

This article was downloaded by: [University of Victoria]

On: 16 December 2014, At: 11:56

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



## Journal of European Integration

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20>

### The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab Revolt: Differential Implementation

Assem Dandashly<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Political Science Department, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

Published online: 12 Dec 2014.



CrossMark

[Click for updates](#)

To cite this article: Assem Dandashly (2015) The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab Revolt: Differential Implementation, Journal of European Integration, 37:1, 37-56, DOI: [10.1080/07036337.2014.975988](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.975988)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.975988>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

---

ARTICLE

---

# The EU Response to Regime Change in the Wake of the Arab Revolt: Differential Implementation

ASSEM DANDASHLY

*Political Science Department, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands*

**ABSTRACT** Following the Arab Spring, one might expect a paradigm shift in the EU's attitude towards the MENA — at least with respect to democracy promotion. However, the EU response has been neither consistent nor coherent. This paper seeks to answer the following questions: How did the EU react to the Arab Spring events in North Africa? Is there evidence of any change in the goals and instruments pursued by the EU after the Arab Spring? And, do these goals and instruments change coherently across countries? The paper argues, first, that EU goals remain security and stability driven. While the EU viewed the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity for democracy, as events developed the EU prioritized security concerns as a response to the threat of instability in the MENA. And second, the utilization of instruments varied across time and cases due to the domestic politics of the targeted countries.

**KEY WORDS:** ENP, Middle East and North Africa, Arab Spring, democracy promotion, security

## Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been evolving as an international and regional actor, venturing into various new domains such as conflict management, economic development and democracy promotion in different parts of the world. The EU's role in international and regional affairs has increased significantly following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty by developing its relations with its eastern and Mediterranean neighbours. These relations

---

Correspondence Address: Assem Dandashly, Political Science Department, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. E-mail: [Assem.dandashly@maastrichtuniversity.nl](mailto:Assem.dandashly@maastrichtuniversity.nl)

were heavily shaped by the EU's security and stability concerns on its borders — mainly Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

MENA regimes have cooperated with the EU on fighting illegal migration and maintaining stability on the EU southern borders for decades. The EU in return provided economic incentives and turned a blind eye to violations of democracy, human rights and civil liberties. The main goal of the EU and its member states in the MENA countries has been maintaining security and stability, fighting illegal migration and combating terrorism. Among the main aims of the EU action plans with ENP countries is border management. The cooperation of ENP countries is needed in that field, for security reasons.<sup>1</sup>

The Arab Spring events that were a surprise to the EU, its member states and the entire world have changed one of the challenges facing EU action beyond its borders: the unfavourable domestic politics for democratic reforms in some Arab Spring countries. The events that started in Tunisia and resulted in the overthrow of former Tunisian president Zein al-' Abedin Ben Ali spilled over to other countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Syria. The only two countries, in addition to Tunisia, that witnessed a regime change are Egypt and Libya. With the outbreak of the protests, Libya and Egypt's leaders took a more aggressive attitude towards their people, which ultimately led to the toppling of their governments. The three cases witnessed a similar outcome, regime change; however, the changes manifested themselves in different ways, forcing the EU to prioritize different instruments according to the targeted country. The reason for the EU's pragmatic reaction to these issues ultimately stems from its recognition of each country's unique domestic political situation.

This paper seeks to answer the following questions: How did the EU react to the Arab Spring events in North Africa? Is there evidence of any change in the goals and instruments pursued by the EU after the Arab Spring? And, do these goals and instruments change coherently across countries? Answering these questions, the paper focuses on three Arab Spring North African countries (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) and argues, first, that EU goals remain security and stability driven. While the EU viewed the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity for democracy, as events developed the EU prioritized security concerns as a response to the threat of instability in the MENA. And second, the utilization of instruments varied across time and cases due to the domestic politics of the targeted countries.

Following the introduction, section two highlights the stages of EU response to the Arab Spring events and the analytical framework. Section three analyses the EU goals in the MENA pre- and post-Arab Spring. Section four discusses the EU instruments used in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and demonstrates how the fine tuning of the instruments used is shaped by the domestic politics. Section five discusses the rationale behind the EU policies in the three countries. The final section concludes with the main findings.

## EU Response to the Arab Spring Events

The Arab Spring incidents caught the EU by surprise and triggered an immediate review of the EU's policies vis-à-vis the MENA in order to address the new challenges (see Noutcheva 2014). The EU, like the US (see Huber 2014), fostered some hope that this could be a window of opportunity for democratic transition. The 2011 review of the ENP that followed the events highlighted the EU has not been successful in the area of democracy promotion, spelling out what measures needed to be taken to address these deficiencies 'to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links' (European Commission 2011a, 1). Significant research has been conducted on the topic since then assessing the EU response to the Arab Spring events (such as Echagüe, Michou, and Mikail 2011; Pace 2014; Pace and Cavatorta 2012; Schumacher 2011; Teti 2012; Teti, Thompson, and Noble 2013, etc.). Many scholars have been sceptical regarding the EU reforms and argued that the EU has not adopted any major change in its policies towards the MENA (see e.g. Balfour 2012; Behr 2012; Pace 2014; Teti 2012; Teti, Thompson, and Noble 2013). Pace and Cavatorta (2012, 134) draw the conclusion that 'there does not seem to be any serious reflections on lessons learnt from past mistakes of supporting authoritarian regimes in the name of stability at the expense of the protection of human rights and civil liberties'. In terms of democracy promotion, Teti, Thompson, and Noble (2013) analysed the EU documents pre- and post-Arab Spring and concluded that the difference between the two eras is insignificant.

This paper tries to understand the EU policy in the wake of the Arab Spring by focusing on the importance of the domestic politics of the targeted countries. The domestic political changes in North Africa pushed the EU to view the events as a window of opportunity for democratic transition. However, the initial belief that the Arab Spring events represented an opportunity to push for democratic reforms was quickly replaced by stability and security concerns. This shift in the reading of the Arab Spring events and the policies that will be taken in response are heavily based on the domestic changes on the ground — with the increased instability of the southern Mediterranean. With the post-Arab Spring chaos in Libya, Egypt, the Syrian civil war and the silencing of the revolution in Bahrain, stability and security goals were once again a priority for the EU. Its security concerns were sparked by a dramatic increase in illegal migration caused by instability in North Africa, 'worrying both EU officials fearing political consequences in [2014 European Parliamentary] elections and human rights advocates concerned about deaths at sea and other abuses of vulnerable migrants' (Daragahi and Spiegel 2013). The increase in illegal migration pushed the EU to reshift its focus to security concerns and combat it at the source by supporting the domestic authorities' measures to maintain stability in the North African countries — such as in Libya.

The changing domestic politics in the MENA countries meant that the EU had to utilize different instruments to deal with unique contextual issues. This paper argues that the variation in the EU's approach and instruments towards the MENA countries pre- and post-Arab Spring is

heavily dependent on the domestic politics of the targeted countries. The main factors that have changed with the Arab Spring events in the three countries are the domestic politics and the domestic elites. Although some of the new elites (at least in Tunisia) have shown interest in democratic transition, the challenges they face go beyond democratic reforms to cover economic development, stability and security.

Börzel and Risse (2012, 11) highlighted the importance of domestic politics and considered ‘that domestic institutional change responding to EU rules and regulations is unlikely to take place unless domestic actors in politics or society take them up and demand reforms themselves’. In case of domestic violence and lack of stability, the EU democratic instruments will not be used and the focus will be on restoring stability (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014; see also Börzel 2011; Grimm and Leininger 2012). In instances where the EU backed democratic reforms threaten domestic stability, it will abstain from progressing with these reforms, instead reverting to previous security concerns. Moreover, by looking at the domestic situation in the North African countries, they have major socio-economic problems that need to be addressed. Therefore, ‘international actors face the challenge of balancing the fulfilment of humanitarian and social needs with democracy support. Although supporting efficient and effective governance to facilitate access to basic services and public goods has become a mainstay of international development cooperation, socioeconomic development is likely to outrank democracy support in these contexts’ (Grimm and Leininger 2012, 403). In sum, the domestic politics in targeted countries influence the EU selection of instruments and policies.

### **EU Goals in North Africa Pre and Post Arab Spring — Priority for Stability?**

Since the institutionalization of the EU-MENA relations through the Barcelona Process in 1995, maintaining security and curbing illegal migration have been the EU’s key goals. One way this can be achieved is through developing economic conditions and creating more jobs in those countries.<sup>2</sup> Most of the EU documents discuss topics related to institution building, civil society support, civil liberties, human rights, democratic reforms, in addition to economic development and trade. However, when it comes to practice, the focus rests on security concerns and all other issues related to democracy promotion are deprioritized. Even the democracy partnership document included issues related to migration and border security. The review of the ENP did not really change this reality and the major issues remained — despite the fact that the new EU documents highlighted the need for democratic change in the MENA countries.

The 2008 report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy highlighted threats to the EU from the southern neighbours. ‘State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy. Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability

in the region and for the whole non-proliferation system' (Council of the European Union 2008, 1). These threats 'combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability' (Council of European Union 2008, 7). These various kinds of external security threats to the EU have led to internal security threats — especially when it comes to terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration.

Even prior to the Arab Spring events, the EU has made migration, the rise of fundamentalism and counter terrorism issues of central concern. All Arab dictators 'shared with the Union an interest in controlling the risk of terrorism locally' (Wouters and Duquet 2013, 15). In the wake of the Arab Spring events and the increased instability and security threats, restoring stability in the MENA region is now a priority for the EU. The region's instability and increase in the number of refugees, illegal migrants and asylum seekers have raised the potential for security concerns. Consequently, all EU member states have shown interest to address the security concerns emanating from the MENA countries. However, achieving a state of stability requires that instrument selection be based on the unique domestic politics possessed by the MENA countries.

## EU Toolbox: Utilization of Instruments

### *Tunisia*

The well-established political parties, strong unions and highly educated middle class created a favourable domestic political environment for democratic reforms following Ben Ali's fall. This situation enabled the first free and fair elections to take place on 23 October 2011, ultimately won by *En-Nahda Party*, who formed a coalition with the centre-left Congress for the Republic and the left party *Et-Takatol*. This does not mean that the new era was peaceful and did not experience political assassinations and strife between the newly established government and opposition. In fact, issues among the various political parties led to the fall of Hamadi Jebali's government in February 2013 and to protests against *En-Nahda* coalition government, inflamed by the assassination of one of the opposition leaders MP Mohammad Brahimi on 25 July 2013. However, continual political upheaval and violence in Egypt convinced both the opposition and *En-Nahda* coalition to discuss possible scenarios for solving their divisions.

The *Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail* (UGTT) (Trade Union Federation), along with members of the employers' organization *Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et de l'Artisanat* (UTICA) (Tunisian Union for Industry and Handicrafts), the Tunisian League for Human Rights and the national order of lawyers served as mediators between *En Nahda and the opposition*. After tense negotiations, Tunisian elites managed to come to an agreement that resulted in approving a new constitution that adheres to the pillars of a democratic system and appointing a caretaker government tasked with running parliamentary and presidential elections in October and November 2014.<sup>3</sup>

The domestic politics in Tunisia have been favourable for democratic reforms and the Tunisians have taken significant initial steps towards



democracy. This domestic environment and political bargaining has made it easier for the EU to implement its democracy support instruments in Tunisia. Despite the blunt support of the EU to Ben Ali's regime, the EU is still viewed positively in Tunisia and Tunisians consider the EU as a legitimate actor in the region.<sup>4</sup> The agreement between the EU and Tunisia on a Privileged Partnership and the signature of a new Action Plan on 19 November 2012 focused mainly on economic development and democratic transition.

### *Economy, Financial Aid and Trade*

The EU has been supporting economic development in Tunisia and other countries for a long time. In fact, it is the most advanced aspect of EU–Tunisia relations. Following the revolution, Tunisia has sought more EU support to address socio-economic problems and its marginalized regions.<sup>5</sup> A significant percentage of illegal migrants come from those regions. The EU approach regarding economic support has led to some improvements in comparison with the Ben Ali era. The EU agreed to provide more funding to develop marginalized regions and deal with social and economic imbalances. For example, the EU allocated EUR 12 million to reform the health-care systems in the poorest regions (European Commission 2012a).

With the Privileged Partnership, the EU 'reiterated its offer to gradually integrate Tunisia into the European internal market, to re-launch negotiations on liberalising trade in agriculture, to make rapid progress in the aviation discussions and to improve the mobility of EU citizens and Tunisians through the conclusion of a mobility partnership' (Council of the European Union 2012). The Privileged Partnership promised to increase the financial and technical aid to Tunisia, in addition to opening Tunisian agricultural products to the single market, advancing industry and liberalizing the service sector. While the liberalization of the service sector will facilitate European companies' access to the Tunisian market, reciprocity in this context is absent. Tunisians do not enjoy free movement in Europe and Tunisian companies have difficulties in getting the necessary visas to access the EU (B'Chir 2012).

When it comes to trade, the EU is considered Tunisia's primary partner. Access to the market has increased over the years, leading to deeper integration. With the exception of the slowdown in 2009 due to the euro crisis, trade relations between the EU and Tunisia have increased since the 2003. The EU absorbs around 74.1% of Tunisia's exports, while 66.9% of the country's imports come from the EU (European Commission 2012b). In 2008, Tunisia was the first Mediterranean country to remove tariffs for industrial products, thus, entering into a free trade area with the EU. Tunisia has become the EU's 31st largest trading partner (European Commission 2010a). Furthermore, on 14 December 2011, the negotiations for creating Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia were adopted by the Council (European Commission 2014a). The DCFTA 'could lead to a gradual integration of Tunisia's economy into the EU single market. The main



objective of the DCFTA is to bring Tunisian legislation closer to EU legislation in trade-related areas' (European Commission 2014a).

### *Democracy Promotion*

At the democratic level, the EU created an observatory mission to monitor Tunisia's first post-revolution elections held on 23 October 2011. The elections were deemed free and fair by EU observers and other civil society and NGOs' groups. Another area that witnessed increased support from the EU and its member states is the judiciary that had been rife with corruption since the independence of Tunisia in the mid-1950s. Tunisians have trust issues with the justice system and new reforms are in place to address these issues in the judiciary. The EU's attempts to support this domain were blocked by the previous regime. However, as part of the Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme launched by the EU in 2011, the EU has agreed (in October 2012) to increase its financial support to 'political/governance reform and inclusive economic growth, notably targeting the reform of the justice sector, capacity building of civil society, support to the renovation of popular neighbourhoods and support to the implementation of the association agreement and to the democratic transition' (European Commission 2013a).

EU support for civil society has gained momentum as well after being blocked by the previous regime. In the current reform period, many civil society groups in the EU and its member states are helping develop their Tunisian counterparts. Poland, for example, has set up a programme to support Tunisian civil society and democratic transition within the framework of *Support for Democracy 2012 in the form of foreign aid and training*. For example, the following projects were implemented in 2012, aiming at not only developing the civil societies' work but also educating the participants on the important role of active citizens and their relation to the state in a functioning democracy: 'Project I: Training programme for Tunisian youth non-governmental organisations (in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Tunis); Project II: Study visit to Poland for Tunisian local leaders' (Polska Fundacja Międzynarodowej Współpracy na Rzecz Rozwoju 'Wiedzieć Jak' 2012).

### *Migration, Mobility and Security*

The EU has used financial and technical assistance and conditionality to help keep its borders secured and the flow of illegal migrants under control. Soon after the revolution, the number of illegal migrants and asylum seekers originating from Tunisia increased significantly. This forced the EU to take several measures to tackle the issue (see European Commission 2010b, 2011b, 2011c on the European Commission's response to the migratory flows from North Africa). Furthermore, the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries launched the *Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security* to strengthen the cooperation in this area. Regarding Tunisia, the Seahorse programme was launched in 2013 to enhance the Tunisian

authorities' capacity to deal with irregular migration and illicit trafficking (European Commission 2013b). Tunisia will be the first MENA country to benefit from this initiative.

On 3 March 2014, the EU and Tunisia formally established a Mobility Partnership that focuses on facilitating the movement of people between Tunisia and the EU, managing migration and simplifying visa process. The EU support will also target the Tunisian authorities' efforts 'in the field of asylum, with a view to establishing a system for protecting refugees and asylum-seekers. Through this Partnership, the EU and Tunisia will not only develop their bilateral relations in the fields of migration, mobility and security, but will cooperate together to better meet the challenges faced in the Mediterranean', according to Cecilia Malmström (EU Commissioner for Home Affairs) (European Commission 2014b).

In sum, some changes to the level of economic support addressing the urgent needs of the Tunisian political and economic reforms can be observed. The EU has been more involved in supporting Tunisia's efforts to deal with issues related to migration and mobility, marginalized areas, unemployment, economic growth, healthcare, institutional and political reform and building active civil society. Maintaining economic support is crucial to the efforts of the Tunisian authorities not only regarding political reforms but also to maintain security and stability in this EU neighbour. By helping Tunisia economically and supporting its reform, the EU would be dealing with the security concerns at their source and enabling the elites to implement democratic reforms. For example, by addressing the socio-economic reasons leading to illegal migration, the EU would be addressing this problem and providing the infrastructure for Tunisians to stay in their country. In sum, the EU's instruments in Tunisia focus on financial and technical assistance, conditionality and strategic instruments such as signing the privileged Partnership.

### *Libya*

While Tunisia's toppling of Ben Ali was purely domestic, Libya's revolution came about through NATO intervention. Since the toppling of Gaddafi, Libya's domestic politics' situation has suffered from many security problems, lack of stability and increased crime levels. Despite the July 2012 elections in which non-Islamists won a majority, the new government was unable to immediately form.<sup>6</sup> The main task of the government involves stabilizing the country and addressing security concerns brought on by the various militias, an issue underlined by the killing of the American Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens by a jihadist militia in Benghazi on 11 September 2012.

The domestic political situation has not been conducive to democratic, institutional or economic reforms. The Libyan government has tried to address the security issue by 'declaring the south of the country a closed military zone and formally shutting the southern borders'; integrating the militias that participated in toppling Gaddafi in the security forces and military — with limited success (European Commission 2013c, 2). Up until now, the consecutive Libyan governments have failed to control or disarm

the militias, provide security for the people, reform the infrastructure and restore the economy to pre-revolution levels. With this situation, there is a risk that Libya will become a failed state on the EU borders. In addition to the security problems, Libya is more divided than at any other time and that increases the need for national reconciliation and opening dialogue between the various tribes and conflicting groups. This lack of stability and security ties the EU hands with respect to supporting economic development and democracy promotion. As a result the EU can only afford to focus on security concerns.

It is important to note that the EU's involvement in Libya is much less when compared to its neighbours (Tunisia for example). While member states are playing a more active role in the institutional transition, the EU role has been very limited 'in particular in the demobilisation and integration of members of revolutionary brigades, the reorganisation of the armed forces and assistance in controlling land and sea borders' (European Parliament 2012). EU allocated resources and energy has been marginal. The European Parliament 'considers it regrettable that the EU contribution in the security sector is slow to materialise, and that difficulties in planning and implementing this contribution are leaving the field open to bilateral initiatives of doubtful visibility and consistency' (European Parliament 2012).

#### *Post Revolution Measures: Technical, Financial and Humanitarian Aid*

Among the first actions taken by the Commission, following the revolution, was allocating EUR 30 million in humanitarian aid to address 'the most immediate humanitarian needs in Libya and of displaced persons at the Tunisian and Egyptian borders' (European Commission 2011d). By January 2012, the EU became the biggest donor to Libya in terms of humanitarian aid in which the humanitarian and civil protection funding reached EUR 158,733,523 (European Commission 2012c).

The EU contribution to Libya's reforms amounted to EUR 79 million focusing on security, migration, institutional reform, democratic transition, healthcare, civil society and educational and vocational systems' reform. The security sector alone received EUR 24.3 million allocated as follows: 10 million to the rule of law and security sector reform; 4.3 million is allocated for criminal investigations and crisis response; 5 million for physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of conventional weapons and ammunition; and another 5 million to dispose of unused munitions and provide Libyans a safe living environment (European Commission 2013c, 4).

The EU supported other programme, which are mainly of an economic nature: technical vocational education and training (EUR 6.5 million), healthcare (EUR 8.5 million), public administration and democratic transition, migration (EUR 19 million prior to the revolution in addition to 10 million as of 2011) and protection of vulnerable groups (EUR 4 million). All these programme not only support the economy and the quest for security, but also help in combating illegal migration by creating a safe working environment. At the moment, the EU is addressing the same areas


(reconciliation, public administration capacity, civil society and integrating women in public life, migration, healthcare and education) with a budget of EUR 30 million (EEAS 2013). However, due to the increased violence and the lack of stability and security, the focus has been diverted to those areas.

### *Migration, Mobility and Security*

The increasing number of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers that use the central Mediterranean route to get to Europe (see Figure 1) has forced the EU to concentrate on security and migration concerns. The instability and fragmentation of political control in Libya have made it easier for migrants (main nationalities are Eritreans, Somalis, other sub-Saharan Africans and Syrian nationals) to cross the Mediterranean via Libyan borders. This situation has pushed the Greek prime minister, Antonis Samaras to say that Libya is ‘an open door to the Mediterranean Sea’ (Daragahi and Spiegel 2013).

Therefore, the main concern for the EU in Libya is the migration issue as Libya is ‘both a destination country for economic migrants and a transit country for irregular migrants and people in need of international protection, heading towards the EU’ (European Commission 2014c). Therefore, at the beginning of 2014, the EU announced a new programme to support human rights-based migration management and asylum system. The EU allocated EUR 10 million to the programme, financed through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The aim of this programme is to strengthen the Libyan authorities’ capacities in border management and control. It also aims at limiting the number of those migrants who arrive in Libya (for better economic opportunities or escaping from conflict zones) from trying to cross the Mediterranean. In order to limit this migration, EU and Libyan officials have focused ‘on improving living conditions for migrants in retention facilities by reviewing administrative procedures, improving services provided to migrants and facilitating their access to the local labour market’ (European Commission 2014c).

Most of the EU’s instruments are of financial and technical nature, meant to help stabilize the country, address the urgent issues and maintain the borders’ control. On one hand, the EU involvement in Libya has lacked



**Figure 1.** EU Illegal Border crossing via central Mediterranean  
Source: see Frontex (online edition), 2014.

the necessary recourses to push for significant political reforms. On the other, the weak Libyan infrastructure and unfavourable domestic politics have created more challenges for both the Libyan authorities and the EU's active engagement. Despite the EU's support for democratic elections, Libya's current domestic politics and lack of stability have forced the EU to focus on stability and security, financial and technical assistance, training programme for security forces and border control. These threats pose great risk to EU security, forcing them to become its main focus.

### *Egypt*

The violence that started during the last month of the Muslim Brotherhood rule continued even after the recent military coup and constitutional vote. Among the reasons for this is the polarization of the Muslim Brotherhood and those who oppose them. The military and the interim government, following the fall of Morsi, have taken several hostile measures including the persecution of most of the Muslim Brotherhood's senior leaders including the elected president Morsi. This instability had strained the economy, despite generous financial contributions from some GCC countries such as United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Under military rule, Egypt has seen limited stability, successfully electing a new President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Instability in Egypt's domestic politics limits the EU's ability to push for more democratic reforms, as there is an urgent need to deal with more pressing stability and security concerns which continue to threaten Egypt's delicate economic situation. The persistent unrest in Egypt only heightens the EU's fear of illegal migration, especially in Greece and Italy. According to an EU diplomat, Egypt is 'a country of almost 90 million people on the EU's southern fringe. If things keep getting worse, where do you think that they will go?' (*EUobserver* 11 October 2013).

For many years, the EU has made minimal use of its democratic instruments, or has suspended their use in Egypt. The usage of positive conditionality, financial assistance and diplomacy to instil democracy did not work under the Mubarak regime and has since been ineffective after the revolution. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) documented the ineffectiveness of EU spending in various areas of governance before and after the January 2011 uprising. Karel Pinxten (ECA member responsible for the report) stated that the soft 'approach has not worked, and the time has come for a more focused approach which will produce meaningful results and guarantee better value for the European taxpayers' money' (ECA 2013). Following the outbreak of the revolution, the EU emphasized its support for 'the Egyptian population's legitimate request for their civil, political and socio-economic rights' (European Commission 2013d).

### *Democracy Promotion*

Soon after Mubarak stepped down, there was hope among EU leaders that Egypt would finally move to civilian leadership after 60 years of military rule. The EU launched a package of EUR 20 million aimed at supporting

civil society and approved programmes for 2011 in the amount of EUR 132 million that targeted Egypt's socio-economic problems (European Commission 2011e). The EU's offer to monitor the Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections was declined by Egyptian authorities. Instead, the EUR 2 million (under the Instrument for Stability) was allocated to 'assist the High Electoral Commission in its work and provide support to civil society organisations' (European Commission 2011e). The EU showed readiness to start negotiations on Mobility Partnership and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), however, the Egyptians authorities did not move forward with this goal (European Commission 2011e).

The parliamentary and presidential elections increased the EU's support towards democratic and socio-economic reforms. Following former President Morsi's visit to Brussels in September 2012, the EU and Egypt agreed to establish an EU-Egypt Task Force that met in Cairo on 14 November, 2012. The EU pledged EUR 253 million (EUR 90 million euro from SPRING and EUR 163 million from Neighbourhood Investment Facility). In addition, the European Investment Bank and the European bank for reconstruction and Development each committed an annual EUR 1 billion for the period 2012–2013 (EU-Egypt Task Force: Co-chairs conclusions 13 November 2012). Štefan Füle emphasized that most of the financial package money was '(a) linked to continuing reforms and transformation; and (b) promised by financial institutions and linked to the existence of good projects' (*Abramonline* 31 October 2013). However, no significant reforms and transformations were conducted since the fall of Mubarak. And since the end of Brotherhood rule, the priority has been to deal with instability. Even prior to the overthrowing of Morsi, the European parliament expressed concerns regarding democratic transition, freedom of expression, respect of human rights, rule of law and the increased social and sectarian clashes.

### *Diplomacy*

The July 2013 military coup that resulted in the forceful removal of the democratically elected president Mohammed Morsih increased the level of violence and social division. The ECA report and the political crisis in Egypt challenge the feasibility of using soft diplomacy in a polarized society plagued by political and social distrust. Though 'the EU achieved some success in building relations with new forces and mobilising economic support, it was unable to make any real mark on Egypt's turbulent political scene' (European Council on Foreign Relations 2013). The EU emphasis 'on incremental cooperation and sectoral reform seemed poorly aligned with the realities of Egyptian political life' (European Council on Foreign Relations 2013).

Catherine Ashton called upon all the parties to 'rapidly return to the democratic process, including the holding of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections and the approval of a constitution, to be done in a fully inclusive manner' (ENPI 2013). This soft tone did not work during Mubarak's era and was criticized by the ECA report. It seems that 'Ashton's statement showed little evolution from the EU's attitude in the



immediate wake of Mubarak's resignation where they called for a "transition towards democracy and for free and fair elections" (West 2013). Ashton has been critical of the use of force and the attempt to isolate the Muslim Brotherhood. In her opinion, 'the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood will at best bring short-term stability while damaging further the prospects of building democracy' (Ashton in Dempsey 2013). The EU's diplomatic instrument was on display during Ashton's numerous visits to Egypt to mediate between the different political powers.

### *Threat of Sanctions*

With the increase of violence in Egypt following the military coup, EU officials threatened to review not only its aid to Egypt but also its diplomatic ties.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the European Parliament raised deep concerns regarding the escalation of violence in Egypt and the stalling of social, economic and political reforms. On 14 March 2013, the European parliament embraced a non-binding decision calling for an EU suspension of assistance in case 'no major progress is made regarding respect for human rights, and freedoms, democratic governance and the rule of law' (European Parliament 2013). However, no economic sanctions were imposed and aside from agreeing 'to suspend exports to Egypt of any equipment that can be used for internal repression and review any arms sales', EU leaders stopped 'short of explicitly agreeing to end such trade' (Pawlak and O'Donnell 2013). The decision not to impose economic sanctions 'reflects a concern that abruptly cutting aid could shut dialogue with Cairo's military rulers and damage Europe's ability to mediate in any future negotiations to end the worst internal strife in Egypt's modern history' (Pawlak and O'Donnell 2013).

In sum, the EU role has not been at full power in Egypt due to many domestic political issues. However, that does not mean that the EU cannot be more influential. The 'EU may not have the leverage of the annual aid that the United States gives ... but it enjoys something far more desirable at the moment — credibility' according to Yasser El-Shimy (International Crisis Group) (*Middle East Online* 30 July 2013). However, the EU has yet to utilize all its instruments and capitalize fully on its credibility in its relation with Egypt. Volker Perthes (German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin) believes that the EU's financial assistance, and diplomacy and conditionality are not well utilized. The EU's 'package of money, markets and mobility (linked to human rights) for its southern and eastern neighbourhoods could be better used. Money is fine, but its uses are exaggerated, and markets can always be expanded' (Perthes in Dempsey 2013). Social and physical mobility are important, i.e. 'allowing people to travel, to live and study abroad in societies as open as those in Europe in order to see how they function and how political coalitions and compromises are made' (Dempsey 2013).

Moreover, in comparison to Tunisia and Libya, the EU is not the main player in Egypt: (1) the Egyptian military is closer to the American administration and (2) the influence of some GCC countries (mainly Saudi



Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) who promised to support Egypt to the tune of USD 12 billion dollars right after the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood. This is in addition to other loans and funds that have since been awarded by the GCC countries.

Overall, the EU utilized different instruments according to the targeted country. Table 1 summarizes the main findings in the three cases:

### **Understanding the EU Response to the Arab Spring Events in North Africa**

The EU involvement in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has shown that unique domestic environments with varying levels of domestic political instability and social-economic uncertainty have influenced the prioritization of goals (stability in the MENA over democracy promotion) and the instruments used by the EU. As we can see, the most advanced relations have been with Tunisia followed by Egypt and Libya and this was the case as well even prior to the Arab Spring. Depending on the domestic politics of the targeted country, the EU customized the instruments it employed

#### *Geostrategic Interests*

EU foreign policy, towards the MENA region for example, can be better explained by a neorealist claim in which the normative attitude is secondary to other strategic materialistic interests (Hyde-Price 2006) (such as economic interests, security, fighting terrorism, illegal migration, etc.). Instability in the Arab World affects the security concerns of the EU with respect to migration and transnational terrorism. As we have seen earlier, at the beginning of the Arab Spring, the EU viewed the events as a window of opportunity for democracy, however, as the events developed, the security threat resulting from instability in the MENA pushed the EU to prioritize its security concerns.

In Tunisia, we see a focus on economic development, mobility and migration and to a lesser extent on democracy. This approach has been applied due to the more stable situation in Tunisia in comparison to the other two countries. Even though, when the events creating instability and some Tunisians migrated to southern Italy, the EU and its member states raised major concerns regarding that issue and how to tackle it if it escalated. Dealing with the reasons that led to the revolution in Tunisia (mainly socio-economic) became a priority, as it will help create stability and more jobs in Tunisia that will lower the percentage of illegal migrants. In the case of Libya, the escalating violence has made border security the issue of primary importance. As the paper showed, Libya is considered the point of departure for illegal migrants and asylum seekers for the central Mediterranean route. Egypt went through two stages: the Muslim Brotherhood era and the post-military coup. In both stages, the EU fear of chaos in its large southern neighbour created a fear of floods of migrants coming from there.

In sum, security concerns pushed the EU to address the threats at their point of origin. By helping the MENA countries maintain stability and address economic hardships, the EU would be maintaining its security in addition to protecting its interests and its borders.

Table 1. EU involvement in the MENA

EU	Goals	Instruments	Domestic situation in the targeted Country and cooperation of targeted countries' domestic elites
Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Stability and Order</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conditionality</li> <li>• Financial Assistance</li> <li>• Financial pledges for democratic reforms (prior to the military coup)</li> <li>• Technical Assistance and knowledge transfer</li> <li>• Diplomacy: Mediation among the conflicting parties</li> <li>• Suspension of some military exports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unstable domestic situation</li> <li>• Too many domestic hindrances for reforms</li> <li>• Have its own domestic agenda</li> <li>• Narrow margin for the EU to get involved</li> <li>• Weak compliance and cooperation from the post revolution elites</li> <li>• Strong military intervention in political life</li> <li>• Heavy involvement of other players: US and some GCC countries</li> </ul>
Libya	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Borders' Security</li> <li>• Stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minor Financial assistance</li> <li>• Technical instruments targeted at border's security issues</li> <li>• Humanitarian aid</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unstable and chaotic domestic situation</li> <li>• Very weak infrastructure</li> <li>• Unfavourable for effective EU involvement</li> </ul>
Tunisia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With the toppling of Ben Ali: Democracy building.</li> <li>• Soon after that: Security and Stability</li> <li>• Maintaining its position as Tunisia's main economic partner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conditionality</li> <li>• Financial and technical assistance</li> <li>• Assistance for Democratic reforms</li> <li>• Strategic Instruments: Conclusion of Privileged partnership</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Favourable; EU is viewed as a strong ally and major player</li> <li>• Tunisian citizens and elites differentiate between some member states and the EU</li> <li>• Increased support for some member states such as Germany and Poland at the expense of France</li> </ul>

*Collective Identity and Self-Understandings*

The EU has developed a foreign policy identity of a liberal democracy that privileges ‘civilian’ as well as ‘soft’ power. Therefore, with the beginning of the Arab Spring events, the EU viewed the events in the MENA region as an opportunity for democracy promotion. At the same time, the EU considered the whole range of its foreign policy instruments — including economy, trade, aid, security, diplomacy, etc. The EU issued few documents to deal with the new challenges (see Noutcheva 2014); however, when it comes to implementation, the main focus has been more on EU security concerns ‘than a vibrant partnership between both shores of the Mediterranean’ (Dias 2014, 54). Even the newly negotiated mobility partnerships aim at ‘combating irregular migration and implement effective readmission and return policy’ (Dias 2014, 54).

There is an agreement among all EU leaders that democracy promotion in the MENA is uncontested, however, in practice, it becomes harder to implement due to several difficulties such as domestic situation in the targeted country and lack of incentives. This leads to different scenarios in different countries. In Tunisia, we notice a variety of instruments implemented, including democratization instruments — such as support for civil society, reform of the judiciary and institutions. While in Egypt, the EU attempt to support democratic reforms was faced by: some resistance from Egyptian elites during the Muslim Brotherhood era; a military coup followed by chaos and instability; and involvement of other more attractive players (US and some GCC countries). In Libya, the EU focused on humanitarian and financial aid with special attention to stability and border control and security.

This utilization of a variety of instruments reflects the EU’s self-understanding of what actions it views as crucial to its interests. This prioritization of the EU interests, and what instruments and tools to pursue these interests is based on the domestic politics of the targeted countries and is clearly reflected in the cases at hand. As for the European identity of a democratic power, its foreign policy is not supported in the EU reaction to the Arab Spring. At the beginning of the events, the EU viewed the events as a window of opportunity for democratic change without transforming these democratic aims into consistent empirical steps to be implemented in all the countries. Security remained a priority while democratic support did not witness much change in comparison to the pre-Arab Spring era.

*Domestic and Bureaucratic Politics*

When discussing the bureaucratic politics and the various actors involved at the EU level, we notice several complications and sometimes conflicting interests (see Noutcheva 2014). However, as this article focused on the implementation process and EU utilization of instruments, one can notice a few things: First, it is important to differentiate between what the EU does and what some member state do individually — which does not have to be contradictory. This issue was clear in Tunisia for example, with respect to civil society support and sharing the Polish experience with the Tunisian

counterparts. In Libya, the limited EU role has pushed member states to play a more active role at various institutional and political levels. In Egypt, the division between the EU institutions and member states was apparent especially during the military coup and the aftermath violence.

When member states feel their interests are threatened (in Libya for example), they take initiatives themselves. In Libya, for example, the slow reaction following the fall of Gaddafi pushed some member states to take the initiative and support borders control and security. The bureaucratic/internal EU politics matter as Noutcheva discussed in her article when drafting the policies. Therefore, one might look at rivalries and conflicts between the various EU institutions involved in foreign policy such as the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) as well as at the interaction between the Commission, the EEAS and the Council bureaucracy. However, these interactions do not necessarily impair the EU's utilization of instruments or its effectiveness on the ground as we have seen in the three cases.

### **Conclusion**

The Arab Spring caught the EU by surprise. Even though the EU launched a critical review of the ENP focusing on how to reform it, a lot of work still remains. The EU's democratization efforts have not been successful in the region due to its focus on security and stability at the expense of democracy. The EU's response to the Arab Spring events has been selective. The EU is heavily involved in Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Libya and Egypt. Among the reasons for this selective approach is the domestic politics in the targeted countries. Nevertheless, the EU is viewed more positively than other players in some MENA countries due to its credibility (that is based on its soft power) and its historic relations with the region.

The EU goals in the MENA region have not moved away from its previous prioritization of security and stability. Democracy promotion as a goal became a priority with the outbreak of the Arab Spring events; however, with the deterioration of stability in MENA, security and stability concerns have once again emerged as the EU's primary concerns. As for the instruments, the EU has mainly relied on financial and technical assistance, positive conditionality and diplomacy. Yet, we see some variation depending on the targeted country's domestic politics. For example, in Tunisia, the focus has been on financial assistance, technical assistance, conditionality and increased support for democratic transition. In Egypt, the focus has been on financial and technical assistance and diplomacy. In Libya, the EU instruments were mainly minor financial assistance, humanitarian aid and technical instruments targeted at border's security issues.

What emerges from the case studies is that the variation in the degree of stability in the MENA countries determines the variation in instruments used. So the level of instability and insecurity in these countries is a key characteristic of the domestic politics variable, with Libya being the most unstable, Tunisia the most stable and Egypt in-between. The EU use of instruments is in line with the realist argument — which complies with one of the explanations put forth by the introduction of this special issue (Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2014).

## Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank professors Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse in addition to the participants at the two workshops, held in Berlin on 8–9 June 2012 and 25–26 October 2013, for their comments and feedback on earlier draft of this paper. Moreover, the author would like to thank the Centre for Global Studies (CFGs) at the University of Victoria (Victoria, Canada) for hosting him for few months in 2013 and giving him the opportunity to work on his research and present it. The comments and feedback from the CFGs staff have been very helpful.

## Notes

1. The ‘Action Plans should [...] include measures to improve the efficiency of border management, such as support for the creation and training of corps of professional non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure. The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security’ (European Commission 2004, 16–17).
2. Interview with a member of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly, October 2013.
3. By the time of writing, the second free and fair parliamentary elections (post Ben Ali) took place on 26 October 2014 with 60% of the registered voters participating. The elections’ official provisional results show a victory of *Nidaa Tounes* (a secular party that was formed after the fall of Ben Ali by Beji Caid el Sebsi – a former prime minister from 27 February 2011 to 24 December 2011), which won around 38% out of the total 217 seats, while *Ennahda* party came second with 31% (Turak 2014).
4. Interviews with various members of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and government officials, October 2013.
5. Marginalized regions are mainly regions outside the major cities that have not been developed for a long time and suffer from lack of infrastructure, lower education and lack of job opportunities.
6. Following the July 2013 parliamentary election, Dr. Mustafa Abu-Shagour was elected to succeed Abdurrahim El-Keib as Prime Minister in 2012. Abu Shagour’s appointment ‘represented a critical opportunity for the true independents and local interest groups to form an executive protected from destructive party politics that dominated the GNC’ (Megriss 2013). However, Abu-Shagour failed to receive congressional approval for his cabinet’s nominees due to his ‘failing to properly respect the power of local political groups and mishandling the bitter reaction of Mahmoud Jibril, [the head of the National Forces Alliance, which is one of the largest political parties in Libya,] opponent in the race for prime minister, to defeat’ (Megriss 2013). This caused few months delay before Prime Minister Ali Zidan secured the approval of the General National Congress to his new government that included ‘a mixture of liberal figures and Islamists as he tries to build a coalition acceptable to all parties’ (BBC 31 October 2012).
7. The EU called for a meeting in order ‘to discuss whether the 5 billion (£3.2 billion) in loans and grants it has set aside for Egypt will make it there now that Morsi [...] is no longer in charge’ (Ramsey 2013).

## References

- Ahramonline. 2013. *Inclusive political dialogue key to EU support for Egypt: EU commissioner*. 31 October. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/85139/Egypt/Politics-/Inclusive-political-dialogue-key-to-EU-support-for.aspx> (accessed 12 January 2014).
- B’Chir, N. 2012. Tunisia — UE: Partenaire privilégié ... Ni partenaire ni privilégié? [EU-Tunisia privileged partnership ... Neither partnership nor privileged?] *Business News-Tunisia*, 20 November.
- Balfour, R. 2012. EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring. *Papers IEMed* 16: 1–33.
- BBC. 2012. *Libyan parliament approves new government*, 31 October. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20152538> (accessed 28 February 2014).
- Behr, T. 2012. The European Union’s Mediterranean policies after the Arab Spring: can the Leopard change its spots? *Amsterdam Law Forum* 4, no. 2: 76–88.

- Börzel, T.A. 2011. When Europe hits ... across its borders. Europeanization and the near abroad. *Comparative European Politics* 9, no. 4: 394–413.
- Börzel, T.A., A. Dandashly, and T. Risse. 2014. Responses to the “Arabellions”: the EU in comparative perspective – Introduction. *Journal of European Integration* 37, no. 1: 1–17.
- Börzel, T.A., and T. Risse. 2012. From Europeanisation to diffusion: introduction. *West European Politics* 35, no. 1: 1–19.
- Börzel, T.A., and V. van Hüllen. 2014. One voice, one message, but conflicting goals: cohesiveness and consistency in the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21, no. 7: 1033–49.
- Council of the European Union. 2008. *Report on the implementation of the European security strategy — providing security in a changing world*. S407/08, 11 December.
- Council of the European Union. 2012. *EU Tunisia Association Council*. PRESS/12/479. 19 November.
- Daragahi, B., and Spiegel, P. 2013. Libya instability fuels EU migrant fears. *Financial Times*, 28 October.
- Dempsey, J. 2013. Influencing Egypt with soft power. *The New York Times*, 2 September.
- Dias, V.A. 2014. A critical analysis of the EU’s response to the Arab spring and its implications for EU security. *Human Security Perspectives* 10, no. 1: 26–61.
- Echagüe, A., H. Michou, and B. Mikail. 2011. Europe and the Arab Uprisings: EU vision versus member state action. *Mediterranean Politics* 16, no. 2: 329–35.
- EEAS. 2013. *Libya*, <http://eeas.europa.eu/libya/> (accessed 10 October 2013).
- ENPI. 2013. *Ashton: EU wants to help Egypt find its way to democracy in an inclusive way*. 4 October. <http://www.enpi-info.eu/medportal/news/latest/33773/Egypt-Ashton-urges-all-sides-rapidly-to-return-to-democratic-process> (accessed 14 October 2013).
- EU-Egypt Task Force: Co-chairs conclusions. 13 November 2012. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133511.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133511.pdf) (accessed 12 January 2014).
- EUobserver. 2013. EU fears economic migrants from Egypt’. 11 October. <http://euobserver.com/foreign/121757> (accessed 30 January 2014).
- European Commission. 2004. *Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy*. Strategy Paper{SEC(2004) 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570}/\*COM/2004/0373 final\*/
- European Commission. 2010a. *Trade: bilateral relations — Tunisia*, [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/countries/tunisia/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/countries/tunisia/index_en.htm) (accessed 28 March 2012).
- European Commission. 2010b. *Commission proposes better management of migration to the EU*. IP/11/532. 4 May.
- European Commission. 2011a. *A new response to a changing neighbourhood: a review of European neighbourhood policy*. Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission. COM(2011) 303, 25 May.
- European Commission. 2011b. *Frequently asked questions: addressing the migratory crisis*. MEMO/11/273, 4 May.
- European Commission. 2011c. *The European Commission’s response to the migratory flows from North Africa*. MEMO/11/226. 8 April.
- European Commission. 2011d. *Joint Communication to the European Council, The European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean*. COM(2011) 200 final. 8 March.
- European Commission. 2011e. *The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’*. MEMO/11/918. 16 December.
- European Commission. 2012a. *Tunisia: more EU support for judiciary and health care*. [http://ec.europa.eu/commission\\_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2012/10/20121002\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/headlines/news/2012/10/20121002_en.htm) (accessed 12 January 2013).
- European Commission. 2012b. *Memo — mission for growth: creating economic ties to benefit Tunisia and the EU*. Memo/12/920.
- European Commission. 2012c. *Humanitarian aid and civil protection-Libyan Crisis*. [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/libya\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/libya_en.pdf) (accessed 12 August 2014).
- European Commission. 2013a. *EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The state-of-play after two years*. MEMO/13/81. 8 February.
- European Commission. 2013b. *EU action in the fields of migration and asylum*. MEMO/13/862. 9 October.
- European Commission. 2013c. *ENP Package — Libya*. MEMO/13/250. 20 March.
- European Commission. 2013d. *EU-Egypt relations*. MEMO/13/751. 21 August.

- European Commission. 2014a. *Trade: Countries and Regions: Tunisia*. (last update 19 May 2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/tunisia/> (accessed 12 August 2014).
- European Commission. 2014b. *EU and Tunisia establish their mobility partnership*. IP/14/208. 3 March.
- European Commission. 2014c. *Supporting human rights-based migration management and asylum system in Libya*. MEMO/14/26. 20 January.
- European Council on Foreign Relations. 2013. *Middle East and North Africa — Egypt*, <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2013/mena/56> (accessed 15 October 2013).
- European Court of Auditors (ECA). 2013. Press Releases, Court of Auditors — ECA/13/18 18/06/2013, [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_ECA-13-18\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-13-18_en.htm) (accessed 30 September 2013).
- European Parliament. 2012. *European Parliament Report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy* (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy). 12562/2011 — 2012/2138(INI), October 31. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0455&language=HR> (accessed 12 August 2014).
- European Parliament. 2013. *European Parliament Resolution P7\_TA(2013)0095 on the situation in Egypt*. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0095&language=EN> (accessed 12 August 2014).
- Frontex (online edition). 2014. Update on Central Mediterranean Route. <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/update-on-central-mediterranean-route-5wQPyW> (accessed 30 January 2014).
- Grimm, S., and J. Leininger. 2012. Not all good things go together: conflicting objectives in democracy promotion. *Democratization* 19, no. 3: 391–414.
- Huber, D. 2014. A pragmatic actor — the US response to the Arab uprisings. *Journal of European Integration* 37, no. 1: 57–75.
- Megrisis, T. 2013. Libya's house of cards. *MUFTAH*. <http://muftah.org/libyas-house-of-cards/> (accessed 28 February 2014).
- Middle East Online*. 2013. Europe takes over from the US to resolve Egypt's Crisis, 30 July. <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=60455> (accessed 2 September 2013).
- Noutcheva, G. 2014. Institutional governance of European neighbourhood policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. *Journal of European Integration* 37, no. 1: 19–36.
- Pace, M. 2014. The EU's interpretation of the 'Arab Uprisings': understanding the different visions about democratic change in EU-MENA Relations. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 52, no. 5: 969–84.
- Pace, M., and F. Cavatorta. 2012. The Arab uprisings in theoretical perspective — an introduction. *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 2: 125–38.
- Pawlak, J., and J. O'Donnell. 2013. Europe shies away from cutting aid for Egypt'. *Reuters*, 21 August. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/us-egypt-protests-eu-idUSBRE97K0WE20130821> (accessed 28 February 2014).
- Ramsey, A. 2013. Egypt's Foreign Aid isn't going anywhere fast. *Vice*, 28 August. [http://www.vice.com/en\\_uk/read/egypts-foreign-aid-isnt-dissapearing-anywhere-fast1](http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/egypts-foreign-aid-isnt-dissapearing-anywhere-fast1) (accessed 28 February 2014).
- Schumacher, T. 2011. The EU and the Arab spring: between spectatorship and actorness. *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 3: 107–19.
- Teti, A. 2012. The EU's first response to the 'Arab Spring': a critical discourse analysis of the partnership for democracy and shared prosperity. *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 3: 266–84.
- Teti, A., D. Thompson, and C. Noble. 2013. EU democracy assistance discourse in its new response to a changing neighbourhood. *Democracy and Security* 9, no. 1–2: 61–79.
- Turak, N. 2014. Nidaa Tounes leads Ennahdha by strong margin. *TunisiaLive*, <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/10/27/nidaa-tounes-leads-ennahdha-by-strong-margin/> (accessed 28 October 2014).
- West, T. 2013. EU ineffective in Egypt once again. European Foundation, <http://www.europeanfoundation.org/tom-west-eu-ineffective-in-egypt-once-again/> (accessed 12 June 2014).
- Wouters, J., and S. Duquet. 2013. *The Arab Uprisings and the European Union: in search of a comprehensive strategy*. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 98, January.