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Canadian Labour, the Cold War
and Asia, 1945-1955

Introduction

Studies of the international policies and actions of trade unions during the Cold War exist for unions in a number of countries including the United States and Great Britain.1 Yet, despite the fact that Canadian labour history is a well-developed field, there has not been a major study of Canadian labour’s international policies in general, let alone one that focuses on the Cold War.2 This is not to say that there has not been any study of Canadian labour and the Cold War—indeed, the literature is abundant. But it concentrates almost exclusively on the ramifications of the Cold War within the labour movement itself or on relations between Canadian unions and their U.S. centres.3 This essay offers an initial exploration of the Canadian labour movement’s international policies during the early Cold War period, with particular reference to views on Asia where the Cold War had its most devastating effects.4

Windmuller suggests that Canadian labour was closely allied with the U.S. and Great Britain in their moves to capture and pull the international labour movement to the side of the Anglo-American alliance. The consequences of this were profound in that it led, in the case of U.S. labour, into a close alliance with the U.S. state, including the CIA, in what amounted to covert operations against those opposed to an all-embracing capitalist order. The most extreme example of this was the activities of Jay Lovestone who, as part of his collaboration with the CIA, funded a spy operation on the Chinese mainland in 1950 and then engaged in the blowing up of a Shanghai dock on November 8, 1950.5

This initial research foray into Canadian labour’s activities did not find such extreme examples of Canadian union activity abroad as those of Lovestone and the AFL. But what it does point to is a congruence of views among U.S., British and Canadian unions that were reflected in similar approaches to the Cold War. The research suggests that the Canadian labour movement became increasingly attentive to international affairs during and immediately after World War II, culminating in the establishment of a department of international affairs within the Canadian Congress of Labour in 1953. Union leaders at the time conceived of Canadian labour’s role as that of a keystone in the arch of Anglo-American unity, a unity rife with racial and cultural overtones. While Europe was the focus of much of Canadian labour’s attention, events in Asia were seen as significant, on a par with developments in Latin America. Canadian labour leaders adopted a staunch attitude demonizing communism, and the effects of this anti-communism led the labour movement to oppose various liberation struggles in Asia, to oppose the nascent peace movement, and to reject the non-aligned movement which came to play such an important role in Asia. Instead, the Canadian labour movement developed close ties with the Canadian government and to some extent became an appendage of state foreign policy as it evolved under the Liberal governments of King and St. Laurent. In the end, the Canadian labour movement in this crucial period had neither the inclination nor the capacity to develop an international policy independent from that of the government, the ICFTU or the U.S. unions with which many Canadian unions remained affiliated. It would take another decade before this would begin to change.

Keystone in the Arch

A week after Japan’s surrender, Aaron Mosher and Pat Conroy, president and secretary-treasurer respectively of the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.), telegraphed the leaders of the Allied powers, including the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin and China’s Chiang Kai-shek, to congratulate their peoples for defeating the Axis. The unity displayed in military operations would,
they hoped, be “succeeded by a unity in the years to come that will be worthy of the achievements of our soldiers sailors, airmen and people in fighting the world war to a successful conclusion.”

Formed in 1940, the C.C.L. included many Canadian offshoots of industrial unions including the steel and autoworkers’ unions. C.C.L. aspirations for a continued unity among the great powers of the world was echoed in the immediate postwar views of the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC), the national labour federation representing craft or occupational unions in Canada. At their 1946 convention, TLC delegates passed a foreign policy resolution that called on the major powers to resolve outstanding issues on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and the agreements arrived at by the “Big Three” at Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam. These agreements reflected the idealistic goals of self-determination, social and economic security, and human rights for all nations that were, at least theoretically, the basis upon which the war had been fought.

The Canadian unions’ telegram and the references to the wartime agreements were not just polite references to official memoranda. Whatever brought workers and women into the war effort, they came out of it with dreams of a peaceful future, one in which workers would not be subject to the vagaries of economic cycles and depressions of the sort that had haunted Canada and the world in the pre-war period. And yet, within five years, the world was once again trapped under a foul fog of division and war.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to delve at length into the origins of the Cold War. Suffice it to say that there were multiple causes and complex dynamics on a global scale. In Asia, confrontations evolved first in Southeast Asia where national liberation forces resisted the reimposition of Dutch, French and British colonial rule. In Northeast Asia, Koreans chafed at the division of their country at the 38th parallel and the lack of progress towards independence. In China, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party moved towards civil war. Communists were involved in all these contests but, as we now know, the Soviet Union generally was not (with the exception of Korea) and had demonstrated a remarkable willingness to compromise on Asian issues in order to appease the U.S. In Korea, Moscow agreed to allow U.S. forces to divide the peninsula even though Soviet armies had been in a superior position to take the Japanese surrender. Moscow also agreed to allow the U.S. to control the occupation of Japan and continued to recognize the Kuomintang as the government of China, while offering very limited aid to the C.C.P. The U.S., on the other hand, agreed and abetted the recolonization of Southeast Asia and built up its own military presence on the Pacific islands including Okinawa. But it was Churchill, out of power after the 1945 election, who pushed confrontation with the Soviet Union in his bellicose speech in Fulton, Missouri in 1946. The British plea for the U.S. to intervene in Greece and Turkey and Truman’s decision to take up the mantle of world policeman, articulated in his March 1947 speech to the U.S. Congress, heralded the onset of American intervention on a world scale.

The Canadian wartime experience, including the internment of the Japanese-Canadian population, reinforced the Euro-American bias of the Canadian labour movement. The Canadian Congress of Labour conceived of its own postwar role as similar to that of the Canadian government: “It is scarcely necessary in this connection to refer to Canada’s historic role as a keystone in the arch of Anglo-American understanding, and the necessity of Canada’s continuing to act in that capacity for many years to come.” This concept— that Canada was a link between Great Britain and the U.S.—would shape the policies not only of the labour movement but also those of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the Canadian social-democratic party founded in 1933 in which leaders of the C.C.L. played a significant role and the party officials of which were extremely influential in the C.C.L.

A telling example of how Canadian labour’s role as this “keystone” affected its policies in the emerging Cold War was its role in the British Commonwealth Labour Parties meetings. The first meeting of Commonwealth labour parties had taken place in London in December 1944.
According to David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF who attended this first London meeting, the Canadian delegation emphasized the need to dismantle British imperial control and “insisted that India and other colonies had to be given their freedom once the war was won.” This view did not triumph in this first meeting nor at a second meeting held September 6-7, 1947 in Canada. This conference may have been a turning point in Canadian labour’s international policy. In the run-up to the Canadian conference and at the conference itself, Lewis continued to press the British Labour Party, in power in Britain since 1945, on the race issue. In his memoirs Lewis noted that this pressure was the most interesting aspect of the gathering because he and his colleagues “felt strongly that the conference should include Asians and Africans and not be a purely white gathering.” The British, according to Lewis, did not want any confrontations at the conference and also argued that it would be impossible to decide who to invite given the scope of socialist groups in the colonies. Lewis found the British reticence unimaginative although perhaps understandable, and argued for “even a token presence to signify that the Commonwealth was not a white man’s club even in 1947.” It is not clear why the CCF, as the host of the conference, could not have made its own token gesture, but more significantly, it is clear that neither Lewis nor the CCF understood the implications of this interchange regarding British imperialism. In fact, while allowing India its freedom, the British Labour Party was at that very moment re-imposing colonial control in Malaya and Hong Kong and supporting the French in their similar moves in Indochina. Coming from Canada, itself still in the process of gradual de-colonization, CCF leaders such as David Lewis felt that de-colonization should be sped up, but it appears the historic amity between the Canadian and British labourites (Lewis had studied at Oxford in the 1930s) resulted in the CCF subordinating its views to retain friendly ties with the British.

In the end, the second Commonwealth labour conference, held at Victoria College in Toronto, brought together representatives from only the Australian and British labour parties and the Canadian CCF. Attending on behalf of the CCF were M.J. Coldwell, national leader; Frank Scott, national chairman; David Lewis, national secretary; members of parliament Angus Maclnnis and Stanley Knowles; as well as provincial figures. Representing the labour movement was a contingent of Canadian Congress of Labour officers, including A.R. Mosher, president; Pat Conroy, secretary-treasurer; and Norman Dowd, executive secretary. And while Asian and African social democratic leaders may not have been invited, the British and Canadians had no qualms about inviting officials from unions in the United States, including the notorious Jay Lovestone, who played a key role at the conference.

Two key positions emerged from the conference. Firstly, economic distress in Europe became the focus of attention and the conference lent its support to the Marshall Plan, a US scheme (named after the US secretary of state George Marshall) aimed at financing capitalist reconstruction of west Europe as a means of countering growing left-wing influence. Secondly, the Soviet Union was targeted as the new imperialist power. As for the economic situation in the participating countries, Morgan Phillips, national secretary of the British Labour Party, which formed the British government at the time, described the dollar crisis of 1947 as a balance of payments crisis and not of a cyclical nature in as much as unemployment in 1947 was running at a minimal 1.5 percent. “The most serious factor,” he claimed, “is the rise of 40% in United States prices.” This had led, Phillips stated, to a dollar shortfall of $450 million in 1946 and of $350 million for the first half of 1947. As a result, the “U.S. announced the temporary suspension of the automatic exchange of sterling into dollars.”

United Autoworkers’ U.S. representative Don Montgomery, standing in for newly elected president Walter Reuther, told delegates he well understood the implications of the European crisis: “If the Communist Party takes over, in the military sense, it means permanently occupying many countries in Europe and Africa. It means that in the United States we live under a military
regime.” “You,” he told the British delegates, “are making your last stand against totalitarianism.” Speaking to the economic issue, Montgomery echoed Phillips’ assertion that inflation in the United States was rampant. In the U.S., he said, “Our crisis is monopoly.”

Jay Lovestone took up where Montgomery left off: “One of the primary causes for the crisis in the world today is that there is a determination for planned chaos in the world. This comes from Russia.” Congratulating the British Labour Party for supposedly decolonizing its empire, Lovestone proceeded to outline his theory regarding imperialism: “There is American imperialism but the tendency is against it.” Instead, Lovestone asserted, “the main source of danger in the world is not from American imperialism, which is declining, but from the new type of imperialism, the Russian type.”

U.S. labour representatives affirmed that both the AFL and CIO were behind the U.S. Administration in its determination to seek policies which might halt the communist advance in Europe. They warned about griping against the U.S. on the grounds that “American people are getting ‘fed up’ with their country being kicked even when it is giving help.” As secretary of the conference, it was incumbent on David Lewis to summarize the conference results in a press release. Loans, he stated, were not enough to resolve the European crisis and therefore assistance had to be on a mutual-aid basis. “The Marshall plan was welcomed,” said the press release. Whatever the cost of reconstruction, it would be cheaper than the alternative of “chaos, depression, dictatorship and international strife.” The conference called for further exchanges among the political parties and unions in Europe and Canada-America, which could then “mobilize the strength of their organizations for the achievement of the proper policy.” Not only did the non-white labour parties not make it to the conference, neither did the issue of decolonization.

The 1947 conference was an early instance of international policy formulation that did not necessarily reflect the aspirations of Canadian workers but rather the particular prejudices of British and American labour officials of this era. Both the Marshall Plan and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became divisive policies that split not only the Canadian labour movement but also the world labour movement as a whole. At the C.C.L. convention the following month (October 1947), the Congress executive and resolutions committee rejected “a large number of resolutions that were sent in by local unions” that condemned Canadian foreign policy, the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan” and gained the convention’s approval for an omnibus resolution on foreign policy. While making token mention of monopoly capitalist imperialism, the resolution condemned “rampant and militant Russian Communist imperialism, assisted by its “fifth columns”; supported the Marshall Plan which was said to be “a symbol of the generosity of the people of the United States and Canada in giving so largely of their treasure,” and claimed that it was “geographically logical that Canada exercise military co-operation with the United States of America.” Conroy took the extraordinary measure of forwarding the resolution to Canada’s minister for external affairs, Louis St. Laurent. Writing in reply to Conroy, St. Laurent noted with approval that the resolution supported government policy and it gave him “much pleasure to make a copy of this resolution available to each one of my colleagues.”

In 1947, Canadian communists such as Harold Pritchett, Harvey Murphy and C.S. Jackson were key leaders in their respective unions, the International Woodworkers of America, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, and the United Electrical Workers union. During the convention, they spoke fervently against the Marshall Plan, as might be expected. But they were not alone. In the final vote at the convention, supporters for the resolution numbered 546, with 165 against. Among those opposed was Bob Carlin, leader of the Mine-Mill union at Inco in Sudbury, twice elected as a CCF member of the Ontario legislature. He, too, criticized the Marshall Plan and refused to participate in the attacks against communists in his union. For this he was hauled
before the CCF provincial council and legislative caucus and, when he refused to recant, he was informed by the CCF executive that he could no longer represent the party.

In 1948, resistance to CCF support for the Marshall Plan expanded to rejection of the proposed North Atlantic military alliance. Again, communists were not alone in their attacks on NATO. David Lewis characterized the fly in the ointment in the following words:

I also anticipate difficulty because I am certain that quite a sizeable section of our movement will be opposed to the idea altogether. I am also convinced that in this section there will not only be the very few who are pro-Soviet, or the slightly larger number who are pacifist, but also quite a number who are neither, but who have grave, and to some extent justifiable, doubts about the wisdom and efficiency of a purely military alliance by a limited number of nations, depending as such an alliance must be on the good will and questionable policies of the United States.23

On January 30, 1949, the national council of the CCF endorsed the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For most of the council, support for NATO was the only logical position in light of the 1948 convention’s support for the Marshall Plan and the Brussels treaty. But opposition was intense. For example, the B.C. provincial council of the party voted 38 to 2 against involvement in the Atlantic pact, a point that was not lost on the Vancouver Sun which reported the rift in front page headlines.24 Further complicating the picture was opposition within the federal caucus itself. MP for Vancouver Centre Rodney Young, as well as a number of others, campaigned to have their minority view heard although they bowed to caucus discipline in the actual vote. Writing to Manitoba MLA Barry Richards, Young expressed his hope for the formation of a “third force” that would include governments that refused to be influenced by either the Russian or American governments and that could form a “power sufficiently great to prevent either of the aggressors from plunging civilization into an atomic war.”25

In the labour movement, opposition to the Marshall Plan continued to make itself felt. George Burt, director of the United Automobile Workers (U.A.W.) in Canada informed the C.C.L. executive council in the spring of 1949 that even employers were complaining about the negative effects of the Marshall Plan. In response, the executive council passed a resolution calling for investigation of the effects of the Marshall Plan. The investigation, conducted by Eugene Forsey, director of research, concluded: “Both directly and indirectly, therefore, the Marshall Plan has unquestionably been of very considerable benefit to Canada, to the United States and to the recipient countries of Europe. The present crisis is in no way attributable to the Plan; on the contrary, it would have been infinitely worse without it, and would have come at least a year ago instead of now.”26 The report included a letter from E.G. Burgess, vice-president of Massey-Harris Company, who denied Burt’s allegation that company officials were critical of the Marshall Plan.

That the leadership of the C.C.L. was oriented towards a Euro-American alliance was not surprising given its self-conception as a “keystone” in the arch of Anglo-American unity. Their views reflected their heritage, both ethnic and religious. But there were also other factors at work. The intense hostility between C.C.L. leaders such as Millard, Conroy and Mosher and their communist counterparts led to severe competition—to the point that policy issues became secondary and the sole focus became winning the leadership struggle, regardless of how. The anti-communist purges that began in 1948 accelerated in subsequent years as international developments and the anti-colonial and civil wars in Asia led to further polarization.

Splitting the World Federation of Trade Unions
Created in 1945, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) reflected in its composition the wartime aspirations for international working class unity. Founded by the British Trades Union Congress, the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the American Congress of Industrial Organizations, the WFTU became the central world labour body in the 1945-1950 period. The Canadian Congress of Labour affiliated to the WFTU but the Trades and Labour Congress, like its U.S. counterpart the American Federation of Labour, refused to affiliate. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions also affiliated to the WFTU.

By the end of 1948, the debate over the Marshall Plan and NATO created serious tensions within the World Federation of Trade Unions. On January 11, the C.C.L. announced that it was calling for the abolition of the WFTU because “it has not functioned on a basis of benefit to the workers in their immediate problems. The WFTU has, instead, become a political agency, the chief function of which is to operate as a sounding-board for Russian political policies.” A few days later, on January 19, James Carey of the CIO, Arthur Deakin and Vincent Tewson of the British T.U.C., and Evert Kupers of the Dutch union federation bolted from the Executive Bureau of the WFTU, announcing the withdrawal of their respective federations from the world union.

The WFTU’s general secretary, Louis Saillant, responded to the actions of the three unions at the executive bureau meetings and called for a meeting of the executive council on January 28. On March 24, the C.C.L. executive council announced its formal withdrawal from the federation. The most authoritative study of the breakup of the WFTU paints a very different picture of the events leading to the split. It shows that there were, of course, divisions between the various federations in the WFTU. For example, a WFTU delegation to Korea criticized the U.S.-supported repression of trade unions in the south and, after stopping over in Japan, also criticized the U.S. occupation policies, antagonizing CIO delegate Willard Townsend. Nevertheless, the study also points out that when the Soviet labour union representatives were confronted with opposition, they “inevitably compromised.” So, for example, while the Soviet unions vigorously opposed the Marshall Plan, they never brought the issue to a vote, and instead each federation was allowed to adopt its own policy. In fact, the Marshall Plan became the means by which the Euro-American unions demarcated and then eventually split from the communist movement. The Marshall Plan was predicated on a breaking up of the WFTU and the international trades secretariats (ITS), the international federations of unions representing workers in related occupations, refused to come to an agreement, “no matter how many concessions were offered to them.”

At the meeting of the Free World Labour Conference held in London in December 1949, Percy Bengough told delegates the TLC had never joined the WFTU because they “did not like the look of it. We did not believe that it was possible to have a true expression of the workers through the mouths of puppets from State owned and controlled institutions, irrespective of the title under which they were masquerading.” He went on to outline the ban on communists holding office in the TLC and suggested that Pat Conroy of the C.C.L. would have told the same story if he had more time. “The organised workers of Canada are of one mind on the issue of Communism. They want no more of it.” Bengough concluded by pledging full support to the Free World Confederation of Labour. Attending the founding meeting on behalf of the C.C.L. were Pat Conroy, J.E. McGuire, Sam Baron, and Fred Dowling. McGuire, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees, wrote and published a report on the conference that was subsequently submitted as the delegation report to the C.C.L. executive. As we shall see, the C.C.L. came to play a much more active role than the TLC in the new federation.

The Korean War

Those who predicted military conflict arising out of the emerging power alignments were correct.
but when war did arrive it was in an unexpected region—Korea. The war began on June 25, 1950 with northern Korean forces crossing the 38th parallel into the south. The United States seized on this opportunity to intervene militarily on a massive scale, but it also took the issue to the UN Security Council in order to provide international legitimacy to the intervention. The Soviet Union could have exercised a veto to prevent UN involvement, but at the time was boycotting the Security Council because of its refusal to recognize the newly founded People’s Republic of China.

The ICFTU reacted swiftly to the war in Korea, characterizing it as a “flagrant and unprovoked armed attack launched by Communist forces on Southern Korea.”35 “This is clearly the latest move in a systematic plan for enlarging—by armed force, if necessary—the totalitarian sphere of influence.” Canada’s two national labour federations issued a joint statement on August 10, 1950, calling for “full support” for the UN Security Council in its attempt to counter the attack from North Korea and to “re-establish peace and democratic government in Korea.”36 The statement called on the affiliates of the federations to provide unqualified support for the war effort: “As is now well known, the armies of Stalin’s puppet government of North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25th, after having resisted all efforts of the United Nations to re-unite Korea under stable democratic government.”

In September, the ICFTU circulated millions of copies of an open letter to unionists throughout the world. The letter stated: “The last war was started by Hitler, and the present Communist aggression in Korea was unleashed on the direct instructions of Moscow. Hundreds of Russian tanks were waiting in North Korea, together with over 100,000 fully equipped and well-trained troops, ready for the invasion of the south, which was unprepared even to defend itself, let alone attack.”37 Shortly afterwards, Trades and Labour Congress delegates gathered at the Mount Royal Hotel in Montreal from September 11-16, 1950 for the union’s 65th convention. Percy Bengough did not mince words in his opening address: “We are fighting Stalin’s Russian Soviet dictatorship in South Korea. We must fight its willing dupes right here at home, and most particularly, it is our job to expose them and destroy their influence inside our own trade unions.”38 Invited to address the convention, the Liberal minister of labour, Milton Gregg, leapt into full oratorical flight, elaborating on the supposed Soviet conspiracy to dominate the world: “Korea is a cross-roads in human affairs. Korea today; Indo-China or Malaya or Iraq, or Europe tomorrow—anywhere they can get a foothold, with satellite armies preferred, until they consider the timing opportune to commit their own forces in a more ambitious timetable.”39

The entry of China into the war in the fall prompted the C.C.L. to comment on the serious turn of events by referring to Lester Pearson’s views on the recent developments. If the war should spread, stated Pearson, “the responsibility rested definitely with Peiping, the Chinese capital, and Moscow.”40 Regarding use of the atomic bomb, however, Pearson suggested it was a last resort and that it’s use “for a second time against the Asiatic people would dangerously weaken the links between the Western and Oriental world.”

Canadian labour leaders depended on the ICFTU and the Canadian government for their analysis of the events in Korea. In retrospect, this analysis was fundamentally flawed.41 The real question, however, is whether the trade union leaders at the time should—or perhaps could—have known better. The answer appears to be in the affirmative. Take for example, the C.C.L. assertion that the southern regime was democratic. The fact is that the WFL mission to south Korea in 1947 had undertaken a fairly thorough study of the situation in the south and had, accurately we now know, exposed the problems of repression that had limited the trade union movement and criticized the nature of the U.S.-backed Rhee regime. The information was available but the trade union leadership, steeped in a destructive anti-communism, chose not only to ignore the information but to destroy an organization that had the potential to provide some understanding of
the emerging post-colonial world. This destructive strategy grew to encompass anyone who took issue with the party line. The communists in the trade union bore the brunt of a vicious red-baiting campaign, but branding was used to demagogically attack any criticism of the war, whether it came from communists or not.

An important example of the destructive nature of the campaign was the way in which the trade union movement dealt with the nascent peace movement of the time. Just as the Korean War was breaking out, peace activists were gathered in Stockholm to issue an appeal against a nuclear arms race. This movement, although it included many communists, also involved many others including in Canada, for example, a large number of churches. The Stockholm Appeal contained basic ideals later endorsed not only by the UN but also by the World Court:

> We demand the outlawing of the atomic weapons as instruments of aggression and mass murder of peoples.
> We demand strict international control to enforce this measure.
> We believe that any government which first uses atomic weapons against any other country whatsoever will be committing a crime against humanity...42

At the time, however, the ICFTU criticized what it deemed “spurious appeals from so-called peace movements aimed at sabotaging the legitimate defence measures of democratic peoples.” Such movements were “a thinly disguised attempt to mobilise fifth column support for totalitarian, aggressive designs.”43 Echoing the ICFTU’s attack on the peace movement, the C.C.L./T.L.C. August statement condemned the duplicity of those who “campaign in favour of peace on the one hand and armed aggression on the other.” Communists and their sympathizers were asking union members to sign “the phoney Stockholm Peace Pledge to pass ‘ban the A-bomb’ resolutions, hoping to keep us disarmed and leave Soviet Russia free to move in on any country whenever it suits their purpose.”44 In the August edition of its journal, the TLC not only denounced the northern Korean movement into South Korea but railed against the nascent peace movement: “Considering the inspiration and direction of the North Korean attack and the source and promotion of the Stockholm Peace Pledge and A-bomb resolutions, it is, perhaps not surprising that some of our very good people should be bewildered unless they are fully conversant with the objectives and methods of the Stalinist dictatorship of Soviet Russia and its willing dupes throughout the world.”45 The TLC would not, the editorial stated, “be taken in by any phoney proposals such as are now being put forward in the shape of the Stockholm Peace Pledge.”

In Canada, the peace movement was spearheaded by I.G. Perkins of Donlands United Church in Toronto and the well-known Canadian missionary to China, Dr. James Endicott.46 Lester Pearson, Percy Bengough and Pat Conroy simply condemned this movement for being communist-inspired, failing to deal with both the substantive issues and the divergent values which lay behind them. Branding people as “communist” became an all-encompassing index of right and wrong, preempting discussions that might have provided a more balanced view. But not all non-communist labourites or social-democrats were cut from the same cloth. For example, prominent CCF leaders Ernest Winch and Tommy Douglas both signed the peace appeals then being circulated by the World and Canadian Peace Councils, refusing to be cowed by the red-baiting.

Recognition of China

As for China, prior to 1949, both the CCF and C.C.L. leaders opposed Canadian arms shipments
to support Chiang Kai-shek against the communist-led forces during China’s civil war. Chiang’s
defeat and the Communist Party’s ascent to power in China did not deter the C.C.L. from calling
for Canadian recognition of the People’s Republic (P.R.C.) and for its seating at the UN, a position
also upheld by the British government. But the onset of the Korean War in June and the
involvement of Chinese troops in October complicated matters. In reaction to Soviet suggestions
that it would try to resolve the Korean situation if the UN recognized the P.R.C., C.C.L.
commentator I.P. Birrier wrote in *The Canadian Unionist* that north Korean troops had to be
repulsed regardless of whether China was seated or not, but that UN “refusal to seat the Chinese
delegate is also wrong and that must be corrected, no matter what happens in Korea.” Not all
were as ready as Birrier to support the P.R.C. in its quest for UN recognition. Addressing the 11th
C.C.L. convention in 1951, president Aaron Mosher berated China as a Soviet satellite: “Since the
war it [the Soviet Union] has carried out an imperialistic programme of expansion, undermining
the governments of such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even the enormous Republic of
China, and bringing them within its orbit. The fact that the Communist Government of China
intervened in the Korean situation in spite of the enormous losses of manpower and war-material
which that might involve, indicates the extent of the control which Soviet Russia has over her
satellite countries.” By 1953, however, the Congress adopted a somewhat more conciliatory
approach, demanding that the Canadian government push forward peace initiatives related to
Korea and “recognize the de facto Government of China and press for its admission to the United
Nations.”

The establishment of an international department and its move to Ottawa led to greater
interaction with the government, and C.C.L. leaders tried to come to terms with the government’s
continued lack of movement on recognition of China. At a May, 1954 meeting of the International
Committee, Donald MacDonald argued that the Canadian government was sympathetic to
recognizing mainland China but because the Conservatives had “raised such a clamour on the
issue that the government was now treading very carefully.” MacDonald worried that a public
campaign around the issue might imperil the good relations the Congress had with External
Affairs. He also suggested that the Congress lacked information on international issues and that
the ICFTU did not provide such information or take a stand on controversial questions. The
Committee resolved to develop machinery that would enable them to carry out work on foreign
policy. At the C.C.L.’s 14th convention, convened from September 27-October 1, 1954, an
omnibus resolution on foreign policy urged the Canadian government to recognize the de facto
government of China and support its admission to the United Nations. This brought a response,
however, from workers of Chinese descent in B.C.’s forest industry. Writing to Donald MacDonald
on October 6, 1955, 80 workers employed at the Capilano Timber Company (members of I.W.A.
Local 1-217) complained that the C.C.L. resolution on China was wrong: “To put it mildly, we were
shocked. We feel very strongly the scourge of Communism and would propose to use mean[s]
possible to preventing it to lay a foothold on to the Free World.” Unsigned, the letter included a
copy of a resolution on China that the workers had submitted to the local union. It stated “the
14,000,000 oversea Chinese, including 50,000 in Canada...are ever loyal to the Nationalist
Government at Formosa, and wholeheartedly denounce the Red Government in the Mainland.” It
called on the C.C.L. to demand that the Canadian government withhold recognition of China but
the resolution was defeated at the local level and never reached the convention floor. They
needn’t have worried, however. So fearful was the Canadian government of upsetting the U.S.,
that it refused to recognize the P.R.C. until 1970.

**Colombo Plan**
The main focus of C.C.L. activity in Asia was South and Southeast Asia, reflecting the Cold War
priorities of the ICFTU at the time. With China “lost”, Korea at war, and Japan safely tucked under
the wing of U.S. interests, South and Southeast Asia, including India and Indochina, were
perceived as the yet untoppled dominoes. At the 1951 C.C.L. convention, Mosher announced that
the Congress had undertaken to raise $50,000 as its contribution to the South-East Asia
Organization and Leadership Training Fund to be administered by the ICFTU. Mosher charged
every convention delegate “to regard this aspect of the fight against Communism as of the
greatest importance, and go back to his local or other organization willing to do everything he can
to see that a substantial contribution is made to the South-East Asia Organization and Leadership
Fund.” By 1954, the C.C.L. had raised $40,000 of the $50,000 objective and had also sent Joe
Miyazawa, associate director of research and education for the International Woodworkers of
America, to attend an international seminar on education held at the Asian Trade Union College in
Calcutta, a college financially supported by the ICFTU for training union personnel. Of its efforts
in this region, however, its most ambitious undertaking was to work with the Canadian government
on what became known as the Colombo Plan.

Named after the city in which it was conceived, this plan for bilateral aid for Asian regional
economic development has been described by an Australian scholar as having “more to do with
the containment of communism and the countering of criticism of racist policies in Australia, and
the development of trade and future markets in the region, than any of its publicly avowed aims.”
Gathering in the capital of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in January 1950, foreign ministers from
Canada, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, India, Pakistan,
and Ceylon met for the first Commonwealth Meeting of Foreign Affairs. At the time, the British and
French were fighting all-out to quell national liberation struggles in Vietnam and Malaya in the
wake of the Chinese communists’ triumph a few months earlier. Percy Spender, Australia’s foreign
minister, reported to Prime Minister Robert Menzies that he had “stressed dangers of Chinese
Communist infiltration throughout South-East Asia, and called for the fullest exchange of
information among Commonwealth countries regarding communist activities.” At Australia’s
initiative, the foreign ministers resolved to promote economic development in the broader region
and Australia proposed to host a meeting toward that end. Developing countries such as India
perceived the Colombo proposals as a legitimate means of obtaining economic support from
industrialized countries. Thus divergent interests converged within the Commonwealth to give
birth to the Colombo Plan.

Representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the U.K., India, Pakistan and Ceylon
came together in Sydney in May 1950 to form the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on
Economic Aid to South and South-East Asia. The United States was invited and agreed to join the
committee, and non-Commonwealth countries including Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia,
the Philippines and Thailand began to attend Colombo Plan meetings in 1951. Developing
countries were urged to provide national economic development plans to the donor countries and
aid agreements were to be reached through bilateral negotiations. The Colombo Plan envisaged
two types of aid–preferential loans or grants for capital projects and assistance for technical
training. For the Canadian government, the Colombo plan was important for a number of reasons.
First, St. Laurent, who had replaced MacKenzie King as prime minister in 1948, perceived the
Commonwealth as an important bridge between “East” and “West”: “Now we can see that one of
the aims of world communism is to stir up strife between Asia and the western world and thereby
to gain control of the forces of nationalism for its own purposes.” The Commonwealth, with the
recent addition of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, could become a “new bridge of understanding”
between countries that he perceived as having a European heritage and Asian countries. For
Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Colombo Plan represented a
means by which the Commonwealth could relieve the United States of some of the burden of
foreign aid.
A positive program of action in Southeast Asia, tied to the Commonwealth, appealed to the Eurocentric trade union centres. In its annual memorandum to the Liberal government, the TLC leadership urged, for example, that the Commonwealth intervene to “stabilize and improve the situation in the Pacific area, and, in particular, in Southeast Asia.” In that connection, the brief stated, the TLC took pleasure in the good working relations among the Commonwealth nations, a trend that could only add to peace and stability in the region.

Writing to Aaron Mosher in relation to the C.C.L.’s 1951 submission to the government, St. Laurent thanked the C.C.L. for its support for Canadian participation in the Colombo Plan: “The government feels that this a practical way of helping to deal with the threat of Communism in that area.” St. Laurent went on to congratulate the C.C.L. for what it had done “to eliminate Communist influence in the labour movement” and for its role in the ICFTU. The opening of the ICFTU’s Singapore office, he suggested, would allow “the fullest cooperation from the Confederation in the working out of the Colombo Plan.” Shortly after, the St. Laurent government signed agreements with Pakistan and India (September 10) to begin implementation of the Colombo Plan. A similar agreement was initialed with Sri Lanka on July 11, 1952. The government contributed $50 million towards the plan in the 1951-1953 period. While a systematic, critical, analysis of the Colombo Plan remains to be done, the self-serving and paternalistic aspects of Canadian participation are not hard to discern. On the one hand, the official first in charge of Canada’s participation in the Plan, Nik Cavell, perceived his job in almost messianic terms: “We cannot hope to raise the standards of living of these peoples except by using the methods by which we ourselves have become wealthy, we must aid the man by the machine; but first the man must know how to use the machine and how to take care of it. So that more food can be grown and the terrible famines averted, the whole field of Asian agriculture must be given a face lifting—that means trained experts, thousands of them!” Cavell pleaded for the cooperation of his business audience from the Canadian Importers and Traders Association and the Canadian Exporters Association to help out the government: “I can think of no greater ultimate benefit to this country than that we should have this great opportunity to get to know these people, to teach them to know and use our machinery and Canadian products, to make friends with them, to show them something of the great kindly heart of the Canada of ours...”

In the first year, $15 million was provided to India and $10 million to Pakistan. Of the initial $15 million provided to India, $10 million was used to purchase Canadian grain, supposedly at the insistence of the Indian government. The grain was then sold in India and the funds collected were set aside in a counterpart fund to be used as capital for a large-scale irrigation project in Mayurakshi. As the irrigation project required generating facilities, $3 million of the Canadian aid went to the purchase of Canadian-made power plant and transmission equipment. In this case, too, the funds, ultimately provided by the Canadian taxpayer, were ending up in the pockets of Canadian corporations. Such was also the case with a $4.5 million transportation project in Bombay in which the Canadian government purchased 835 trucks, 450 buses and 70 tractors and trailers, all in Canada, and gave them to the government of India, which then loaned them to the Bombay authorities. While this was an export subsidy scheme beneficial to Canadian business, the extent to which India and other countries actually benefitted remains to be established. In any case, the effectiveness and potentially unequal relationships that flowed from such arrangements were of little concern to the Canadian labour movement. In its all-consuming obsession with communism, the C.C.L. would continue to heap undiluted praise on the Canadian government for its participation in the Plan and would eventually try to gain a piece of the action for itself.

In the fall of 1953, C.C.L. officials began to consider promoting labour participation in the technical assistance programme of the Colombo Plan. Donald MacDonald raised the issue with
Lester Pearson and other officials of External Affairs and reported that they were “sympathetic to our point of view.”  

MacDonald also raised the matter with D. Mungat, the representative of the ICFTU-affiliated Asian Regional Organization, who cautioned that Asian governments might not be willing to cooperate with such an initiative.

The Congress decided to take things a step further by raising the issue for official discussion by the Asian Regional Organization and in March, Martin Levinson drafted a letter to the secretary of the A.R.O.: “What we had in mind is that, for example, the Steelworkers union in India might find it of some assistance to have a[n] experienced Canadian steelworker give advice on such matters as the establishment of a wage rate evaluation scheme in the steel industry in India; or perhaps a qualified Canadian Textile worker could be of some assistance on matters pertaining to the setting of time-rates in the Textile industry of Asia (if such is the method of wage payment now).”  

He requested that the Asian Regional Organization discuss the Canadian proposal at its next executive meeting. Mungat agreed to raise the issue at the next meeting but it appears that any further efforts in that direction came to naught.

Collaboration with the State

C.C.L. leaders such as Charles Millard were critical of AFL officials for their attempts to manipulate the ICFTU into becoming an international anti-communist, business-union central, a vision that conflicted with the social-democratic unionism of both the C.C.L. and the CIO. After a Fall 1951 meeting of the ICFTU, Millard reported back to Aaron Mosher: “Actually the conduct of George Meany at Brussels was disgusting; his attitude did nothing to enhance American prestige with our friends in Latin America and the East.”  

He also criticized the AFL for opposing the affiliation to the ICFTU of the UIL of Italy, a social-democratic trade union federation that competed with the AFL-backed anti-communist union, the CISL: “Last year Irving Brown made a vicious attack on an officers’ report made by Oldenbroek to the Executive which in substance recommended the affiliation.”  

The AFL however, “through Meany and Brown (and the State Department, some of us think) were still determined to keep the UIL out.”

Nevertheless, Millard, Conroy and Mosher were all willing to collaborate with the Canadian government in the same fashion that the AFL was collaborating with the CIA and U.S. State Department. For example, in January 1951, Pat Conroy wrote A.D.P. Heeney, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, requesting that the government adopt “a policy of appointing Labour Attaches to diplomatic positions in as many countries as possible.”  

Conroy gave two reasons for the request. First, he stated that because the government provided representation for commercial interests in embassies abroad, appointing labour attaches would provide a more balanced representation of the people of Canada. The second reason was based on his perception that “the era of ‘silk-hat’ or ‘top-hat’ diplomacy is past, and because of the challenge issued and maintained by the Soviet Empire, and because of the nature of this challenge, which is grounded essentially not on customary diplomatic channels, but on proletarian and working-class levels...” An embassy without a labour attache would be at a disadvantage in trying to gather worthwhile information, he said. He suggested that labour attaches should be posted to London, Paris, Italy and Washington. The second priority for Conroy was Asia: “I think in view of the world situation, a strong effort should be made to have another man posted in Asia, with his base in India perhaps.”  

He also argued for sending labour representatives when personnel were sent abroad as part of overseas development aid. “It just does not make sense that in this battle to capture the vast masses of Asia, in particular, we have people from a comparatively high social and economic level sent to speak the language of people who may be making as low as $30.00 to $35.00 per year.”  

Conroy suggested there were good trade unionists who might be available for such postings. An External Affairs official replied the next
day, stating the proposal merited study but that he “would not of course admit for one moment that the regular members of this Department who are drawn from many varied backgrounds from all across Canada are in any sense ‘top-hat’ diplomats or incapable of making contact with groups other than those of any one social class.”74

Conroy was not alone in arguing for posts abroad. Charles Millard, the Steelworkers’ Canadian director, travelled to Brussels in November 1951 to attend the ICFTU executive board meeting on behalf of the C.C.L. Writing to C.C.L. President Aaron Mosher later, Millard complained that the U.S. labour attaché in Brussels was “Johnny-on-the-spot” when he arrived in Brussels but that there had been not a peep out of the Canadian embassy.75 Millard proceeded to have the ICFTU media representative contact the Canadian embassy and a commercial counsellor, Bruce MacDonald, invited Millard for lunch. In this meeting, Millard pressed MacDonald on the idea of appointing a Canadian labour attaché in Brussels. “I told MacDonald I would write a report on liaison with ICFTU and the national centres in Europe for the Departments of External Affairs, Defence and Labour, with a copy to him.” Millard recognized that the C.C.L.’s support for the CCF at home created problems in its relations with the Liberal government but he believed collaboration was possible: “If the government is sincere about UN, NATO and the Colombo Plan, then it seems to me that even though they dislike our political views on the home front, they should be big enough to cooperate on the international front.”76 He proposed a meeting with “Heeney and Escott Reid of External Affairs, Major General Burns of Defence and MacNamara” to keep them abreast of labour developments internationally. In the same memorandum, he suggested that Pat Conroy, who had quit as secretary-treasurer of the C.C.L. the previous Fall, was “available for such an appointment.” In January 1952, the government appointed Conroy as the labour attaché to the Canadian embassy in Washington, a post he retained for twenty years.

Shared Cold War sentiments also prompted C.C.L. officials to collaborate with other government officials. C.C.L. Secretary-Treasurer Donald MacDonald maintained regular contact with U.S. labour attaché John A. Ballew, then stationed in Ottawa, regularly forwarding him copies of Sohyo News, an English-language publication of the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo in Japanese). U.S. Occupation officials had cultivated this federation as an anti-communist federation of unions in Japan but as the U.S. moved to incorporate Japan into its Pacific military network and to re-arm it, unionists and the Japan Socialist Party re-assessed their independence and articulated a new platform of non-alignment in the Cold War.77 Ballew, writing MacDonald to thank him for lending him a copy of Sohyo News, told him that “I knew the editor, Jiichiyo Koikawa, rather well and find it most difficult to believe that he is in sympathy with all that he writes.”78

Cultural affinity with Euro-American labour types, whether they be employed by the U.S. government or not, put Canadian labour leaders in a poor position to understand what was happening in other parts of the world. Ideological bias also played its role. The ICFTU, determined to create a pro-Western national centre in Japan, refused to recognize Sohyo and in fact worked actively against it. On June 24, 1954, Takano Minoru, general secretary of Sohyo, wrote the C.C.L. asking them to send solidarity greetings to Sohyo’s 5th annual convention due to begin on July 12.79 A standard courtesy among unions, such letters had been sent by the C.C.L. on numerous occasions to the conservative Japan Federation of Labour (Sodomei) and the Japan Seaman’s Union. But on July 8, the ICFTU’s Oldenbroek went to the trouble to telegraph the Canadian affiliate the urgent message: “Advise against sending message Sohyo convention” and the C.C.L. complied. In other words, Canadian union officials, blinded by the society-wide demonization of communism, not only failed to see the just struggle of developing countries but also cut themselves off from potential allies such as Sohyo which, because of their position in the world system, were able to better perceive the nature of U.S. aims in Asia.
At the C.C.L.’s 14th convention, convened from September 27-October 1, 1954, Steelworkers’ delegate and chair of the resolutions committee William Sefton, introduced an omnibus resolution on foreign policy that called for further attempts at disarmament in light of the H-bomb tests conducted by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. and welcomed the armistices in Indochina and Korea. The resolution denounced, however, the “new Soviet line of ‘peaceful co-existence’” and reiterated its support for NATO as well as for the South East Asia Treaty Organization. In defense of the resolution, Sefton claimed that the North Atlantic and Southeast Asian treaties were necessary to protect Canada and that delegates should not worry about India’s objection to the formation of SEATO: “India is in a state of ferment now, and possibly is a bit reluctant to go along because of the nearness of the Soviet Union, and therefor is not participating fully with the world in these defense arrangements. But we must realize, too, that we have the Commonwealth of Australia and...New Zealand, we have the people in the Philippines, and other nations down there...” The resolution also pointed to Communist successes in Indo-China and British Guiana which proved, it claimed, that “poverty and colonialism are the handmaiden of totalitarianism.” This policy resolution put the Canadian labour movement firmly in the camp of opposition to national liberation struggles, and to the emerging non-aligned movement led by India. Support for SEATO, a treaty created by the U.S. government as part of its containment policy, firmly aligned Canadian trade unions with American imperialism in Asia.

At the same convention, Martin Levinson submitted the first report of the newly formed Department for International Affairs. While fundraising had been a key objective in the first period of operations, the department, stated Levinson, would be devoting more attention to Canadian foreign policy, especially with the establishment of the department’s office in Ottawa the previous September. At the Trades and Labour Congress convention that year, Percy Bengough opened the proceedings with a farewell speech. By this time, the fires of rabid anti-communism, having accomplished their purpose, had died down and Bengough rambled through domestic affairs. The only word on international affairs was his view that foreign aid should be curtailed: “Sending millions of dollars abroad to aid the depressed with a view of raising their standards of living should be the right thing to do, but shouldn’t we ease up doing these nice things until we have found out where we can get the money to initiate work for our own people...”

Conclusion

Canadian labour leaders in the early postwar period perceived their role and that of the labour movement they represented as helping to build an overriding arch of British-American understanding. They conceived this arch to be key not only for the future of Europe, but also in developing a united labour strategy based on anti-communism and anti-Sovietism that in its very conception was global in scale. This was particularly true for Canadian Congress of Labour officials and less so for the Trades and Labour Congress whose officials quickly moved to a more insular attitude. That these officials would be prone to favour their cultural comrades is, on a personal level, quite understandable. However, when these biases were transferred into the policy realm, leaders such as Conroy and Millard were predisposed to acceptance of Euro-American strategies. To some extent at least, this meant acceptance of colonial and neo-colonial policies then being articulated by their U.S. and British comrades. As a result, officials were often unable to understand the nature and scope of the anti-colonial revolution then in progress. Furthermore, their fervid anti-communism often blinded them to the fact that many who believed in the anti-colonial revolution would naturally believe and support communism because of its theoretical appreciation at least of the importance of their revolutions. Similarly, within the Canadian labour movement, anti-communism blinded these officials to accepting criticism from the left. While these criticisms may not have been always correct, they often
contained the seeds of understanding that would have bloomed into possible solutions and policies that would have better reflected the interests of union members. In the years subsequent to those under study, much has changed in the labour movement and this study will hopefully contribute to further measures that will allow a diversity of leadership and a deepening of democratic debate. Only thus can we pay proper tribute to the hard struggles and bitter lessons of the past.

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Notes


2. The closest thing approaching such a study is Andrew Carew’s review of Charles Millard’s role as the director of organization for the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1955-61. Even that essay, however, focuses on the ICFTU and Millard’s role within it and not on the Canadian labour movement’s own international policies and actions. See Anthony Carew, “Charles Millard, a Canadian in the International Labour Movement: A Case Study of the ICFTU 1955-61,” Labour/Le Travail, 37 (Spring, 1996), 121-148.


Conflicts related to the Cold War led to real wars in Asia of which the most devastating were those in Korea and Vietnam. Approximately seven million people died in these conflicts, a large number of whom were civilians.

For details of Lovestone’s activities and collaboration with the CIA, see Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone, Communist, Anti-Communist and Spymaster (New York, Random House, 1999). On the Chinese operations specifically, see Ibid., pp. 202-209.


A good example of the close linkages can be seen in the appointments of staff. Eugene Forsey, the long-time research director of the Canadian Congress of Labour and later the Canadian Labour Congress, relates in his autobiography how Charles Millard, Steelworker director in Canada and C.C.L. executive member, and David Lewis, national secretary of the CCF, arranged to have him appointed as director of research for the C.C.L. See Eugene Forsey, *A Life on the Fringe: The Memoirs of Eugene Forsey* (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 72.


Ibid., p. 239.

Ibid., p. 350.


Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 8.


Rodney King to Barry Richards, March 24, 1949, University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections and University Archives Division, Grace MacInnis Fonds, Box 4 File xx, p. 1.


For the justifications of these unions for leaving, see Trades Union Congress, “Free Trade Unions Leave the WFTU” (London, 1949) contained in NAC, CLC Series, MG 28 I 103, Vol. 255, File 1).


Ibid., p. 80.

Weiler, op. cit., p. 97. Behind the ITS refusal to come to terms were the AFL’s Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone who were determined to see an end to the WFTU.


Ibid., p. 2.


As reprinted in *The Canadian Unionist* (October 1950), p. 265.


While there remains a strong tinge of Cold War bias regarding Korea even today, a critical consensus is emerging that recognizes the force of nationalism that was overwhelming in both the north and the south; the extremely repressive and ruthless regime that the U.S. had supported in the south, one that it manipulated the UN to recognize with Canada's assistance; and the domestic factors at work in the 1945-50 period that imbued the war with a strong flavor of a civil war manipulated by the United States and the Soviet Union. See Carter J. Eckert et al, *Korea Old and New: A History* (Seoul, Ilchokak Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University Press, 1990). Among the most influential works in this trend see Bruce Cumings's seminal analysis contained in his *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981) and *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990).


ICFTU, “Free Trade Unions Denounce Communist Aggression in Korea”, p. 1

Ibid., p. 274.


A. R. Mosher, “The President’s Address,” *The Canadian Unionist*, Vol. 25 No. 11 (October 1951), p. 300. The Congress was only partially successful in this fundraising effort.


Ibid., p. 11.


Ibid., p. 2.

The initial arrangements regarding the Colombo Plan are outlined in Department of External Affairs, *The Colombo Plan* (Ottawa, n.d.–a reprint of articles appearing in the April and May 1953 issues of External Affairs) and Nik Cavell, “Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan”, Statements and Speeches No. 51/38, Information Division, Department of External Affairs.


Ibid., p. 3.


Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 4.


Ibid., p. 2.


John A. Ballew to Donald MacDonald, October 1, 1953 (NAC, MG 28 I 103, Vol. 260, File 12).


Ibid., p. 119.
