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Abstracts of papers, by author(s)

Learning from Presupposition

Dominic Alford-Duguid (University of British Columbia)

Strawson (1950) famously distinguishes what a speaker presupposes from what she asserts in uttering a sentence like 'The present King of France is bald'. I defend a claim about presupposition's epistemic significance, namely that presupposition can provide a distinctive testimony-based way for an audience to learn about the world. My argument has three parts. I first bring out presupposition's distinctive epistemic profile by showing that an audience can learn from a speaker's presuppositions even when she regards a speaker's assertion as resting upon a false presupposition. I then use that result to argue that presupposition provides a distinctive way for an audience to learn about the world. Finally, I motivate the view that when an audience learns from a speaker's presuppositions in this way, she thereby acquires a testimony-based belief.

The Real McCoy: fictional realism, indeterminate identities, and de *dicto* interpretation

Peter Alward (University of Saskatchewan)

The central goal of this paper is to defend fictional realism from Everett's charge that it entails that indeterminate character identities inside fiction yield indeterminate character identities outside of fiction. In this paper, I distinguish between *de re* and *de dicto* interpretations of stories and argue that (i) given *de dicto* interpretations, principles linking identities inside and outside of fiction do not apply and (ii) given *de re* interpretations, characters are individuated independently of the goings on in the works under consideration.

The Case for Eliminating Identity

Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia)

I defend eliminativism about identity, the view that we should do away with a commitment to the identity relation and to identity facts in our ontology. I first show that the dispensability or the indispensability of the identity sign to our first-order logic has no bearing on the ontological status of the identity relation. I then provide a new argument from explanatory redundancy for doing away with an ontological commitment to the identity relation.

Assessing Two Versions of Modified Divine Command Theory

Peter Andes (University of Alberta)

In this paper, I assess two versions of modified divine command theory (MDCT). The first, taking inspiration from ideal observer theory (IOT), stems from the work of Thomas Carson and Harry Gensler. The second, taking inspiration from an Augustinian-Platonist approach, is defended by the likes of William Alston and William Lane Craig. I argue that although the IOT form of MDCT is less metaphysically extravagant than the Augustinian-Platonist form, it faces the difficulty that it offers us only a set of descriptive facts about what a wise and loving God would command and cannot seem to offer us any normativity from these facts. I defend the Augustinian-Platonist form against an objection from Jeremy Koons and other possible objections before concluding that ultimately a modest

approach open to multiple theories at once is preferable to endorsing either version of MDCT or ethical non-naturalism exclusively.

Carnap and Quine on Ontology and Categories

Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)

This paper joins the recent scholarly debate around Quine's reading of Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (ESO) in "On Carnap's Views on Ontology" (CVO). The paper strongly supports Quine's claim that ESO is principally concerned with category questions pertaining to the distinction between ontologically separate kinds of entities. Quite controversially, Quine claims that Carnap's external questions of existence are all category questions. Most scholars think that Quine's interpretation of ESO is wrong. In this paper I support Quine's claim. I also offer a new interpretation of Quine's objection to Carnap that the distinction between different types of variables (for different frameworks) is merely typographical. I conclude that for Carnap, but not for Quine, to be an entity of a certain kind is to be an entity whose existence is established by a certain type of epistemic procedures.

Mechanical Dreams: Automata and Mechanistic Conceptions in Greek Antiquity

Sylvia Berryman (University of British Columbia)

Derek De Solla Price suggested that 'mechanistic' conceptions of the natural world were a causal factor that led to the building of automata in antiquity, rather than the reverse. I have argued that we cannot meaningfully talk of 'mechanistic conceptions' of organisms in antiquity prior to the development of mechanics, because there is nothing that would count as 'mechanistic,' absent the reference to a discipline known as mechanics. Adrienne Mayor's 2018 book, *Gods and Robots: Myths, Machines, and Ancient Dreams of Technology*, challenges my claim that a difference in kind exists between the imaginative speculation about created life and the 'mechanistic' vision that is driven by experience with working artifacts. Mayor suggests that my understanding here of the 'mechanistic' is tautological. I am, indeed, making a point that begins with the meaning of a term, but that also embeds within it a significant substantive claim about the formation of our 'commonsense' notions of what is technologically possible.

Black Utopias, Speculative Fiction, and Aesthetic Liberation

Corbin Covington (Northwestern University)

Jayna Brown, black utopian theorist, claims that fixation on the negative aspects of black life leads to an inability to imagine existence anew through aesthetic experience. She argues that, black people's exclusion from the category of the Human allows for a freer range of ontological exploration, ways of imagining new forms of being. Rather than subscribing to an ontological absolutism, black speculative visionaries ask what exists of blackness in other realms of being that pulse at different levels of consciousness. My project emerges from the same urgency and shared anxiety: new modes of expression beyond the Human. The "untethered state" thesis, while optimistic, is misguided. Instead, I argue that blackness is the crux of liberal humanism and modern identity; the negation of the Human yet a necessary condition of its possibility and interiority. I posit afro-pessimism (as an analytic) is better suited to analyze this dizzying onto-metaphysical question of blackness and being. Afro-pessimism observes the ontological bind of blackness, though it does not foreclose the option to explore marvelous modes of being. There remains aesthetic possibility to imagine and depict blackness differently without the false claim of [ontological] freedom from which aesthetic theories proceed.

Virtue, Happiness, and the Crafts in Plato's *Euthydemus*
Dimitrios Dentsoras (University of Manitoba)

The essay examines Socrates' use of the craft analogy in the first hortatory speech of *Euthydemus* (278d-282e). Interpreters of the passage fall in two broad groups. The first maintains that virtue is able to provide a wide range of bodily and psychic goods, which constitute happiness. This view, while in line with the craft analogy, makes the sufficiency claim implausible. The second camp tries to bolster the sufficiency claim by presenting virtue as the source of psychic goods, rather than any external possession. This focus on virtue's internal effects seems to be in contrast with the craft analogy. The essay provides an interpretation that retains the craft analogy. At the same time, I offer an argument in favor of virtue's sufficiency for happiness, based on the idea that virtue functions in a way that is sensitive to one's circumstance and can adapt one's expectations and possessions to the situation.

What justifies a return on capital?
Peter Dietsch (University of Victoria)

Claims to labour income can be presented on different grounds: need, contribution, or skill are all plausible candidates. When it comes to capital income, parallel justifications of this kind are underdeveloped in the literature. This paper aims to fill this gap. I present and evaluate two main justifications for a return on capital: a justification based on time on the one hand, which argues that capital income represents a reward for the patience involved in more complex processes of production; and a justification based on incentives on the other hand, which views capital income as a means to get people to make investments that are socially useful. Finally, I suggest that from a practical perspective, the length of the production process can serve as a proxy for both of these dimensions.

The unnecessary presumed-necessary beloved
Lauren Edwards (York University)

This paper suggests that contemporary, philosophical theories of love have a problem: they assume, without justification, that love must always have a beloved but, this assumption is in tension with paradigmatic cases, common uses, and other philosophical theories. To make this claim, I show first that current theories of love in philosophy do presume that the beloved is a necessary feature of what love is. Then, I outline one definitional criteria for evaluating this definitional assumption, drawing on the philosophy of conceptual analysis: the Use criterion. In the section on Use, I draw on the paradigmatic beloveds God and self, and the common uses of love with inert, abstract, and imaginary beloveds – e.g. love of deceased persons, love of nation, and love of fictional characters – to show that the presumed-necessary beloved cannot be required to exist, be distinct from the love, or participate/reciprocate in the loving relationship. In conclusion, and in light of the challenges raised throughout this paper, I argue that the presumed necessary beloved is unnecessary and this opens up one, profound possibility – there can be love without any object.

Are intentions in action *de re*?
Kevin Falvey (University of California, Santa Barbara)

George Wilson has argued that when one acts intentionally, there is a kind of intention in action that is *de re* with respect to the very action underway. John McDowell has criticized Wilson's account, arguing that the non-existence of the acts in question at the time of the intention makes it impossible for them to be *de re.* I think McDowell's criticism is overly broad, ruling out the possibility of a person having any de re attitudes about her own future actions. I offer reasons for thinking some such attitudes are possible, and advance a different argument against Wilson's notion of *de re* intentions

that is compatible with their possibility. Finally, I sketch a variant of Wilson's ideas that I think is viable and does mark a difference between prior intentions and intentions in action.

Semantic Layering and the Success of Mathematical Sciences
Nicolas Fillion (Simon Fraser University)

What are the pillars on which the success of modern science rest? Although philosophers have much discussed what is behind science's success, this paper argues that much of the discussion is misdirected. The extant literature rightly regards the semantic and inferential tools of formal logic and probability theory as pillars of scientific rationality, in the sense that they reveal the justificatory structure of important aspects of scientific practice. As key elements of our rational reconstruction toolbox, they make a fundamental contribution to our understanding of the success of science.

At the same time, any science, however exact, is dominated by approximation, error, and uncertainty, a fact that makes one wonder how science can be so successful. This paper articulates and illustrates general themes---e.g., that truth-preserving arguments often fail to preserve approximate truth---that highlight the need for additional semantic resources. Thus, our proposal is that persistent failures to unravel the reasons behind the success of science in the face of pervasive error and uncertainty should be attributed to an insufficiently rich way of rationally reconstructing scientific and mathematical knowledge. What is missing? This paper claims that there is a third formal method of reasoning that constitutes a distinct pillar on which rests the success of science, namely, perturbation theory. The paper outlines how the representational and inferential tools of perturbation theory differ from those of logic and probability theory, and how they enable us to understand the apparently elusive aspects of the success of science.

However, compared to its peers, perturbative reasoning has not received the attention it deserves. As the paper explains, this partly results from the circumstances in which perturbation theory is taught, and partly from the fact that perturbation theory first appears to be a vaguely related collection of methods offering no systematic semantic insight. In an attempt to show that this first impression is wrong, this paper presents its contribution to the semantic dimension of scientific representation and inference in terms of what I call ``semantic layering.''

Black Lives Matter and the WNBA: Silencing Activist Speech Through Symbolic Appropriation
Nelson Graves (Concordia University)

What does a concern with brand optics really mean for the future of the #BlackLivesMatter movement? This paper hopes to illustrate some mechanisms that allow for activist imagery to make a substantive change and will also explore the detriment that comes from corporations and other entities appropriating these symbols. Looking at activist movements through the lens of Charles W. Mills's domination contract, this paper claims that activist language chips away at dominating systems by building solidarity. Then through Rae Langton's description of illocutionary disablement, this paper will explore how activist symbols can become appropriated to silence genuine activism. To conclude, this piece looks to the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) as a case study of these frameworks in action.

Semicompatibilism Imperiled
Ish Haji (University of Calgary)

Blameworthiness semicompatibilism is the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral blameworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise. Two concerns with this thesis

are raised. First I show why Frankfurt examples, which play a key role in underwriting blameworthiness semicompatibilism, are not as secure as many believe because of conceptual ties between blameworthiness and impermissibility. Second, I argue that if blameworthiness is conceptually associated, even if in a roundabout way with impermissibility, and one cannot do wrong unless one could have done otherwise, blameworthiness semicompatibilism is imperiled. With suitable amendments, parallel problems plague praiseworthiness semicompatibilism, the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral praiseworthiness even if incompatible with freedom to do otherwise.

Relating climate changes and prehistoric art to aesthetic sensibilities and ethical values
Thomas Heyd (University of Victoria)

This paper takes note of the fact that, although present climate change is unprecedented by being anthropogenic, rapid, global environmental changes due to climatic changes have repeatedly taken place in the past. We do have an eloquent record of images on rock and of portable sculpted objects that testify to peoples' aesthetic engagement during at least some parts of prehistory. Here I explore whether climatic changes during the last 40,000 years were associated with changes in content and styles of rock art. The archaeological record suggests that there were both long periods in which major climate disruptions surprisingly were accompanied by aesthetic continuities, and particular climatic change moments in which there were important aesthetic discontinuities. In conclusion it is suggested that visual cultures, and the aesthetic sensibilities that they track, likely are not directly sensitive to climatic changes, but possibly instead to broad-scale socio-economic shifts that sometimes accompany environmental changes.

Truth in Fiction -- A Sequel
Mark Hinchliff (Reed College)

David Lewis develops an account of the conditions under which fictional sentences are true. A fictional sentence has the form given by the scheme "In f, K", where 'f' is to be replaced with the name of a fiction and 'K' with a sentence that can be true or false. An example of a fictional sentence is, "In 'The Speckled Band', a baboon startled two men". After reviewing the development of Lewis's analysis, I raise a difficulty with his analysis, present a natural way to avoid the difficulty, and discuss a potential threat of circularity to that way.

Psychedelic Drugs and Kantian Moral Theory
Sarah Hoffman (University of Saskatchewan)

Scientific research into the therapeutic potential of psychedelic drugs seen a recent resurgence into the mainstream as has and their use in ways that are not simply recreational but involve some spiritual, exploratory or self-care aspect. A consideration of the moral landscape around these drugs thus seems timely. But what could Kant contribute to this? At first glance that Kant does not seem the most likely philosopher to look to for any sympathetic account of drug use; he has been taken to be directly hostile to the use of intoxicating substances. But there is more in Kant that can contribute to thinking about psychedelics than this indicates. First, Kant himself argues for the moral value of (some forms of) intoxication. Moreover, there is mounting evidence that the use of psychedelic drugs can produce positive changes in a person's self-knowledge and outlook that are clearly in line with fulfilling the moral duty to self-perfection Kant asserts we have. Kant's moral ideas may prove to provide a more nuanced view of the morality of psychedelic drugs than one that simply says they impermissible.

Is Consciousness Fundamental or Fictive? Why Realists and Illusionists About Consciousness Are Both Wrong

Andrada-Elena Holmgren (University of British Columbia)

In the debate between realists and illusionists, one theorist's datum is another theorist's fiction. On the one hand, phenomenal realists argue that consciousness, understood as *qualia*, is the central datum to be explained by any theory of mind that is worth its salt. On the other hand, illusionists argue that the realists' concept of consciousness fails to refer to any datum, but is instead an antiquated theoretical construct that has long since outlived its usefulness for a science of mind, and so should be reconceptualized in terms of third-person neuroscientific evidence.

I argue that the oft-neglected transcendental philosophy of Ernst Cassirer provides us with the conceptual resources we need to surpass the current deadlock between realists and illusionists by enabling us to recognize that the entire debate is misframed, given that consciousness is neither a datum, nor a posit, but is instead the general condition for the intelligibility of particulars.

The Beautiful and Good: Encouraging Environmental and Social Possibilities

William Konchak (University of Iceland)

As we look to the future, pressing environmental issues such as global warming and issues of income inequality and environmental injustice point to the limits of competitive individualistic and capitalistic paradigms. Discourses of progress and the excessive belief in scientism and technology foster an approach of seeking to master and control nature to its detriment. In this paper, I will draw upon Hans-Georg Gadamer's approach to dialogue and the notion of the beautiful and the good which are inspired by Plato's thought to present an alternative paradigm of relating to each other and nature based on mutual respect and solidarity. A working hypothesis of this paper is that if we have some common vision of the good, we may have a greater potential to meet our collective challenges.

Scepticism about Induction

Noa Latham (University of Calgary)

In this paper I argue that a plausible exercise of inference to the best explanation can show scepticism about the past and the future and scepticism about induction to be unreasonable. I examine what worldview it is rational to believe when many worldviews are consistent with all the evidence. I argue that it is the worldview that best explains the evidence and that the most important good-making feature of such explanations is their simplicity. I argue that a nonHumean view of fundamental laws allows a uniformity of nature principle to be derived, and also allows the alleviation of sceptical concerns about the rationality of induction that arise even when this uniformity of nature principle is satisfied. By contrast, I argue that on a Humean view of fundamental laws, inference to the best explanation allows no plausible response to any of these sceptical scenarios.

Love as Ontological Foundation in Leone Ebreo's *Dialoghi*

Luís Lóia (McGill University & Universidade Católica Portuguesa)

The present text starts from an approach to the *Dialoghi* of Leone Ebreo (Judá Abravanel), trying to understand Love as the ontological foundation of Being, from which it manifests itself and can be understood. The scope given to the category of Love, immersed in a Renaissance Neoplatonic conception, allows an understanding of the hierarchy of beings from an ontic foundationalism that is, at the same time, creationist, ordering and relational. The creationist dynamism of Love culminates in a Universal Love, which embraces the whole and in which all creatures are included, in particular that

being that is situated between worlds and who, with their own loving creations, is able to relate to God, epistemically, but also actualizes Him, in ontological terms. Conceiving Love as *energéia*, in its Aristotelian sense, we will seek to demonstrate that Leone Ebreo supports an aesthetic reason that, through intellectual love, allows for the greatest degree of contemplation and union/reunion with God.

A Living Forest Approach to Indigenous and Treaty Rights in the Canadian Constitution
Nicole Lokstadt (McMaster University)

In this paper, I discuss John Borrows' "(Ab)Originalism and Canada's Constitution" (2012), where he argues that Indigenous and treaty rights should be approach from a living tree approach to constitutional interpretation rather than an originalist one. While I agree with the rejection of originalist interpretation, I worry that the current living tree approach utilized in Canada may also be problematic, and thus insufficient to address the concerns raised by Borrows. More specifically, I worry about the Canadian government's history of colonialism and discrimination, and the "paradigm paralysis" which it has existed within for the past century. I argue instead that we should be looking at the forest rather than a single living tree if we are to achieve meaningful reconciliation between Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in Canada.

Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty
Dom Lopes (University of British Columbia)

Philosophers working on pleasure posit an essential link between pleasure and motivation. Yet some philosophers working in aesthetics characterize aesthetic pleasure as disinterested. This is part of a longer paper arguing that this is a mistake. (You might think the horse is dead and needs no flogging. Alas, disinterested pleasure is back – Berger forthcoming – and the classic critique of disinterest was not focussed on disinterested pleasure.) Whether or not the characterization conflicts with the posit obviously depends on how each is interpreted. Moreover, how the characterization is interpreted should reflect its role in accounts of aesthetic value. Appeals to distinterested pleasure must earn their keep and the assumption is that they do so by helping to answer questions about aesthetic value. On two (pleasingly asymmetrical) interpretations, the characterization and the posit are consistent, but neither does a good job of shedding light on aesthetic value, so we have no right to hold that aesthetic pleasure is disinterested.

The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness
Dylan Ludwig (York University)

Philosophers and scientists generally assume that consciousness is characterized by a 'first-person perspective.' On one interpretation of this claim, experiences are defined, at least in part, by representations that encode a subject-centred 'point of view.' But claims about the defining features of consciousness must be sensitive to the possibility of dissociation: if a neurobiological structure or psychological function is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness, it cannot be a defining feature in any robust sense. I appeal to research on unconscious emotion, visually guided action, perceptual constancy, and psychiatric disorder to argue that first-personal representations dissociate from conscious experience.

Aristotelian Reflections on the Biodiversity Crisis
Duncan Maclean (St. Mary's University)

Ancient Greek ethical theory is not a typical resource for environmental philosophy. With their emphasis on politics and the inner human life, the Greek philosophers showed little interest in our

relationship to the wilderness beyond the city walls. The suggestion, then, that we look to Aristotle to better understand our duties to plants and animals might strike one to be roundly unproductive. Nevertheless, I argue that Aristotle's theory of *eudaimonia*, or happiness, confers upon us the duty to protect or preserve biodiversity, as studying nature is one way of employing reason in the best possible way. The claim that we ought to protect biodiversity for the sake of intellectual excellence sounds problematically anthropocentric and I defend the *eudaimonic* argument against the charge by placing it within the wider context of Aristotle's teleological view of nature.

Bradford's CCC: 'The Unexamined Life [with Art] is not Worth Living'
Nicolas Michieli (Western University)

By applying Gwen Bradford's notion of 'CCC' to Joseph Raz's 'life with art' follows support for Socrates's famous dictum from Plato's *Apology* (the unexamined life is not worth living). The argument for CCC [Consciousness Comparative Claim] is that a 'C-state' (consciousness state) with a 'W-state' (welfare state) as its intentional object is much more valuable than a W-state alone. When CCC is applied to Raz's 'life with art' (life is enhanced holistically by artistic engagement), I demonstrate that, specifically, welfare is enhanced through the awareness of one's life as one fulfilled by aesthetic experience. I.e., a subject's welfare is enhanced when the fact that their life is fulfilled by art is the intentional object of a C-state. In a corollary, I show that since the consciousness of the life with art is analogous in application to the perception of W-states in CCC, and aesthetic objects are also good *simpliciter*, wellbeing is good *simpliciter*.

Moral Attention in Collingwood's *Principles of Art*
Chris Mole (University of British Columbia)

The idea that literature makes a morally valuable contribution to society has rarely been advocated in the last half century, and there have been few attempts to give a philosophical account of what that contribution might be. Recently, however, there has been some interest in the account of these matters that was assayed by R.G. Collingwood, in his 1937 book *The Principles of Art*. Among these recent commentators, Robert Hopkins has suggested that Collingwood's account requires an excessive amount of work to be done by the notion of attention, and has therefore tried to adapt Collingwood's proposal, so that its central notion is no longer attention, but now understanding. The present paper shows this to be unmotivated . Attention is up to the job that Collingwood assigns to it, and the attention-centred version of his theory gives a plausible and distinctive theory of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics.

Peirce on Beauty as a Predicate of Firstness
Christopher Morrissey (Trinity Western University)

Peirce observes a beautiful object "must have a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their totality" (CP 5.132). The "positive simple immediate quality" of a solution to the Three Wise Men puzzle is explored by introducing a variation in which a queen designates those wise men whom she considers to be the most beautiful or not. A formal demonstration of the solution to the puzzle is derived by using a semiotically-informed term logic that realizes the Leibnizian ideal of an algebra of concepts for natural language. Commentary on the abductive, inductive, and deductive aspects of this derivation is made by using it to illustrate key points from two Peirce essays. An experience of "beauty" as firstness can happen when that simple predicate is a new sign dynamically generated by the lucidity of an inferential constellation of complex predicates.

Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony
Daniel Munro (University of Toronto)

This paper gives an account of mental imagery's role in certain cases of testimonial belief-formation, arguing that imagery can simultaneously serve as both the means by which one comprehends testimony and the format in which one acquires a testimonial belief. It then argues that such imagery-involving cases of testimonial belief-formation pose counterexamples to a widespread view about the nature of testimonial justification.

Eros, tragedy, and replaceability: a reading of Diotima's *Scala Amoris*
Luke Neilson (University of Calgary)

Any satisfactory account of *eros* should accommodate both (what I call) the irreplaceability intuition and (what I call) the security desideratum. The former requires that love objects should not be replaceable by any object possessing relevant similar properties. The latter requires that loving, inasmuch as it is essential to human satisfaction, should not be susceptible to frustration. According to Martha Nussbaum (2001), Diotima's account of *eros* in the *Symposium* can accommodate the security desideratum but not the irreplaceability intuition; the *Symposium* is thereby supposed to have trapped the lover in a tragic choice between loving irreplaceable individuals and loving securely. In this paper, I argue that the Symposium describes no such tragic choice. On the contrary, the exemplar lover of Diotima's *Scala Amoris* may regard the beloved as imaginably replaceable, which captures what is central to the irreplaceability intuition.

Cutting Off a Hydra's Head: Plato on the Insatiability of desire
Alec Oakley (University of Victoria)

In the *Republic*, Plato describes our appetitive desires as insatiable. I argue that it is this feature of desire, whatever it turns out to be, that is Plato's chief worry about desires being left to themselves. Thus, if we are to understand what motivates Plato to develop a system of education that shapes our desires, we must understand in what sense he takes them to be insatiable. This note presents an answer to this question, according to which our desires are insatiable in that they grow always more intense and numerous upon resurfacing. After considering two tempting but mistaken readings, we introduce our own. We explain what it means for the desires to become more intense and numerous and why Plato finds this worrisome. With the reading of insatiability laid out, we go on to explain why Plato thought of the desires as insatiable in this way. We argue that the increases in intensity and multiplicity are due to the spirited and rational parts, respectively, taking the appetitive desires as their own. We conclude by drawing out a remarkable consequence of our view, namely that it justifies the Republic's central thesis of the goodness of the just life.

Humean Belief and the Social Construction of Gender
Katie Paxman (Brigham Young University)

Recent scholarship presents Hume as a constructivist about gender and gender roles. In this paper, I apply Hume's theory of belief formation, as systematized by Lorne Falkenstein, to the case of our socially constructed beliefs about women and their social roles. I find that beliefs about women on Hume's picture of belief are best understood as a product of education, not association and constant conjunction. Such beliefs are particularly difficult to correct, as their vivacity is established by repetition, not experience, and thus persist even when we have contrary experience. Applying Falkenstein's reading further, I argue that a Humean solution to the resulting prevalence of prejudiced beliefs concerning women must involve the adoption of a skeptical approach to our passively adopted beliefs via education.

On Denotatoring
Kent Peacock (University of Lethbridge)

In 1905 Russell drew a famous distinction between definite and indefinite descriptions. I show how it is possible to adapt Hilbert's epsilon-calculus to allow a simple way of symbolizing both kinds of descriptive phrases. Using symbolic constructs that may be called denotators we can readily represent `an F' and `the F'. This simplifies certain kinds of problem-solving in elementary first-order predicate logic, and may also simplify finding a satisfactory semantics for predicate logic (though this last suggestion remains a work in progress).

On the Ineptitude of Hope in Dealing with Climate Change
Arunkumar Rajavel (University of Victoria)

In much of the literature on the appropriate attitude towards climate change, it is averred that despite all the odds one should always have hope. In this essay, I argue that for problems as grave and as urgent as climate change, hope is not effective. I propose that we should embrace our hopeless situation and dwell in despair/mourn collectively. This collective mourning helps us make peace with the situation. One worry is that despair can deplete our agency. So, I propose that post mourning, we should act with anger. To objections that anger is an irrational and non-virtuous emotion, I argue that anger towards climate change qualifies as moral indignation which is both rational and virtuous. Thus, I present this two-step approach as the correct approach for problems as grave and as urgent as climate change.

Emotive Expertise & Moral Competence in Hume: does the true aesthetic judge need to adopt a general point of view?
Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Hume draws frequent and strong analogies between moral and aesthetic judgment. Both are grounded on sentimental responses; moral judgments are responses to beauties of character; and true taste is a virtue of character. I do not want to deny the importance of the comparison, but I do want to advise caution about assimilating aesthetic and moral normativity. I illustrate some points of difference by considering how Hume thinks we judge the characters of those who show good (or bad) aesthetic or moral judgment and what sorts of abilities go into the ability for each kind of judgment. I argue that good aesthetic judge shows a kind of special expertise that is not demanded for moral judgment and that there are good social reasons for the difference.

Rethinking Descartes's Volitional Theory of Judgment
David Scott (University of Victoria)

Descartes's account of errant judgment is central to his preoccupations with method. Descartes casts judgment generally as a function of the will (volition) rather than of the intellect or "pure" perception. On this will-perception (or judgment-intellection) distinction, judgment features as a distinct-from-the-perceptive-fact type of volitional act on our part. Despite the ubiquity of this view in his mature philosophy, I show that it may not reflect Descartes's argumentative practice and (therefore) his actual understanding of judgment. On my analysis of Meditation Four's pivotal account of error, which I conduct in the light of Meditation Two, I urge judgment to be the culmination of the (pure) mind or intellect's efforts to realize an originating, motivating interest in truth, rather than a distinct faculty in its own right.

Concepts of Wilderness
Shawn Simpson (Mississippi State University)

The U.S. Forest Service, the National Park Service, and other government agencies expend great resources on the identification, protection, and regeneration of wilderness. Many non-profit groups and activist organizations have fought and are fighting for wilderness's protection too. At times the battle over wilderness has become heated, even violent. In the age of climate change and mass species loss, the status of wilderness has become an even more important issue. At present, unfortunately, there is no widely accepted definition of wilderness being used by the various groups. Federal agencies, activist organizations, and researchers alike use different renderings of the concept of wilderness in their work, the result often being that the various parties, when they do engage, end up engaging in mere verbal disputes. This paper examines three prominent views of wilderness commonly used by these groups with the hope of narrowing down a more agreeable shared concept. In particular, I look at what are sometimes known as the folk view, the Leopold view, and the legal view of wilderness. I show that each of these views have merit and have parts worth keeping but also that each view in some way misses something special about this thing we call "wilderness". At the end of the paper, I gesture toward a way forward that combines the best of these three views.

Understanding Subversive Characteristics in Conceptual Art and Overcoming Appreciative Failure
Siranat Thamtrachai (University of Calgary)

When perceiving many contemporary artworks, art perceivers find them difficult to be appreciated because of their subversive and disturbing content, portraying distorted forms and evoking unpleasant feelings which can cause appreciative failure. Traditionally, for instance, ugliness implies a low level or even a complete absence of aesthetic value. This paper will develop an approach to understanding the nature of subversive characteristics in conceptual artworks.

This paper argues that to appreciate rebellious characters in such art is to consider beyond artistic media and forms and to appraise more on ideas and feelings that such art presented. This is because most conceptual art primarily engages art appreciators intellectually, rather than sensuously. This leads to re-thinking about beauty's meaning which is not limited to aesthetic and artistic excellence. Some discomforting emotions are means for enhancing aesthetic apprehension and semantic representation that the works express. These meanings and ideas are sources of aesthetic value.

Propositions Beyond Comprehension
Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba), Joshua Spencer (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), & Adam Murray (University of Manitoba)

We first rehearse our preferred reply to Russell's paradox for naive set theory. We then endeavor to apply lessons from that reply to the Russell-Myhill propositional paradox. We argue the key to both lies in rejecting certain sweeping principles of comprehension (roughly, principles that tell us under what conditions we have a certain "thing"--like a set or a plurality).

Towards a practical climate ethics: mapping out two approaches to guide ethical decision-making in concrete climate contexts
Anthony Voisard (Université de Sherbrooke) & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (Université de Fribourg, Environmental Sciences and Humanities Institute)

This paper discusses two approaches to climate ethics for practical reflection and decision-making in climate change governance. After a brief review of the main conceptual frameworks existing in climate ethics research, we show that none of these approaches is context specific and pluralistic enough to be of appropriate guidance in concrete local climate policy contexts. As alternatives, we present principlism as the methodology of middle-level principles and environmental pragmatist ethics. We specify their points of intersection and the possible tensions between them. We argue that the methodologies of principlism and pragmatism both offer a more pluralistic framework allowing to properly integrate real-world conditions and contexts of climate governance.

Moderate Formalist Aesthetics and Inorganic Nature

Jennifer Welchman (University of Alberta)

Nick Zangwill defends a "moderate formalist" account of the aesthetics of both human artefacts and of biological organisms, on the grounds that artefacts and organisms can exhibit a kind of nonformal beauty in addition to any formal beauty they possess, i.e. functional beauty. However, as inorganic nature is neither designed nor has evolved to perform any functions, he concludes any beauty it possesses must be purely formal. I review Zangwill's position and consider objections, including the objection that inorganic nature may possess ecological functions. Then I argue for another basis for taking a moderate formalist approach to inorganic nature, processes. Because nonaesthetic processes as well as functions can be 'beautifully' realized, moderate rather than extreme formalism is a viable approach to aesthetic appreciation of inorganic nature

Why Hume's Censure of Monkish Virtues is not Question-Begging

Ronald Wilburn (University of Calgary) & Jennifer Welchman (University of Alberta)

Hume's famously denounces the so-called monkish virtues ("celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, and solitude") in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals on the grounds that they fail a critical four-fold test. That is, such practices "serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment …on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupefy the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper."

However, critics have disputed Hume's assessment as question-begging. Hans Lottenbach argues that all Hume establishes is that he and his monkish counterparts "do not share a common notion of happiness that would allow adjudicating the question of which standard of vice and virtue we should follow." William Davie claims that "Hume's explicit formula for identifying virtues fails to justify his rejection of monkish virtue if followed without prejudice." And Annette Baier notes that "The sour may well approve of sourness, the hard-hearted of ruthlessness", etc. All three agree, in short, that Hume endeavors to settle the question of whose standard of happiness and virtue is correct, "by simply prejudging matters by using [his own] standard of judgment."

Common to these critiques is the presumption that what Hume calls the monkish virtues are approved by their possessors as immediately agreeable and/or productive of pleasure. This leads them to conclude that the point at issue between Hume and the monkish is a disagreement about what pleases. As we shall show, this is incorrect. The monkish agree with Hume that monkish practices are neither agreeable in themselves nor useful for promoting personal or social happiness. Indeed, it is because they are disagreeable that the monkish practice them.

In Praise of the Climate Leviathan
Byron Williston (Wilfrid Laurier University)

When it comes to global climate politics we can no longer afford utopianism, but succumbing to blank realism will lead to the sort of despair that can only deepen the disaster. So this is our challenge: to rethink global politics as embodying both the aspiration to succeed in the project of deep decarbonization and the realistic recognition that current economic and political forces are dead-set against this project succeeding. What possible political futures are we left with in light of this reality? In this paper, I make a two-pronged argument: (a) that there are effectively just two choices, neoliberalism and green-Keynesianism; and (b) that we should work to establish a global order instantiating green-Keynesian principles. This is the Climate Leviathan, a construct described and criticized by Mann and Wainright in their arresting book (2016). Most of my analysis here defends this political form from their attacks against it.

False Interpretive Frameworks
Michel-Antoine Xignesse (Capliano University)

Literary criticism is an ostensibly explanatory endeavour: its purpose is supposedly to elucidate the content and structure of texts. But certain strains of literary criticism eschew their explanatory responsibilities entirely, focusing instead on theorizing for the sake of theory. These false interpretive frameworks, I argue, are characteristically insensitive to truth in the real world, and exhibit routine violations of the Reality Assumption. Worse still, their primary concern is exterpretive rather than interpretive; their goal is to use stories as data-points in support of their dubious claims about the structure of the real world. I advocate, instead, for criticism to return to the stories themselves.

Defensiveness and Identity
Audrey Yap (University of Victoria) & Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)

Criticism can sometimes provoke defensive reactions, particularly when it implicates identities people hold dear. For instance, feminists told they are upholding rape culture might become angry or upset, since the criticism conflicts with an identity that is important to them. These kinds defensive reactions are a primary focus of this paper. What is it to be defensive in this way, and why do some kinds of criticism, or implied criticism, tend to provoke this kind of response? What are the connections between defensiveness, identity, and active ignorance? What are the social, political, and epistemic consequences of the tendency to defensiveness? Are there ways to improve the situation?

The Socio-functional Self
Kousaku Yui (University of British Columbia)

Existing views of the self take the individual to have metaphysical and explanatory priority. I propose a new view according to which the self is understood as a component of the social system. The animating analogy is to a node in a computer network. Without a network, there can be no node. Similarly, without a society, there can be no individual. I will argue that the view shares some of the explanatory benefits of functionalism about the mind.

Aristotle Does Not Need to Tell Me Whether I'm a Hero: Aristotle's Account of Virtue in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and What a Procrustean Endeavor in the Supererogation Literature Reveals About Our Modern Approach to Ethics
Jenna Yuzwa (Simon Fraser University)

In recent decades, there have been some attempts to demonstrate that virtue ethics can accommodate supererogation, while others have denied that the former is irreconcilable with the latter. Regardless of the stance philosophers take, they share a common assumption – that an ethical theory must be capable of justifying and explaining the moral status of a given act. This is a modern expectation and one that did not belong to Aristotle. Aristotle was instead concerned with questions about how we ought to be and how we ought to live. To expect that Aristotle's account of virtue meet the expectation of justifying and explaining the moral status of an act not only imposes an aspect of our modern conception of ethics on his thinking thereby distorting his view, but this expectation more broadly also carries the very real risk of facilitating unethical rather than ethical behavior.