strengthen domestic institutions in any number of ways. How well will they do? We cannot know until we try.

To take a concrete example, consider how government networks could help in the rebuilding of Iraq. A global or regional network of judges could be charged with helping to rebuild the Iraqi legal system, both through training and technical assistance and through ongoing monitoring of new Iraqi judges compliance with the network’s norms, which would incorporate standards from the UN Principles on the Independence of Judges. A global or regional network of legislators could be similarly charged with helping to establish and assist a genuinely representative legislature in Iraq. And
regulators and other executive officials of every stripe could help to rebuild basic government services, from policing to banking regulation. In all these cases the experts and targeted technical assistance would be readily available; the rebuilding efforts would be multilateral and sustainable; and the new Iraqi officials would have a continuing source of technical, political, and moral support.

Self-consciously constituted government networks could also acknowledge the power of discussion and argument in helping generate high-quality solutions to complex problems. For certain types of problems, vigorous discussion and debate is likely to produce the most creative and legitimate alternatives. In addition, government networks constituted this way could harness the positive power of conflict as the foundation of lasting political and social relationships. This understanding of conflict is familiar within democratic societies; it is only within the world of diplomacy, where conflict can escalate to fatal dimensions that conflict per se is a danger if not an evil. Among disaggregated government institutions, national and supranational, conflict should be resolved, but not necessarily avoided. It is likely to be the long-term engine of trust.

Note that government networks, both as they exist now and as they could exist, exercise different types of power to accomplish results. They have access to traditional “hard power”, or coercive power. The central role of national government officials in government networks means that when the participants take a decision that requires implementation, the power to implement already exists at the national level. The power to induce behavior through selective admission requirements is also a form of hard power. At the same time, much of the work of many horizontal government networks depends on soft power – the power of information, socialization, persuasion, and discussion. An effective world order needs to harness every kind of power available.
The Transformation of the G20

Against this backdrop, I have three basic proposals concerning the future of the G20. First is to make it a much more robust institution with deeper roots in the member countries by replicating the existing network of finance ministers with networks of other regulators, legislators, and judges. Second is to give the G20 a presence in other larger international institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. And third is to take advantage of the many other networks that G20 members are simultaneously part of to promote ideas and practices supported by the G20 and to collect and bring back important information from other networks to the G20.

A Global Think Tank

The distinctive characteristic and strength of the G20 is that it is small enough to be effective but large enough to be genuinely representative of the diversity of the world’s nations and cultures. At a time when global inequality continues to grow and the fundamental policy agenda of North and South are diverging (with the North focusing primarily on the security of states, and hence the threats of terrorism and WMD and the South on basic human security, and hence the threats of AIDS and other diseases, grinding poverty, lack of basic educational and economic infrastructure, and environmental destruction), the need for a forum in which a genuine global dialogue can take place, much less collective brainstorming and problem-solving, is paramount. The G20 offers just that, but to capitalize on that asset it should extend its reach far beyond financial crises.
Using the EU Council of Ministers as a model, or APEC, G20 ministers and lower level regulators of all types should meet to exchange best practices and air divisive issues in their particular area of expertise. So too should judges and legislators. The point would be to create a dense web of contacts among government officials from different branches of government in this particular group of countries – a group that can serve as a key bellwether on a wide range of global policy issues. Thus, for instance, if the trade ministers of the G20 were able to work out potential solutions to the Doha stalemate, or the environmental ministers were able to think through an improvement on Kyoto that the U.S. could sign, together with the legislators from the same countries, the G20 would gain real traction within larger institutions and on the global stage more generally.

In this capacity, the G20 would effectively serve as a global think tank. Its distinctive characteristics, again, would be the diversity and representativeness of its membership and its ability to engage directly the national government officials responsible for making and implementing policy on the ground. G20 officials in these different areas could also pioneer pilot implementation projects, trying out initiatives like the current proliferation security initiative being pushed by the U.S. administration, to work out the kinks and to help create the conditions necessary for wider adoption. Another possibility would be for these officials, now including judges, to take the lead in offering training and capacity-building assistance to new government officials in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia – wherever nations need to be built or bolstered to avoid collapse. A network of twenty judges or regulators or ministers or legislators is small enough to create a genuine collective solidarity to support and assist select foreign counterparts.
A starting project could be to address the thorny issue of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). According to experts on this issue, the EU and the U.S. are locked in a fierce fight fueled by domestic politics on both sides. Developing countries are caught in the middle. On the one hand, they could benefit considerably from some GMO crops. On the other hand, the EU export market is sufficiently large, and the labeling requirements sufficiently stringent, that at the moment the safest strategy to ensure continued exports to the EU to shun all GMOs. Compromises can be found, but they require a smaller and less public forum than the WTO or U.S.-EU relations. If the G20 were able to find such a compromise, it would almost surely be adopted, and the G20 value on the global stage even more firmly established.

**Develop a Presence within Larger Global Institutions**

With all the calls for UN reform, and similar pressures on the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions, the time is ripe for a G20 caucus within these larger institutions. Within the UN, for instance, Security Council reform is actually very unlikely. But in many ways the G20 is an excellent substitute. None of its members have vetoes, and together they represent a far greater slice of global public opinion. Imagine, for instance, if G20 members at the UN (UN ambassadors from G20 countries, perhaps supplemented by the foreign ministers meeting at the UN as part of a regular G20 meeting) had debated the proposed use of force in Iraq. A vote in the G20, or even a “sense of the group” resolution, would have broadened the context of the Security Council debates, allowing different countries a genuine voice and putting pressure on individual Security Council members to put collective interests ahead of national interests. Further, given that the P5
are all G20 members, it would require them to genuinely convince other countries rather than simply threaten the veto.

Within the IMF, a G20 caucus could tackle specific questions like an alternative sovereign debt mechanism, or generally be a cohesive voice for the Montreal Consensus. Within the WTO, as noted above, the G20 could bridge the G7 and the G24 – a vitally needed service. The developing country members of the G20 can take comfort that they are not breaking ranks with the G24 alone; the developed country members are likely to find a more flexible negotiating environment; and the world would be better off.

A G20 caucus in different international institutions would have no formal status, but that would be part of its strength. At the same time, it would have much more durability than an ad hoc coalition of countries on a specific issue or set of issues. Nor would members of the caucus always have to be able to reach a common position to be effective. Just the existence of a credible alternative forum in which a subset of members of the larger institution can hash things out can create a different dynamic within the plenary. It will also reinforce both the reality and the distinctiveness of the G20 itself – a more formalized informal network.

**Pioneering Networked Governance**

The individual finance ministers who are members of the current G20 are simultaneously members of many other networks – the G7/G8, the EU networks, APEC networks, OECD networks, Commonwealth networks, OAU and OAS networks, etc. Each of these networks engages a different subset of G20 members. In this sense, the G20, and particularly a G20 broadened to include networks of many other ministers and officials, can be seen as sitting at the intersection of an entire web of global and regional
government networks. If they so chose, the G20 members in any other network could form a mini-caucus both to promote ideas and practices developed in the G20 through other networks and to harvest the ideas and practices developed in these other networks and bring them back to the G20.

These existing networks are conduits – for information, ideas, cooperative strategies, communication, and even conflict. They could be much more effectively exploited as a fundamental part of the infrastructure of global governance – the capacity of actual government at the global level, but without the form. But to even begin to exploit their potential, they must be made more visible and useful. The G20, itself a government network, but a relatively small, flexible, and diverse one, could be a catalyst for developing and implementing governance initiatives through these networks. Indeed, the G20 could even convene networks of networks – in different issue areas, as the Basle Committee did with the Year 2000 network, which combined existing networks of central bankers, securities commissioners, and insurance supervisors – or in the same issue area but stretching across different regions and groups of countries. For instance, the G20 might combine one of its meetings with the finance ministers of the OAS, or of the OECD, or APEC, to try out a particular set of ideas, or tackle a particular problem, or propose a set of measures for broader adoption.

Networked governance operates differently than hierarchical governance or governance in formal international institutions with fixed voting rules. It operates primarily through the transmission of information in an environment where the appetite for credible information to help address policy problems of all kinds is great; where fast-changing technology and circumstance creates a need for continually updating codes of best practices; and where shared information allows government officials to solve
coordination and cooperation problems together with their foreign counterparts. Government networks can also help build capacity in countries where the will to comply with both domestic and international obligations exists but the means does not. They can lay the foundation for policy convergence sufficient to make more formal international agreements possible where they were not before. And they can reinvigorate and push reform in existing international institutions.

In many ways, the G-20 could well be what the founders of the UN would come up with today, in a world of 191 nations instead of 50-odd – too many for a genuinely global institution operating on a one-state one-vote principle to be effective except through its specialized agencies, and in a world in which international problems require national-level solutions. It could be a global think tank, a caucus in many existing institutions, a catalyst for networked global governance operating through national government officials. It is a genuinely representative global institution that is small enough and flexible enough to be effective. It could become the steering committee of many of the world’s networks.

**Conclusion**

Peoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means. Further, it has become a commonplace to claim that the international institutions created in the late 1940s, after a very different war and facing a host of different threats from those we face today are outdated and inadequate to meet contemporary challenges. They must be reformed or even reinvented; new ones must be created.
Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles.

This is the globalization paradox. We need more government on a global and a regional scale, but we do not want the centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed. It is the paradox identified in the European Union by Renaud Dehousse, and by Robert Keohane in his millennial presidential address to the American Political Science Association. The EU has pioneered “regulation by networks”, which Dehousse describes as the response to a basic dilemma in EU governance: “On the one hand, increased uniformity is certainly needed; on the other hand, greater centralization is politically inconceivable, and probably undesirable”. The EU alternative is the “transnational option” – the use of an organized network of national officials to ensure “that the actors in charge of the implementation of Community policies behave in a similar manner”.

Worldwide, Keohane argues that globalization “creates potential gains from cooperation” if institutions can be created to harness those gains. However, “institutions themselves are potentially oppressive”. The result is “the Governance Dilemma: although institutions are essential for human life, they are also potentially tyrannical”. The challenge facing political scientists and policymakers at the dawn of the twenty-first century is “discovering how well-structured institutions could enable the world to have ‘a new birth of freedom’”.
Addressing the paradox at the global level is further complicated by the additional concern of accountability. The conventional reaction in the 1990s to the problem of “world government” was instead to champion “global governance”, a much looser and less threatening concept of collective organization and regulation without coercion. A major element of global governance, in turn, has been the rise of “global policy networks”, celebrated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, as bringing together all public and private actors on issues critical to the global public interest.16

Global policy networks, in turn, grow out of various “reinventing government” projects, both academic and practical. These projects focus on the many ways in which private actors now can and do perform government functions, from providing expertise to monitoring compliance with regulations to negotiating the substance of those regulations, both domestically and internationally. The problem, however, is ensuring that these private actors uphold the public trust. Martin Shapiro, for instance, argues that the shift from government to governance marks “a significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its administration and what lies outside them”.17 The result is to advantage “experts and enthusiasts”, the two groups outside government that have the greatest incentive and desire to participate in governance processes.18 However, “while the ticket to participation in governance is knowledge and/or passion, both knowledge and passion generate perspectives that are not those of the rest of us. Few of us would actually enjoy living in a Frank Lloyd Wright house”.19

The network form, with its loose, informal, and non-hierarchical structure, only exacerbates this problem. The governance dilemma thus becomes a tri-lemma: we need global rules without centralized power but with government actors who can be held to account through a variety of political mechanisms. These government actors can and should interact with a wide
range of non-governmental groups and organizations, but their role in governance bears distinct and different responsibilities. They must represent all their different constituencies, at least in a democracy; corporate and civic actors may be driven by profits and passions, respectively. “Governance” must not become a cover for the blurring of these lines, even if it both possible and necessary for these various actors to work together on common problems.

In this context, a world order based on government networks, working alongside and even in place of more traditional international institutions, holds great potential. Critics of these networks, however, see them as a conspiracy by the most developed nations to avoid the 1-state, 1-vote procedures and elaborate formal negotiations of many existing international institutions. They see them as secretive and suspicious, using the network form to avoid transparency and accountability. And they worry that once again for the great majority of nations in the world, who you know will matter more than what you know or what you need.

The G20 has the potential to counter these critics by demonstrating how a government network can in fact be more inclusive than existing international institutions – e.g. the UN Security Council and even the WTO, in terms of balance of power. It can demonstrate how such a network can be transparent with regard to its aims and its results, if not its actual deliberations. And it can develop ways for the maximum possible number of domestic officials to engage their counterparts as well, ensuring that legislators as well as regulators and judges have input into networked cooperation. Finally, it can be a catalyst for change and creative problem-solving within existing international institutions, as well as at the center of its own network of networks. But to achieve all this, its deliberations must produce genuine results.


The Financial Stability Forum was initiated by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Seven industrial countries in February 1999, following a report on international cooperation and coordination in the area of financial market supervision and surveillance by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. In additions to representatives from the Basle Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS, its members include senior representative from national authorities responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centers; international financial institutions such as the BIS, the IMF, the OECD, and the World Bank; and committees of central bank experts. [HTTP://IMF.ORG/EXTERNAL/NPL/EXR/FACTS/GROUPS.HTM](http://IMF.ORG/EXTERNAL/NPL/EXR/FACTS/GROUPS.HTM).

American readers may be skeptical of these reports due to the widespread and completely false statistic about how few members of Congress have a passport. In fact, 93 percent of all members hold passports and average two trips abroad a year. Indeed, 20% claim to speak a foreign language. Eric Schmitt and Elizabeth Becker, “Insular Congress Appears to be Myth”, *New York Times*, 4 Nov. 2000. What is true is that some members fear that their constituents will identify trips to meet their counterparts abroad with “junkets”, but that is a matter of public education.


Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 1.


Ibid., p. 376.

Ibid., p. 374.