

Ireland: Nationalist Ideology on the Road to Independence 1914-1922

by

Alison Hogan
BA Hons., University of Victoria, 2016

A Major Research Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of History

© Alison Hogan, 2018
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This paper may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without the permission of the author.

Supervisory Committee

Ireland: Nationalist Ideology on the Road to Independence 1914-1922

by

Alison Hogan
BA Hons., University of Victoria, 2016

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Simon Devereaux, (Department of History)
Supervisor

Dr. Mariel Grant
Departmental Member

Abstract

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Simon Devereaux, (Department of History)
Supervisor

Dr. Mariel Grant
Departmental Member

Ireland's struggle for independence from the British Empire stands out as a fertile study in the essentials of nation-state formation in the last century. This paper will explore pivotal events that shaped Irish nationalism between 1914 and 1921. The narratives that have arisen around Ireland's transition to freedom are instructive in assessing how the ideologies of nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century took shape at the turn of the twentieth. The damage sustained from the violent struggles for hegemony is still very much in evidence in the social fabric of modern Ireland, and, despite international recognition of the Republic of Ireland as an autonomous nation-state, the country remains deeply divided over race, ethnicity, religion, and the right of belonging. As Britain prepares to negotiate its exit from the European Union, Ireland's identity as a partitioned nation-state is once again drawn into sharp focus around issues of re-establishing hard borders, deepening the divide between two polities that cohabit its geographical boundaries.

Table of Contents

Supervisory Committee	ii
Abstract	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1
Origins of Dysfunction	11
Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill (1912-1914)	20
Rising to Free State (1916-1921)	29
Bibliography	47

Introduction

Carleton Hayes 1926: During the nineteenth century the tide of nationalism rose steadily. Perhaps flood tide has been reached in the Great War of the twentieth century. But who knows? The mighty surge of nationalist propaganda still booms loud.¹

* * *

Social psychologist Michael Billig, writing about nationalism in the mid-1990s, pointed to two characteristics inherent in modern nationalism: violence and belonging:

Nations do not have to pass a theoretical test of nationhood, showing that they possess some notional criterion of internal unity, whether of ethnicity, language or culture. The tests are concrete, based upon the ability to impose order and monopolize violence within established boundaries. The major test is international, for the nation will seek recognition from established nations, who, in their turn, will recognize their own nationhood in the successful new claimant.²

Ireland's struggle for independence from the British Empire stands out as a fertile study in the essentials of nation-state formation in the last century. This paper will explore pivotal events that shaped Irish nationalism between 1914 and 1921. The narratives that have arisen around Ireland's transition to freedom are instructive in assessing how the ideologies of nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century took shape at the turn of the twentieth. The damage sustained from the violent struggles for hegemony is still very much in evidence in the social fabric of modern Ireland, and, despite international recognition of the Republic of Ireland as an autonomous nation-state, the country remains deeply divided over race, ethnicity, religion, and the right of belonging. As Britain prepares to negotiate its exit from the European Union, Ireland's identity as a partitioned nation-state is once again drawn into sharp focus around issues of re-establishing hard

¹ Carleton Hayes, "What is Nationalism?? *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan 1926), 59.

² Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications Ltd. 1995), 85.

borders, deepening the divide between two polities that cohabit its geographical boundaries, and re-opening old wounds that have never really healed.

Ireland was drawn into Great Britain with the Act of Union in 1801 as a polity fraught with a “perfect storm” of contradictions, a “colony within the core.”³ As such, it invites a number of considerations within a post-colonial analysis of nationalism. My assessment of the historiography looks at some important questions that have been asked over the last fifty years, particularly with regard to recent scholarship concerning Ireland as a colonial anomaly within the broader project of the British Empire. My focus on the period between 1914 and 1922 stems from an interest in how that particular period of crisis brought the Irish Question into the realm of international relations on the global stage. It is beyond this paper’s scope to present a deep historical exploration of the many complexities of Irish government during this time, and it is not my intention to rework the ground, already covered in rich detail by historians, of the Great Famine, the Easter Rising, or the War of Independence. I will, however, consult certain press accounts, parliamentary debates, and other documents dealing with key events in an attempt to understand how they reflected public opinion regarding extant ideologies of nationalism as they related to Éire’s bid for freedom from British rule. In my assessment of the historiography, I will reference the arguments surrounding how the history of Ireland’s struggle for liberation from empire during and after the Great War impacts its current status in a postmodern world. On a side note, as a dual citizen of Canada and Éire, and great-granddaughter of both an Irish nationalist MP and a member of the Royal Irish Constabulary, I have strands of both sides of the socio-political fabric embedded in my

³ James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, “Imperialism and nationalism: The Home Rule struggle and border creation in Ireland, 1885-1925,” *Political Geography*, 26 (2007) 940.

family history. With this in mind, negotiating between the two poles in writing this narrative represents a challenging exercise in historical objectivity.

The fact that Irish Catholics were admitted to the English Parliament as participants in the democratic process in the nineteenth century was a significant milestone in the country's progress toward forming an independent nation-state. With the creation of the Republic in 1949, the Irish achieved independence by leaving the Commonwealth altogether, but the question of whether or not it arrived at that moment equipped to function as a fully-realized nation is open to debate. It was a long and turbulent journey to independence, and, as we know, the violence due to partition between North and South continued for most of the Age of Fracture and continues to reverberate today. How those ongoing tensions interact with the project of nationalism and postmodern identity formation is a topic for another paper, raising many more questions than can be answered in this one. It will be interesting to see what future historians will have to say regarding recent developments surrounding Brexit, and how they will impact Éire's position in the European Union and its relationship with the Unionist polity in the northern counties that continues to imagine itself as part of a United Kingdom.

Commenting on Ireland's colonial status in the nineteenth century, Clare Carroll refers to it as a site of "violently imposed English social, economic and political structures," Frantz Fanon's "arsenal of complexes" that were the template for Britain's

colonial endeavours throughout the empire.⁴ Brendan Bradshaw argues that Ireland represented a unique situation in that it “enjoyed a form of devolved government unknown elsewhere in the Crown’s dominions.”⁵ Paul Bew claims that the Act of Union sought to neutralize strategic concerns regarding national security, but was also intended as a tool for managing an ancient enemy and establishing “a new benign framework” for development as a progressive nation. Bew pinpoints the negotiations surrounding Catholic emancipation as the first major hurdle on the road to assimilation, as the debates at the end of the eighteenth century exposed rifts in the English body politic that caused a prime minister to clash with a recalcitrant monarch over the terms of Union before tendering his resignation.⁶ The issues that amplified dissension within the government set back the emancipation project for another two decades.⁷ However benign or optimistic the original intentions may have been, by the close of the nineteenth century the 1801 legislation was being vilified as one of the more egregious blunders in British history.⁸ Resistance to the union from both sides created conditions that retarded Ireland’s growth as a fully-fledged participant in the project of modernization, and ultimately threw the country into a state of socio-cultural schizophrenia that has never really gone away.⁹ To

⁴ Clare Carroll, “Introduction: The Nation and Postcolonial Theory,” *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*, Clare Carroll and Patricia King, eds. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 2003), 3, 12.

⁵ Brendan Bradshaw, “Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in Modern Ireland,” *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 104 (1989), 332.

⁶ Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 559.

⁷ Charles John Fedorak, “Catholic Emancipation and the Resignation of William Pitt in 1801,” *Albion, A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* (Spring 1992) Vol. 24, No. 1, 63-64.

⁸ Jeremiah MacVeagh and Winston S. Churchill, *Home Rule in a Nutshell: A Pocket Book for Speakers and Electors* (London: The Daily Chronicle 1912), 5-6.

⁹ Dennis Dworkin, ed. *Ireland and Britain 1798-1923: An Anthology of Sources* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2012), 4.

quote William Gladstone, there was “no blacker or fouler transaction in the history of man.”¹⁰

Bew enumerates possible reasons for Ireland’s developmental delay as being a failure of the English to achieve *moral hegemony*, in addition to uneven economic outcomes between the agrarian south and a more industrialized north, and the evolution of an enduring nationalist agenda that resisted the constant imposition of an uneven power dynamic.¹¹ A major complication was, of course, religious differences between the predominantly Catholic south and Ulster in the north, with Protestants and unionists forced to co-exist alongside Catholic republicans. The creation of separate nationalist/unionist discourses evolved around oversimplified binaries that portrayed the narrative of Ulster as being overwhelmingly Protestant and urban, the industrial northern powerhouse, versus the impoverished Catholic agrarian republican south. This narrative ignored historical realities that were far more complicated and difficult to unravel.¹²

In a 2006 speech commemorating the Easter Rising of 1916, Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern spoke of “two histories, separate and in conflict.”¹³ The commemoration sparked riots in Dublin as Ulster unionists attempted to parade down O’Connell Street in remembrance of Protestant victims of The Troubles of 1969. With such disparate and divisive narratives acting in opposition to one another, the question arises: was this a result of nineteenth-century Ireland being consigned to subaltern status

¹⁰ Dorothy Macardle, *The Irish Republic* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951), 39.

¹¹ Bew, 561. Catherine Hall, ed. “Introduction,” *Cultures of Empire: A Reader. Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Manchester University Press, 2000), 7.

¹² Anderson and O’Dowd, 940.

¹³ Bew, 581.

in Chakrabarty's 'waiting room of history' as a *not yet* entity, suspended indefinitely in a powerless pre-political state?¹⁴

Catherine Hall claims that nationalism is just one component of the larger project of rethinking imperial history that calls for "reconnecting race, nation, and empire."¹⁵ Hall asks that we consider Ireland's relationship with Britain as uniquely complicated in two respects: proximity and migration. Our understanding of the contingencies behind the Act of Union is enhanced when we recognize how easy it was for old enemies from the continent to access the 'back door' through Ireland.¹⁶ The Act of Union made sense in terms of holding one's enemies closer; this point was put to a critical test when relations broke down at the peak of the Conscription Crisis in 1916 with the attempted shipment of German guns destined for the Easter Rising intercepted by the British Navy, and the delivery of Roger Casement to the Irish Coast in a German submarine.¹⁷

Hall points out that nineteenth-century migrations of the Irish throughout the rest of Britain were the other side of the coin, as the post-colonial diaspora made its way to points of entry throughout the empire. Mass emigration served to export and reproduce similar problems and frictions of culture and class in the sites of settlement that resisted assimilation.¹⁸ Stephen Fielding's analysis of the Irish working class in Britain's industrial north argues against a historiographical trend that assumed that the Irish in

¹⁴ Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Idea of Provincializing Europe," *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Colonial Difference* (Princeton, 2000), 8.

¹⁵ Hall, "Introduction," 2.

¹⁶ Anderson and O'Dowd, 940-941.

¹⁷ Macardle, 152.

¹⁸ Catherine Hall, "The Rule of Difference: Gender, Class and Empire in the Making of the 1832 Reform Act" in *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century*, Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall eds. (Oxford and New York: Oxford International Publishers Ltd., 2000), 114.

Britain had begun to assimilate by 1900, claiming that such narratives fail to acknowledge the significance of an Irish Catholic presence that retained its ethnic and nationalist identity until after the Second World War.¹⁹ A distinctly Irish nationalist identity was perhaps the most significant export to the United States, a fact that came into sharp focus during Éamon De Valéra's eighteen-month-long American fundraising campaign during the height of the War of Independence.²⁰ Even there, a deep socio-political divide threatened to derail his best efforts at achieving unanimity of purpose at every turn.²¹

Despite the resilience of Irish identity overseas, Brendan Bradshaw writes that the development of a self-conscious national historiography did not really get under way in Ireland itself until the mid-1930s with the establishment of a national archives, the formation of the Irish Historical Society, and the launch of *Irish Historical Studies* as an outlet for new scholarship emanating from British universities.²² In addition, the Irish Folklore Commission undertook major initiatives to collect oral histories and other material after the declaration of the Irish Free State in 1921.²³ This cultural turn occurred concurrently with the country's tumultuous transition from Free State to full independence from Britain in 1949. It was amplified by the hardships heaped upon neutral Ireland after Britain severed diplomatic relations and (with the exception of

¹⁹ Steven Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholics in England, 1880-1939* (Buckingham: Open University Press 1993), 2-3. Enda Delaney, "Our island story? Towards a transnational history of late modern Ireland," *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 148 (November 2011), 613-614.

²⁰ Macardle, 309-324.

²¹ Troy D. Davis, "Eamon de Valera's Political Education: The American Tour of 1919-20," *New Hibernia Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2006), 70.

²² Bradshaw, 334.

²³ Cormac O Grada, *Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999), 195.

relenting on the issue of providing wheat and coal to the Guinness brewery) cut supply lines during the Second World War.²⁴ However, this historical self-consciousness remained confined within a very narrow frame until the mid-1990s. (State archives were not made generally available to historians until 1966.)²⁵

The remarkable endurance of the Orange Order's annual commemoration of the Battle of the Boyne is another example of how self-conscious nationalism is continually reproduced in an entity seemingly resistant to the homogenizing influence of modernity. With Theresa May courting the Unionist vote in the midst of Brexit negotiations, the Democratic Unionist Party is once again lining up against Sinn Féin in a standoff for the power position, and the bickering over such seemingly banalities as the rights to parade reflects deeper and more troubling aspects of an anachronistic world view:

Parading disputes, like the conflict in general, represent a fundamental disagreement between two nationalities about identity, territory, belonging, and control.

...

A central irony of contemporary British politics is that the people and party most obsessively committed to preserving the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland are entirely out of step with the rest of the union's political culture. The DUP's stout defense of parades and the identity they represent reveals that it is principally a parochial party, concerned with local, rather than national, issues, and holding a local, rather than national, sense of the nation's identity.²⁶

The very fact that violent paramilitary posturing still happens in modern Ireland typifies an historical myopia that has the power to provoke more violence and deeper divisions in an already deeply divided society.

²⁴ Bryce Evans, "'A Pint of Plain is Your Only Man': How Guinness Saved Ireland During the Emergency," *History Ireland*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (September/October 2014), 36.

²⁵ John M. Regan, "Irish Public Histories as an Historiographical Problem," *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 146 (November 2010), 270.

²⁶ *The Atlantic*, "What a Protestant Parade Reveals About Theresa May's New Partners," 11 July 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/protestant-parade-northern-ireland/533151/> (Accessed March 30, 2018).

Christine Kinealy notes that the negotiation of a 1994 cease-fire was instrumental in freeing native Irish historians from an oppressive revisionist national narrative that had been cemented into place within a very limited historiography, particularly around “sanitized” versions of traditional Famine narratives that glossed over atrocities or elided any less-than-noble intentions of the British élite.²⁷ As national preparations for commemoration of the Great Famine began in 1994, troubling questions arose around authenticity, agency and voice.²⁸ With political suppression of anti-British voices temporarily suspended by the peace process (bombing would resume in London in 1996), historians, some of whom were funded by the government, seized the opportunity to embark upon fresh forays into the archives in order to address the lopsided revisionism that had held sway for so long. Kinealy notes that it was at this point that historians also began to examine old assumptions about the behaviours of Irish Catholic landowners in the same period.

The fact that it took until the 1990s to arrive at a place where academics felt safe enough to rework old stories and bring uncomfortable truths into the light speaks to the argument that at the end of the twentieth century Ireland remained in a kind of post-colonial limbo that hinders the development of a true national identity. Indeed, as late as 1993 there was still a remarkable degree of ambiguity surrounding Ireland’s status as a nation, highlighted by some awkward royal protocol surrounding what to call Irish president Mary Robinson on her landmark official visit with Queen Elizabeth.²⁹ Ireland’s

²⁷ Christine Kinealy, *The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion* (New York: Palgrave 2002), 4.

²⁸ David Lloyd, “Colonial Trauma/Postcolonial Recovery?” *Interventions*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), 220.

²⁹ John Coakley, “‘Irish Republic’, ‘Eire’ or ‘Ireland’? The Contested Name of John Bull’s Other Island,” *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January-March 2009), 49-50.

ties with Britain may never be completely undone, but the transition to independence for Éire at the turn of the twentieth century was a defining moment in the history of the relationship. The surviving polities of that moment represent a bundle of contradictions within a fractured society cohabiting a partitioned state, forever grappling with the complications arising from 700 years of conflict and subjugation.

Origins of Dysfunction

The violence that periodically erupted in the nineteenth century from bitter religious and ideological differences served to hinder Ireland's entry into the modern age of liberalism, based on standards of individualism, liberty, and property as defined by Ian McKay.³⁰ By the 1840s, with the country decimated by famine, emigration, and the subsequent destruction of much of its domestic infrastructure, it had become clear that Ireland was going to be Britain's problem child. A growing electorate under Daniel O'Connell pursued its own agenda, driven by a very different understanding of liberty as winning independence from a British state that had been engaging in "criminal misgovernment" for centuries.³¹ Kinealy argues that optimistic liberals saw the post-Famine period as an opportunity for overhauling social relations that had fallen into a pattern of inertia between an unmotivated peasantry and landholders who had taken no initiative in making improvements to their properties.³² Land reforms were intended to restart the engines with the application of the energies of a new class of commercial farmers and an injection of English capital to revive a decimated economy.³³ The market was left to its own devices in the belief that the Irish would finally begin to respond to the potential benefits of progressive liberalism, and that any interference would be

³⁰ Ian McKay, "The Nationalism: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review* Vol. 81, No. 4 (December 2000), 623-624.

³¹ Laurence Ginnell, *The Irish Republic. Why? Official Statement Prepared for Submission to the Peace Conference* (New York: Friends of Irish Freedom 1919), 60.

³² Kinealy, 19.

³³ Dworkin, 6.

counterproductive.³⁴ How then did the mechanisms of the free market fail to hasten the modernization of Irish society through tried-and-true methods of economic stimulus?

Joe Cleary offers an explanation in his Marxist analysis of the Famine as an economic disaster that severely retarded the development of an urban working class. He argues that the exodus of a young generation of more mobile Irish to the more prosperous areas of Britain and Europe left a vestigial rural peasantry that remained “the revolutionary motor of social change.”³⁵ An efflorescence of Gaelic culture after 1890 saw a conscious revival of Irish language, literature, and the arts that further undermined the British project of assimilation and gave shape to the nationalist agenda of Sinn Féin, who ultimately pronounced the Anglo-Norman conquest a failure.³⁶ The power and persistence of linguistic and cultural memory that defied every attempt at eradication became very clear with the election of Éamon De Valéra in 1917, when “[o]ld men and women who had never before ventured to a polling booth came down from remote cabins on July 10 to vote.”³⁷

In Cleary’s analysis, the socio-economic repercussions of the Famine represented an unprecedented and utterly unanticipated disruption of the British imperial agenda. The conundrum was further complicated by the fact that the Irish were now embedded within the British state and, as such, could not be denied their rights to full participation in the

³⁴ Cormac O Grada, *Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999), 6.

³⁵ Joe Cleary, “‘Misplaced Ideas’?: Colonialism, Location, and Dislocation in Irish Studies,” 40, and David Lloyd, “After History: Historicism and Postcolonial Studies,” *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*, 56.

³⁶ Ginnell, 23.

³⁷ Macardle, 224.

democratic process.³⁸ Despite these developments, the British public, reluctant to embrace the fact of a shared identity as imperial subjects, remained at odds with the idea that the Irish would ever be their equals.³⁹ In any assessment of Irish historiography, the question of race inevitably arises. How did the British government justify the subjugation and exploitation of a country populated by whites? What undercurrents were percolating beneath the surface of a rapidly modernizing society that made racism directed at whites so acceptable?

Stephen Fielding notes that anti-Irish sentiment was an offshoot of a general disdain for Celts that had its origins in the Norman Conquest, and was sustained in cultural discourses that portrayed them as “primitive, violent, tribal, and backward.”⁴⁰ Ireland’s recalcitrant rejection of assimilation and the relentless demand for Home Rule set the stage for continued vilification after 1800.⁴¹ Anne Laura Stoler argues that British imagery of the Irish as racially distinct had been circulating since the seventeenth century.⁴² This was certainly evident at the end of the eighteenth century: in *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature*, L. Perry Curtis quotes John Pinkerton writing (in 1797) that the Irish “...have been savages since the world began, and will be forever savages, *not yet advanced even to a state of barbarism.*” [emphasis added]⁴³

³⁸ Paul A. Townsend, “Between Two Worlds: Irish Nationalists and Imperial Crisis 1879-1880,” *Past and Present*, No. 194 (February 2007), 141.

³⁹ Cleary, 42.

⁴⁰ Fielding, 8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴² Ann Laura Stoler, “Cultivating Bourgeois Bodies and Racial Selves,” *Cultures of Empire*, 105.

⁴³ L. Perry Curtis, *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press 1971), 95.

Luke Gibbons notes that these perceptions of the Irish as not even having “the redeeming qualities of the noble savage” continued well into the nineteenth century.⁴⁴

The racist discourse was magnified by an intense ancestral fear and loathing of Catholicism, which Catherine Hall notes was sustained within the Protestant population while simultaneously diminishing within government circles in the years leading up to the Reform Act of 1832. Hall notes the repercussions of Catholic Emancipation in 1829:

...the figure of the Irish rebel continued to haunt the English imagination. Irish Catholics were both within and without the nation: some were political citizens but their subjecthood was framed by Irishness, their forms of cultural belonging to that nation strictly limited.⁴⁵

There is no denying that the Irish, in addition to confronting overt racism, faced barriers to full inclusion in terms of cultural belonging, a notion reinforced by Stephen Fielding’s observation that “hostility to the Catholic Church was one of the first defining qualities of modern ‘Englishness’ shared by all members of society.”⁴⁶ To the Protestant mind, religion was the keystone of progress and national identity.⁴⁷ With cultural memories of the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution so imbricated in the fabric of English life, it is no wonder that the inclusion of Irish Catholics into the body politic would be reviled by the descendants of the Ulster plantation. Despite its inequitable distribution of the franchise in Ireland *vis-a-vis* the rest of Britain, we can consider the 1832 Reform Act to

⁴⁴ Luke Gibbons, “Race Against Time: Racial Discourse and Irish History,” *Cultures of Empire*, 209.

⁴⁵ Catherine Hall, “The Rule of Difference,” 117.

⁴⁶ Steven Fielding, *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholics in England, 1880-1939* (Buckingham: Open University Press 1993), 6.

⁴⁷ Bew, 103.

be a pivotal moment in the project of bringing the colonial population into the fold of ‘civilization.’⁴⁸

As extensions of the franchise proceeded to rearrange the political landscape throughout the nineteenth century, emergent fields of anthropological study added fuel to Ulster’s hatred of the Catholic ‘other.’ The reformist agenda co-existed with widely-held views that the Irish race was irredeemable, incapable of achieving even the lowest order of the anthropological minimum required for civilization.⁴⁹ The publication of John Beddoe’s *The Races of Britain* in 1862 provided pseudo-scientific justification for these theories, placing Celts in the Cromagnon/Africanoid category: “Though the head is large, intelligence is low, and there is a great deal of cunning and suspicion.”⁵⁰ British paranoia regarding Irish nationalists reached a fever pitch with the Phoenix Park murders of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Thomas Henry Burke in 1882, an event characterized by one British magistrate as “a crime almost unparalleled in the annals of civilization.”⁵¹ At this juncture, the British public’s revulsion intensified to the point where caricatures turned to representing “Paddy” as Frankenstein.⁵² With Charles Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) exercising its considerable muscle as a bloc in Westminster after 1885, such overt racism began to conflict with political and social realities that would form the basis of Anglo-Irish relations in the progression toward Home Rule and, ultimately, independence

⁴⁸ Hall, “The Rule of Difference,” 117.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁵⁰ John Beddoe, *The Races of Britain: A Contribution to the Anthropology of Western Europe* (London: Trübner and Co. 1885), 10-11.

⁵¹ “The Assassinations in Dublin,” *The Times*, 12 May 1882, 10. In the interests of balanced reporting, *The Times* included an explanatory excerpt from *The Irishman* that hinted that the killers were perhaps driven by perfectly justifiable ancestral rage.

⁵² Curtis, 38.

for the Republic. Joe Cleary argues that a key problem was that equality and liberty for the Irish were consistently perceived as a threat to the very structure of the Empire. This reinforces the idea that there was a power structure in place that would never be anything but a colonial one.⁵³

Despite further electoral reforms in 1867 and 1885 which increased the Irish franchise to 700,000 as a ‘peasant deluge’ joined the ranks, race and ethnicity continued to problematize Anglo-Irish relations.⁵⁴ The pot that had simmered throughout the nineteenth century boiled over with the Lords’ refusal to pass the budget in 1909, precipitating an election. The Liberal government returned to power with a hair’s-breadth majority and the backing of the IPP in December of 1910.⁵⁵ The trade-off was to be Home Rule for Ireland, and the vehicle for making it a reality – the Parliament Act of 1911 – challenged the ancestral authority of a House of Lords heavily weighted with Unionists.⁵⁶ Conservative outrage was palpable during debate on the third passage of the bill:

THE EARL OF HALSBURY: ...[i]t is suggested that His Majesty has been applied to, and has agreed to make as many Peers as will be necessary to force this Bill through the House. I want to deal plainly in this matter, and I say that that is a gross violation of Parliamentary decency.

...

⁵³ Cleary, 43.

⁵⁴ F. Hugh O’Donnell, *A History of the Irish Parliamentary Party*, (London: Longmans Green & Co. 1910), 189-90. O’Donnell characterized the Irish electorate as “mainly composed of the most uninstructed multitude to be found in Western Europe ... the risen tide of the enfranchised bogtrotters and clodhoppers.” This type of language coming from a British-born Irish MP highlights further divisions related to class consciousness which served to complicate the nationalist project even further.

⁵⁵ “The Polls,” *The Times*, 20 December 1910, 7.

⁵⁶ Philip Norton, “Resisting the Inevitable? The Parliament Act 1911,” *Parliamentary History*, Vol. 31, Part 3 (2012), 449-450.

I do not believe the people of the country understand what is going on in Parliament. They do not know that the Constitution of the country is in peril.⁵⁷

The Marquess of Londonderry was unequivocal on the issue of Home Rule:

We have always asserted, and we assert again, that a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland will mean ruin, bankruptcy, and, in all probability, civil war.⁵⁸

How, then, did Irish nationalists set about breaking the chokehold of British rule and initiating divorce proceedings? The path toward independence was littered with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, the most difficult being the notion that partition was the only way forward. It was partition that exposed the most bitter divisions in the negotiations surrounding Home Rule after the turn of the century, given the necessity not only of accommodating the deeply ingrained allegiances of nationalists and unionists, but also of navigating between the complicated and often conflicting self-identification of Catholic unionists living in the south and Protestant nationalists living in the north:

Given the confrontation between unionists and nationalists/Sinn Féin, there was no realistic alternative to partition in 1920. A 32-county state, run from Dublin, with an oath of allegiance, would almost certainly have found itself facing, as Tom Garvin has written, ‘not one but two civil wars, one in Munster and another in Ulster’. As it was, the early years of both Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State were marked by violence and a strong challenge to the legitimacy of the two governments.⁵⁹

Further complications arose from deep divisions within the Catholic Church that highlighted two very separate agendas that had arisen around land ownership:

The ultramontane faction favoured gradual and constitutional land reform and movement toward national independence; Catholic clergy operating within the Gallican tradition of Irish patriotism supported more radical land reform and complete separation from Britain.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ *Hansard*, House of Lords Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 9, 20 July 1911, 594-595.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 601.

⁵⁹ Brian M. Walker, *A Political History of the Two Irelands: From Partition to Peace*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), xi-xii, 7.

⁶⁰ Anne Kane, “Narratives of Nationalism: Constructing Irish National Identity during the Land War, 1879-82,” *National Identities*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 246.

The baffling complexities of the Irish Question returned to the stage as Parliament prepared for a final attempt at implementing Home Rule in 1912. The opposition began to rally in Belfast on 5 January, where Unionist leader Sir Edward Carson campaigned before a large contingent of Ulstermen. A personal account conveys a sense of the building tensions:

They marched past Sir Edward Carson, who stood close to a county monument erected to the Tyrone men who fell in the Boer War, and as I watched them file past in disciplined array and studied the hard, angular faces breathing resolution and affording such a marked contrast to the softer and rounder features of the Celtic South ... one felt that one was in the presence of a depth of conviction far beyond argument and even in a sense beyond expression, something entirely different from the displays of mere party feeling to which we are accustomed in England, an elemental force of dangerously explosive character. ... These people mean business...⁶¹

A crowd estimated at 100,000 gathered in Dublin to hear an eloquent speech from IPP leader John Redmond on 31 March. Special trains were laid on from all over the country to bring people to the city, including 18 from Ulster, and 150 bands played ‘A nation once again’ throughout the day.⁶² Redmond acknowledged the factions within the nationalist movement and issued a clear warning:

There are two sections of us – one that would be content to remain under the British Government in our own land, another that never paid, and never will pay, homage to the King of England. I am of the latter, and everyone knows it. But I should think myself a traitor to my country if I did not answer the summons of this gathering, for it is clear to me that the Bill which we support today will be for the good of Ireland and that we will be stronger with it than without it. ... Let us unite and win a good Act from the British; I think it can be done. But if we are tricked this time, there is a party in Ireland, and I am one of them, that will advise the Gael to have no counsel or dealings with the Gall [the foreigner] for ever again, but to answer them henceforward with a strong hand and the sword’s edge. *Let the Gall understand that if we are cheated once more there will be red war with Ireland.*⁶³ [emphasis added]

⁶¹ “Unionist Cause in Ireland,” *The Times*, 6 January 1912, 5.

⁶² “Dublin Home Rule Demonstration,” *The Times*, 1 April 1912, 8.

⁶³ Macardle, 82.

The following week in Belfast, Andrew Bonar Law addressed a massive unionist rally

...larger than the whole white population of South Africa. It is no light thing to endeavour to thrust such a body of our fellow-citizens out of the place which they have inherited with us in the British Constitution, and to impose upon them a domination which they abhor.⁶⁴

Bonar Law exhorted the crowd to hold fast to the unionist ideal by remembering their shared history: “You hold the pass for the empire. You are besieged. Let the picture of the past, the glorious past with which you are familiar, rise again before your eyes.”⁶⁵ It would be two more years before the Home Rule Bill made its way through three sessions in the House of Commons and two in the House of Lords. By the time it received royal assent in 1914, Britain was on the brink of joining a war that would rearrange the international landscape amid unprecedented bloodletting at home and abroad. Ireland’s ‘red war’ had only just begun.

⁶⁴ “The Ulster Unionists,” *The Times*, 9 April 1912, 7.

⁶⁵ “Solemnly Promise to Fight Home Rule,” *New York Times*, 10 April 1912, 4.

Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill (1912-1914)

One of the most contentious pieces of legislation in modern British history, the Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bill, was tabled in the House of Commons on 11 April 1912 by Liberal leader Herbert Asquith. Terms of the Bill had been the subject of a controversial and highly-charged meeting in Belfast between Redmond and Winston Churchill in February, although Redmond was not made privy to the details until debate began in the House. The *Daily Mail*, reporting on the opening of Parliament a few days later, noted:

This is to be above all a Home Rule session. None the less the odds are about 10 to 1 that it will end without Home Rule. Even if the Nationalist Party in the House of Commons can be brought to swallow something which is certainly not the Home Rule of which Mr. Parnell dreamed, Mr. Redmond's supporters in Ireland have still to be reckoned with. ... Home Rule is not a winning horse.⁶⁶

The text of Asquith's preamble made a best effort at persuasion. He reviewed the trajectory of the two previous Home Rule Bills that had failed to pass during William Gladstone's ministries, noted the slim Unionist majority in Ulster, and remarked upon the extraordinary persistence of the desire of the Irish to govern themselves against all odds:

From the first moment the Irish people was granted an articulate political voice it pronounced by a majority of four to one of its representatives in favour of Home Rule.

...

Taking Ulster as a whole, the province of Ulster is represented at this moment, how? By seventeen Unionists and sixteen Home Rulers.

These figures in themselves are quite sufficient to show the misleading character of the pretence that Ulster would die rather than accept Home Rule.

...we will not admit, the right of a minority of the people, and relatively a small minority - particularly when every possible care is being taken to safeguard their special interests and susceptibilities - to veto the verdict of the vast body of their countrymen. That verdict, I say again, is to-day as emphatic as it was twenty-five years ago. And if you refuse to recognize it, you are refusing to recognise the

⁶⁶ "The Promise of the New Session," *Daily Mail*, 12 February 1912, 4.

deliberate constitutional demands of the vast majority of the nation, repeated and ratified...

Sir C. KINLOCH COOKE: *What nation?* [emphasis added]

The Prime Minister: What nation? The Irish nation - repeated and ratified time after time during the best part of the life of a generation.⁶⁷

The interjection by the Conservative MP on the use of the term tells us that Asquith's characterization of an Irish 'nation' was somewhat premature and still extremely problematical. In his preface to *Home Rule in a Nutshell*, Winston Churchill depicted nationalism (or 'nationality' with a capital "N") as emanating from the spiritual plane, intimating that to deny Ireland her right to independence would be a violation of the natural order of things:

The spirit of Nationality demands self-government, and that spirit cannot be eradicated. Nationality may be only a sentiment, but sentiment rules the world, and no wise statesman seeks to ignore it. Centuries of oppression have failed to suppress Irish Nationality, it has spoken from the battlefield, from the felon's cell, from the scaffold, from the platform, from the ballot-box, from the Senate. The impulse of Nationality comes from higher than earthly powers, and is indestructible.⁶⁸

Such rhetoric is reflective of late nineteenth-century ideas of nationalism promulgated by romanticists who regarded the nation as "a living soul, a spiritual principle," with a heroic past that constitutes the social capital of shared sacrifice.⁶⁹ Romanticism aside, the record would suggest that Britain's agenda in the Home Rule question was primarily fiscal self-preservation, seeking "emancipation from local cares and local burdens of the Imperial Parliament."⁷⁰ In other words, the increasingly untenable burden of managing a complex matrix of local governments, particularly in Ireland, was simply becoming too expensive

⁶⁷ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 36, 11 April 1912, 1401.

⁶⁸ MacVeagh and Churchill, 3.

⁶⁹ Ernest Renan, *What Is a Nation?* 11 March 1882, 80-81.

⁷⁰ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 36, 11 April 1912, 1403.

and cumbersome. In Churchill's view, "Commons is overwhelmed with unsifted business," and Home Rule was the only sensible solution to the problem.⁷¹

Asquith unveiled the proposal to relieve the purported parliamentary congestion and held up examples of successful self-government among the dominions to bolster his argument.⁷² Redmond reiterated the theme and stated his case for Home Rule as a panacea against separatism:

We on these benches stand precisely where Parnell stood. We want peace with this country. We deny that we are separatists, and we say we are willing, as Parnell was willing, to accept a subordinate Parliament created by Statute of this Imperial Legislature, as a final settlement of Ireland's claims.⁷³

Viscount Castlereagh denied parliamentary congestion was a valid reason for Home Rule and claimed that Asquith was being disingenuous and merely catering to the Nationalist bloc to retain his majority. Castlereagh was convinced that it would be a major blunder to disrupt the *status quo* just as "prospering prosperous Ireland" was beginning to reap the fruits of the Union, and he argued that the main problem with the Bill was that it ignored the elephant in the room, the socio-political realities of the Irish polity that precluded the creation of a single nationality:

If there is any force in the argument that expression should be given to a separate nationality *we must realise that there are two races and two creeds in Ireland*, and the same argument which urges the Government to grant to Nationalists the self-government which they desire must also give force to the argument that self-government should also be granted to the individuals who live in the north of Ireland.⁷⁴ [emphasis added]

⁷¹ MacVeagh and Churchill, iv.

⁷² *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 36, 11 April 1912, 1426.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 1443, 1445.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 1465.

Captain Craig, the Unionist architect of the Ulster Covenant, denounced the Bill as a travesty:

I say that under no circumstances whatsoever shall we who have control of certain parts of Ulster accept this Bill, or submit to it when it is passed under a shattered Constitution secured by trickery from the country while it was blind to the mad rush you were making at the time.⁷⁵

Unionists evicted two thousand Catholic workers from the Belfast shipyards that summer, and half a million loyalists signed the Covenant and Declaration denouncing Home Rule in September as Sir Edward Carson's Ulster Volunteer Force drilled in the streets of Belfast.⁷⁶ As Home Rule made its way through endless months of torturous debate, battle lines were being drawn. By the spring of 1914, Ulster was at breaking point.⁷⁷

The King's Speech on 10 February expressed concern about the possibility that failure to equitably resolve the Irish Question could result in "grave future difficulties."⁷⁸ During debate on the Government of Ireland Bill the following day, Carson remarked upon the speech and issued an ominous warning:

I doubt if the House has yet realised, or if the country has realised, the unparalleled gravity of the statement in the Gracious Speech from the Throne. I venture to think that in the political life of no Member of this House has such a grave statement been made with reference to the domestic relations of fellow citizens of the United Kingdom.⁷⁹

...

I hope peace may continue to the end. I know and have weighed all the horrors that civil commotion may bring. It will not be my fault if resistance becomes necessary, but, Mr. Speaker, on my conscience I shall not refuse to join it.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Ibid., 1481.

⁷⁶ Macardle, 85-86.

⁷⁷ M.L. Connelly, "The Army, the Press and the 'Curragh Incident,' March 1914," *Historical Research*, Vol. 84, No. 225 (August 2011), 539.

⁷⁸ *Hansard*, House of Lords Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 15, 10 February 1914, 3.

⁷⁹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 58, 11 February 1914, 169.

⁸⁰ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 58, 11 February 1914, 179.

The King's fears of a Home Rule backlash were soon realized. Following a security conference in London on 18 and 19 March, amid rumours of mass resignations of officers stationed at the Curragh camp, the main base of British military forces in Ulster, General Sir Arthur Paget issued orders to move more troops into Ireland in the interests of protecting supply depots and barracks.⁸¹ Carson was welcomed back to Belfast on 20 March by an enthusiastic crowd of Ulster Volunteers; the *Daily Mail* reported that "in the excitement, revolver shots were fired," and *The Times* noted that guards at the Curragh had been issued carbines and ammunition in place of lances and swords, such preparations being "to an extent unprecedented since Fenian days." Both Carson and Redmond appealed for calm, and a Nationalist parade was cancelled in the interests of averting a major incident.⁸²

Paget arrived in Dublin and informed his officers that those residing in Belfast who objected to Home Rule could withdraw from participating in quelling any disturbances; others were given two hours to decide whether or not to accept an ultimatum to follow orders or risk dismissal and forfeiture of their pensions.⁸³ The crisis deepened with proliferating rumours and confusion regarding troop movements and impending military action against the north.⁸⁴ Lloyd George was quoted in *The Times* accusing Ulster of being "the spoilt child of Ireland" and calling the Home Rule crisis

⁸¹ Connelly, 539.

⁸² "The Bullying of Ulster," *Daily Mail*, 21 March 1914, 5. "The Army and Ulster," *The Times*, 21 March 1914, 8.

⁸³ Connelly, 539.

⁸⁴ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 60, 23 March 19 1914, 71-72, 396-397.

“the greatest issue raised in this country since the days of the Stuarts.”⁸⁵ Deeply disturbed by the news, George V summoned his ministers and officers to Buckingham Palace to get to the heart of the matter, and Asquith’s government managed to explain the crisis away by attributing it to an unfortunate misunderstanding.⁸⁶ The fallout from the Curragh incident resonated among diplomatic circles and raised questions about the integrity of the British armed forces. It also attracted international attention, with sympathetic Unionists prepared to send reinforcements from Canada and Australia in the event of civil war.⁸⁷

After the defeat of the second passage of the Bill by the Lords, the contentious debate resumed in the House on 21 May. Prior to the vote on 25 May, IPP leader William O’Brien elucidated the dilemma:

If this Bill ever becomes an Act, it will be borne with a rope round its neck. ... It blots out the name of Irish nationality. ... If you pass this Bill without the amending or rather repealing Bill, it will be a farce too great for words, because you know you cannot enforce it until you have got 40,000 or 50,000 rifles out of the hands of the Ulster Volunteers, and everybody, I hope, even the First Lord of the Admiralty, now know that that is a practical impossibility. Even if it were otherwise, your beating down of Ulster would be a disastrous blow. On the other hand, if you only pass this Bill at practically the same time at which you pass the amending Bill, destroying it in its most vital principles well, then, let us drop this canting pretext that you are really satisfying the national claims and aspirations of Ireland by splitting the country up into two rival and hostile States, when you will have not less than three minorities in a state of discontent and anger and revolt instead of as at present one minority.⁸⁸

Asquith’s Amending Bill, which temporarily excluded Ulster from the terms of the legislation, passed in the House of Lords on 8 July. Final negotiations at Buckingham

⁸⁵ “Mr. Lloyd George on the Crisis,” *The Times*, 23 March 1914, 10.

⁸⁶ “Crisis in the Army,” *The Times*, 23 March 1914, 8.

⁸⁷ Ibid. Jerome aan de Wiel, “1914: What will the British do? The Irish Home Rule Crisis in the July Crisis,” *The International History Review*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (2015), 665-666.

⁸⁸ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 63, 25 May 1914, 88.

Palace later that month ended in yet another impasse, just as Austria was preparing to declare war on Serbia.⁸⁹

Britain entered the war in August with Asquith's proclamation in the House:

We are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith by the arbitrary will of a stronger and overmastering power.⁹⁰

A Suspensory Act was passed on 15 September which effectively postponed the enactment of Home Rule for a period of twelve months or the duration of the war, whichever period was longer.⁹¹ During the debate on that measure, O'Brien drew comparisons to Poland as he restated the nationalist objections to partition.⁹² An article in *The Economist* also speculated that partition would violate the principles of European nationalism and self-determination, the very principles over which the war was about to be fought.⁹³ The Home Rule Bill received Royal Assent on 18 September, and was finally passed just before Christmas.⁹⁴ The outcome would spell the beginning of the end of Redmond's political career, and Asquith's words would subsequently become the battle cry of Irish nationalists in the quest to achieve recognition as an autonomous polity on the international stage.

⁸⁹ Macardle, 106-116. aan de Wiel, 667.

⁹⁰ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 65, 6 August 1914, 289.

⁹¹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 66, 15 September 1914, 920.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 915.

⁹³ "The Home Rule Bill," *The Economist*, Issue 3708, 19 September 1914, 483.

⁹⁴ Macardle, 118.

Rising to Free State (1914-1921)

In the years leading up to the Great War, Ireland had begun to recover from the demographic effects of decades of famine and migration, a factor that gave fresh energy to the nationalist cause.

For generations there had not been so many young men in Ireland at one time. An increase in prosperity among Irish farmers and stoppage of emigration owing to the war as well as their own desire to serve in the national movement had kept them at home. 200,000 of military age and fine physique were organizing resistance to British rule.⁹⁵

In spite of the Suspensory Bill, the long-awaited passage of Home Rule set the tone for the rest of the war years, lighting a match to a powder keg of pent-up patriotism.

Unionists reacted with demonstrations and drills in a show of force that ramped up tensions all over the country. In Ulster, Carson's UVF had become an extremely well-organized and well-armed contingent thanks to the addition to its arsenal of 20,000 Austrian-made rifles acquired in a gun-running operation that encountered no interference from British authorities in the spring of 1914.⁹⁶

Republican Volunteers were less well-equipped, and their movements were closely watched by the RIC and reported to Dublin Castle. On 26 July, Irish Volunteers marching into Dublin with a cache of rifles landed at Howth were confronted by a large contingent of police backed by 160 soldiers from the King's Own Scottish Borderers.⁹⁷ After a brief skirmish, in which some of the local constabulary refused to participate, the Volunteers escaped, and, as the regiment returned to Dublin, soldiers fired into a large

⁹⁵ Macardle, 236.

⁹⁶ aan de Wiel, 663.

⁹⁷ *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 65, 27 July 1914, 935.

crowd of people hurling stones. Three men and a woman died from gunshot wounds, and many more were injured.⁹⁸ The “Bachelor’s Walk” incident, as it came to be called, drew considerable heat in Parliament and amplified the intense resentment of nationalist Ireland against the British military presence in their midst. As the dead were laid to rest with elaborate public funerals, “the sense of being a conquered people whose country was occupied by enemy forces was acutely brought home.”⁹⁹

The subsequent outbreak of international hostilities ironically proved to be a welcome distraction, bringing about a temporary *détente* as Redmond spoke hopefully of a united Irish effort in a common patriotic cause.¹⁰⁰ Despite the enthusiastic enlistment of thousands of young Irishmen into the British Expeditionary Forces, the imposition of war measures at home added fuel to smouldering resentments that would explode into insurrection in 1916. As the history of the Easter Rising has been well documented by historians, a brief summary of events will suffice here.

British wartime paranoia about Irish collusion with Germany was not altogether unfounded, particularly given Volunteers treasurer Roger Casement’s overtures to the Chancellor over the winter of 1914 regarding equipping and transporting a brigade of Irish prisoners of war “as a free gift to the cause of Irish independence.”¹⁰¹ By 1915, the British government was caught in a delicate balancing act between maintaining order in Ireland and placating Redmond’s nationalists in the interests of encouraging enlistment, a situation that required officials at Dublin Castle to refrain from cracking down on the

⁹⁸ “Fighting in Dublin,” *The Times*, 27 July 1914, 9.

⁹⁹ Macardle, 115.

¹⁰⁰ *Hansard*, Fifth Series, Vol. 65, 3 August 1914, 1828-1829.

¹⁰¹ Macardle, 128.

increasingly bold activities of Sinn Féin.¹⁰² Conscription was implemented in Britain in January of 1916 with an exemption for Ireland that incensed the Unionists; Carson labelled it “an insult and humiliation to the loyal and patriotic population of that country.”¹⁰³

By March the waiting game was intensifying, with Volunteers openly drilling in the countryside and conducting mock raids in Dublin. Under the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), concrete evidence of ‘hostile association’ was required in order to prosecute for sedition. With the RIC effectively embedded as an impressively efficient network of informants throughout the country, authorities conducted raids, dismantled printing presses, and arrested individuals without cause as war measures became more draconian.¹⁰⁴ At an Irish Race Convention in New York City, Friends of Irish Freedom declared its mission to bring international attention to the situation in Ireland by taking a delegation to the post-war peace conference.¹⁰⁵ In Dublin, plans were made to meet a German boat carrying a shipment of guns to be delivered on Easter Sunday, with the intention of holding the city long enough to achieve belligerent status and thus be eligible for a place at the table in Paris.¹⁰⁶

The delivery of weapons for the Rising was scuppered by miscommunications that resulted in an intervention by the British Navy, and the arrest of Roger Casement in a

¹⁰² Macardle, 130-131.

¹⁰³ “The Compulsion Bill,” *The Times*, 5 January 1916, 9.

¹⁰⁴ Macardle, 144.

¹⁰⁵ “Hours of Oration for Irish Freedom,” *New York Times*, 6 March 1916, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Macardle, 156-157.

field in Tralee after his arrival on a German submarine.¹⁰⁷ This was the evidence British authorities needed to invoke martial law throughout Ireland, and it was their license to subsequently deliver the harshest of consequences to the leaders of the Rising.¹⁰⁸ Over six days, the conflict reduced Dublin to what one observer called “Ypres-on-the-Liffey,” leaving three hundred dead and over a thousand wounded, including two hundred civilian bystanders. General John Maxwell, dispatched from London to impose martial law, issued a statement indicating that punishments for any further insurrection would be severe.¹⁰⁹ On 3 May the firing squads began with three of the signatories to the Proclamation of the Republic, Padraic Pearse, Thomas MacDonagh and Thomas Clarke, and continued until 10 May when a stay of execution was granted to two commandants who were the last to be arrested, Thomas Ashe and Éamon De Valéra. Aside from the fourteen executions, the Rising resulted in 73 sentences of penal servitude, six of hard labour, and 1,706 deportations.¹¹⁰

Asquith was called to task over the government’s secrecy surrounding the proceedings, and the public became increasingly disturbed by rumours and speculation.¹¹¹ MP John Dillon noted that the end result of the summary executions would be to intensify anti-British sentiment amongst the Irish population and turn the tide in favour of the nationalist agenda:

What is happening is that thousands of people in Dublin, who ten days ago were bitterly-opposed to the whole of the Sinn Fein movement and to the rebellion, are now

¹⁰⁷ Macardle, 160-163.

¹⁰⁸ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 81, 27 April 1916, 2510-2511.

¹⁰⁹ L.G. Redmond-Howard, *Six Days of the Irish Republic: A Narrative and Critical Account of the Latest Phase of Irish Politics* (London: Maunsel & Co. Ltd. 1916), 55.

¹¹⁰ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 82, 11 May 1916, 886.

¹¹¹ “Why Hide the Truth?” *Daily Mail*, 11 May 2016, 4.

becoming infuriated against the Government on account of these executions, and, as I am informed by letters received this morning, that feeling is spreading throughout the country in a most dangerous degree.¹¹²

The convergence of the Rising with the contingencies of war measures created a situation that drove British occupying forces to employ exceedingly cruel punishments that drew unfavourable comparisons to German atrocities. George Bernard Shaw justified Irish resistance as being in the true spirit of the European underdog fighting a righteous war.¹¹³ Sinn Féin MP Laurence Ginnell gave a bitter speech in the House about prisoners whose remains were buried in an unmarked mass grave in Dublin after their executions:

You wanted our young men to remember Belgium—they prefer to remember Ireland. They remember how time and again in the past you decimated them by fire and sword, pitch-cap, and gibbet, and coffin ships. They remember those things, and it is because they remember those things that they took the action they did, prematurely I regret to say, and deeply regret; but it was because they remembered those things, because they remembered their own country instead of Belgium, that they are dead men.¹¹⁴

On 12 May, the death sentence on De Valéra was commuted to penal servitude for life even as he was composing farewell letters to his family and friends.¹¹⁵ American press reports speculated that he was spared due to his status as an American citizen, but he later attributed it to the timing of his trial.¹¹⁶ The harsh treatment of surviving Irish prisoners garnered international attention despite the press blackout imposed under martial law, and Irish MPs brought it up repeatedly in the House over the summer months. Censorship prohibited publication of any material ‘likely to produce

¹¹² *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 82, 11 May 1916, 948.

¹¹³ *London Daily News*, 10 May 1916.

¹¹⁴ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 82, 11 May 1916, 969.

¹¹⁵ Mary C. Bromage, *De Valera and the March of a Nation* (New York: The Noonday Press, 1956), 56-59.

¹¹⁶ “What Saved Dev From The Firing Squad?” *The Independent*, 24 January, 2016. <https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/1916/the-rising-explained/what-saved-dev-from-firing-squad-34385779.html>. [Accessed March 27, 2018].

disaffection' under the terms of DORA, and there was much derisory debate over its rigorous application.¹¹⁷ Over the next year, DORA, in tandem with the RIC, became the Crown's primary weapon against the highly disciplined and well-organized tactical machinery of Sinn Féin under the leadership of Michael Collins.¹¹⁸ Despite the government's best efforts, however, internment camps and jails became little more than incubators for a new generation of nationalists.¹¹⁹ Considering the unfavourable optics of the increasingly untenable situation, particularly in light of an impending Irish Convention ostensibly to be conducted 'in an atmosphere of harmony and good will,' the government issued an order for the release of all prisoners on 15 June 1917.¹²⁰ The next month De Valéra won a by-election in County Clare for Sinn Féin, with 5,100 votes versus 2,035 for the IPP candidate, a watershed moment and a harbinger of a landslide victory to come.¹²¹

Lloyd George's Irish Convention, which Sinn Féin declined to attend, wound down to an inconclusive end after nine exhausting months of wrangling over partition and taxation in March of 1918. Chairman Horace Plunkett, summing up the futility of that exercise in his report, noted

While, technically, it was our function to draft a constitution for our country, it would be more correct to say that we had to find our way out of the most complex and anomalous political situation to be found in history ... I might almost say in fiction.¹²²

¹¹⁷ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 85, 22 August 1916, 2476-2477.

¹¹⁸ Colin S. Gray, "The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21: Lessons from an Irregular Conflict," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2007), 373.

¹¹⁹ Macardle, 201-203.

¹²⁰ "Irish Amnesty, Mr. Bonar Law's Announcement," *The Times*, 16 June 1917, 8.

¹²¹ Macardle, 224.

¹²² *Report on the Proceedings of the Irish Convention*, House of Commons Sessional Papers, Command Paper No. 9019, 1918, 7.

Laurence Ginnell, now a prisoner himself, composed a republican manifesto after his arrest for land agitation shortly after John Redmond's death on 6 March.¹²³ "The Irish Republic: Why?" was an impassioned polemic that outlined Ireland's case for independence. The document, smuggled into the United States in the hopes that it would be given to Woodrow Wilson, stated the case for Ireland to retain an inalienable right to nationhood. Echoing Wilson's "Fourteen Points," Ginnell's text appears under the heading "Fourteen Propositions."¹²⁴ He builds a powerful argument in favour of self-determination based on Ireland's ancient rights of sovereignty never surrendered or extinguished despite the best efforts of Britain to exterminate them by force.

It was at this critical juncture that De Valéra emerged as a leader with a steadfast focus on establishing a sovereign republic as he set out to rally the attention of Irish people on both sides of the Atlantic. Throughout the war, military authorities continued to invoke and expand DORA, shutting down presses and arresting anyone suspected of even a hint of association with Sinn Féin, actions that did nothing but inflict unnecessary economic hardship and amplify anti-British resentments.¹²⁵ With an American presidential election on the horizon, De Valéra planned to draw international attention and raise funds for Sinn Féin by canvassing the powerful Irish-American lobby. An unfortunate setback to this endeavour was the fact that he had been targeted in the "German Plot" arrests of May of 1918 along with 73 Sinn Féin members and incarcerated

¹²³ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 104, 11 March 1918, 1329. "John Redmond Dies; Many Pay Tributes," *New York Times*, 7 Mar 1918, 11. Redmond's last words: "I am a broken-hearted man."

¹²⁴ Laurence Ginnell, *The Irish Republic. Why? Official Statement Prepared for Submission to the Peace Conference* (New York: Friends of Irish Freedom 1919), 7-15.

¹²⁵ Macardle, 255-257. *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 104, 1450.

under high security.¹²⁶ News reports speculated that the arrests would turn the tide of public opinion against Irish nationalists as German sympathizers, particularly in light of the ongoing opposition to conscription that “has estranged American sympathy.”¹²⁷ An American tour had the potential to be a panacea.

The extraordinary Irish election of December 1918, the first in which women were given a limited franchise, yielded 73 seats for Sinn Féin under De Valéra’s leadership, spelling the end of the Irish Nationalist Party. Reporting on plans to assemble a Sinn Féin government, *The Times* speculated that “the immediate future in Ireland can only be described as dark, dangerous and doubtful.”¹²⁸ Of 73 new MPs, 47 were in jail, including De Valéra; the remaining 26 convened on 7 January 1919 to discuss the creation of the Dáil Éireann, the new Assembly of Ireland.¹²⁹ Plans to appeal to the international community continued apace; Ireland’s new leader would visit America on his own terms, as President of the Republic.

A detailed account of De Valéra’s escape from Lincoln Prison in February of 1919 was a tribute to Gaelic ingenuity, involving a gardener conveying coded messages in Irish ballads sung beneath the jailhouse window, key impressions made from wax purloined from candles used in daily Mass, a convoy of decoy cars, and two girls recruited from Dublin to distract the guards.¹³⁰ With the Paris Peace Conference under way, the most famous political prisoner in the world appeared for the first time in public

¹²⁶ Diarmaid Ferriter, *Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon De Valera* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy 2007), 33.

¹²⁷ “German-Irish Plot,” *The Times*, 20 May 1918, 7. “Sinn Fein Leaders Seized,” *New York Times*, 18 May 1918, 1.

¹²⁸ “Sinn Fein Triumph in Ireland,” *The Times*, 30 December 1918, 10.

¹²⁹ Macardle, 265-271.

¹³⁰ Macardle, 265. “Girls Free De Valera,” *Washington Post*, 3 March 1919, 15.

in his capacity as “Irish President” on 24 June 1919 after first paying private visits to his mother in Rochester and brother in Boston.¹³¹

The announcement of his arrival at the Waldorf Hotel shared the front page of the *New York Times* with the news regarding Germany’s capitulation to the terms of the peace treaty, and the expected return of Woodrow Wilson from France on 4 July:

In the waiting crowd were about thirty Catholic priests and one man in Irish costume – green from head to foot, except one space where his kilts left off and his heavy, turned-down stockings began. And the cheers and tumult! It sounded as though 3,000 instead of 300 were there. ... An old lady pushed past the two policemen ... and kissed him heartily. ... As he was escorted to the elevator the tea-sippers he passed gazed cautiously and there was discreet applause.¹³²

A press release from his first appearance emphasized the unanimity of the will of the Irish people, and drew comparisons that appealed to the principles of liberty in the American constitution:

The men who established your republic sought the aid of France. We seek the aid of America.

...

The Latin races, as well as Poland, Hungary, and Greece, are now free States. Ireland, the one remaining white nation in the slavery of alien rule, will similarly be free unless Americans make scraps of paper of their principles and prove false to the traditions their fathers have handed down to them.¹³³

Conducting interviews from “the Irish White House” on 34th Street, De Valera stated his mission was to raise a bond issue to fund the operations of the government of the republic and to draw attention to Britain’s military occupation of Ireland as being virtually identical to the German occupation of Belgium. As envoys in Paris prepared to deliver documents to President Clemenceau requesting that the Peace Conference recognize

¹³¹ Bromage, 90-92.

¹³² “De Valera Comes Here to Get Help for Sinn Feiners,” *New York Times*, 24 June 1919, 1.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

Ireland as a delegate, he expressed disappointment that President Wilson had chosen not to include the country in his Fourteen Points as he had with Poland.¹³⁴

De Valéra then travelled to Boston for an appearance at Fenway Park before a rambunctious crowd of 40,000 “who surged out of the stands and carried press tables and all police arrangements with them. Several women fainted in the jam.”¹³⁵ His appearance at Madison Square Garden on 10 July was noted as drawing a 10-minute standing ovation as fire marshalls and police struggled to contain “the greatest crowd in its history.”¹³⁶ The President’s tour had not gone unnoticed at home. Reports from Belfast that same week excoriated Edward Carson for stirring up Ulster with “an amazing tirade” against Home Rule, including a warning to the United States:

I say today seriously to America, ‘You attend to your own affairs, and we will attend to ours. You look after your own questions at home and we will look after ours, but we will not brook interference in our affairs by any country, however powerful. It was not for that that we waged the great war of independence just concluded.’¹³⁷

Carson was conspicuously absent from Parliament as the House debated whether or not his speech had been ‘calculated to spread disaffection among His Majesty’s subjects.’ The decision not to prosecute him for seditious speech under DORA in spite of an obvious attempt to incite violence was yet another example of the uneven application of the war measures legislation in Ireland.¹³⁸ As British authorities began to intensify the

¹³⁴ “De Valera Seeks a \$5,000,000 Loan,” *New York Times*, 25 June 1919, 4.

¹³⁵ “40,000 in Boston Hear De Valera,” *New York Times*, 30 June 1919, 4.

¹³⁶ “17,000 Boo and Hiss President Wilson,” *New York Times*, 11 July 1919, 1.

¹³⁷ “Ireland Wants Peace, But Sir E. Carson Threatens War,” *Daily Mail*, 14 July 1919, 4.

¹³⁸ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 118, 16 July 1919, 375-379.

campaign of suppression of the duly elected republican government in Ireland, the Dáil went underground under the leadership of Arthur Griffith as acting president.¹³⁹

In the spring of 1920, a coroner's inquest into the shocking murder of the Lord Mayor of Cork presented damning evidence that the killing had been "organized and carried out by the Royal Constabulary, officially directed by the British Government."¹⁴⁰ With the installation of a new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Nevil Macready, under orders "to suppress the rebellion by whatever means may be requisite," a campaign of random reprisals targeted the economic life of the country with prohibitions on markets and fairs as places of illegal assembly, raids and burning of homes of suspected republican sympathizers, and the wholesale destruction of co-operative creameries and shops.¹⁴¹ As the military locked down Dublin in anticipation of a violent commemoration of the Easter Rising, tax offices and vacant barracks were put to the republican torch throughout the country.¹⁴² During the summer and fall, British-run courts emptied out as the Dáil established its judicial administration, and magistrates and constables began resigning.¹⁴³ Visiting American and French journalists "came for the football match and [remained] to see the 'government' of Ireland."

¹³⁹ Ferriter, 33-35.

¹⁴⁰ "A Black Week for Ireland," *The Times*, 22 March 1920, 16-17. Levi Hollingsworth, *The American Commission on Conditions in Ireland* (New York 1921), 144.

¹⁴¹ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 133, 21 October 1920, 1049. "Irish Creameries, Destruction as Police Reprisals," *The Times*, 23 August 1920, 6.

¹⁴² "Fire Campaign in Ireland," *The Times*, 6 April 1920, 8.

¹⁴³ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 133, 9 August 1920, 24-25. Macardle, 375-377.

Everybody asks what is to be the end of the present *regime* and no one can supply an answer. Meanwhile the customary Irish *joie de vivre* continues without abatement in spite of an atmosphere of political discontent and violence.¹⁴⁴

With the country in this bizarre limbo, the government's answer was to expand its powers under DORA with the passage of the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, effective 21 August. The legislation removed the work of the courts and coroners' juries out of the public eye, and its prohibitions on associations and organizations effectively placed the four-fifths of the population who had elected Sinn Féin on the wrong side of the law.¹⁴⁵ Commentary in the debates suggested that this was a regrettable case of imperial overkill:

It has gone so far, as we know from questions and answers and by debate in this House, as to arrest small boys for whistling and singing 'The Wearing of the Green.'

If I am misinterpreting the intention of the Executive I shall be delighted, but the Bill seems to me to ask for indefinite power of carrying on these wide sweeping regulations which exceed anything any Executive has asked for for fifty years in governing Ireland.¹⁴⁶

A *Times* editorial opined that the Act amounted to a declaration of war:

[W]e hold the policy mistaken, and these measures merely a confession of bankruptcy in statesmanship. On the broad issue of whether the relations between Great Britain and Ireland are to be those of peace or war, the Government have deliberately, even if temporarily, decided in favour of war.¹⁴⁷

De Valéra's American campaign, mired in conflict with Friends of Irish Freedom, led to the formation of an alternative society, the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, whose membership exceeded expectations with the

¹⁴⁴ "A Beleaguered City: Barbed Wire and Tanks," *The Times*, 5 April 1920, 8.

¹⁴⁵ *A bill to make provision for the restoration and maintenance of order in Ireland*, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, No. 195. Macardle, 380-383.

¹⁴⁶ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 132, 6 August 1920, 2851.

¹⁴⁷ "The Lord Mayor of Cork," *The Times*, 23 August 1920, 11.

enrolment of 800,000 members.¹⁴⁸ In November he attended a requiem mass in New York for Terence MacSwiney, the Lord Mayor of Cork, who died after a hunger strike in Brixton prison. Mourners rioted and smashed windows after spotting a British flag displayed in the Union Club across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral, requiring a cordon of 200 police to contain the mêlée.¹⁴⁹

With the situation at home becoming increasingly dire, De Valéra returned to a country in a state bordering on total anarchy as British forces became increasingly more desperate to win the upper hand.¹⁵⁰ Throughout the fall and winter, assassinations and reprisals continued, with Catholic evacuations from rioting in Ulster causing one observer to draw comparisons to the plight of Belgian refugees.¹⁵¹ In November, Macready's tactics came under fire again as the House began to question the futility of participating in what was now obviously a full-blown guerrilla war.¹⁵² At year end, George V, obviously hoping to put an end to the spiralling violence, gave Royal Assent to an Act to Provide for the Better Government of Ireland, partitioning the country and creating two self-governing states, following the model of existing dominion governments.¹⁵³

The King's Speech, 23 December 1920: The state of affairs in Ireland grieves me profoundly. I deplore the campaign of violence and outrage by which a small section of My subjects seek to sever Ireland from the Empire, and I sympathise with the loyal servants of the Crown who are endeavouring to restore peace and maintain order under conditions of unexampled difficulty and danger. ... This Act, by setting up two Parliaments and a Council of Ireland, gives self-government in Irish affairs to the whole of Ireland, and provides the means whereby the people of Ireland can of their

¹⁴⁸ "Attacks de Valera Failure Over Plan," *New York Times*, 10 July 1920, 2.

¹⁴⁹ "Union Club Mobbed," *Washington Post*, 1920 11 26, 1.

¹⁵⁰ Macardle, 410-411.

¹⁵¹ "The Lord Mayor of Cork," *The Times*, 23 August 1920, 11.

¹⁵² *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 135, 24 November 1920, 516-517.

¹⁵³ "The Terms, Self-Government on South African Model," *Daily Mail*, 23 July 1921, 5.

own accord achieve unity. I sincerely hope that this Act, the fruit of more than thirty years of ceaseless controversy, will finally bring about unity and friendship between all the peoples of My Kingdom.¹⁵⁴

Six months later, debate in the House was addressing the finer points of the legality of reprisals against supporters of Sinn Féin. In the House of Lords, the Earl of Dunraven was protesting that the situation in Ireland amounted to a military dictatorship, and the Marquess of Crewe called for an immediate resolution to the deadlock:

The Imperial Conference is taking place to deal with many matters of the greatest moment to the Empire, but there is no question there which approaches, at any rate in urgency, this one of Ireland. . . . I protest most strongly against a comparison of that form of military rule which is to be put into force over there with the humane, and in all cases representative, government which rules in the Crown Colonies.¹⁵⁵

The American Commission on Conditions in Ireland conducted a damning post mortem on what is variously called the Anglo-Irish War and the War of Independence, collecting oral testimony in a series of hearings between November 1920 to January 1921. Witnesses from both republican and loyalist sides were invited to testify. Republicans encountered difficulties in obtaining travel documents, and many undertook the journey to New York in secrecy. Invitations extended to unionist officials and other British politicians were for the most part ignored. The Commission's interim report issued in May of 1921 called the operation of martial law by British forces in Ireland into question:

¹⁵⁴ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 136, 23 Dec 1920, 952.

¹⁵⁵ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 143, 21 June 1921, 1081-1083. House of Lords Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 45, 21 June 1921, 679, 704-705.

...the facts suggest that the actual operation of this policy was not based upon law. There exists neither under the laws of war nor under the codes of martial law in civilized states any justification for assassination, pillaging or terrorism as a means of suppressing insurrection.¹⁵⁶

The Commission's findings concluded with a seven-point memorandum, noting that the Irish were being denied not only the benefit of the law of the United Kingdom as British subjects, but also the protection of international law "to which they would be entitled as belligerents," and that the British government was essentially operating a campaign of terrorism "contrary to the laws of peace or war among modern civilized nations." Item 4 was particularly accusatory:

A campaign for the destruction of the means of existence of the Irish people has been conducted by the burning of factories, creameries, crops and farm implements and the shooting of farm animals. This campaign is carried on regardless of the political views of their owners, and results in *widespread and acute suffering among women and children*.¹⁵⁷ [emphasis added]

With the whole world now watching, there could no longer be any doubt that the crisis in Ireland had to be settled with something other than brute force.

As the King opened the Northern Irish Parliament on 22 June, negotiations to end the stalemate were under way. A truce was finally established between the IRA and British forces on 11 July.¹⁵⁸ After conferring in London, Lloyd George and De Valera exchanged correspondence, haggling over the position of the British government *vis-à-vis* assigning Ireland Dominion status. A final condition was that Northern Ireland be

¹⁵⁶ Hollingsworth, 10.

¹⁵⁷ Hollingsworth, 13.

¹⁵⁸ Ferriter, 10.

recognized as retaining separate powers of government “which cannot be abrogated without their own consent.”¹⁵⁹ De Valéra’s response was unequivocal:

Ireland’s right to choose for herself the path she shall take to realize her own destiny must be accepted as indefeasible. It is a right that has been maintained through centuries of oppression and at the cost of unparalleled sacrifice and untold suffering, and it will not be surrendered.¹⁶⁰

The Prime Minister reiterated his insistence on Dominion status, and the two argued back and forth on the point of ‘geographical propinquity’ as a reason for Britain to retain control. De Valéra noted that if the rest of Europe were to conform to the British formula, no small nation would be safe from forcible annexation.¹⁶¹ After months of jousting by telegram, arrangements were finally made to organize another conference in London on 11 October 1921; De Valéra sent Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins as plenipotentiaries authorized to finalize the negotiations.¹⁶² With the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921, a particularly difficult chapter of Irish history came to a close. However, the next session of the Dáil was filled with tension as De Valéra and Collins argued over how the negotiations had been conducted, a situation that foreshadowed an absence of consensus that would write far more complicated chapters to come.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ *Correspondence relating to the proposals of His Majesty’s Government for an Irish Settlement*, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Command Paper 1502, D. Lloyd George to De Valéra, 20 July 1921. It was proposed that Ireland retain control over domestic taxation and finance, courts of law and judges, home defence, policing, postal services, education, land, agricultural, natural resources, housing, labour, unemployment relief, transport, trade, public health, health insurance and liquor distribution.

¹⁶⁰ *Correspondence relating to the proposals of His Majesty’s Government for an Irish Settlement*, Éamon De Valéra to Lloyd George, 10 August 1921.

¹⁶¹ *Correspondence relating to the proposals of His Majesty’s Government for an Irish Settlement*, De Valéra to Lloyd George, 24 August 1921.

¹⁶² For a detailed account of the treaty negotiations and the repercussions in the Dáil, see Macardle, 581-626.

¹⁶³ Gray, 373.

Conclusion

During the 1980s, with Ireland experiencing yet another round of sectarian violence, and a fresh exodus of a young generation seeking work, historians turned toward a post-colonial perspective and began to work within the “New British” and “Atlantic model” schools of thought that drew bigger pictures of colonial relations within a global context. Economists began drawing connections between the modern Irish state and post-colonial outcomes in Third World countries to explain its failure to launch as a fully-realized product of progressive liberalism. Modernization theory argued that the project of Ireland’s transition from colonial possession to independent nation is far from complete.¹⁶⁴ In this context, one cannot help but wonder how the implications of Britain’s increasingly hostile relationship with the European Union will impact the Republic’s economic and social standing on the global stage. Cleary claims that post-colonial studies offer the potential for producing alternate discourses that would refute arguments equating the Irish colonial experience with that of the Third World, and issues a challenge to the academy to work on producing a “serviceable historicized typology of colonies” in aid of that project.¹⁶⁵ Richard English issues a similar call for scholarship that includes drawing parallels between developments in England and Ireland, such studies being essential to the project of broader understanding of nineteenth-century socio-political contexts.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Cleary, 19-20.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 29.

¹⁶⁶ Richard English, “History and Irish Nationalism,” *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 147 (May 2011), 454-55.

Edward Said notes similarities between Ireland, Palestine, and Algeria, arguing that there are commonalities in Orientalism on the one hand and “Celticism” on the other that typify their relationships with the colonizers: famines; mutinies; prolonged military occupation; domination by settlers; unsuccessful negotiations; asymmetry of power; and disappointed/disappointing leaders.¹⁶⁷ Said argues that the “deep distortions” of colonization do not simply evaporate once the colonized are supposedly liberated, but rather a whole new phase of recovery from the “structural breaks” in the colony’s history begins, and the process of forming national identity is fraught with further complications, particularly in cases of partition:

To my Palestinian eyes, the idea that partition might resolve political disputes is a disastrously poor one. I have always preferred some form of bi-nationalism in cases where rival communities overlap.¹⁶⁸

Said cautions against “carving out smaller and smaller bits of history to fight over.” Like Cleary and Lloyd, he advocates for the broader view that a post-colonial perspective can achieve.

Lloyd argues that Ireland’s cultural and historical status as a colony continues to be contested.¹⁶⁹ Citing Fanon’s thesis on the violent transition from colonial to neo-colonial state, he positions post-colonial Ireland as having traded one form of subjugation for another in the service of globalized capital, considers colonization to be ongoing, and argues that the process of creating a true national identity remains unfinished.¹⁷⁰ Lloyd identifies Ireland as a crucial site for understanding the process of colonization and

¹⁶⁷ Edward Said, “Reflections on Ireland and Postcolonialism,” *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*, Clare Carroll and Patricia King, eds. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 2003), 177.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 179-185.

¹⁶⁹ Lloyd, “After History,” 48.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

decolonization, and cites Belfast as an example of Fanon's culturally traumatized colonial city within its Foucauldian panopticon of social control.¹⁷¹ His insights point to nationalism as an obstacle to achieving "maximum modernity" prescribed within the liberal order project.¹⁷²

In considering nationalism as an obstacle, it is helpful to look at how the mechanics of constructing national identity have operated in Ireland as a partitioned state. Another factor to consider is that Ireland as a whole remains profoundly traumatized by the events of the mid-nineteenth century and the convulsions in the wake of the Great War that "turned Europe upside down, dismembering empires and creating a host of new states from their shards."¹⁷³ To try to understand the extraordinary persistence and depth of the divide in Irish society, we can turn to this comment by nationalist MP T.P. O'Connor from the conscription debate in *Hansard* in 1916: "All my fellow countrymen know that an Irish Nationalist hates an Irish Catholic Unionist much worse than he hates the most virulent Orangeman."¹⁷⁴

If we compare this to a recent item in *The Guardian* detailing the latest iteration of the ancient enmity, it is painfully evident that hatred of the "other" has mutated and become embedded in the social fabric in another kind of civil warfare altogether:

News of the rise in dissident republican and Ulster loyalist assaults on people within their respective communities came as the head of the Police Service of Northern Ireland revealed that some victims' parents were drugging and getting their loved ones drunk before they were beaten or shot to offset the pain.

¹⁷¹ David Lloyd, "Regarding Ireland in a Post-Colonial Frame," *Cultural Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2001), 14.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 19, 24.

¹⁷³ Daniel Mulhall, "Parallel Parnell: Parnell delivers Home Rule in 1904," *History Ireland*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (May/June 2010), 32.

¹⁷⁴ *Hansard*, House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 85, 22 August 1916, 2563.

The PSNI chief constable, George Hamilton, told the Guardian that some close relatives of those about to be attacked were plying their children with alcohol or giving them powerful painkillers before “appointments” with the “punishment” gangs.

Many of the victims are often savagely beaten after being accused by armed republican and loyalist factions of criminal actions such as drug dealing or car theft, without any form of legal representation or appeal.¹⁷⁵

In 1993 Michael Ignatieff wrote in *Blood and Belonging* that “[i]n the end, the Crown and the Union Jack are reduced to meaning what they signify when tattooed on the skin of poor, white teenagers. They are only badges of ethnic rage.”¹⁷⁶ It is this ongoing dichotomy of ethnic nationalisms within Irish society that acts as a damper on the project of decolonization and transformation into fully-realized nationhood. From this perspective, Said’s vision of bi-nationalism makes the most sense, but one wonders if that will ever be possible as long as the six northern counties remain a ‘statelet’ of the United Kingdom, geographically married to the Irish Republic.

¹⁷⁵ “Northern Ireland “punishment attacks” rise 60% in four years,” *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/12/northern-ireland-punishment-attacks-rise-60-in-four-years> (accessed 12 March 2018).

¹⁷⁶ Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys in the New Nationalism* (New York: Penguin Group 1993), 304.

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Beddoe, John. *The Races of Britain: A Contribution to the Anthropology of Western Europe*. London: Trübner and Co. 1885.

Daily Mail.

Ginnell, Laurence. *The Irish Republic. Why? Official Statement Prepared for Submission to the Peace Conference*. New York: Friends of Irish Freedom 1919.

Hansard, House of Commons Debates.

Hollingsworth, Levi. *The American Commission on Conditions in Ireland*. New York 1921.

Home Rule From the Treasury Bench: Speeches During the First and Second Reading Debates. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912.

House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers*.

MacVeagh, Jeremiah and Winston S. Churchill. *Home Rule in a Nutshell: A Pocket Book for Speakers and Electors*. London: The Daily Chronicle 1912.

McDonnell, F. Hugh. *A History of the Irish Parliamentary Party*. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1910.

Report on the Proceedings of the Irish Convention. House of Commons Sessional Papers, Command Paper No. 9019, 1918.

Redmond-Howard, L.G. *Six Days of the Irish Republic: A Narrative and Critical Account of the Latest Phase of Irish Politics*. London: Maunsell & Co. Ltd. 1916.

Renan, Ernest. "What Is A Nation?" (1882).

The Economist.

The Guardian.

The Independent.

The New York Times.

The Times.

The Washington Post.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Bew, Paul. *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 1995.
- Bromage, Mary C. *De Valera and the March of a Nation*. New York: The Noonday Press 1956.
- Carroll, Clare and Patricia King, eds. *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 2003.
- Curtis, L. Perry. *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature*. Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press 1971.
- Dworkin, Dennis, ed. *Ireland and Britain 1798-1923: An Anthology of Sources*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 2012.
- Ferriter, Diarmaid. *Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon De Valera*. Dublin: Royal Irish Academy 2007.
- Fielding, Steven. *Class and Ethnicity: Irish Catholics in England, 1880-1939*. Buckingham: Open University Press 1993.
- Ignatieff, Michael. *Blood and Belonging: Journeys in the New Nationalism*. New York: Penguin Group 1993.
- Kinealy, Christine. *The Great Irish Famine: Impact, Ideology and Rebellion*. New York: Palgrave 2002.
- Macardle, Dorothy. *The Irish Republic*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1951.
- O Grada, Cormac. *Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999.
- Walker, Brian M. *A Political History of the Two Irelands: From Partition to Peace*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012.

ARTICLES/CHAPTERS

- aan de Wiel, Jerome. "1914: What will the British do? The Irish Home Rule Crisis in the July Crisis." *The International History Review*, Vol. 37, No. 4, (2015): 657-681.
- Anderson, James, and Liam O'Dowd. "Imperialism and nationalism: The Home Rule struggle and border creation in Ireland, 1885-1925." *Political Geography*, 26 (2007): 934-950.
- Bradshaw, Brendan. "Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in Modern Ireland." *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 104 (1989): 329-351.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. "The Idea of Provincializing Europe." *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Colonial Difference* (Princeton, 2000): 3-26.
- Cleary, Joe. "'Misplaced Ideas'?: Colonialism, Location, and Dislocation in Irish Studies." *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*. Clare Carroll and Patricia King, eds. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 2003.
- Coakley, John. "'Irish Republic', 'Eire' or 'Ireland'? The Contested Name of John Bull's Other Island." *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January-March 2009): 49-58.
- Connelly, M.L. "The Army, the Press and the 'Curragh Incident,' March 1914." *Historical Research*, Vol. 44, No. 225 (August 2011): 535-557.
- Delaney, Enda. "Our island story? Towards a transnational history of late modern Ireland." *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 148 (November 2011), 599-621.
- Davis, Troy D. "Eamon de Valera's Political Education: The American Tour of 1919-20." *New Hibernia Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 2006): 65-78.
- English, Richard. "History and Irish Nationalism." *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 147 (May 2011): 447-460.
- Evans, Bryce. "'A Pint of Plain is Your Only Man': How Guinness Saved Ireland During the Emergency." *History Ireland*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (September/October 2014): 36-38.
- Fedorak, Charles John. "Catholic Emancipation and the Resignation of William Pitt in 1801." *Albion, A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* (Spring 1992) Vol. 24, No. 1, 49-64.
- Gibbons, Luke. "Race Against Time: Racial Discourse and Irish History." *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Reader*. Catherine Hall, ed. London: Manchester University Press, 2000: 207-223.
- Gooch, J. "The War Office and the Curragh Incident." *Historical Research*, Vol. 46, No. 114 (November 1973): 202-207.
- Gray, Colin S. "The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21: Lessons from an Irregular Conflict." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2007): 371-394.
- Hall, Catherine, ed. "Introduction." *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Reader*. London: Manchester University Press, 2000: 1-36.
- Hall, Catherine. "The Rule of Difference: Gender, Class and Empire in the Making of the 1832 Reform Act" in *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall eds. Oxford and New York: Oxford International Publishers Ltd. 2000.
- Kane Anne. "Narratives of Nationalism: Constructing Irish National Identity during the Land War, 1879-82." *National Identities*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2010): 245-64.

- Lloyd, David. "Colonial Trauma/Postcolonial Recovery?" *Interventions* Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000): 212-228.
- Lloyd, David. "Regarding Ireland in a Post-Colonial Frame." *Cultural Studies* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2001): 12-32.
- McKay, Ian. "The Nationalism: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History." *Canadian Historical Review* 81 (4), Dec. 2000: 616-78.
- Norton, Philip. "Resisting the Inevitable? The Parliament Act 1911." *Parliamentary History*, Vol. 31, Part 3 (2012): 444-459.
- Regan, John M. "Irish Public Histories as an Historiographical Problem." *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 146 (November 2010): 265-292.
- Said, Edward. "Reflections on Ireland and Postcolonialism." *Ireland and Postcolonial Theory*. Clare Carroll and Patricia King, eds. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 2003: 177-186.
- Stoller, Ann Laura. "Cultivating Bourgeois Bodies and Racial Selves." *Cultures of Empire: Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Reader*. Catherine Hall, ed. London: Manchester University Press, 2000: 87-119.
- Townsend, Paul A. "Between Two Worlds: Irish Nationalists and Imperial Crisis 1879-1880." *Past and Present*, No. 194 (February 2007): 139-174.