Sovereignty and FTAs

The remarkable Canadian reality is that our social philosophy and policies have progressively diverged from those in the US over the very time frame that we have progressively integrated economically with the Americans. In effect, we have successfully married the dynamism of the American economic model with the cohesion of the continental European social model, and we have no intention of surrendering either. Indeed, these models are mutually supportive. In particular, our demonstrated ability to create a sharing society in the upper half of North America has been in no small measure due to our ability to forge ever closer trade and economic links with the Americans.

However, this vision of Canada runs counter to the widespread belief that NAFTA and other international agreements are reducing Canadian sovereignty. Part of the reason for this disconnect is that concepts like sovereignty and democracy, which are typically defined in relation to the traditional (Westphalian) model of the nation state, need to be rethought and redefined in this era where the nation state itself is under full evolutionary flight. But I believe that a persuasive case can be made that trade agreements are sovereignty enhancing even within the traditional framework.

Toward this end, an appropriate starting point is Garrett Hardin’s 1968 Science article *The Tragedy of the Commons* where the “commons” is the English common grazing pasture. By the very nature of a commons, every herder will be enticed to add yet another sheep to his/her flock. This is so because the herder receives all of the proceeds from the sale of an additional sheep while the costs of the resulting overgrazing are spread across all animals and herders. As Hardin aptly notes, freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. One obvious solution is an agreement that assigns property rights to the pasture, in which case it ceases to be a commons.

En route to viewing free trade agreements (FTAs) as allocating economic property rights in an economic commons, we fast forward to the environment and to the Kyoto Protocol. The rationale for the Protocol is to address the “global environmental commons.” Again, freedom in this global environmental commons spells ruin to all. And again, the obvious solution is to develop a set of rules and procedures that serve to constrain the various actors (e.g., polluters and their national governments). While these agreements/protocols will surely limit the room to manoeuvre of national governments, they will equally surely increase effective national and
international control over the future of the environment. This is sovereignty enhancing.

With this as backdrop, the focus finally shifts to the relationship among globalization, FTAs, and sovereignty. In the era of high tariffs and limited capital mobility, nations held effective property rights over their economic space and, in aggregate, over global economic space. However, the processes of globalization have progressively undermined this territorial economic sovereignty. For example, highly mobile capital can and will flow over, around and through political and policy boundaries, so much so that nations are losing the ability to control key aspects of their economies within their own borders. In light of the above, the result should be clear: Globalization has converted the Westphalian system of economic property rights into a veritable global economic commons. Once again, freedom in this commons will spell ruin for all if nations attempt to outbid each other for capital. This is an erosion of national sovereignty.

How do nations reclaim their sovereignty? Again, one obvious avenue is via international economic protocols or FTAs. In effect, such FTAs allow nations to pool shares of their sovereignty in order to, inter alia, countervail capital (e.g., to develop domestic and international rules and standards to regulate capital flows) which will in turn serve to reassert control over the economic commons. However, because factor mobility and globalization are efficiency-enhancing and wealth-creating, nations will not attempt to reproduce the pre-globalization version of national economic space. Rather, the focus will be on rules, procedures and standards under which the free (or freer) mobility of goods and factors can proceed.

While FTAs, like environmental protocols, will admittedly limit the room to manoeuvre on the part of national policy makers, the more important result is that they will allow nations a role in formulating multilateral principles and procedures that not only will provide an enhanced degree of order and certainty to the international economic system but, in addition, will permit national governments to regain and/or effectively reassert domestic control over selected policy areas. This is clearly sovereignty enhancing. Indeed, applying this line of reasoning to the EU led information-era guru, Manuel Castells, to proclaim that nationalism (in the sense of regaining control over national economies), not federalism, is the political goal of the EU.

These principles and analysis are especially relevant for Canada because we were in danger of finding ourselves almost alone among our trading partners in not having guaranteed access to a market upwards of a hundred million people, let alone the 300+ million of the EU. Indeed, what brought Canadian business onside in terms of the Canada-US FTA was the fear that rising US protectionism in the mid-1980s would erode the rather dramatic export penetration by Canadian-based companies into US markets earlier in the decade. Intriguingly, the resulting FTA/NAFTA increases our ability to manouevre in areas well beyond the economic sphere. This claim can be recast as follows. What Canadians want from the Americans is access to their markets. With respect, we do not want their values, or their institutions, or their policies. This is exactly what the FTA and NAFTA have delivered to us – access to the American market. In turn, this provided the economic and political confidence to design our policy space in our own likeness and image, the latest health accord being the most recent exemplar. Indeed, NAFTA may have enhanced our ability to manoeuvre politically since it is not obvious that, absent NAFTA and the FTA, Canada would have taken the position it did on sending troops to Iraq.

None of this is intended to imply that NAFTA and its FTA forerunner have gone far enough in guaranteeing access, in outlawing discriminatory practices, in providing fair and transparent dispute resolution procedures, etc., let alone in taking politics out of trade. But
surely the underlying intent of having joint determination of supranational rules and regulations over trade and commerce is, on the economic front, to secure the gains from trade and, on the societal front, to rework property rights relating to trade and commerce in ways that allow Canada much greater certainty in terms of the overall environment within which it legislates and implements its chosen policies. Moreover, the FTA and NAFTA were designed from the outset to be more sovereignty-friendly than were the series of EU agreements. For example, the operational principle in Europe is the “single market” or “home-country rule” which by its very nature drives the EU toward uniform regulations. In contrast, NAFTA’s operating principle is “national treatment” which is both “sovereignty preserving” in the abstract, and sovereignty enhancing with respect to the status quo ante. Under national treatment Canada is free to enact those policies that it deems appropriate, subject only to the proviso that Canadian policy must not discriminate between American and Canadian agents.

NAFTA at 20: Updating, Broadening, Deepening

In the current time frame, not only have most Canadians bought into NAFTA (including, it seems, the Canadian Labour Congress) but several factors have coalesced to advance the case for even further trade integration. One of these contributing factors is the still-on-going series of conferences occasioned by the 15th anniversary of the FTA and the 10th anniversary of NAFTA. Invariably these papers tend to focus on the case for broadening or deepening NAFTA or on what NAFTA at 20 could or should look like. Another is the reality that there are some problematic areas in our trading relationships that NAFTA has not resolved (softwood lumber) or even addressed (transportation). A third factor arises from the very success of the FTA/NAFTA in expanding trade. Specifically, north-south trade has increased so dramatically that Canada and the provinces are now much more vulnerable to policies or events that impede access to US markets. Relatedly, production chains and industry clusters are often fully integrated cross-border so that access also needs to be timely (as in just-in-time production processes) or the cluster will have an incentive to move wholly into the US. Finally, but hardly exhaustively, there is 9/11 and the new US single-mindedness – “homeland security.” Spearheaded by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), 9/11 has triggered a groundswell of interest and activity in Canada toward rethinking NAFTA in the larger context of an overall security perimeter encompassing homeland security as well as economic security. As the CCCE has noted (d’Aquino, 2003), North American economic integration is irreversible and North American economic and physical security is indivisible. And herein lies the ingredients for a potential “grand bargain.” (Gotlieb, 2003).

Updating NAFTA

Accordingly, most of the remainder of the paper will elaborate briefly on the case for rethinking and reworking NAFTA, under the rubric of what University of Toronto’s John Kirton, calls the Tim Horton or “double-double” approach to rethinking NAFTA – double broadening and double deepening. These are above and beyond requisite updating necessitated by what Michael Hart and Bill Dymond refer to as the “tyranny of small differences:”

Cumbersome rules of origin, discriminatory government procurement restrictions, complex antidumping procedures, intrusive countervailing duty investigations, burdensome regulatory requirements, vexatious security considerations, onerous
immigration procedures, and other restrictive measures remain in place, discouraging rational investment decisions and deterring wealth-creating trade flows. The key to resolving many of these issues can be found in better ways and means to manage the border. (Hart & Dymond, 2001, p. 3, emphasis added).

By way of how the border might be managed, post 9/11, the CCCE (d’Aquino, 2003) proposes shifting key aspects of border security enforcement away from the internal (Canada-US) border to the North American perimeter and then streamlining the internal border by a) creating shared identity documents for frequent border users, b) moving commercial clearing away from the border, and c) sharing border infrastructure and policing. The 22-point program in The Canada-US Smart Border Declaration (largely negotiated before but finalized after 9/11) represents solid progress in terms of addressing these border-efficiency and border-effectiveness issues. These efforts will continue since both nations have similar interests here. More controversial are the “double-double” reforms, to which the analysis now turns.

Double Broadening

The first and obvious way to broaden NAFTA is to extend the agreement into new areas, probably the most pressing of which relates to services, writ large – financial, transportation, telecommunications and professional services. With trade in services expected to increase substantially and with employee mobility an essential part of services trade, failure to expand the Trade-NAFTA Visas (T-N Visas) beyond professional workers will surely tempt Canadian-based firms to relocate in the US. More generally, the thicker the border, the greater will be the incentive to locate State-side for those firms intent on serving the North American market. Not surprisingly, this is an important issue for Canada.

The second form of broadening, one where Canada and the Quebec Summit have played a leading role, is to extend NAFTA to embrace the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). A NAFTA/FTAA combo would embrace 34 countries, 400 million people and an annual GDP of US$ 12.5 trillion. But extending NAFTA to the members of the FTAA may get caught up in the “European Dilemma” – deepening NAFTA may preclude meaningful broadening to encompass the FTAA members, while broadening NAFTA to the FTAA may prevent further deepening. On the other hand, with the EU now opening its markets and providing stability (including currency stability) to the ex-Soviet-bloc countries, pressures may develop for the United States, and NAFTA more generally, to play a similar role in the Western hemisphere.

Double Deepening

substantive/institutional deepening

Deepeening NAFTA can involve substantive/institutional deepening or political/democratic deepening where the latter would bring sub-national governments and citizens more formally under the umbrella of the agreement. In terms first of the former, most proposals for deepening NAFTA pre-9/11 focussed on either or both of substantive deepening (moving NAFTA toward a customs union, CU, or even a common market, CM) and institutional deepening (embedding more in the way of internal governance structures in NAFTA so that it has the ability, as in the EU treaties, to adjust from within to new challenges). While these also remain as possible goals for deepening, post-9/11 Canadian thinking has shifted toward what Dobson (2002,1) has termed “strategic bargains:”
Canadian initiatives would be required in areas of interest to the United States, specifically border security, immigration, and defense. Energy security is another key area where Canada should build on its existing strengths. In exchange for these initiatives, Canada should seek customs-union- and common-market-like arrangements that achieve deeper integration but recognize deep attachments to political independence and distinctive national institutions.

The CCCE position paper (d’Aquino, 2003) embeds Dobson’s energy security proposal within a broader “North American resource security pact,” encompassing oil, gas, electricity, coal, uranium, metals, forest products and agriculture. What the CCCE hopes to accomplish is to trade off resource security for the US for the resolution of long-standing issues and irritants relating to pricing, subsidies and regulatory practices in selected resource products (e.g. lumber).

In terms of institutional depth or internal governance, NAFTA stands in sharp contrast to the EU. On the one hand, NAFTA is among the most highly detailed international agreement ever negotiated: “NAFTA is broader in scope of coverage ... than the WTO agreement ... [and] was drafted at a level of detail substantially higher than the EC treaty (Abbott, 2000,542). On the other hand, and unlike the EC treaty, NAFTA has essentially no discretionary internal governance institutions and, therefore, no ability to adapt and adjust from within. The inevitable result is what has earlier been referred to as the “tyranny of small differences” – a progressive accumulation of problems and irritants which arise because NAFTA itself cannot resolve them. There is an important message here: NAFTA is governance- and institutionally-shallow by design, not by happenstance, because the US has no desire for NAFTA to intrude on its sovereignty. The corollary is that proposals for deepening NAFTA institutionally are not likely to be successful unless US self-interest alters significantly. Arguably the “strategic bargain” nature of the Dobson and CCCE proposals were designed in light of the possibility that 9/11 and homeland security have provided a potential window of change in terms of what is in the self-interest of the US.

As a bridge between these proposals for substantive deepening and the following section on political/democratic deepening, it is appropriate to note that my Queen’s colleague Robert Wolfe (2003), among others, takes a rather dim view of substantive deepening. His reason is that the Americans will not likely share our interest in these reforms, which in turn means that the only way they can be implemented is on Washington’s terms and probably in the form of Washington-based institutions. Rather than attempting to deepen NAFTA from the top, why not further deepen NAFTA from below, which is the focus of the next section.

**political/democratic deepening**

In 2002, there were nearly 300 treaties, agreements and understandings in force between Canada and the US (Wolfe, 2003). Yet, this is but the tip of the iceberg of the thousands of arrangements – some formal and some informal, some written and some tacit or in the form of conventions, some public and some private – that effectively serve as a living and growing “constitution” of North America. Moreover, this network of linkages, formal or otherwise, is expanding rapidly. For example, the number of bilateral arrangements/agreements that will emerge in connection with the reform of corporate governance and accounting/auditing procedures and principles in the wake of the Enron debacle will surely run well into the hundreds as regulatory agencies, stock exchanges, legal firms, accounting firms, civil society associations
and governments on both sides of the border harmonize or otherwise reconcile their approaches to this common challenge. Wolfe would argue that it is this complex and comprehensive web of arrangements that needs to be deepened and broadened in order to advance common interests in North America. One might refer to this as an argument for *democratizing North American integration* by viewing or relegating NAFTA to the role of one (albeit the most important) of many frameworks/agreements for conducting trade and economic relationships in North America.

An alternative approach (Blank 2002) is to *democratize NAFTA* itself. Canada, Mexico and the US are all federal systems and between them have close to 100 sub-national governments (excluding cities/municipalities). Moreover, their sub-national governments are increasingly engaged in cross-border associations or agreements such as the Council of Great Lakes Governors (with Quebec and Ontario as associate members), the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, the Pacific Northwest Economic Region, the Montana-Alberta Bilateral/Advisory Council, with similar associations across the Mexican-US border. Why not have these associations formerly come under the NAFTA umbrella? And just as provincial experimentation in one province can inform policy design and delivery in all provinces, so might sub-national cross-border “best practices” be a fertile ground for informing and updating NAFTA. Implicit in both approaches (democratizing integration and democratizing NAFTA) is that some trade disputes that currently defy resolution, because they get caught up in the high politics of the Ottawa-Washington-Mexico City power corridor, might be more amenable to resolution by the relevant sub-national, cross-border interests operating in a more pluralistic, decentralized and subsidiarity-driven framework. Others have suggested joint annual meetings of sub-national (or even national) parliamentarians on NAFTA-related issues where the national delegations would report to their national NAFTA secretariats. (A version of this currently exists). All of this would serve to tilt NAFTA in the direction of a North American community of economic interests. Daniel Schwanen (2004) has provided one longer-term perspective of what such a North American community might look like.

**NAMU and NAFTA**

In light of the fact that Canada is more closely linked trade-wise to the US than is any EU country to the rest of the EU, I have long been persuaded that our exchange rate with the US is far too volatile given that the US is the destination for over 80% of our exports and that Canada needs fixed exchange rates, the optimal longer term version of which is a North American monetary union (NAMU). From the low 70-cent range when FTA negotiations began, the exchange rate appreciated to nearly 90 cents in the early 1990s, fell to the low 60-cent range in the wake of the Asian crisis, and at the time of writing has broken through 78 cents and (in my view) likely to continue to rise. With this degree of volatility foreigners may think twice about producing for the North American market from a Canadian location, which is no doubt one of the reasons why Canada’s share of North American inward FDI has sharply fallen off of late. Note that his volatility or currency misalignment is a much greater problem as we shift away from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy, since the former is fixed geographically whereas our knowledge base is mobile internationally. As Courchene and Harris (1999) argued, substantial overvaluation for long periods leads to downsizing, off-shoring and exit, while substantial undervaluation provides incentives for the migration of human capital and
underinvestment in productivity enhancing technology, the net result of which is that Canada will be more resource-based and less human-capital intensive than would be the case under fixed exchange rates. This will surely spell economic trouble in the knowledge-based economy.

I accept Fred Gorbet’s (2004) articulation of the set of issues at play in terms of a common currency (although I would come down on the pro-monetary-union side more often than he does), so that it is not necessary to rework this territory. Rather, I would like to emphasize a few points that tend to be glossed over too quickly in the public debate of this issue. The first is that monetary union is not the same as using the US dollar. Indeed, the exact opposite is true: one of the key reasons for my support of NAMU is that it offers a viable alternative to adopting the US dollar. Under NAMU, we would issue our new currency (replete with Canadian symbolism), linked one-to-one with the US dollar after undergoing an internal currency revaluation essentially identical in principle to that undergone in each of the Euro countries. Domestic transactions would occur in our own currency (as is the case in countries with currency boards), we would collect our own seigniorage, clearings would be finalized east-west before clearing north-south, and the Bank of Canada would continue to exist as is the case with the central banks of the Euro countries. Actually, we could do all of this without the **imprimatur** of the Americans, via fixed exchange rates, or a currency board anchored to the US dollar if more stability is required. What the US could offer would be a formal recognition of our parity and, in the case of a monetary union, a formal recognition that the Canadian currency is identical to the US currency as well as a seat on the overarching governing board where we would likely have the same influence as one of the dozen current Federal Reserve Districts.

Second, to be in favour of NAMU is not to be critical of the Bank of Canada, and certainly not of its Governors. In the last decade or so, the Bank of Canada has gained a stellar reputation, arguably second to none, in the global central banking community. No country can claim to be running inflation targeting more effectively than our own central bank. Rather, my problem is that the flexible-rate regime is the *wrong paradigm* given our degree of integration with the US.

Third, and relatedly, there seemed to be more support for the idea of a common currency when the exchange rate was at or near 62 cents. But there ought to be heightened concerns now, as it heads for 80 cents and perhaps beyond. The US massive twin deficits (fiscal and balance of payments) have forecasters expecting a bleak future for the US dollar. What do we do about our (short-term?) competitiveness if market forces are intent on driving the dollar back up to the 90 cent range?

Fourth, the dramatic post-FTA depreciation in the Canadian dollar (89 cents to 62 cents) has been intricately linked with many of our trade disputes with the US, although almost no Canadians will own up to this. According, from American Robert Pastor (2001,10):

> A significant element of the timber problem – and, for that matter, many other trade problems – is due to foreign exchange rates. As long as the Canadian dollar sells for about two-thirds (65 cents) of the US dollar, Canadian exports will remain cheap, and a surge is likely to have dangerous effects, evoking threats of countervailing duties or antidumping from the United States. If the currencies were in better alignment, protectionist measures would diminish.

It is one thing to ignore this issue, as many Canadian reform proposals do. It is quite another for Canadians to then propose that the Americans convert their countervail and antidumping
procedures (CVAD) to rules-based adjudication, without recognizing that the Americans will in turn insist on ensuring that Canada does not use 1990s-style exchange rate depreciation to undercut any such agreement. This is one area where Canada can influence the degree to which NAFTA may be deepened. (As a side, there really is a free lunch here, since both fixed exchange rates and a subsidies/CVAD code would be beneficial to Canada.)

Finally, and harkening back to the earlier sovereignty discussion, the heyday of creative Canadian social policy initiatives was surely the Lester Pearson era – CPP/QPP, completing the expansion of the equalization program, the Canada Assistance Plan, Medicare, PSE agreements and later DREE. This is the core of what makes us unique in North America and it was all put in place during the only post-war period where we effectively had a common currency with the US (i.e. the fixed- exchange-rate regime over 1962-70). To be sure, correlation is not causation but this does provide tangible counter-evidence to those that routinely claim that a common currency will erode Canadian sovereignty over a wide range of policy areas. Just possibly, the precise opposite is the truth – by adopting US monetary policy in the form of a currency union we can free up considerable room on our policy plate to focus on a range of other issues more directly related to how we should live and work and play in the upper half of North America.

Conclusion

Canada has long been one of the world’s most open economies and trading nations. Because of this and because we are a small economy we are among the most ardent supporters of the GATT/WTO, i.e., of the multi-lateral rules-based international trading order. However, the fortunate reality is that we share the upper half of North America with the world’s current economic superpower, so that it is natural that our progressive post-war trade integration would eventually become formalized in the something like the FTA/NAFTA. It is likewise natural that Canada would and will continue to work toward ensuring that both the WTO and NAFTA deliver more secure access in the context of level playing fields. Phrased differently, Canada will move on all of the earlier-mentioned avenues.

To be sure, all Canadians would welcome more diversification in our exports, even though there are still enormous gains to be reaped by trading with the Americans–for example, the Maritime provinces are only beginning to take advantage of the many opportunities arising from closer economic ties with the US northeast. Attempting to “legislate trade diversity” is akin to the old picking winners game, especially if Canadian business maintains its eyes on the US market. But NAFTA at 20 will surely see greater trade diversity, if only because China will presumably then be the world’s largest trader and the economies of India and Brazil will be more developed and open. Phrased differently, the trade diversity issue is well on its way to being solved.

NAFTA at 20 will also see other developments. What was referred to above as political-democratic deepening will have proceeded at its current fast pace, arguably to the point where their will be much more of a community of economic interest (though not of political interest since none of the NAFTA partners want this, nor do their citizens). My view is that Canada will, after the US election and after Iraq is off the front pages, make some formal strategic proposals for deepening NAFTA within a homeland-security/economic-security. These may not succeed, but part of their role is to ensure that the NAFTA file active and open. Actually, since the US has been drawn into trade disputes by many nations, the prospect for
deepening Canada-US integration in terms of obtaining CVAD/subsidies codes is more likely to come from the multi-lateral WTO route. Whether we will be closer to a currency union will not be a depend on the Bank or Finance, but rather on the cumulative currency choices of Canadians, businesses and consumers alike. My principal concern here is that if the opportunity arises for a monetary union we will have done our homework, as was the case for the FTA.

If there is a problem with this scenario, it is likely to be that the US economic star may be shining less brightly under the burden of its massive twin deficits and the Chinese economic miracle. Were this to occur, NAFTA will be viewed as a godsend since US protection will likely be rife and we are running huge current account surpluses with the Americans. But this does not differ from the overall message, namely that Canada’s economic prosperity and policy sovereignty drive off continental integration, the latest (but not last) version of which is the FTA/NAFTA framework.

---

References


