Structural Adjustment Programs and Inequalities:
A Case Study of the Philippines

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"The experience of the less developed country borrowers is filled with irony, but nowhere is this more apparent than in the Philippines" (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 373).

Introduction

Development is a historically relational process that often framed a transition from tradition to modernity, but in actuality, shaped by asymmetrical colonial and postcolonial power relations (McMichael and Weber 2025, 2-3). Much of the discourse on development has focused predominantly on economic growth, specifically, in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita terms. However, as emphasized in this course, such a focus is analytically limited, as it fails to fully capture the sacrifices and costs to produce such "growth" (McMichael and Weber 2025, 6; 18).

McMichael and Weber describe the 1980s as a transition into a new era, in which the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)—assumed the central role in managing economic crises in the Global South (McMichael and Weber 2025, 80). Newly independent states in the Global South relied heavily on external borrowing to finance their development, and to integrate into the global markets. When the United States (US) Federal Reserves Board moved to halt the dollar's further devaluation from overcirculation in the decade prior, real interest rate on loans, primarily held by Global South countries soared (McMichael and Weber 2025, 79). Borrowing money continued, however, to face the rising cost of oil—rising oil prices and declining export earnings triggered by instability in the Middle East, turning the 1980s into an era of debt crises (Kind 2000, 37). The Bretton Woods financial institutions hence shifted to a debt management plan; through the IMF-led structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that imposed austerity, liberalization, and market-oriented reforms.

Moreover, the shift is not only economic, but inherently political. “Financialization, debt, and the accelerated concentration of wealth today work through social relations already configured […] by imperial conquest and racial capitalism” (Byrd et al. 2018, 1). This insight is important when considering the effects of SAPs, specifically whether the program intensified inequalities. Adjustment measures, moreover, “fell hardest on the poorest and least powerful social classes” (McMichael and Weber 2025, 81). For instance, when the SAPs were implemented in the Philippines in two phases—primarily, when SAP loans were granted in 1980 and 1983—such funding was tied to policy conditions such as tariff reductions, trade liberalization, and deregulation (Simbulan 2001, 46). The program “eliminated the current account deficit and restored the rate of inflation to near zero, [but] in some sections of the country […] there was widespread malnutrition.” (Dohner and Intal 1989a, 169).

The history of the Philippines is a history of colonialism; three centuries of Spanish rule, followed by its cession to the United States (US) in 1898, and a brief occupation by Japan during World War II. The initial “Spanish colonization set the conditions for the integration of the [Philippines] into the global capitalist marketplace” (Rafael 2018, 6). As such, the selected case study is significant: the Philippines is one of the longest colonies to have ever existed, and categorized as a ‘developing country’ today, but is characterized by systemic corruption that undermine infrastructure projects (Guinto and Simonette 2025), enabled by patronage politics alongside nepotism (Castro 2025).

On top of these institutional deficiencies, GDP-based growth indicators often mask underlying structural inequalities as wealth and development remain concentrated among elites while marginalized communities see little benefit (Garcia 2025). Moreover, “the roots of contemporary problems lie in the colonial years,” and when nation-building was the primary project in the postwar era, the Philippine elites consolidated political and economic dominance by shaping institutions to preserve their interests (Weekley 2006, 85-86; 90-91). Political dynasties are rooted in precolonial structure that became more pronounced under colonial rule, and "socio-economic inequalities and the concentration of wealth allowed dynasties to thrive" (Lanzona et al. 2025, 349). Based on this, elites can be defined as actors that have exercised disproportionate influence over state institutions, for this paper.

Against this backdrop, SAPs did not operate in an economically neutral environment, but within a political economy presupposed by colonial legacies, and elite dominance. This paper will investigate the sociopolitical effects of the debt crisis, specifically the SAPs, in the Philippines. This paper asks: *Did the structural adjustment programs intensify socioeconomic class division in the Philippines? If so, how?* Informed by critical development, postcolonial, and feminist theories, the research will address the questions, drawing on a range of English-language sources, including academic scholarship, historical documents and policy papers. As English and Filipino are the official languages of the Philippines, where English is used widely used in governance and academia, concerns regarding translation bias are minimal, thereby enriching the reliability and consistency of the sources used in this analysis.

This paper will argue that SAPs reinforced socioeconomic class divisions by redistributing economic and social burdens downward while preserving elite control over state resources and economic policy—not simply as isolated policy failures, but as mechanisms that reconfigured an already unequal political, social, and economic environment. Moreover, that the SAPs reinforced elite control over economic resources while redistributing the social costs of adjustment onto more vulnerable sectors of society, particularly through the institutionalization of labor export with overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).

I. Pre-existing Inequalities, Elite-Accrued Debt

The ethos of the global post-1945 era is characterized by national development, resulting in the inauguration of the Bretton Woods program (McMichael and Weber 2025, 49-50). The IMF's conditionality requirement ensured that development priorities were fitted toward First World evaluation and objectives (McMichael and Weber 2025, 53). In the context of the Philippines, the post-1945 era is also its postcolonial era: after gaining formal independence in 1946, the subsequent years saw rebuilding and significant economic growth, which placed the Philippines as a "Tiger of Asia" by the 1950s (Dohner and Intal 1989a, 170). Merely two decades later, such label would be rescinded and replaced—as the "sick man of Asia" (Kind 2000). This deterioration in economic performance may directly be linked to domestic measures, trade practices and patterns of debt accumulation driven by elite interests and exacerbated by corruption.

Moreover, the effects of SAPs in the Philippines are also better understood when situated within the country's political economy, embedded with deep structural inequalities. As Thompson argues, colonial governance relied on local intermediaries, entrenching systems of authority that privileged only a small group of elites, and structured the state around these mediated power relations (Thompson 2017, 32; 44). Inequality has been historically entrenched, as land concentration to select families—the material base of elite influence and power even during colonial period—persisted in the postwar, postcolonial era, as "land and other natural resources were held by […] local elite at the top of the distribution pyramid" (Williamson 2017, 40; 50). Furthermore, elites are understood as those whose privileges were shaped by colonial systems, playing ambivalent roles as both anti-colonial actors and collaborators benefiting from colonial rule (Reyes 2017, 212), reflecting the notion that concentration of wealth reflects qualities from coloniality (Byrd et al. 2018). Elites consist of both traditional landed families, and technocrats. While the former emerged from the colonial systems of landownership and local governance, the latter were cultivated through postwar development strategies and Cold War geopolitical conditions (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 387; Woods 2020, 153; Tadem 2020, 537).

In the Philippines, technocrats were, at large, born out of US strategy to train experts to counter communism and promote development in the neo-liberal global project (Woods 2020, 131; Tadem 2020, 535). By the Marcos era (first term 1965-69; second term 1969-72; martial law rule 1972-1986), these elites had consolidated control over economic and political institutions, enabling them to shape development policies to further reinforce their position. The Philippines' economic policy was thus managed by a group of technocrats, who held the confidence of foreign creditors; the country was among the first countries to take advantage of the new, extended financing facilities of the Bretton Woods institutions (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 373). Such large-scale borrowing through the World Bank was made in the name of "infrastructure projects, such as dams, highways, and power plants" (McMichael and Weber 2025, 52). Marcos' 1969 reelection campaign marked a turning point, as public spending increased dramatically to finance infrastructure projects to simulate domestic development; this expansion contributed to a balance-of-payments crisis, which in turn accelerated reliance on external borrowing (Punongbayan and de Dios 2025, 3; Dohner and Intal 1989b, 382).

It is important to note that corruption was not an isolated phenomenon, but rather a structural feature of the Philippine political economy. At least, as early as post-1945 era, corruption had been present; the Philippine Institute for Public Administration (IPA) identified that "families that historical ruled politics" as "primary perpetrators of corruption" (Woods 2020, 153). In contemporary politics, at least "70% of incumbent officials come from political dynasties" and "elections have become mere formalities for transferring power from parents to children or from one sibling to another." (Castro 2025). As such, corruption is more indicative of the Philippines' state of democracy, and the political culture enshrined with patronage politics.

Under Marcos, several notable projects came to fruition throughout the 1970s using foreign loans—such as the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, Cultural Center of the Philippines Complex, and San Juanico Bridge—however, corruption and theft from these loans took place (Ateneo Martial Law Museum n.d.). This is noticeable by evaluating at the evolution of external debt; when Marcos assumed the presidency, the external debt was less than $1 billion, but by the time of his expulsion in 1986, the figure was closer to $28 billion (of which, it is estimated he had taken $5 to $10 billion of, though the exact number is difficult to track)—Marcos had used his position to provide family, close friends, and supporters 'behest loans,' which are "inevitably nonperforming loans that cannot be collected from the debtor" (Chaikin and Sharman 2009, 164-169). Moreover, the projects were typically constructed in haste, to simulate development to citizens, but often compromised on structural safeties (Afinidad-Bernardo n.d.). Many such projects were inefficient, and by 1986, "nonperforming assets totaled over $7 billion, or almost a third of the Philippines' total external debt" (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 533-535; quote from 374).

The benefits of debt accumulation under the guise of infrastructure projects were thus highly concentrated to the elite and Marcos' circle, who used such projects for his reelection campaign, while project safety, economic performance and efficiency were risked. Access to foreign loans and state resources were mediated through political connections, allowing elites to capture disproportionate gains. These elites did not disappear with the political transition, but were reconstituted across periods—from colonial intermediaries to postwar political dynasties, and later to technocrats and cronies under Marcos—retaining control over state institutions and economic policy. This continuity is critical, as it expounds how the same groups were positioned to benefit from both debt-financed development and the subsequent restructuring under SAPs. When the debt crisis inevitably occurred in the 1980s, SAPs were put in place by the Bretton Woods institutions, which called for various domestic policies to be changed. But this pattern of borrowing and crisis formation reflects how debt accumulation under authoritarian rule produced long-term economic effects that extended beyond the Marcos period (Punongbayan and de Dios 2025).

II. Policy Changes

These pre-existing inequalities shaped not only how the crisis emerged, but also how its resolution through SAPs would be experienced across different social groups. “Although SAPs emerged as a form of conditional policy re-regulation, their actual implementation was not as smooth as perhaps one might have originally envisaged” (Weber 2004, 366). By the global debt crisis in the 1980s, the economic performance of the Philippines significantly deteriorated in relation to the oil shock. The crisis was worsened by “the failure of several large firms, many of which were bailed out by the government” (Dohner and Intal 1989a, 174). This response reflects an uneven distribution of state support, where politically connected firms were protected from collapse while smaller actors and the broader population remained exposed to the crisis.

Although the Marcos government-initiated tariff reform and trade liberalization in the early 1980s under the SAP framework against such backdrop (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 572), the Philippines, in fact, began the 1970s with “debt rescheduling and an IMF-sponsored stabilization program” (Dohner and Intal 1989a, 170). This earlier context matters because the Marcos government had already introduced the “New Society” program in 1974, which reoriented educational curricula toward state ideology and, crucially, toward labor export (Maca 2018, 9).

Social studies and civics were redesigned to promote this "New Society," including the normalization of overseas employment as part of national development, with textbooks explicitly presenting overseas work as beneficial to both workers and the state (Maca 2018, 8). Filipino (Tagalog) remained the "dominant language" during the colonial period, with Spanish functioning as a "high" language of schooling and governance, while English was institutionalized under U.S. rule such that by 1904 "primary instruction […] was conducted entirely in the English language" (Thompson 2017, 43). After gaining independence, there were moves within the Philippines to forge and foster its own national identity: language was included in this movement (Curaming 2023). Despite such moves, the educational reforms under "New Society" took place, predating the implementation of SAPs in the 1980s; the groundwork was shaped in the years immediately following the debt rescheduling with the IMF in the early 1970s. Taken together with the formal labor export policy discussed in the next section, these reforms suggest that the Marcos regime was already preparing Filipinos to be inserted into the global workforce. Labor export, then, was not merely a response to the debt crisis: rather, it was a system already institutionalized as part of the state's development strategy, subsequently deepened under SAPs.

Generally, the conditions set forth under SAPs included currency devaluation, privatization of state enterprises, and drastic reduction of public spending (McMichael and Weber 2025, 81). In the Philippines' case, stabilization under the SAP constituted "liberalization, export-oriented economic efficiency, privatization of estate owned assets, reducing government expenditures, and streamlining the bureaucracy" (Abocejo 2014, 19). However, the outcomes of SAP implementation diverged significantly from their stated objectives. For instance, trade liberalization contributed to the "severe erosion on the country's industries which were left unable to compete in the open market" as the program "failed to consider onset of global recession" (Abocejo 2014, 22). This erosion contributed to declining employment and weakened domestic production, disproportionately affecting workers who relied on these industries for income. These reforms therefore did not fail to deliver growth, but actively restructured the economy in ways that entrenched existing class hierarchies.

As SAPs shifted state priorities toward external obligations, during the 1980s approximately half of government expenditure was directed towards debt servicing, shifting state resources away from public welfare and disproportionately burdening lower-income populations (Abocejo 2014, 21). This was not only true for the Philippines, but globally: in 1984, "direction of capital flows reversed—that is, the inflow of loan…into the former Third World was replaced by an *outflow* in the form of debt repayment" (McMichael and Weber 2025, 81; emphasis in original). Privatization, urged by the Bretton Woods institutions' SAPs, further reinforced the unequal effect of the program; instead of fostering more market participation, it instead led to "the creation of local monopolies," effectively becoming a "transfer of control from government ownership to few elite-rich-business magnets" and thereby concentrating economic power among elite actors, limiting a broader participation (Abocejo 2014, 22). In this sense, privatization did not expand market participation, but reallocated state assets to already dominant actors, thereby consolidating elite control over key sectors of the economy. This outcome reflects a broader trend in which market-oriented reforms redistributed risk onto vulnerable populations while maintaining structural dependence on external capital (Weber 2004, 370).

Furthermore, the austerity measures taken by the Philippine government also disproportionately affected lower-income populations, as cuts in subsidies and social services reduced access to health, education, and basic welfare provisions—strengthening existing socioeconomic divisions (Simbulan 2001, 47-49). With Simbulan's compiled data, as well as the Philippine government's budget records (Department of Budget and Management 1989), the following insights on the breakdown of budget are observed:

- The earliest available data, in 1986, of the total national budget, debt servicing accounted for 24.51% in contrast to health at 3.12%.
- The most skewed figure is in 1989, when, of the total national budget, debt servicing account for nearly half at 42.68% while health remained 3.21%.

The low priority on health spending, as shown above, contributed to the government's insufficiency "to meet even the most basic health needs of the people, particularly the poor—the population most vulnerable to diseases." (Simbulan 2001, 51). This is evident when examining mortality and morbidity data from the Philippine Department of Health. Analysis by health researchers indicate that preventable illnesses such as tuberculosis and pneumonia remained the two leading causes of death from the 1960 through the 1980s, while measles remained in the top ten causes of mortality from 1976 to 1990 (Ladredo and Española 2017)—a trend that would continue until the 2000s, when the Philippines "graduated" from its usage of IMF (Baldovino and Bird 2023, 69).

Taken together, austerity and policy changes introduced to cater to SAP conditionalities were concentrated benefits among elites while shifting the costs of economic adjustment onto workers, consumers, and lower-income households. Moreover, such developments reshaped the Philippines' domestic economy, and pushed the country into a more dependent position within the global division of labor. Rather than generating new forms of inequality, SAPs operated by redistributing existing economic risks downward, intensifying structural divisions that were already embedded within the Philippine political economy. This is most evident with the institutionalization of OFWs, with the burden placed in a top-down structure, from state to families, to individuals.

III. Overseas Filipino Workers and Gender

Marcos was ousted in the 1986 People Power Revolution after two decades of rule, artificially prolonged with his declaration of martial law in 1972. Under the new Aquino government in 1986, unemployment rate rose to 45% (Dohner and Intal 1989b, 546-47). Crucially, even after Marcos was ousted, the legacies of his policy remained, primarily in the institutions he created which saw the government directly profit from export of labor. This arrangement further benefited the same elite-controlled state structures, which relied on remittances while avoiding structural reforms to domestic employment.

Unemployment and economic difficulty—as mentioned in the previous section—was not new in the context of the Philippines in the 1980s. In fact, the inception of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) as a formal policy of exporting labor “emerged as an official economic development strategy from 1974” to address unemployment and “the failure to develop the economy” under Marcos (Maca and Morris 2012, 472). While there were already records of labor migration from the Philippines, these were managed by the private sector. As Maca notes:

> The government takeover and eventual monopoly of the sector meant additional fee revenues from prospective migrant workers—from documentation fees (i.e. birth certificates, police clearance, etc) to insurance and placement fees (some partly paid by foreign employers). The government further decreed that overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) could only remit their dollar earnings to families back home through government banks.” (Maca 2018, 5).

To date, OFW remittances remain the largest source of foreign exchange in the Philippines through this system. The policy has continued as “economic hardship, underemployment, and low wages” continue to incentivize “Filipinos to seek opportunities abroad” (Quiroga 2025, 155). In 2025, recorded OFWs remittance was 39.62 billion US dollar, or equivalent to 7.7% of the country's GDP (Villanueva 2026). While OFWs are often regarded as "heroes" for such economic contribution, "their personal sacrifices are less acknowledged" (Quiroga 2025, 154). "OFWs remit billions of dollars—enough to keep the neocolonial system afloat and the elite relatively safe in their gated luxury enclaves." (San Juan 2009, 121-122).

However, government protection of OFW's safety has remained insufficient. Of the nearly 5,000 reports of OFWs' maltreatment in 2020, the majority came from the Middle East with 4,302 reported cases—some resulting in injuries or death (Ignacio 2023). While the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has increased social media presence to assist OFWs in distress, these measures remain challenged by DFA budgetary constraint, limited internet and communications technology (ICT) capacity, verification issues, and lack of institutionalized strategy (Katigbak and Roldan 2021, 357; 363-365). While labor export was coopted by the elites and the government they consist of, protecting migrant workers remain a problem in contemporary Philippines.

More than half of the labor force that make up OFWs are women. In 2024, women accounted for 57.2% of the total OFWs (Baclig 2026). This phenomenon of feminization of migration is reflected in the concept "global care chain", which is defined as "a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring" (Hochschild 2000, 131). Parreñas, in examining globalization and the politics of reproductive labor, with particular focus to the case of Filipina migrant domestic workers, points out that "the choice of maximizing their earnings as transnational low-wage workers denies them the intimacy of the family." (Parreñas 2000, 576). This phenomenon reveals the deeply gendered social costs of labor migration, particularly the fragmentation of family structures and the redistribution of care responsibilities. Moreover, it reflects how the social consequences of migration are internalized at the household level; while households in receiving countries benefit from the availability of low-cost labor of care, the families of OFWs must reorganize care in their absence—absorbing the social costs of adjustment. At the same time, the government and the elites that restructured institutions benefit from the export of labor: in the form of remittance inflows, which serve as a key source of foreign exchange, further embedding labor export within the national economic strategy despite the personal sacrifices that OFWs make—and, thereby allowing the state to rely on external income flows rather than addressing structural unemployment domestically.

In this sense, labor migration under SAPs did not reduce inequality, but contributed to its reorganization across transnational spaces. The burdens of economic adjustment—declining wages, limited employment opportunities, and reduced access to social services—were effectively displaced onto workers who were compelled to leave their families to sustain both household livelihoods and broader economic stability. Meanwhile, elites remained largely insulated from these pressures, benefiting from continued access to capital, state resources, and global markets; the result was not a reduction of divisions, but rather an expansion and reconfiguration across both domestic and global contexts. As San Juan notes, "OFW remittance contributes to paying the foreign debt, […] disintegrates families, and subsidizes the wasteful spending of the corrupt patrimonial elite." (San Juan 2009, 100). This demonstrates that SAPs contributed to the redistribution and deepening of inequality across multiple scales.

Conclusion

Structural adjustment programs in the Philippines must be understood within a longer historical trajectory shaped by colonial legacies, and elite dominance. As Reyes argues, the 'postcolonial' does not mark a liminal break from colonialism, but instead reflects the ongoing reconfiguration of colonial structures, which persist in adapted forms rather than disappearing after the formal rule ends (Reyes 2017, 210). In this context, SAPs did not introduce inequality, but rather operated as accelerants within a pre-established hierarchical political economy, intensifying and redistributing structural disparities.

Moreover, the implementation of SAPs reemphasized these inequalities. Adjustment policies reoriented state priorities toward fiscal discipline and debt servicing, limiting the capacity of the state to sustain public investment and social services. Trade liberalization weakened domestic industries, privatization concentrated economic control, and austerity reduced access to essential services. At the same time, elites remained relatively insulated, benefiting from state protection, access to capital, and opportunities created through market reforms. As the executive director of United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), James P. Grant, is quoted, "It is hardly too brutal an oversimplification to say that the rich got the loans and poor got the debts" (McMichael and Weber 2025, 80).

These dynamics become visible in the restructuring of labor. As domestic opportunities declined, labor export became institutionalized as a development strategy (McMichael and Weber 2025, 110), linking workers' livelihoods to the country's external obligations. Through the "global care chain" (Hochschild 2000, 131), overseas Filipino workers—particularly women—became integral to both global labor markets and household survival. This process involves an "international transfer of caretaking," where the costs of social reproduction are displaced onto migrant workers and their families (Parreñas 2000).

Taken together, SAPs intensified socioeconomic class divisions by preserving elite advantage while systematically and disproportionately shifting the costs of adjustment onto workers and lower-income households, through unemployment, reduced public services, and migration. The Philippines' case demonstrates that development policies implemented within unequal structures do not alleviate inequality, but instead foster and intensify it across domestic and global contexts.

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Appendix A

Figure depicting Philippine government spending (Abocejo 2019, 21)



FIGURE 1: Selected Philippine gov't. spending, 1981-2006 (% of Nat'l.Budget) Data sources: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Dep't. of Budget and Management, 2010 African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)`

Appendix B

Figure depicting OFW occupation type and numbers (Maca 2018, 10)

Figure 2. Overseas Filipino Workers Occupational Types



Source: Survey on Overseas Filipinos, 1993-2001 and Philippine Statistical Yearbooks, various years (in Ruiz, 2014 p.147)

Appendix C

Figure comparing Philippine national budget; allocation by sector/category (Simbulan 2001, 53)

Table 1:

National Expenditure Program by Key Sectors (Million Pesos) & Percent Share, 1986 - 2000

Year	Nat'l Budget	Health [1]	Education	Defense [2]	Debt Service [3]
1986	114,504,792	3,569,741 **(3.12%)**	14,838,073 (12.96%)	7,611,045 (6.65%)	28,061,000 (24.51%)
1987	160,415,788	4,951,519 **(3.09%)**	18,430,862 (11.49%)	8,222,223 (5.13%)	65,895,000 (41.08%)
1988	169,728,000	5,754,050 **(3.39%)**	21,991,942 (12.96%)	9,704,588 (5.72%)	61,450,832 (36.20%)
1989	228,940,000	7,352,532 **(3.21%)**		20,769,777 (9.07%)	97,712,492 (42.68%)
1990	233,507,847	8,204,692 **(3.51%)**	33,814,000 (14.48%)	22,580,090 (9.67%)	86,819,236 (37.18%)
1991	259,283,983	9,743,385 **(3.76%)**	39,417,000 (15.20%)	28,030,091 (10.81%)	74,763,000 (28.83%)
1992	308,368,476	11,284,053 **(3.66%)**	40,255,000 (13.05%)	26,311,004 (8.53%)	113,033,000 (36.66%)
1993	330,237,082	6,237,559* **(1.89%)**	41,799,000 (12.66%)	28,691,135 (8.69%)	126,485,765 (38.30%)
1994	362,038,357	13,050,443 **(3.60%)**	46,392,000 (12.81%)	33,117,168 (9.15%)	117,812,000 (32.54%)
1995	384,713,251	10,122,423* **(2.63%)**	55,294,000 (14.37%)	24,334,484 (6.33%)	109,361,000 (28.43%)
1996	415,557,000	11,470,000 **(2.76%)**	75,994,000 (18.29%)	36,701,000 (8.83%)	69,236,000 (16.66%)
1997	476,170,000	15,919,429 **(3.34%)**	93,512,000 (19.64%)	37,092,196 (7.79%)	74,201,000 (15.58%)
1998	540,788,000	15,281,093* **(2.83%)**	109,490,000 (20.25%)	47,188,113 (8.73%)	75,545,000 (13.97%)
1999	579,481,000	14,107,728* **(2.43%)**	112,356,000 (19.39%)	30,190,411 (5.21%)	120,719,000 (20.83%)
2000	651,000,000	11,562,694* **(1.78%)**		55,209,074 (8.48%)	109,314,000 (16.79%)

Source: National Expenditure Program, *1986-2000. Department of Budget & Management*

* *Health budget decreased.*

[1] *Mean increase of Health budget = 3.0%*

[2] *Mean increase of Defense budget = 8.0%*

[3] *Mean increase of Debt servicing budget = 29.0%*