The 1997 Indonesian Elections: 'Festival of Democracy' or Costly 'Fiction'?

Jim Schiller
Lecturer in Asian Studies
Flinders University of South Australia
1997 Visiting Fellow at
Centre for Asia Pacific Initiatives
University of Victoria
Victoria, B.C., Canada

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"How fraudulent does an electoral process have to be before it denies legitimacy?" .................. R. H. Taylor

"[F]or how much longer can the New Order's version of Pancasila Democracy remain a useful fiction." .... R.W. Liddle

The government party, Golkar, easily won the 1997 Indonesian election. In fact the government political organization was victorious in each of the 27 provinces and in all but three of Indonesia's rural districts and cities. It gained more than 74% of the votes cast. Golkar averaged 67% of the vote in the urban and industrialized island of Java and 85% in the 22 provinces outside Java. In the six 'New Order' elections held since 1971 Golkar had never received less than 62% of the vote, and this time it bettered its 1992 result by more than six points.

Only Golkar and two other approved organizations were permitted to contest the 1997 election. They were the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the United Development Party (PPP). Both organizations are government creations — heavily manipulated, mergers of older political parties. PDI is the successor to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) — a party with symbolic links to former President Sukarno and the nationalist movement. PDI also has members from Protestant, Catholic, and two smaller secular parties. PPP is a merger of several Islamic parties representing quite different wings of Islamic thought — one with a mainly Java-based constituency and another drawing most of its support from outside Java. PDI, whose leadership was removed in a blatant, violent act of government-approved intervention, received just 3% of the vote, a collapse from its previous 14.9%. PPP, whose more compliant leadership had been protected from challengers by the government, won 23% of the vote, up from 17% in 1992.

The participation rate was high. More than 124 million voters were registered and 112 million votes were cast. The Minister of Home Affairs, later claimed that Indonesia might have the highest election participation rate in the world.

In a highly controlled election system we cannot take these results at face value. While the results may tell us something about the popularity of the government or the unpopularity of the alternatives offered, we need to pay much more attention to the environment in which those results were obtained. We need to know what various elements of the state and society expected the outcome to be. We need to understand what methods and resources were employed to achieve the government's election goals, and what resistance was encountered. We need to understand the consequences of the elections for public visions of the government's legitimacy and for public willingness to abide by the state's rules.
This study explores the 1997 elections in the context of Indonesia's pattern of controlled elections since 1971. The paper investigates the methods used by the state in the pursuit of its election goals. It discusses the intensity of the government effort and the range of controls employed by the government. It explores the range of resistance by Indonesia's citizens to government election controls and manipulation. The paper examines the election violence and looks at some of the significant election outcomes. It closes with a brief consideration of the legacies of 1997 and the Soeharto-controlled election system for the "democratic" elections scheduled for June 1999.

A few caveats about this study are in order. Although I have been studying Indonesia's controlled elections since 1977, this paper was researched and written between May 1997 and December 1998. This has been a period of drastic change, most noticeably a cataclysmic deterioration in the Indonesian economy and the forced resignation of President Soeharto, after a 32-year period of military-backed, personal rule. It has also seen a concerted, grass-roots challenge to the institutions, policies, and practices that characterize the Soeharto period and an attack on the public officials and business cronies of Soeharto and his regime. This reform movement has been strongest at the local level in Java but has had an impact across the archipelago. At the centre, it has forced the government to introduce "democratic" reform laws for elections, the media, and freedom of speech.

Given the depth of Indonesia's economic crisis, this is not an auspicious time for democratic reform. Nor is it an easy time to forecast the appeal to future Indonesian leaders of the Soeharto-era system of electoral controls and manipulative election practices. In the present apocalypse, where one paradigm for how to govern Indonesia seems to have been destroyed and the new paradigm is far from certain, it is hard to focus on efforts to control elections in what many Indonesians hope is a bygone era. One temptation is to read too many signs of the emergence of a reform movement into the events of the 1997 elections. A greater danger would be to assume that either the social conditions that made election engineering possible or the institutions that thrived on election manipulation will have little impact on how post-Soeharto elections are managed and contested.

What Are Elections Supposed to Do in Indonesia?

Democratic theory suggests that elections may provide opportunities to rotate elites, to select leaders, to express grievances and desires. Elections are said to compel elites to consider the wishes of the rest of the population, to provide opportunities for public dialogue, to confer legitimacy on governments, and to strengthen the sense of power and belonging of individuals.

Elections, of course, have purposes other than representation. They are useful internationally because they justify foreign 'aid' and investment by 'fellow democracies'. If managed properly they also convey a notion that the state is modern and capable of
managing an act of political consent. This helps to convey an image of stability that is useful for attracting capital.

Elections have domestic purposes too. Ben Anderson points out the role of elections in pacifying the population. He suggests that elections allow leaders to say to critics: "You have had your say, but we have won. Now you must follow the rules and let us go ahead with our policies." Elections thus delegitimize protests, riots, and public violence. They also moderate some opposition supporters by convincing them that even though they lost this time, future elections might turn out differently. Finally, elections can justify state repression of those opponents who don't play by the 'voter endorsed' rules.

Under the rule of President Soeharto, the Indonesian government entrenched and expanded upon an idea developed by former President Sukarno that Indonesia was a pancasila democracy, not a liberal democracy. The notion was put forward that this was a truly indigenous method of decision making by consensus (rather than decision making by the 'tyranny of majority'). It was claimed that liberal democracy had failed Indonesia and that it was unfettered political competition that had led to chaos. In its place, Sukarno proposed, and Soeharto refined and empowered, an authoritarian system with a strong central government and a powerful chief executive accountable only to a mostly appointed super parliament, the MPR. Instead of being referendums on public policy or competitions between political parties for the right to govern, elections became heavily managed, ritualized acts of public approval which the government called 'festivals of democracy'. Indeed the Soeharto government set out to make political parties a dirty word, even denying that its own 'election participant organization' (Golkar) was a political party.

Liddle suggests that Soeharto's Indonesia relied on a useful, albeit fragile, fiction of democratic legitimacy. He argues that it had only limited credibility and that most Indonesians paid lip service to democratic legitimacy because of the Soeharto government's development successes, or because they felt protected or privileged by the New Order or frightened by political change. If democratic legitimacy was a useful fiction, then controlled elections were a necessary stage prop in maintaining that fiction. The following discussion briefly examines the controlled election system.

1997 and the New Order System of Election Controls

The 1997 elections, like the five New Order elections before them, were not intended to allow the Indonesian people to determine who should govern. Rather, the government intended the elections to be a "festival of democracy," in which the two political parties were not meant to compete, but to be pendamping, accompanying the main player, the victorious government party (Golkar).

To create the appearance of choice at a 'festival of democracy'; a ritual without much choice, the Soeharto government put in place one of the most comprehensively "engineered" electoral processes in the world.
The New Order government began by reducing the stakes. Government was not put at risk. The Presidency was not filled through popular elections. Instead, the President was "elected" by a mainly appointed super parliament (the MPR). The MPR consisted of 500 representatives from the national parliament (the DPR), of whom 75 were military appointed by the President, plus an additional 500 Presidential appointees. The voters' choice was limited to 42.5% of the body that elects the President, 85% of the seats in a rubber-stamp national assembly that has never initiated legislation, and 80% in the only slightly more vocal regional and local assemblies.

Since 1977 only three parties have been permitted to contest the election: the state party, Golkar, which has had unparalleled access to finances, media coverage, and the resources of the state (and of state-dependent businesses), and two government-manipulated, poorly-financed, badly-divided political parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the United Development Party (PPP). The government allowed only a brief campaign period and then limited each party's campaign activity in each province and district to one day in three. Parties found it difficult to organize outside the election period while the government, whose officials were also Golkar party cadre, had a permanent organization and found it easy to influence voters in the months before the campaign began, or during the 'quiet week' just before the vote. The government determined the permissible campaign symbols, venues, and topics. The state or the President's children controlled all television stations. Radio and press coverage was closely monitored. The government screened prospective candidates, banned campaigners deemed too critical, and used the full weight of the army and bureaucracy down to the village level to ensure victory. Between elections it intervened frequently to remove popular or outspoken party leaders and members of parliament. It also detained and threatened to bring to trial those who questioned the legitimacy of the election process and called for an election boycott.

In the run-up to the 1997 elections the government condoned or initiated both the intervention in the PDI to remove former President Sukarno's daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, from leadership and the violent expulsion of her supporters from party headquarters. The government also detained a number of activists trying to establish new political parties and intervened less dramatically to ward off challenges to the more obliging leadership in the Moslem-based PPP.

Perhaps the most important reason for the government's success at achieving a high turnout and high Golkar vote was its control of a highly centralized administrative structure which stretches from Jakarta down to the village and neighborhood level. Local officials issue permits and clearances that are crucial in the everyday life of most Indonesians. Indonesians who want to send their children to school, change residence, start a business, buy or sell land, apply for a job, or obtain an identity card must obtain the signatures of their neighborhood and village officials.

Through their access to state development funds, local officials also controlled substantial patronage which could be used to reward the loyal. This control over sanctions
and rewards made state officials powerful patrons everywhere in Indonesia, but especially in poor, rural, and isolated areas outside of Java.

State and village officials were required to join the government party and were given quotas for soliciting Golkar members and Golkar votes in their area. Government officials managed the Golkar campaign and they and their families were candidates for local assemblies. These government officials also headed the committees that supervised the campaign, voting, and vote-counting process, and investigated complaints.

Government-approved election witnesses from the parties could observe the vote and vote-counting processes. However, few people in rural Indonesia were willing to risk declaring their affiliation with a non-government party or publicly expressing their doubts about the fairness of government officials.

The vote-counting and tallying process in New Order elections was also engineered to provide little opportunity for independent scrutiny. The election ritual closed with a declaration of acceptance of the results by all participating parties. Regional and national party leaders were coerced, cajoled, and offered inducements to sign these declarations. All of these controls resulted in a powerful capacity to engineer a massive voter turnout and government party victory.

**Engineering Choice**

"The government pretends to hold elections and we pretend to monitor them." \(^{13}\)

The Soeharto government had an impressive array of election controls at its disposal. However, this does not imply that it had no popular support. Before 1998 the government had considerable success at convincing many Indonesians that Soeharto's "New Order" was responsible for the economic development and political stability that benefited them. It also had the capacity to deliver patronage to supporters and deny patronage to opponents. The state also attempted to sustain a fear that doing anything but voting in the election and voting for the government party would promote dangerous change.

Liddle argues convincingly that many Indonesians were willing to participate in the election process and close their eyes to the unfairness because they believed the government benefited or protected them. \(^{14}\) I am arguing that whatever consent the election generated was not just the result of unfettered calculations of personal or group benefits. The risks and costs of non-compliance with the government's election ritual were high.

The state had tremendous capacity to structure the climate for voter choice. Partly, this is due, as Liddle stresses,\(^{15}\) to the government's development record and to the fears of middle-class, especially Christian, Chinese, and other ethnic minority Indonesians, about the dangers of a more open political system. Partly, it was also due to the high personal risk and limited possibility for gain that Indonesians saw from abstaining or from voting.
against the government party, and the even higher risk from publicly urging an election boycott or supporting a political party. Indonesians knew that the government would win and that the other parties would not be able to make policies or dispense patronage. Many Indonesians also suspected that their ballots might not be secret and that abstentions or votes against the government might not be counted. Even without intimidation, those less-well-off Indonesians who were dependent on patrons for access to jobs and credit found it easy to listen to state-connected patrons who urged them to vote for the government party. In regions where the economy was backward and autonomous institutions absent, the government's clout was greatest.

This enormous capacity for manipulating the election created problems for the state. The government's aim was to carry out elections which generated enough public participation and enthusiasm to give the government some legitimacy and international credibility without threatening stability or demonstrating the regime's need to resort to repression or fraud. However, the government found it easier to mobilize or intimidate voters than to show finesse in dealing with political parties or with those promoting election boycotts. The mechanics of achieving a huge turnout and handsome victory for the government party were not so difficult for the state apparatus to achieve. Maintaining an image of elections as unrehearsed and spontaneous with popular enthusiasm for authentic political parties was much more problematic.

Perhaps the greatest problem was deciding what the government and electorate would accept as a real victory when everyone knew that the state had near limitless access to patronage and repression as well as control of a far-from-transparent voting and vote-counting process. When winning an election is never in doubt, deciding how big an effort to put into how large a victory becomes a dilemma for the state. Interpreting the significance of the election result is equally problematic for all those who want to analyze its impact.

The 1997 Elections

I have argued that elections in Soeharto's Indonesia were part of what Liddle called a 'useful fiction of Indonesian democracy'. Good fiction (or good theatre, if the election is a spectacle) needs to make the audience suspend disbelief. A fiction of Indonesian democracy needed to have a controlled election that seemed plausible. To be plausible an election needed to produce images of enthusiasm and compliance. A plausible election is not supposed to produce widely-distributed images of unfairness, intimidation, government repression, violence, and electoral fraud. I will argue that the 1997 elections did not contribute to democratic legitimacy. Rather, I contend, they either weakened government legitimacy or demonstrated its declining legitimacy.

This section looks at several remarkable features of the 1997 elections. These include the altered political environment in which the elections took place, the increased intensity of the government victory effort, the changed character of the resistance to government control and manipulation, as well as the greatly increased election-related
violence. Some of the election outcomes themselves deserve attention. Among these are the rise in the Golput¹⁸ (blank ballot) vote, the enhanced stature of Megawati (the daughter of Indonesia's charismatic first President), the decimation of the government-backed Suryadi wing of the PDI, and the emergence of the Islamic-based PPP as the only legal party for dissidents.

The Election Environment

The political and social environment in 1997 was substantially different than in previous elections. Probably the greatest single difference was the increased tension caused by the certainty of an aging President and the uncertainty about how successfully Presidential succession would be managed.

President Soeharto had dominated Indonesian politics for more than 30 years. His style of rule had included direct presidential involvement in almost every area of policy making. His regime oversaw rapid economic growth and the creation of a burgeoning middle class. However, it also facilitated the creation of huge first-family and Chinese-Indonesian clientelist business empires based upon connections to power. These conglomerates and the state-dominated economy and society that created them appeared vulnerable in a post-Soeharto Indonesia.

The problem was that President Soeharto had labored to see that no institution or individual might emerge that could provide a credible alternative to his personal rule. Strong personal rule meant that there was considerable doubt about who would be Soeharto's successor, and about whether Soeharto's successor and the institutions of the New Order would be able to deal with the complex social and economic problems that Indonesia seemed likely to face.

There was a widespread belief that this election would be Soeharto's last — that a new President would take office during the term of the 1997 parliament. In what Kompas, one of Indonesia's leading dailies, called the uncertainty of the post-Soeharto political map,¹⁹ senior bureaucratic and military officials competed to demonstrate both their capability and their loyalty to Soeharto by delivering a large Golkar victory.²⁰ This helped set the stage for what one analyst (Cornelis Lay) called "a shattering process of structural cheating."²¹ In this climate local government officials had strong incentives to do anything needed to achieve the desired result.

The impact of social and technological change on the 1997 election environment is more difficult to chart. It can only be sketched here.

The Indonesian economy had undergone rapid growth for more than 25 years and consequently the Indonesian political public²² — the group of people who have the time, energy, resources, and inclination to follow national politics and to sometimes believe that they can wield political influence — has also grown rapidly. The growth of the Internet,²³ the expansion of satellite television, the emergence of an overseas Indonesian press, and
the increased mobility of Indonesian university students and workers have all worked to
give the contemporary Indonesian political public wider and freer access to information
and ideas about Indonesia and the world.

What I am saying is that the government had increasingly less control over the flow
of ideas and images that influenced how Indonesians perceived the state and their political
system. In 1997, the Indonesian political public and those who shaped its opinions had
greater access than ever before to print and electronic media, including the Internet.
Negative stories about alleged government efforts to win the election through vote-buying
or electoral fraud were reported on the Internet, in electronic journals like Tempo, in
Indonesian community newspapers in America, Europe, and Australia, and frequently in
the Indonesian domestic press. The fiction that controlled
elections are legitimate expressions of Indonesian democracy thus became increasingly
difficult to maintain.

Increased access to alternative ideas — combined with the crudity and intensity of
the government election manipulation — led many Indonesians to doubt government
explanations of the need for election controls, and to believe allegations of vote rigging,
intimidation, and government-provoked election violence.

The political public is a pool for potential political activism. In 1997, the intensity,
goals and methods of that activism were influenced by a number of factors. One of these
was the rise of Islamic expectations and the increased public expression of Islamic
grievances. By the mid-1990s there was a widespread belief in Indonesia that Islam was
undergoing a revival, that its influence on Indonesian culture was deepening and
broadening. This was coupled with a belief that more devoutly Islamic Indonesians were
about to receive a greater share of political and economic power. The government's
patronage of the Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals' Association (ICMI) in the five years up
to 1997 helped to fuel expectations of increasing Islamic influence.

Another factor, not yet well explained but perhaps related to a widespread
perception that economic growth was very uneven and unjust, was the violence in the
period leading up to the election. In the years preceding the election, Indonesia was rocked
by sectarian and communal violence in East Timor, Aceh, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan.
The July 1996 government-sanctioned attack on Megawati supporters at PDI headquarters
in Jakarta culminated in the worst outbreak of violence in the capital in more than 20 years.

The inability or the unwillingness of the security forces to control communal
violence and the government's own involvement in the violence at PDI headquarters led
many in the political public to believe that there was widespread unrest and an expectation
that violence would be tolerated. The campaign atmosphere was soured by the presence
of thousands of Megawati supporters, angry because their candidate had been barred from
the election. Many of these mainly young, reform-oriented Indonesians perceived the
campaign restrictions and election as a reminder of their victimization by the government.
This, of course, heightened the tension of the campaign.
Another factor in the election climate was the greater global focus on human rights in Indonesia. International and domestic pressure led to the formation of a National Human Rights Commission (KomnasHam) in 1993. The Commission operated with an unexpected degree of independence and in 1997 offered a channel for human rights advocates to focus greater national and international media attention on election-related human rights abuses.

Another organization, founded by prominent Indonesian intellectuals in 1996, was the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP). KIPP mobilized 9,000 volunteers in 40 branches for independent monitoring of the election and to report on the election implementation process. The creation of KIPP was itself a challenge to the government's control over how the election process would be seen at home and abroad. The existence of KIPP implied that the state needed to be monitored and questioned the government's notion that it stood like a father figure, knowing and doing what is best for all Indonesians. The presence of KomnasHam, KIPP, and various other legal aid and human rights organizations assured that the election process would be more closely scrutinized than the government desired.

The problem for state officials was that they were under increased pressure to deliver a large victory while facing growing numbers of Indonesians who were critical of the government's election management. These dissidents had the will and the capacity to vocalize their concerns. The presence of thousands of Megawati supporters angered by government suppression of their party made election management even more problematic.

The Government Election Effort

In assessing the intensity of the government's election effort it is necessary to consider both the resources used to conduct the Golkar campaign and the resources used to control the election process and to manipulate the election outcome. The Golkar effort included pre-campaign political activity, organizational support from the bureaucracy, biased media coverage, and Golkar's use of 'money politics' to win cadre and voter support. The election manipulation effort included biased candidate screening, intimidation of voters, party cadre and election witnesses, campaign restrictions, and reported electoral fraud. While similar government practices predated 1997, both the total Golkar effort and the election manipulation appeared more intense.

In the 1992 election, the Minister of Home Affairs, Rudini, had reduced the pressure on local government officials to deliver the vote to Golkar. One result had been the least coercive and least manipulated of the New Order elections. Another result had been a 5% decline in the government party's national vote and a double digit decline in its Central and East Java vote. In 1997, Minister of Home Affairs Yogie MemeT encouraged department officials to take a more partisan role. Similarly, the army commander, General Hartono, announced that every soldier was a Golkar member. There were also reports that the Information and Education Departments issued instructions on how to vote and how many others were to be recruited to be Golkar voters.
When Minister of Information Harmoko was elected head of Golkar in 1993 he promised to reclaim the votes lost at the 92 election. He immediately began a major pre-campaign effort which included a membership drive in which each government employee was expected to sign up 9 new Golkar members from the community. Membership rallies were held throughout the country and widely covered in the electronic and print media.

Governors and district heads solicited membership and financial support from local elites and implemented programs to demonstrate Golkar's strength. One of these programs involved painting houses, public buildings, trees, and sometimes whole villages yellow, the color of Golkar. People that did not display yellow paint risked accusations of disloyalty. Several areas of Central Java erupted into "paint wars" as Megawati-PDI and PPP supporters tried to repaint areas white or green.29

President Soeharto's daughter Tutut30 played a major role in the Golkar campaign in East and Central Java. Her presence put greater pressure on the Governors of these populous provinces to deliver a good result. They in turn pressured District Heads who leaned on their subordinates down to the village official level. The President's daughter campaigned frequently in strongly Islamic areas. Her campaign forays were accompanied by large rallies and parades in PPP strongholds. These shows of strength by the government and counter-demonstrations by PPP and Megawati supporters often triggered violence.

As in past elections, local government personnel, communications networks, and vehicles were all mobilized to facilitate the Golkar campaign. Also the government used its ownership and control of electronic and other media to encourage greater and more favorable coverage of Golkar.31

Perhaps the most notable change in the Golkar election effort was the substantially increased role of money politics. Cornelis Lay suggests that money was the main force in political mobilization by the government party.32 Harmoko's organizing efforts had led to increased involvement by businessmen and women in the Golkar campaign. One businessman alone claimed to have given hundreds of billions of rupiah to Golkar.33 Private campaign contributions plus the enormous amount raised by compulsory monthly contributions by every civil servant gave Golkar a great financial advantage.

Early in the campaign the media reported Golkar rallies in West Java where wealthy businessmen and a village head threw out 10,000 and 50,000 rupiah notes to the crowds. Stories emerged also of Operasi Fajar, a plan to distribute gifts during the quiet week before the vote to win the support of Islamic leaders in rural Indonesia.34 Regional and national papers reported charges of Golkar vote-buying in Jakarta and across wide areas of Indonesia. In rural areas vote buying seems to have more often involved paying village or district officials for delivering all or most of the votes of their followers. For example, the Jepara branch of Golkar reported awarding one million rupiah each to party cadre in 101 voting stations where a 95% vote for Golkar had been obtained.35 In other districts
there were reports of bonus development grants, cattle for a village feast, or other prizes being distributed to villages that produced massive Golkar victories. Intimidation of voters, party leaders, and supporters was also perceived as being more widespread and more intense than in the last election. In Jakarta, school teachers were reportedly instructed to practise voting with their students and to warn them that they might fail if Golkar did not receive a high vote. Many students were required to vote in their schools. Government officials, workers in state enterprises, and some large private businesses were also required to vote in their workplace and were subject to strong pressure to vote Golkar.

In Bengkulu, village heads were required to record the names of villagers expected to vote against Golkar. PPP leaders and supporters were attacked in Pekalongan, Demak, Kudus, Temanggung, and Jepara. Violent clashes occurred during Golkar and PPP rallies. In Temanggung the PPP head was reportedly beaten by a youth group with government and gangland connections. In Jepara PPP campaigners were run down by government vehicles and PPP supporters were attacked by gangs on their way home from rallies. A dog's head was delivered to the home of the outspoken PPP leader in Solo. There were also many reports of detentions of party supporters by the security forces or attacks by gangs or unknown elements.

Intimidation continued after the election. In West Sumatra the Governor visited the house of the regional PPP leader to convince him to sign a declaration that the election in West Sumatra had been free. The Governor, reportedly threatened that the military would visit shortly if further persuasion was needed.

Campaign restrictions became an important issue in 1997. Since the 1992 elections, when very large crowds were common features of election rallies, the government had complained that the campaign was too anarchic and not sufficiently educational. They urged the parties to hold small, indoor forums instead of large, outdoor meetings. The government's 1997 election regulations restricted large rallies and parades in which parties demonstrated the size and enthusiasm of their following. These efforts to control campaign procedures and to prohibit banners with words or symbols unacceptable to the government met with fierce resistance. This resistance will be discussed in the next section.

It is impossible to know how much vote fraud there was in the election. My own reading is that there was widespread manipulation of the figures and that the government had established a system for rigging the vote count that would have facilitated even more massive vote fraud if it had been necessary.

There is evidence that village heads, sub-district officers, and district heads were polled regularly to declare the size of the Golkar vote in their area. In one sub-district in Bengkulu, a completed election declaration with a massive Golkar victory appeared several weeks before the election. The government claimed that it was only a "practice" declaration form. The final sub-district Golkar vote was slightly greater than in the early declaration.
In many regions, witnesses who were supposed to observe the voting and local vote counting processes found it difficult or impossible to obtain the permits required to register as a witness. Elsewhere, proposed witnesses withdrew their names after obstruction or threats from village officials. In some places approved witnesses were not permitted to observe the vote count. With such pressure for a large victory it is hard to believe that there was no vote fraud in areas where there was no risk of being caught.

There were also many charges of multiple voting by government officials and other Golkar supporters. Rumors suggested that the number of absentee (AB) ballots printed might have been as high as 60% of the entire total votes cast. Government officials were in charge of voting, so it may have been easy to vote for Golkar at more than one location. Political party and independent election monitors were only able to observe a small portion of local vote counts, mainly in urban areas. Even in urban areas in Java, I have seen perfunctory vote counts (100% Golkar!) conducted in very dark conditions with no non-government witnesses present.

However, even when the local vote count was monitored there was no way to confirm that accurate local vote counts did not change as votes were aggregated at the district and provincial level. One reported case in Jember saw the sub-district figures change from a PPP victory over Golkar, 26,000 to 12,000 to a Golkar victory, 32,000 vs. 8,000 for PPP.\(^1\)

Perhaps the most brazen case of vote manipulation occurred in North Sumatra. The PDI had to win two seats in North Sumatra to obtain the 11 seats needed to fill all of its committee assignments in the national parliament. PDI's failure to win that minimal number would have embarrassed the government. With 90% of the provincial vote counted, only ten PDI representatives were likely to be elected. Somehow PDI, which obtained less than 6% of the provincial vote, obtained more than 60% of the last 100,000 ballots counted in the province and elected 11 representatives.\(^2\)

It is difficult to compare the government effort put into staging the 1997 election victory to the effort in the early New Order elections. In the 1971 and 1977 elections there had been substantial use of force to convince village heads or rural patrons to strongly support the government party. In later elections many of these elites had seen what had happened to those who opposed the juggernaut and ceased resistance. The government became increasingly confident that it could obtain the result it wanted with the state machinery and patronage. Coercion therefore could be reduced.

In 1992 the government's more relaxed effort had still allowed a comfortable win. As some magazines put it, the government party seemed hegemonic. In 1997 the government was seen to be willing to use extreme measures to obtain a large victory. It had been willing to intervene in the PDI party congress to remove Megawati. It had detained leaders trying to start new political parties. It had tried to prohibit popular campaign symbols and to restrict campaign activities that it viewed as disorderly. As in past elections, it had intimidated voters and local leaders. It vastly outspent its opponents.
and engaged in what looked like large-scale vote buying. Finally, its efforts at vote manipulation were brazen rather than discrete, and were widely reported by the Indonesian and foreign media. The more intense focus of the media made all of this activity more visible. The New Order's use of such measures made the state look far more repressive and clumsy and far less hegemonic. It also made the election spectacle less credible.

Resistance to Controlled Elections

Resistance to the government's election controls, vote manipulation, and electoral coercion was both greater and more innovative than in previous elections. This section discusses both the sources and forms of resistance to the 1997 controlled elections.

A substantial part of campaigning in all of Indonesia's elections — including the democratic ones of the 1950s — has been about demonstrating support through mass rallies. Under Soeharto, this tendency was reinforced. The political parties were financially weak and had little media access. Mobilizing thousands of voters in rallies and parades was a way to demonstrate support to the voters and to the government. In 1997, when the government tried to limit these mass rallies and parades many party supporters were frustrated. Some of these turned to violence.

It has been argued that the government's tight control of the election outcome led many Indonesians to see the public act of participation in the campaign as more important than the individual act of voting. Many people believed that their vote might not be counted and certainly would not matter to the outcome. On the other hand, they expected that the campaign would provide an opportunity to let off steam, to express their anger and frustration at the authorities and, in some cases, to flaunt motor and public behavior laws. Police, for example, were more likely to tolerate rowdy crowd behavior or traffic offences (e.g. four people on a motorbike or people sticking out the doors and windows of a car) when they occurred during campaigns that were part of a "festival of democracy".

This notion that the election outcome is fixed, but that the campaign is supposed to provide an opportunity to express feelings that are normally repressed, combined with massive Golkar presence, the government efforts to minimize crowds, and the presence of large groups of aggrieved, youthful, Megawati and PPP supporters, explains much of the campaign hostility and violence.

Violence in the 1997 elections was on an unprecedented scale. The violence began to escalate before the election and deserves its own essay. I will just make a few generalizations here.

The violence needs to be seen in context. The government-condoned action to attack Megawati supporters in the PDI headquarters in July 1996 helped to create the atmosphere for violence. Continued government intimidation of voters and party leaders must also have incited violence. It also must be remembered that violence was not a monopoly of the government's opponents. Much of the violence was by gangs or youth...
groups with government connections.

Although nearly one third of the official campaign deaths occurred in one incident in Banjarmasin, most of the violence appears to have taken place in the more contested areas of Java. Elsewhere in Indonesia, where the government found it easier to obtain the desired election result, there was less need for force (and little opportunity for opposition use of force). 45

Much more of the campaign violence was directed at the government and its supporters than in previous elections. Official buildings, vehicles and police stations, police, and civil servants were often targets for angry crowds. A number of the incidents followed campaign forays by Golkar into PPP strongholds. Finally, in places like Madura and Jember in East Java, PPP anger at alleged vote fraud resulted in attacks on voting stations and on government offices. These attacks continued for weeks after the election.

Finally, it should be noted that the violence seems to have been largely anarchic or bottom-up rather than directed. It is commonplace in Indonesia to look for outside (often urban intellectual) agitators to blame as the puppet master (dalang) for rural and small town violence. In this case much of the anti-government violence seems to have been a spontaneous response to pent-up frustration and to local election restrictions, attacks or detentions of PPP leaders, and fraud.

Resistance to a government victory or to a government claim of democratic legitimacy flowing from the elections came from many sources. These included Megawati supporters, regional leaders of PPP, students and intellectuals in the Golput (blank ballot) movement, intellectuals and professionals in the independent election monitoring agency (KIPP), the National Commission on Basic Human Rights (Komnasham), and other human rights-oriented agencies, religious leaders, and what one analyst described as the anarchic power of the masses in the regions. 46 All of these sources and channels of images of the election which ran counter to the government's desired 'festival of democracy' were mutually reinforcing.

One important cause of greater resistance was the increased intensity of the government effort. It was the government move to depose Megawati as PDI leader and the crackdown on dissidents which radicalized many who would have otherwise had a stake in trying to increase the PDI vote rather than protesting the election. Some Megawati supporters joined the Golput movement or set out to disrupt the Suryadi-PDI campaign. Many joined PPP or attended its rallies and helped to make its campaign more vocal and critical. And it was the government effort to restrict campaign parades and rallies that was often the spark for campaign violence.

Another source of resistance to government controls and government manipulation was the boycott movement (Golput), which included PDR and PUDI supporters. This boycott movement benefited from Megawati's announcement that she would not vote. It also benefited from pastoral letters by both the National Council of Churches and the
Catholic Council of Bishops advising the faithful that they had the right to abstain if their conscience told them to do so. The election boycott was energized because it could repeatedly test its strength against the government-endorsed PDI. Frequently, PDI rallies attracted more pro-Megawati protestors and security forces than supporters of the government-backed PDI. The poor PDI campaign turnout and the frequent cancellation or disruption of PDI campaign rallies were opportunities to demonstrate the strength of opposition to Megawati's removal. The final challenge was to get a higher blank ballot or destroyed ballot total than the vote received by the PDI. This was easily achieved.

The PPP was more publicly critical of the government than in past elections. Even before the campaign, PPP's national leadership criticized the election procedures (especially the regulations governing media coverage) and threatened to withdraw. On the other hand, it eventually accepted the election result over the objection of many of its regional leaders' branches. Regional leaders in places like Solo, Jepara, Pekalongan, Madura, and Jember were much more vocal than the national leadership in their criticism of "unfair" election tactics. The pro-Megawati forces and those in PPP who tried, with some success, to attract Megawati supporters found symbolic ways to express their resentment of government restrictions and the government control of popular symbols. Yellow paint and yellow flags (symbols of Golkar) were frequently removed and replaced with white or green paint or flags.2 Mega-Bintang signs and T-shirts, indicating that Megawati supporters were switching to a more vocal PPP, appeared widely, even after they were banned by the authorities.

In Java and Bali, Megawati and Golput supporters found ways to celebrate their success in securing a much-increased election boycott total which surpassed the PDI vote. People paraded with shaved heads, held shadow play performances, and ritually paraded an empty chair symbolizing Megawati's removal. In Solo, PPP representatives also shaved their heads and bicycled around the city to celebrate the increased PPP vote in Central and East Java.

There were numerous complaints about election-related irregularities or violations. Several local PPP branches took down their own posters and temporarily ceased campaigning to protest unfair treatment by the authorities. After the election, the Jepara branch of PPP, several of whose supporters were beaten or detained during the campaign, held a benefit night for over 100 victims of the election. Also in Jepara, the 16 new PPP local assembly, representatives refused, for a time, to attend the assembly, as a protest against the unfairness of the election. The national head of PPP attempted to delay his signing of the election declaration to list his party's grievances about the election. When that was not allowed, he apologized to PPP supporters for signing the election declaration.

Komnasham, the national human rights commission, conducted investigations into many incidents of reported campaign violence. This provided an opportunity for many victims to air their grievances publicly. It also provided the domestic media with an
opportunity to report campaign violence and reports of state coercion. KIPP, the independent committee for observing the election, reported election irregularities to the domestic and foreign press.

The Internet, satellite television, the overseas Indonesian community press, and the domestic Indonesian press reported the campaign violence, stories of election fraud, and the investigations of human rights abuses. Printed editions of Internet stories about election irregularities, especially from the banned national news magazine Tempo, may have reinforced the image of the election as flawed. The access to these sources may also have convinced reporters in the official media to be more critical and more daring in their writing. The willingness of ordinary Indonesians across wide areas of Indonesia to ignore campaign restrictions and to engage in violence or counter-violence also played an important role in focusing the media and the nation's attention on what was wrong with the election.

**Election Outcomes**

Near the beginning of the election State Secretary Moerdiono said that "the election should take place quietly, full of anticipation and full of enthusiasm". Golkar won a massive victory in the 1997 election but the "festival of democracy" did not turn out as Moerdiono had hoped. Reports of government intimidation of voters and party leaders and electoral fraud were widespread and the violence — more than 300 deaths — was an order of magnitude greater than in any previous election. The government intervention in PDI to remove Sukarno's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri did not diminish her stature and the frustration of her supporters may have been a major contributor to campaign violence. Megawati's public, but personal, decision to boycott the elections — it is a crime in Indonesia to urge others to abstain from voting — had a substantial impact. It appears the number of blank ballots was more than three times the number of votes for the government-endorsed leadership of PDI. The decimation of the government-sanctioned PDI was so complete that it obtained only 11 seats in the 500 seat legislature. The election confirmed Megawati's status as a popular leader denied the right to participate in the election, and it emboldened those who rejected the New Order party and election system.

Two other election outcomes were also unpleasant for the government. First was the surprising belligerence of the Moslem-based PPP party. In this election it became more critical of the government and of the election process. Buoyed by support from some of Megawati's followers, many regional PPP leaders briefly resisted government pressure to sign the election declaration. After the election Soeharto faced a resurgent Moslem party, which was the only legal political "opposition". PPP was in a position to use an Islamic discourse to represent those unhappy with the injustices of Indonesian development.

Second, the media focused on the campaign violence, campaign controls, and vote fraud. International newspapers and human rights organizations described the election as voting to a script and reported intimidation of voters and suspicious vote counts. The U.S.
government took the unprecedented step of condemning the management of the election and calling for democratic reform in Indonesia.60

Domestic media coverage was a bit more subdued. However, it publicized many election incidents, including official election declarations prepared before the campaign, violence against (and by) PPP supporters, and alleged vote buying. It also publicized Megawati's election boycott, and party leaders' complaints about vote fraud and the intimidation of voters and vote witnesses. KIPP, Indonesia's independent election monitor, was only able to monitor a few, mainly urban, voting stations but reported widespread malpractice by election officials. The government's national human rights commission (Komnas HAM) also focused considerable media attention on its investigations of campaign violence and intimidation of the political parties. Its vice-chairman, Marzuki Darusman stated that the quality of the election had declined and that "the 1997 election took place in an atmosphere of violence, with a high intensity...which led to a feeling of fear which spread through the campaign period".61

So How Should We Interpret the 1997 Indonesian Election?

My own inclination is to agree with R. William Liddle's notion that the elections were meant to provide a second-order legitimacy to the Soeharto government.62 They were intended to provide a plausible facade of democratic legitimacy for people who — because they saw the benefits of development or were afraid of more genuine democracy — were willing to pretend that this was Indonesian democracy. Liddle portrays this election process as a prop for the useful fiction that Indonesia was democratic.

I would argue that in 1997 the election did not support that "fiction". Fewer people than in past elections were willing to tolerate the constraints and inequities of the election process. More were willing to engage in violence to make their point. There were more political leaders willing to challenge the government view that this had been a "festival of democracy" or a free and just election. Finally, there were more channels, including KIPP, Komnas HAM, the Internet, and other media, able to disseminate images of the election unfavorable to the government. Across Indonesia, local PPP leaders like Mudrich Sangidoe (in Solo), Megawati supporters, Golput (boycott) supporters, and others with reasons to oppose the regime made full use of those new channels to promote their own agendas. When the New Order lost its 'economic legitimacy' in the wake of the rupiah crash, the controlled 1997 elections provided no reserve of legitimacy for a government which suddenly had little patronage to deliver or development to promise.

Implications for Democratic Elections

What legacy did the Soeharto system of election controls, and particularly the 1997 elections, leave for possible democratic elections? There is space here to raise only a few points for further research and analysis.

One problematic legacy is the lack of experience with competitive elections and with the give and take between competing parties before and after elections.
Soeharto, election rules have largely been instructions from above and election competition highly constrained.

Parties have no experience at conducting campaigns on the issues that matter to voters. Indeed, Indonesia has grown used to campaigning by show of strength. Mobilizing large crowds and rallies without large-scale violence in the current climate is going to require care, good will, and some good fortune. The new and old parties will need to compromise on the election laws, on their interpretation in the campaign, and on how to form a government and manage debate in the parliament (DPR). There has been little chance to learn these skills under the New Order.

A second legacy of Soeharto will be a deep suspicion of the electoral process. The government's use of election fraud and increased campaign violence by the government — by gangs with government connections, by party supporters, and by more radical reformers — will encourage competitors to be more suspicious of each other and of the government. It will also make it easier for losers to claim foul play and reject the results of the elections. In the current atmosphere, this cynicism and expectation of foul play will raise the risk of violence.

Finally, the bureaucracy will not find it easy to implement an election in which the process and its outcome are not tightly controlled. It simply has no experience with uncertainty about who will govern nationally and locally. More importantly, until the present period of "reformasi" the local bureaucracy had little experience at dealing with public criticism and public demands. Particularly worrying is the reported increase in 1997 of "money politics" — the allocation of huge sums of money — to win the support of voters and their patrons. Many Indonesian local government officials have been torn between their political obligation and their developmental mission, between loyalty to the center and the need to work with local elites.

Bureaucrats may no longer be legally required to support the government party. However, in the economic crisis, they may find the appeal of money and the fear of losing privilege and power to community leaders too strong to resist. If there is large scale vote-buying and partisan behavior by local officials, President Habibie and his government could be returned to power in an election which confers no legitimacy. To deal with its economic and political reform agenda, Indonesia desperately needs an election that creates a government with wide support and even wider good will. Many of those who vote for parties which do not end up being part of the new government will need to be persuaded to accept the result and give the new government a chance to govern. The Soeharto system of controlled elections and its management of the 1997 election will make that goal even more difficult to achieve.
Footnotes


3. 197 and 1992 figures are available in tables 1-4 in the Appendix.


7. My thanks to CAPI and especially to Sandra Schatzky and Stella Chan for making my stay in Victoria comfortable and stimulating.


9. A state philosophy; the five principles that comprise the Pancasila are said to arise out of Indonesian society. Pancasila democracy means the indigenous, Indonesian version of democracy.

10. See "Useful Fiction" in R.H. Taylor (ed.)

11. Literally, people at the side, those who accompany the bride and groom at a Javanese wedding.

12. The additional five hundred represent functional groups and regions.

13. Goenawan Mohamad The Australian (April 13, 1997). He is a leading journalist and intellectual and was head of Indonesia's Independent Committee for Monitoring Elections (KIPP).

14. See his "Useful Fiction" in R.H. Taylor (ed.).

15. Ibid.

16. Affan Gafar's column (*Gatra* May 24, 1997) describes the options faced by "rational voters" in Indonesia, and how their rationality lead them to vote Golkar. My point is that voting decisions are far from autonomous.

18. A Golput vote is a formal protest against the election process by abstaining. It can be done by marking all choices on the ballot paper. Figures for the Golput vote often include accidentally spoiled ballots and registered voters not voting.


20. Soeharto seemed particularly anxious about the possible competition from Megawati, the daughter of the President Sukarno, whom Soeharto had manoeuvred from power 30 years before. Arguably, this anxiety about Megawati and, later, about her boycott raised the pressure on officials for a big Golkar victory.


22. The term was first used by Herb Feith. It is also used in my Developing Jepara in New Order Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996). The term 'political public' is preferable to 'middle class' because 'middle class' is loaded with many dubious assumptions about shared goals.

23. There were an estimated 40,000 subscribers in late 1996 and numbers had been doubling every six months. See David Hill and Krishna Sen "Wiring the Warung to Global Gateways: The Internet in Indonesia" Indonesia, April 1997: 67-90.


25. Soeharto complained that "the pressure of the advanced countries and other developing countries on human rights and democracy issues was increasingly strong." "Tekanan Negara Maju Making Kuat" (the pressure of the developed nations increasingly strong) Republika 17, June 1997, p. 1.

26. 236 PDI and PPP candidates did not pass the screening process while only 21 Golkar candidates were rejected. "Laporan Hasil Pemantauan Pemilu 1997" (Monitoring Report of the 1997 Election) KIPP, p. 5.

27. The Department of Home Affairs manages local government and the election process.


30. Her name is Siti Hardijanti Rukmana. She is commonly known as Tutut.


34. "Giliran Golkar Meggebrak" (Golkar's turn to strike) *Republika Online*.


37. The source was an anonymous personal communication from a local journalist. There was also violence in the 1992 Temanggung campaign. On the scope of violence see "Bentrokan di Daerah-daerah Panas" (Clashes in hot areas), *Forum Keadilan* p. 4 & p. 6, June 2, 1997: 17-18.

38. Among other Jepara stories see Suara Merdeka 2 and 14 June, 1997 "Mobil Kami Ditembak" (Our car was shot) and "Ada Pelanggaran HAM, Seorang Tewas" (There were human rights violations, One Dead).


40. "Depdagri Akan Cek Temuan PPP" (Home affairs will check the discover of PPP) *Suara Merdeka* May 10, 1997, p. 19. The form showed an 86.39% Golkar vote. The actual final vote count produced a still greater Golkar victory.


42. Compare the preliminary and final election results published in Kompas Online on June 4 and June 24, 1997. It appears Golkar leaders "gave" those votes to PDI. PPP
claimed that election rules did not allow such transfers.

43. There were many discussions of campaign restrictions and violence. See, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of Indonesia's largest Moslem organization, N.U. in "Golkar 74.30" Kompas, June 1, 1997 or Karny Ilyas' excellent essay "Kampanye" (Campaign) Forum Keadilan, June 2, 1997, p. 6.

44. Official figures were over 300 dead. Some critics said more than that died in one campaign incident in Banjarmasin. In previous elections there had been only a handful of deaths.

45. It would be interesting to know more about the connection between the resistance and the competitiveness demonstrated by the final vote count. Was the Golkar vote substantially lower in Java than elsewhere because local officials were afraid to use more intimidation and fraud, or because there was more 'civic' trust and therefore local officials were less willing to anger community leaders? Alternatively, were Javanese voters more critical or more dependent upon 'traditional' patrons who opposed the state?

46. The United Development Party. A Moslem-based political party.

47. An election boycott coalition.


49. PDR and PUDI were new radical political parties banned in 1996.

50. See Indonesian Daily News Online "PGI bisa pahami jiika umat tak memilin" (The Indonesian National Council of Churches can understand if some of the faithful do not vote), May 29, 1997.

51. "Dilaksanakan sesuai SK Menpen, PPP siap memboikot kampanye" (If it is implemented in accordance with the Minister of Information's Decision Letter, PPP is ready to boycott the campaign) Kompas Online, April 1, 1997.

52. White is the symbol of Golput the Blank Ballot (or White Group) and also a symbol of mourning, in this case the death of democracy. Green is the color of PPP and Islam.

53. Mega is a shortened name for Megawati and also means grand. Bintang means star which is the symbol of PPP.

54. Violations reported included, double voting by Golkar, non-registration of PPP voters,
discrepancies between local and aggregated vote tallies, the absence of party
witnesses to the vote count, and the coercion of party supporters and voters.

55. "PPP memberi santunan bagi 100 korban pemilu" (PPP gives donations to 100
election victims), Suara Merdeka Online, June 2, 1997.

56. "Buya minta maaf kepada pemilih PPP" (Buya apologizes to PPP voters) Kompas
Online, June 24, 1997.

57. One scholar of the Indonesian press argues that it is possible that the formatting of
Tempo and other Internet stories to make them look like "traditional" magazines and
papers may have given them more credibility. Paul Tickell, personal communication.

58. "Presiden Peringatkan Pimpinan Ketiga OPP" (President Warns the Three Election

59. It must also have been perplexed at the belligerence of crowds and their willingness
to ignore campaign restrictions.

60. "Amerika Serukan Indonesia Lakukan Reformasi Politik" (America urges Indonesia
to carry out political reform) Kompas, June 2, 1997, p. 1.

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