Gendering Theories of Nationalism:
Masculinity and Nationalism in France and Germany, 1789-1815

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I. Introduction

In his introduction to *Nationalism and Sexuality*, George Mosse states that nationalism is "the most powerful ideology of modern times,"1 yet the definition of nationalism is deeply contested among scholars. The nationalist view contends that nationalism is the natural expression of the nation; for scholars such as Ernest Renan, on the other hand, the nation has no material existence and to belong to a nation is to engage in a constant plebiscite.2 Between these two views there exists a spectrum of theories of nationalism. For A. M. Alonso, the majority of definitions within this spectrum share a fundamental and problematic omission. Whether conceived as a material, political, linguistic, cultural or ethnic construct, the nation is a space "in which women, from the point of view of nonfeminist scholars, have had only a marginal presence; hence, most influential male theorists of nationalism have ignored gender."3 The omission of gender in histories and theories of nationalism excludes women’s voices, but it also obscures a significant aspect of men’s lives. Without denying the importance of reintegrating women’s voices into history, both within and without nationalist narratives, a thorough gender analysis must also seek to rehabilitate a key factor of the history of nationalism: masculinity.

In this paper I address three groups of scholars of nationalism and summarize their positions as they pertain to France and Germany in the period 1789-1815. In each

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case, I use the work of gender historians such as Karen Hagemann, Joan Landes and John Tosh to examine the ways in which a discussion of masculinity nuances and even undermines the claims that historians attempt to make about nationalism. Modernist materialist scholars (those who argue that nationalism is a product of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), such as Ernest Gellner, John Breuilly and Eric Hobsbawm, stress the political and material aspects of nationalism. Hagemann shows that gender is crucial to these histories, not only because the participants of nationalism are often assumed to be men, but because male subjects’ masculinity was actively politicized by the processes of nation-building. The second group of modernist scholars, the non-materialists, is comprised of Benedict Anderson, Elie Kedourie and George Mosse. These scholars focus on the nation as an “imagined community” and interpret nationalism as an expression of this collective imagination; however, Landes argues that the basis for citizenship and participation within the public sphere of this imagined community was deeply informed by the rhetoric of masculinity. Third, I examine the long-term view of nationalism as put forward by Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes and John Armstrong. Although long-term nationalism bypasses the issues of masculinity that impact modernist theories, a discussion of gender in Pierre van den Berghe’s socio-biological interpretation of long-term nationalism reveals the essentialist tendencies of this theory and its ultimate inability to provide a useful historical framework. By introducing gender into these discussions, I attempt to show how masculinity was fundamental to the emergence of nationalism in the period from the French Revolution to the Wars of Liberation.
II. Materialist Theories of Nationalism and the Figure of the Citizen-Soldier

The first theorists of nationalism that I examine are Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly. These scholars reject the traditional theory of nationalism which, in Breuilly’s words, “assumes that nationalism is an expression of the nation.”⁴ Hobsbawm in particular is hostile towards this theory; he goes so far as to insist that nationalists cannot be historians of nationalism, as “[n]ationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.”⁵ Rather than assuming a natural link between a polity and its people, these scholars argue that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, and they attempt to explain it in terms of the material and political factors that sustain it. In this essay I loosely refer to these scholars as “materialist” in the sense that they are concerned with the material conditions of the nation and the political institutions that underlie them. Gellner’s definition of nationalism (which Hobsbawm uses verbatim, and which Breuilly adopts with some qualifications)⁶ states that nationalism is “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”⁷ These scholars situate the emergence of nationalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; Hobsbawm argues that the “modern sense of the word [nation] is no older than the eighteenth century, give or take a predecessor.”⁸ Therefore they argue for

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⁴ Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 18.
⁶ Ibid., 9.
an understanding of nationalism that is dependent upon the political and material contexts of modernity.

In *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), Gellner explicitly defines nationalism as a product of industrialization, which transformed societies into nations (which he equates roughly with cultures)\(^9\). Gellner argues that pre-national agrarian societies experience a division between the “high culture” of the political and cultural elites and the majority of the population, which self-replicates through endo-educational methods, passing down labour-related skills and knowledge directly from generation to generation.\(^{10}\) As societies modernize, however, the “reproduction of fully socialized individuals itself becomes part of the division of labour, and is no longer performed by sub-communities for themselves.”\(^{11}\) Exo-education becomes the standard for society, operated by the only institution large enough to fund, enforce and control this function: the state.\(^{12}\) The individual’s skills are no longer identity-specific, nor do they define an individual’s identity, but are part of a shared universal high culture which characterizes not the individual but the nation.\(^{13}\) Through this process a kinship-based society mediated by *structures* gives way to a nation mediated by *culture* and sustained by exo-education.\(^{14}\) It is this relationship between nation (i.e., culture) and polity that is key to nationalism: “high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the

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\(^{11}\) Ibid., 32.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 37.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 142.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 86.
polity. *That* is the secret of nationalism." Gellner’s model emphasizes the need to understand nationalism as a product of the material changes – such as industrialization and state-sponsored education – that are a product of the modern age.

Hobsbawm similarly situates nationalism in the modern period in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (1990). While he willingly concedes the existence of “popular proto-nationalism,” i.e., patriotic bonds that existed before nationalism and which nationalism could mobilize on a mass scale, Hobsbawm argues for a non-necessary relationship between proto-nationalism and nationalism. As a Marxist, he characterizes nationalism as a construction of the cultural and political elites, and he opposes traditional histories that argue for the historical continuity of nations along ethnic or linguistic lines. Hobsbawm argues that this attitude is false according to the material conditions of the modern age; for example, the concept of a national language (beyond that of administrators and preachers) was not possible before state-sponsored primary education. While he does not deny that individuals identified with specific language groups, he draws attention to the material differences between groups within cultures: the literate elite had a wider cultural horizon and understood language differently than the majority of the population. Hobsbawm argues that the “popular masses” are the last to be affected by the development of a national consciousness, and he opposes the view that nationalism is the natural expression of a nation’s population.

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17 Ibid., 76.
18 Ibid., 52.
19 Ibid., 53.
20 Ibid., 12.
Of these materialist historians, Breuilly is perhaps the most interested in the political dimension of nationalism; in *Nationalism and the State* (1982) he concentrates on the “key role played by the state in shaping nationalism.”\(^{21}\) Unlike Hobsbawm, Breuilly suggests that a general theory of nationalism is probably impossible.\(^{22}\) Instead he traces the relationships between politics, power and states around the globe, and concludes that nationalism in the modern period should first be understood through the lens of politics. Nationalism, he claims, “is explicitly political. It appeals to people in terms of their rights and their own identities rather than in terms of their shared beliefs.”\(^{23}\) In his discussion of European nationalism, he argues that the national ideology of the French Revolution was not expressed in terms of common culture or a people bound by a national society, but was instead an expression of religious and political principles.\(^{24}\) The first expressions of French nationalism used the language of politics, not culture. In the German case, he argues that the nationalists who concentrated on ethnic or linguistic connections between German peoples were primarily isolated intellectuals, whereas political nationalism, which explicitly concentrated on German territory, was a stronger, more effective force in the struggle for national unification.\(^{25}\) Breuilly concludes his discussion of nationalism on a purely political level: “[n]ationalist ideology,” he argues, “is a pseudo-solution to the problem of the relationship between state and society.”\(^{26}\) The relationship between a nation’s culture and its politics is arbitrary, yet politicians are able

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\(^{21}\) Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, ix.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{23}\) Ibid., 49.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 45.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., 67.
\(^{26}\) Ibid., 349.
to exploit the confusion and naturalization of these boundaries to insist that national politics are an expression of natural cultural values. This process of justification, argues Breuilly, reflects the political mechanisms of nationalism, but not any "intrinsic" character of a nation.

These three theories of nationalism all situate the phenomenon in the modern period, and explain it as primarily an effect of political and material conditions. By concentrating on the political and material causes of nationalism, however, these writers are open to a seemingly obvious charge: they privilege traditionally male-dominated spheres of activity and ignore women’s political and material contributions to nationalism and the nation-state. According to Jürgen Habermas’s model, the public sphere that emerged in the eighteenth century was a space for the discussion and critique of political policy with regards to the interest of the public.27 Joan Landes argues that Habermas’s model presupposes a “public” that is comprised solely of men. This masculine public is essential to Habermas’s construction of a public sphere; his “exclusion of women from the bourgeois public was not incidental but central to its incarnation.”28 This (by now) standard observation has been used by feminist historians to argue that this approach makes women invisible in history. More recently, however, gender historians have argued that this approach does something else – it makes the masculinity of the male historical subject invisible as well. These scholars’ lack of interest in gender causes their theories to discount or ignore the role that masculinity played in the construction of nationalism through the citizen/soldier dynamic. The introduction of gender

fundamentally alters any discussion of the material and political factors that Gellner, Hobson and Breuilly use as a basis for their understanding of nationalism.

Using the same time frame (1789-1815) as these modernist historians, gender historians such as Stephan Dudink, Karen Hagemann and Joan Landes have pointed to the establishment of the citizen/soldier dynamic as a key element in any political study of nationalism in France and Germany. In France, the figure of the citizen-soldier emerged with the levée en masse and the creation of the Grande Armée. The levée en masse, in conjunction with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), asserted that all men had political rights as citizens within the nation based on their duty to defend it in a military capacity. The “democratization” of the new military service and the depiction of the Wars of Liberation as a people’s war challenged the established association between social privilege and the right to wage war.\(^{29}\) This definition theoretically erased differences of class, religion, politics, etc., between men, but it insisted upon gender as a marker of inclusion or exclusion from citizenship. In the Ancien Régime, women’s exclusion from politics was less remarkable, not only because women were active in salons and public life in a non-official capacity, but also because very few men were allowed to participate either.\(^{30}\) The citizen-soldier profoundly altered this exclusive idea of citizenship as women were gradually denied constitutional rights. During the Revolution, many French women claimed property rights; similarly, in the case of the American Revolution, women claimed citizenship status since they retained


\(^{30}\) Landes, Women and the Public Sphere, 2.
significant property rights, though they were not enfranchised. Women were actively involved in both Revolutions, and Linda K. Kerber suggests that American women, like their European counterparts, made political decisions through their “private” domestic roles as producers and consumers. Kerber overstates her case, however, and admits in her conclusion that despite the political ramifications of their actions, it is hard to know “what these women thought they were doing,” i.e., it is difficult to assess their degree of political awareness. Kathleen Canning refers to this ambivalent status as “social citizenship” or “secondary citizenship”: in this way women could be national participants, but their participation was nevertheless curtailed by the denial of their full political and civil rights. The boundaries of female citizenship were never clarified, whereas the size and scope of the Grande Armée ensured that more men than ever were directly involved in a national project. The rise of the citizen/soldier dynamic, in which the only “true” citizens were soldiers, set the stage for the gendering of citizenship within the modern state.

With the implementation of universal male suffrage, the distinction between public and private spheres became explicitly gendered. The relationship between the

32 Ibid., 94.
33 Ibid., 97.
35 Kerber, “May All Our Citizens Be Soldiers,” 98.
36 The Wars of Liberation marked the largest military deployment in European history at the time; in 1813 the Grande Armée consisted of approximately 440,000 men, and the Coalition army was even larger. Karen Hagemann, “Reconstructing ‘Front’ and ‘Home’: Gendered Experiences and Memories of the German Wars against Napoleon – A Case Study,” War in History, 16:1 (2009): 28.
French citizen and the French state was mediated through his gender; the citizen-soldier had a “masculine claim” on the nation, and vice-versa. The path of this “masculine claim” was prepared by the Enlightenment thought that preceded the Revolution. Rousseau, for example, saw no place for women in the public sphere; though men’s and women’s lives both derived their meaning from public discourse, only men possessed agency in the public sphere. Working from a classical tradition of male citizenship, Rousseau argued that sexual inequality was both natural and rational. Citizenship, however, acquired new meaning as a result of the Revolution. The “universal” bourgeois figure of the revolution was a gendered subject from the beginning; only male rights to political freedom were enforced, and this differentiation based upon gender was exacerbated by the implementation of universal male conscription. The levée en masse required a “fraternal understanding of the revolutionary nation,” in which a “full citizen” of the Republic was a soldier in theory, if not in practice. Although female revolutionaries attempted to gain new political rights in this period, often using their sexual differences (i.e., their roles as mothers and wives) as arguments for increased participation in the Republic, the political sphere was ultimately a male space.

Women’s clubs and organizations were banned, and women were officially excluded.

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38 Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*, 69.
39 Ibid., 86.
43 Timm and Sanborn, *Gender, Sex, and the Shaping of Modern Europe*, 35.
from politics in 1793. Universal male suffrage and conscription fundamentally changed relations between the sexes, but their gendered effects cannot simply be understood in terms of the private sphere. The primary subject of the French Republic was now the citizen-soldier.

The soldier/citizen dynamic operated differently in the German territories. Military service in Prussia was never equated with citizenship; soldiers were still subjects (not citizens) who were nonetheless required to provide military service without the recompense of political rights. However, Prussian military reform after the humiliating Peace of Tilsit in 1807 had many of the same repercussions for a gendering of the public and private spheres as the levée en masse had in France. Prussian reform was explicitly based on the Greco-Roman concept of the citizen-soldier. Arguing that military service could only be effective if it was universal, reformers introduced universal conscription in 1811, thereby eliminating the practice of allowing wealthier men to exempt themselves from service. Austria also introduced compulsory universal military service in 1808 in order to counter the threat of the Grande Armée. In Prussia, only a small percentage of men were actually required to serve, but the rhetoric of equality and universality gained currency amongst the middle classes as reformers argued that maximum inclusion in the

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44 Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor,’” 205.
48 Ibid., 19.
military would promote a sense of patriotic duty towards the military amongst all males.\textsuperscript{50} In March 1813, Prussian King Frederick William III established the Iron Cross, the first military badge of honour to be awarded to any soldier for bravery, regardless of his social status.\textsuperscript{51} The creation of the Iron Cross exemplified the masculinization of nationalist rhetoric; any man could conceivably become a national hero through warfare. Although women were not officially excluded from German political life until 1848, the rhetoric that insisted upon the universal duty of men conversely relegated women to a supportive, primarily non-combative role. Women were of course expected to serve the nation, and women as well as men were affected by the patriotic propaganda of the Wars of Liberation, but individuals’ patriotic duty differed according to his or her status, age and gender.\textsuperscript{52} The idea of the nation as a macrocosmic version of a German family placed women in domestic or maternal roles while simultaneously guaranteeing them a place in the national family.\textsuperscript{53} Women were encouraged to put national interests before their family, whereas men were required to serve the nation militarily.\textsuperscript{54} Women were extraordinarily active during the Wars of Liberation: they formed official associations, organized relief for widows and orphans, nursed soldiers in military hospitals, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{50} Frevert, \textit{A Nation in Barracks}, 91.
\textsuperscript{53} Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor,’” 206.
\end{footnotesize}
donated and gathered money and resources for the war effort. As in France, Prussian conscription affected a wide range of the population and for the first time middle-class women were affected by war to the same extent as middle-class men; there was therefore more incentive among women to rally as women and perform their patriotic duties as women. Women’s patriotism was officially encouraged to find expression in “proudly and gladly ‘leading’ their menfolk to enlist.” Women influenced (and were influenced by) the growth of popular nationalism in the German states, yet they held a different position in this nationalistic fervour than men. Universal conscription therefore had the opportunity to both include and exclude; men from different political, economic and religious backgrounds were encouraged to engage in military, political and social affairs at the expense of the exclusion of all women.

The explicit exclusion of women from the public sphere and full political citizenship has long since been assumed and accepted by political and military historians (except in anomalous cases of “warrior women”), but its implications for politics and war – and therefore for nationalism – have been largely unexplored. The citizen-soldier was not simply the result of a negative argument against women, but a positive argument for men. The revolutionary “[d]iscourse of the citizen-soldier,” argue Dudink and Hagemann, “revolved around a new and powerful notion of masculinity.” The citizen-soldier achieved his citizenship through his willingness to fight for the Republic (or, in

56 Ibid., 400.
57 Frevert, A Nation in Barracks, 33.
58 Ibid., 4.
the Prussian case, to die for the fatherland)\textsuperscript{60} and his citizenship was exactly that: his. As
universal male suffrage theoretically placed all men on par with one another, masculinity
was politicized and “virilised” through the conflation of this male citizenship and military
service.\textsuperscript{61} The idea of the citizen as masculine was a product of the political structures
that underlay the creation of the citizen-soldier. The citizen-soldier was only a “nascent
vision of the citizen,” but because he gained his political rights through his military
activity and his willingness to fight for his nation, he redrew the lines of gender
difference that were to characterize the modern nation.\textsuperscript{62} Hagemann argues that the
military was not so much a school of the nation as it was a school of masculinity.\textsuperscript{63} As
Tosh observes in his discussion of public schools, these national institutions were not
patriarchal simply because they excluded women, but because they emphasized the
importance of their male participants’ masculinity.\textsuperscript{64} The model for national citizenship
was masculinized.

Men’s exclusive participation in the public sphere, which was at first grounded in
the classical civic tradition that Enlightenment \textit{philosophes} such as Rousseau promoted,
now found articulation in the same language that was used to express nationalism: the
language of ahistoric naturalness. “It was no accident,” argue Timm and Sanborn, “that
men and women were found to be biologically opposite creatures at the precise moment,
just after the French Revolution, when most Europeans were reinforcing the exclusion of

\textsuperscript{60} Hagemann, “German Heroes,” 117.
\textsuperscript{61} Landes, “Republican Citizenship and Heterosocial Desire,” 96.
\textsuperscript{62} Aalestad, Hagemann and Miller, “Gender, War and the Nation,” 502.
\textsuperscript{63} Karen Hagemann, “Military, War, and the Mainstreams: Gendering Modern German Military History,”
\textit{Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography}, eds. Karen Hagemann and Jean H.
\textsuperscript{64} John Tosh, “What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain,”
women from the public sphere.\textsuperscript{65} In \textit{Making Sex}, Thomas Laqueur explains this transformation as a shift from a one-sex social model of gender to a two-sex biological model. The modern definition of sex, Laqueur argues, was “invented” by the political traditions of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{66} As the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth, masculinity and femininity were reinterpreted as biological attributes that dictated men and women’s social positions. Patriarchal privilege became natural and ahistorical, which had a profound impact on the way men and women were positioned with regard to the political and material factors in which Gellner, Hobsbawm and Breuilly are interested. The “natural” connection between military duties and political rights can be seen in the increasingly negative reception by society of women who enlisted in the army during the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Liberation. In the eighteenth century, female warriors were to a large degree accepted and embraced by society and literature, as long as they returned to feminine roles after their wartime adventures; however, as the \textit{levée en masse} (which was relatively easy for women to join) evolved into a professional army, women’s political status changed to the extent that those who fought in the military were infringing upon the exclusively male right to engage in politics, and were therefore a threat to the social and political order.\textsuperscript{67} Similarly, “women revolutionaries (as political women) \textit{became} unnatural during the course of the Revolution.”\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{65} Timm and Sanborn, \textit{Gender, Sex, and the Shaping of Modern Europe}. 2.
\textsuperscript{66} Thomas Laqueur, \textit{Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud} (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1990), 149.
\textsuperscript{67} Karen Hagemann, “‘Heroic Virgins’ and ‘Bellicose Amazons’: Armed Women, the Gender Order and the German Public During and After the Anti-Napoleonic Wars,” \textit{European History Quarterly} 37:4 (2007), 511.
\textsuperscript{68} Landes, \textit{Women and the Public Sphere}, 12.
between men and women were now intrinsically rooted in their physiologies: all men were naturally soldiers, and as such received political rights; all women were not.⁶⁹ In the eighteenth century, the project to understand the Geschlechtscharacter, or the “character of the sexes,” transformed the social differences between men and women into essential differences.⁷⁰ The citizen-soldier was a significant factor in this process of gender naturalization, as he claimed political rights as a function of his biologically inherent masculinity. Although both nationalism and (biologically-based) masculinity used the language of ahistoric naturalness as the basis for their claims, they were both products of the same historical moment. The naturalization of gender difference meant that “natural” masculine privilege within the public sphere was normalized at the same moment that nationalism became a powerful political currency.

Despite the realities of male and female activity during the French Revolution and the Wars of Liberation, the citizen-soldier dynamic effectively excluded women from the political sphere by shaping political rights as an exclusively masculine privilege, despite its rhetoric of universality. Through the nation-building political processes of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, gender was politicized and naturalized through “separate spheres” rhetoric, thereby establishing the nation as a masculine entity.⁷¹ “Gender,” Scott remarked in her influential article “Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis,” “has been seen as antithetical to the real business of politics,” yet

⁶⁹ Hagemann, “Heroic Virgins’ and ‘Bellicose Amazons,’” 512.
⁷¹ Aalestad, Hagemann and Miller, “Gender, War and the Nation,” 505.
the politicization of gender has vital implications for a political and/or material understanding of nationalism. Just as Landes suggests that Habermas’s model of public and private spheres requires an analysis of gender, the omission of masculinity in materialist scholars’ theories of nationalism is fundamentally problematic.

Gellner’s definition of nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent,” is not tenable. Breuilly’s statement that the French Revolution appealed to individual rights rather than shared sentiments must of course refer only to male rights. At first glance, however, this congruency requirement does not seem to pose a problem in a discussion that is solely about men: as Landes and Hagemann have shown, in France and Germany the political unit was exclusively male, as was the national unit, insofar as the citizen-soldier claimed national citizenship as a male privilege. However, the political institutions that upheld this exclusively male nation were forged in a climate that stressed male subjects’ masculinity as well as their citizenship. The material processes that created national citizens were not gender-neutral, yet these materialist scholars attempt to bypass the gender dimension of political and material nationalism in their use of gender-neutral terminology. “The public,” “the citizen” and “the people” are ostensibly gender-neutral, yet masculinity resides in these terms, though it remains invisible. Louise F. Pusch observes that while “the citizen” may be a gender-neutral term, it is impossible to visualize a gender-neutral French or German citizen without visualizing a male figure; “language is organized grammatically in such a way that the image ‘male person’ is generated by almost every

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73 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1.
sentence that mentions people." The idea of the public sphere not only equates "the public" with men; it also "implies that the public sphere and its values are synonymous with masculinity." Materialist scholars' evasion of gender and masculinity quietly promulgates the assumption that masculinity is natural, and furthermore that it is neutral and does not affect historical subjects. Gellner, Hobsbawm and Breuilly argue for an understanding of nationalism that is dependent upon the political and material contexts of modernity, yet by ignoring the masculinity of their historical subjects they obscure the gendered character of the processes that they attempt to explain.

III. Non-Materialist Theories of Nationalism and Hegemonic Masculinities

The second group of scholars I examine also situates the birth of modern nationalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but instead of examining the material causes of nationalism, these scholars understand nationalism as collective participation; I will therefore refer to them as non-materialists. Elie Kedourie, George Mosse, and Benedict Anderson all provide non-materialist theories of nationalism.

In his seminal work on nationalism, written in 1960, Kedourie provides one of the earliest articulations of nationalism that challenges the traditional long-term view. Like

74 Although Pusch discusses German grammar, her comments are also pertinent in English. Luise F. Pusch, "Language is Publicity for Men – But Enough is Enough!" Gender and Germanness – Cultural Productions of Nation, ed. Patricia Heminghouse and Magda Mueller (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), 326.

the materialist scholars, he places nationalism in a firm historical context:

"[n]ationalism," he declares, "is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century." Kedourie focuses on the intellectual and philosophical traditions of late eighteenth-century Germany to explain why nationalism emerged when it did. Philosophers such as Kant understood logic to be the governing and universal rule of nature, wherein absolutism was a social contract between ruler and ruled that operated for the benefit of all people. This attitude was taken to extremes during the French Revolution; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen stated that sovereignty logically arose from the nation, not from the divine right of the ruler. This conception of the nation as sovereign derives from a presupposition of the collective will of the individuals of the nation; rule, law, and legality in this national context are dependent on the will of the people. Individuals only understand reality through their identification with a collective whole; in a national context, individuals willingly put the welfare of the state before their own interests. The rhetoric of nationalism supports the belief that all individuals within a nation are equal; nationalism disguises inequalities within this collective whole. Although Kedourie has been accused of misinterpreting Kant, he sees nationalism as a modern product of the German philosophical tradition and a response to the French Revolution. "France is not a state because the French constitute a nation," he summarizes; "the French state is the outcome of dynastic

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77 Ibid., 10.
78 Ibid., 12.
79 Ibid., 18.
80 Ibid., 38.
81 Ibid., 127.
ambitions, of circumstances, of lucky war, of administrative and diplomatic skills [...] these which made possible at last the cohesive existence of Frenchmen within the French state.”

In *Nationalization of the Masses* (1975) and *Nationalism and Sexuality* (1985), Mosse expounds upon this idea of collective will, though he nuances it with an exploration of the growth of the bourgeoisie and of a “respectable” definition of sexuality; in fact, Mosse’s treatment of masculinity is in many ways an effective example of a gendered theory of nationalism. Mosse argues that nationalism grew from the eighteenth-century idea of citizenship as a “common substance” for which all members of a nation qualified. This notion of citizenship merged with an understanding of the nation as a product of “the people,” wherein (in the words of Erik Erikson) “each particle achieves an identity by its mere interdependence with all the others.” This process was influenced by the growing middle classes, who defined themselves not solely by their economic intake or status but by an ideal of respectability and their perceived superiority from the upper and lower classes. Mosse examines the aesthetics of the new politics in the German territories, in which Greco-Roman art was used to connect the German nation with a classical, ahistoric past, as well as with a tradition that embraced unity, order, and an appreciation for the cosmic and universal. German and French, pagan and Christian symbols were appropriated by the nation, so that nationalism took on the magnitude of

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83 Kedourie, *Nationalism*, 78.
85 Ibid., 12.
87 Ibid., 36.
religion. This idea of the nation, "symbolized by an eternal concept of beauty," theoretically eliminated social and economic distinctions between Germans. However, the rise of middle-class notions of respectability created a national stereotype that was both bourgeois and male, for "manliness symbolized the nation's spiritual and material vitality." The citizen-armies of the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Liberation provided the impetus for the ascension of masculinity in the German self-image as the middle classes came into power. Although the German middle classes had almost no political say in this period, bourgeois respectability was the primary "unifying force of society;" for Mosse, the collective imagination was more important for nationalism than any political or material factors.

The most forceful articulation of nationalism as the product of a collective imagination, however, is Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983). Anderson argues against a definition of nationalism as ideology, stating that nationalism is more like kinship and religion than liberalism or fascism. The nation is an imagined political community, inherently limited and sovereign. He refutes Gellner's critique of this theory by stating that imagination is not to be equated with fabrication, and that "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity / genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined." The French Revolution destroyed the legitimacy of divinely-ordained hierarchies, and established the nation as a "deep, horizontal comradeship," despite the

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88 Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, 45.
89 Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, 94.
90 Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, 23.
91 Ibid., 66.
92 Ibid., 182.
94 Ibid., 6.
“actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.” Although he largely concentrates on Latin America and Southeast Asia in his later works, Anderson’s three-part model for the development of nationalism is formulated with attention to the European context. Anderson outlines the three “fundamental cultural conceptions” that needed to disintegrate before nationalism could become viable: that language (specifically script) “offered privileged access to ontological truth,” that society was “naturally organized around and under high centers that were divinely ordained,” and the “conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and of men essentially identical.” “Beneath the decline of sacred communities, languages and lineages,” Anderson argues, “a fundamental change was taking place in modes of apprehending the world, which, more than anything else, made it possible to ‘think’ the nation.” With the growth of the bourgeoisie, the first class to imagine themselves as a class, a new national community could be imagined vernacularly.

These scholars concentrate on nationalism as a form of horizontal comradeship that binds an imagined national community together despite the actual inequalities which may exist within the nation. Historians such as Landes and Hagemann, however, have shown that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the participants of this imagined community were explicitly gendered as male. Although nationalist writers of the time attempted to gloss over differences such as class and religion, citizens’ (male) gender and masculinity were presupposed. Just as materialist scholars attempt to simply

95 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.
96 Ibid., 36.
97 Ibid., 22.
98 Ibid., 77, 79.
evade the gender of their historical subjects through gender-neutral terminology, the non-materialists work with a model of nationalism that relies in a fundamental way upon the dynamic operations of masculinity within the imagined national community. By applying R.W. Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinities to this version of nationalism, I argue that the conception of a national community is dependent upon a single vision of masculinity to which other masculinities (and all women) are subjugated.

In order to understand the imagined community as an imagined masculine community, I must first outline Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity. This theory states that patriarchy depends on unequal relations between men as well as unequal relations between the genders.\(^9\) Tosh defines hegemonic masculinity as “those norms and institutions which actively serve to maintain men’s authority over women and over subordinated masculinities.”\(^10\) The patriarchal dividends of this system of power are not available to all men, but only to those men who exemplify and maintain the hegemonic version of masculinity. Furthermore, Michael S. Kimmel argues that masculinity should always be discussed in the plural, because there are “multiple meanings of manhood. Simply put, not all [...] men are the same,” despite the presence of a masculine model to which all men are encouraged to aspire.\(^10\) Scholars such as Thembisa Waetjaen have amended Connell’s model by arguing that there is no single dominant masculinity. By looking at “failed” nationalisms, namely Chief Buthelezi’s Zulu organization Inkatha in


\(^{10}\) Ibid., 51.

South Africa, Waetjaen argues that nationalism is often required to make use of more than one model of masculinity.\textsuperscript{102} Patriarchy and nationalism are not necessarily “mutually supportive constructions”; there is often tension between the two.\textsuperscript{103} “Although it is certain,” Waetjaen argues, “that maleness offers privileges over broad and varied social terrain, men are located in relations of class, age, and racialized hierarchies with differential access to authoritative and allocative power.”\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, although the concept of a “universal masculinity” was promoted and appealed to during the French Revolution and the Wars of Liberation, masculinity cannot be conceived of as a universal category; there are many models of masculinity and all are utilized differently within patriarchal systems.\textsuperscript{105}

A new dominant model of masculinity came to the fore in Europe in the late eighteenth century in the form of the citizen-soldier. As both Dudink and Laqueur have (separately) argued, until the late eighteenth century masculinity was a flexible category, defined not against femininity but in proximity to it.\textsuperscript{106} As the eighteenth century progressed, however, masculinity and femininity were solidified as natural categories and the effete, luxurious aristocratic gentleman gave way to a different model of masculinity that was less threatening to the newly-naturalized gender order.\textsuperscript{107} If the French

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 124.
\textsuperscript{105} Dudink and Hagemann, “Masculinity in Politics and War,” 19.
\end{flushleft}
Revolution is understood as a bourgeois revolution, it must also be understood as a
masculinizing bourgeois revolution against a demasculinizing absolutism, in which
aristocratic women were able to access power through salons.\(^{108}\) Although women from
all social classes famously participated in the French Revolution, they were eventually
relegated to secondary citizenship; the French nation that emerged in the nineteenth
century was based not simply on women’s non-participation, but on their outright
exclusion.\(^{109}\) Men were thereby \textit{gendered} in this period as well as \textit{politicized}.\(^{110}\) The
figure of the citizen-soldier came to represent the hegemonic masculinity of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries – an ideal of manliness that was borne of the
“respectable” values of the emerging middle classes, intrinsic both to middle-class self-
definition and national ideology, and was rooted in politics and war.\(^{111}\)

The figure of the citizen-soldier had a profound influence on the development of
French and German nationalism, if nationalism is defined as a product of a collective
national imagination. Canning and Rose define national citizenship as “a political status
assigned to individuals by states, as a relation of belonging to specific communities, or as
a set of social practices that define the relationship between peoples and states and among
peoples within communities.”\(^{112}\) This position implies the possession of civil, political
and/or social rights. Citizenship can be coterminous with nationality, or it can be used to
exclude certain groups within a nation.\(^{113}\) In the case of Germany and France, the use of

\(^{108}\) Landes, \textit{Women and the Public Sphere}, 10.
\(^{109}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{110}\) Hagemann, “Gendered Images of the German Nation,” 673.
\(^{111}\) Mosse, \textit{Nationalism and Sexuality}, 23.
\(^{112}\) Canning and Rose, “Gender, Citizenship, and Subjectivity,” 427.
\(^{113}\) Ibid., 428.
gender images in the process of mobilizing patriotism for a national war ensured that masculinity became the dominant trope of claims for citizenship.114 This explicitly gendered rhetoric of literature, art, and political propaganda served not to smooth over the material differences between male and female citizenship, but instead used these differences as the basis for fuelling *male* patriotism. The use of gender in this rhetoric complicates Anderson’s argument that the idea of horizontal comradeship obscures the inherent contradictions of equality within a nation. For example, Prussia’s defeat in 1806-07 provided a major impetus for stirring patriotism and instigating military reform to match the *Grande Armée*. Journals, newspapers and literature were all invoked to fuel nationalist sentiment amongst Prussian men and encourage mass support for military mobilization. The rhetoric of this propaganda was highly “German” and highly gendered; it attempted to establish the German identity in opposition to France, to women, and to effeminacy. In Hagemann’s examination of the phenomenon of “manly valor” in Prussian propaganda, France was depicted as weak and unmanly, in opposition to the virtuous and honourable (and male) German citizens.115 The association of France with femininity capitalized on those French women who were attempting to gain political rights and thereby infringing upon French men’s natural sphere of dominance. The characterization of France as weak and womanly helped to stabilize masculine self-confidence after Prussia’s failure in the Fourth Coalition (1806-07).116 Nationalistic propaganda operated on the supposition that all citizens were men, and it addressed all men as citizens; this version of nationalism implied that women were therefore *not* citizens (or at least not

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116 Ibid., 202.
primary citizens) and that the opposite of (masculine) German nationalism was (French) effeminacy. In the cultural and political representations of nationalism (literature, propaganda, songs, artwork, etc.) during the period 1789-1815, the respective masculinities of the French Republic and the German Volk were achieved at the expense of women of both nations, not only by denying them political rights but through the xenophobic assignment of femininity as a quality of the other nation.

The idea of the nation as an embodiment of masculine qualities contributed to a conflation of masculinity and nationalism. Prussian propaganda romanticized war for a new group of men who had previously been exempt from military service. Despite the general disreputability of the professional soldier at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the figure of the citizen-soldier embodied the qualities, such as bravery, honour, and middle-class virtue, of the new hegemonic model of masculinity.117 This figure was present in the literature of the period. Friedrich Schlegel’s “Gelübde” (“Vow”), published in 1809, is an “emphatic summons to an all-German struggle for liberation from Napoleonic domination.”118 Authors such as Schlegel, Friedrich Gentz and Adam Mueller produced nationalistic lyrics and poems, which were especially effective at mobilizing middle-class urban men.119 These songs and poems made an effort to downplay differences between Protestants and Catholics, as well as between the aristocracy and the middle and lower classes, and they spread across all of the German provinces, albeit with some regional differences.120 While valorous masculinity had

117 Frevert, A Nation in Barracks, 30.
118 Hagemann, “‘Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!’” 41.
119 Ibid., 44.
120 Ibid., 51.
always been present in the cultural imagination during times of war and conflict, it was now the hegemonic model of manliness; in Hagemann’s words, this new model “became hegemonic for the first time, securing male power in the state by tying the political rights of the citizen to military service.”¹²¹ The romanticization of the citizen-soldier offered two different visualizations of the fatherland. In the first instance, the monarch was presented as the patriarch in a father-son relationship that provided the basis for patriotism. In the second instance, the fatherland was depicted as a beloved woman. In either form, however, the fatherland was critical to a man’s sense of himself as not only a citizen but a man.¹²²

This second depiction of the nation as the beloved was popular in both literature and art of the period, and it further complicates Anderson’s and Kedourie’s claims that nationalism depends on a horizontal comradeship that blurs rather than exacerbates material differences within a national community. The nation as the beloved explicitly addresses itself to a male audience, and depends upon a certain conception (in this case, the citizen-soldier) of masculinity to generate nationalistic sentiment. The nation as the beloved evoked a homosocial national community, and called on men to love the nation “with the sentimental attachments associated with heterosexual, romantic love.”¹²³ In France, the use of a female figure to represent Liberty distanced the new nation (and the new nationalism) from the Ancien Régime. A male figure was specifically and metonymically connected to the body politic, as the king both stood for and was a part of

¹²¹ Hagemann, “‘German Heroes,’” 130.
¹²² Hagemann, “‘Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!’” 55-56.
the nation, but a female Liberty was metaphorically abstract and unthreatening. By implementing a female Liberty, the political and cultural elites addressed their attempts to rouse patriotism to a solely male audience. Landes observes that men “were encouraged to love the nation as man to wife, lover to beloved,” which ensured that both their manliness and their heterosexuality was extended from the realm of the family and firmly established in the public sphere as the basis of their citizenship. In the imagined community, not all citizens were created equal: the language of gender difference and familial ties was used to smooth over material differences between (male) citizens in the interests of promoting a single ideal of hegemonic masculinity and rousing (men’s) nationalist sentiments.

According to the model put forward by Kedourie and Anderson, nationalism operates by concealing the political, material and social inequalities that may exist within a nation in order to promote the image of a unified (and relatively homogenous) population. This process of imagining communities focuses on the commonalities (whether real or ideal) between citizens. What Anderson refers to as the “deep, horizontal comradeship” of the nation depends on the nationalist emphasis on equality and commonality. As with the materialists, Kedourie and Anderson provide theories of nationalism in which gender seems to be peripheral, even negligible; the rhetoric of nationalism, however, was not gender-neutral. The patriotic imagery that was invoked in France and the German territories was highly gendered not only because it included men and excluded women, but also because it lauded a hegemonic version of masculinity as the primary medium through which individuals could participate in the nation. As

__124__ Landes, _Visualizing the Nation_. 74.
Waeften observes, “[i]nvoking nationhood in the language of the family smoothes over other fragmentations”;¹²⁵ gender differences were not obscured but emphasized in order to promote national unity. An exploration of masculinity reveals that Kedourie and Anderson’s arguments for horizontal comradeship are not sufficient explanations of nationalism. Mosse is more successful. He augments his non-materialist theory of nationalism in *Nationalization of the Masses* with a discussion of gender in *Nationalism and Sexuality*. He moves from the gender-neutral idea that citizenship is a common substance for which “everyone” qualifies to the idea that nationalism privileges masculinity and has a “special affinity” for male society.¹²⁶

Mosse aside, modernist historians – both material and non-material – promote theories of nationalism that rely upon constructions of masculinity, yet they never address it. The modernists stress that nationalism was a product of the modern period, primarily informed by the political effects of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution and the massive military campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars and the Wars of Liberation. These events were more important for the rise of nationalism than any pre-existing proto-nationalisms or regional affiliations. However, although these events (according to the modernists) gave rise to French and German nationalism, this nationalism was not a potentially neutral phenomenon because it invoked (among other things) gender. Nationalism was fused to a hegemonic model of valourous masculinity at its inception. The materialist theory must take account of the fact that with the rise of the citizen-soldier, political rights were extended to all men and denied to all women; the public

sphere was masculinized in a way it had not been during the Ancien Régime. Only soldiers could be citizens (that is to say, legal and political participants in the nation), and only men could be soldiers. The non-materialist theory must take account of the fact that the horizontal comradeship of the nation was articulated in the language of masculinity and appealed to men as agents with masculinity; in cases where the nation was depicted as female or feminine, it was done in an attempt to encourage men to defend her militarily.

IV. Long-Term Theories of Nationalism and The Problem of Essentialism

The third category of scholars I examine belong to a classical historical tradition against which both previous groups of scholars argue. Hans Kohn, Carlton Hayes and John Alexander Armstrong are proponents of this long-term view; they do not argue that nationalism is not a modern phenomenon, but rather that it must be understood as a product of long-term processes.

In The Idea of Nationalism (1944) Kohn begins by stating that nationalism requires a modern context: it cannot be conceived without popular sovereignty and a centralized territorial government. 127 Kohn also insists, however, that modern nationalism emerged from the same formative factors as primitive social groups. 128 These factors include territorial boundaries, common language, common descent, xenophobia and the

128 Ibid., 4.
belief in the relative superiority of one’s own group. The creation of these primitive social groups is natural, but nationalism is not. Kohn suggests that early peoples saw their language as fact, not culture; therefore the difference between the attitudes of primitive social groups and the phenomenon of nationalism is that nationalism must first of all be “a state of mind, an act of consciousness.” In this respect, Kohn’s argument accords with the non-materialist scholars; he argues that nationalism was not caused by the growth of vernacular language, literature, trade, or commerce. Although nationalism requires some elements of a certain set of “objective bounds” (descent, language, territory, politics, traditions, religion, etc.), more important is a “living and active corporate will.” Unlike the non-materialists, however, Kohn identifies the roots of this “corporate will” in Judea and Hellas. The continuity between modern European civilizations and antiquity is not racial but cultural. Kohn discounts racial arguments for nationalism as mythical products of the age of nations, either as the “unchangeable inheritance” of blood, or as the volksgeist, an “ever-welling source of nationality and all its manifestations.” Although modern nationalism distinguishes itself from early social groups by its modern contexts, such as democracy and its increasing morality, nationalism is the conscious continuation of the struggle for human emancipation which began in Palestine and Hellas.

130 Ibid., 6.
131 Ibid., 7, 10.
132 Ibid., 13.
133 Ibid., 15.
134 Ibid., 13.
135 Kohn understands the nineteenth century as the material realization of eighteenth-century demands for liberty and human dignity, which were first articulated in the sixteenth century. Ibid., 575.
136 Ibid., 576.
Like Kohn, Hayes argues in *Nationalism: A Religion* (1960) that nationalism is a modern (European) development, and similarly is a result of consciousness;\(^{137}\) unlike Kohn, Hayes stresses the linguistic and religious roots of this consciousness. The patriotism that is necessary for nationalism to flourish is a natural phenomenon, he argues. Nationalism first found shape in tribalism (which Hayes defines as the primary form of nationalism)\(^{138}\) then expanded into "broader loyalties" and eventually achieved "full flowering in the West."\(^{139}\) The emergence modern nationalism was dependent on four factors, the most important of which was the growth of vernacular languages and the printing press.\(^{140}\) Indeed, Hayes argues that nationalism in Africa and Asia is dissimilar to European nationalism precisely because the key role that language and print should play is muted by widespread illiteracy.\(^{141}\) He also stresses the religious aspect of nationalism: humankind is naturally religious, and it is this innate religiosity that gives nationalism its power.\(^{142}\) Nationalism achieved its modern character through religious reform and the gradual subordination of the church to state, but also in the transformation of religious modes of thought.\(^{143}\) According to Enlightenment tradition, nationalism and deism were both seen as natural and logical.\(^{144}\) By the mid-nineteenth century, with the popularization of cultural nationalism, nationalism was no longer understood as natural and logical but natural, supralogical, and supreme: it transcended mundane reason.\(^{145}\)


\(^{138}\) Ibid., 20.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 19.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 30.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., 158.

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 36.

\(^{144}\) Ibid., 53.

\(^{145}\) Ibid., 93.
Hayes has some arguments in common with the non-materialists, especially Mosse, in his emphasis on the role of imagination in sustaining and invoking both religion and nationalism,\textsuperscript{146} and his argument that contemporary nationalism "appeals to man's 'religious sense.'"\textsuperscript{147} Like Anderson, he argues that collective faith in the nation is the driving force of nationalism.\textsuperscript{148} As with Kohn, however, Hayes differs from the non-materialists in that he understands nationalism to be the fulfillment of a natural and innate human need; he places the advent of nationalism in the pre-modern past.

Armstrong's \textit{Nations Before Nationalism} (1982) is the most recent of the three texts and provides the most sophisticated and in-depth argument for a long-term understanding of nationalism. As a more modern articulation, it also avoids the overt Eurocentrism that Kohn and especially Hayes display, to the detriment of their arguments. Modern nationalism, Armstrong argues, is a "part of a cycle of ethnic consciousness"\textsuperscript{149} in which the internal ethnic characteristics of a group are less important for group identity than its self-perceived boundaries, which support the exclusion of and opposition to other groups.\textsuperscript{150} His concentration on opposition informs his study as he examines different forms of national identities and contrasts their "nostalgic myths." Military success, he argues, is the source of identity for major ruling families; other people then join this genealogical set and adopt and promote these myths.\textsuperscript{151} In Europe, these military myths merged with local myths to become a territorial identity whereas, in

\textsuperscript{146} Hayes, \textit{Nationalism}, 164.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 176.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 29.
the nomadic context of the Middle East, the genealogical identity remained intensely important.\textsuperscript{152} Wider identity myths appeared first in capital cities and city-states; the clearly-delineated territory and consolidated institutions of the capital “developed their own inertia, including esprit de corps centering on metropolitan styles, pride in administrative efficacy, and acceptance of the dynasty’s mythomoteur,” or myth-engine.\textsuperscript{153} In Europe, this mythic momentum developed into the universal myth, where earthly nations were understood as a “universal terrestrial empire reflecting the order of heaven” and whose institutions upheld the “supremacy of centralized authority.”\textsuperscript{154} Because polities were larger than cities, there was difficulty in disseminating myths beyond the elite, but religion could do for these myths what the dynastic administration could not: like Hayes, Armstrong argues that the “penetrative power of religious organizations has important implications for formation of ethnic identity.”\textsuperscript{155} As he sketches this trajectory for nationalism, Armstrong emphasizes the importance of the frontier or “shatter” zone, which provides the legitimizing myth for polities on both sides and helps form supraethnic identities.\textsuperscript{156} Although societies on either side of this rift shared lifestyles, they saw themselves as hostile, because they (e.g., Christians and Muslims) defined themselves in terms of doctrinal cleavages rather than their similarities.\textsuperscript{157} Ethnic identities, Armstrong concludes, are determined not by internal properties such as language but by their interactions in this shatter zone, sustained by

\textsuperscript{152} Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism, 38.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 197.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 91.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 90.
politics and the religious dissemination of myths; therefore there is "nothing predetermined about the boundaries that distinguish an ethnic collectivity" because there is nothing intrinsic to ethnicity.\textsuperscript{158} Armstrong concludes that nationalism is the product of an ethnoreligious rather than ethnolinguistic identity.\textsuperscript{159}

While none of these scholars argue for a "natural" reading of nationalism, Kohn and Hayes suggest that nationalism has natural roots. Kohn argues that primitive societies self-identify naturally; similarly, by depicting tribalism as a solid foundation from which nationalism gradually emerged, Hayes implies that tribalism is to some degree self-explanatory and does not require the same level of examination that nationalism does. Armstrong takes the opposite approach and emphasizes the role of the "shatter zone" in creating identities, not through intra-group similarities but through inter-group differences and the material and institutional forces that developed to sustain these differences. Kohn, Hayes and Armstrong have certain arguments in common with the materialists and the immaterialists, but although they acknowledge the modern character of nationalism they place its roots in pre-modern times, focusing upon primitive social groups, tribalism, shatter zones and \textit{mythomoteurs}.

This long-term understanding of nationalism is a potential stumbling-block for gender historians, who tend to approach nationalism as a modern phenomenon and analyze it as such. Hagemann, for example, argues that nationalism and politicized masculinity were forged at the same historical moment; therefore an analysis of a long-term view of nationalism would be antithetical to her position. By basing nationalism in a

\textsuperscript{158} Armstrong, \textit{Nations Before Nationalism}, 7.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 240.
“natural” tribalism, Hayes and Kohn bypass the rationale of her argument. Masculinity is automatically supplementary rather than constitutive in a discussion of long-term nationalism (barring, of course, the kind of essentialist understanding of gender and sexual difference that Laqueur and other gender historians have successfully disproved). The long-term theory of nationalism seems to be insulated against gender analysis. I have therefore decided to examine a single text to determine if there is a space in which gender can operate in the analysis of long-term nationalism.

In “A Socio-Biological Perspective,” Pierre van den Berghe provides a theory of long-term nationalism that dismisses the nuances of Armstrong’s articulation, yet brings the theory to its logical culmination. Whereas Kohn and Hayes are comfortable to merely hint at the causes of the transition from religious ties and tribal “agglomerations” to full-blown nationalism, van den Berghe makes explicit the connections between nationalism, ethnicity and kin.\(^{160}\) Van den Berghe takes the three main genetic mechanisms for animal sociability – kin selection, reciprocity (cooperation for mutual benefit) and coercion (the use of force for solely personal benefit) – and applies them to human society on the basis that “human behavior is the product of a long process of adaptive evolution that involved the complex interplay of genotypical, ecological and cultural factors.”\(^{161}\) Cooperation between individuals is not altruistic, but merely genetic selfishness: all cooperation is intended to further the interests of their offspring, whether existent or potential, but also the offspring of their kin, with whom they share genetic material. The extent of this


cooperation can be determined by a simple cost/benefit ratio, depending on the degree of genetic relatedness between individuals.162 These cooperative kinship groups formed “superfamilies,” “small in-bred populations of a few hundred individuals, prototypical ‘tribes’ that regarded themselves as ‘the people’, sharing common descent, real or putative, and as children of the mythical founder couple or creator god.”163 In these inbred superfamilies, belief in their relatedness was more important than genetic reality, since the visible phenotypes that were used to differentiate kin groups from each other were biologically trivial.164 Furthermore, since groups were largely immobile and lived in close proximity to one another, culture was developed in order to exacerbate visible differences between them; like Armstrong, van den Berghe emphasizes the need for groups to define themselves in terms of intergroup differences rather than intragroup similarities. The kinship (or imagined-as-kinship) ties of the superfamily were an outgrowth of genetic altruism, and became “the basis of these powerful sentiments we call nationalism, tribalism, racism, and ethnocentrism.”165 Van den Berghe clarifies that he is not arguing for an ethnocentric gene, but rather that “those societies that institutionalized norms of nepotism and ethnocentrism had a strong selective advantage [...] because kin selection has been the basic blueprint for animal society.”166 Once established, these ethnically-based nations had to rely on either reciprocity with one another, or the “asymmetrical parasitism” of coercion, which required legitimation first through paternalism and then, with the growth of global migration and multietnic states

163 Ibid., 98.
164 Ibid., 100.
165 Ibid., 98
166 Ibid., 99.
in the modern period, through democratic political ideologies such as liberalism and socialism.¹⁶⁷ Van den Berghe concludes that _liberté, égalité, et fraternité_ was merely coercive rhetoric in the guise of reciprocity; the French Revolution was not a watershed of nationalism, but merely a shift from paternal to democratic legitimation of a pre-existing extended kinship dynamic. In order to make a direct connection between modern nationalism and Darwinian evolution, van den Berghe’s socio-biological argument bypasses the mythic structures and ethnoreligiosity that Armstrong stresses. Though van den Berghe and Armstrong emphasize different aspects of ethnic development, they both stress the importance of family-related social groups in the growth of nationalism. Van den Berghe merely pushes long-term nationalism to its logical conclusion; he replaces the primitive social groups to which Kohn and Hayes vaguely allude with kinship groups that evolved out of the universal biological need of all living creatures: the need to ensure their genetic survival.

Van den Berghe’s interpretation of long-term nationalism highlights one of the central difficulties of this theory. Although Armstrong argues that ethnic boundaries are not determined by any intrinsic characteristics of an ethnic group, van den Berghe’s idea that individuals are biologically prone to nationalism reveals the most problematic tendency of the long-term theory: the tendency towards essentialism. This tendency has been effectively challenged by modernist theorists: if all individuals biologically tend towards nationalism, then why is nationalism not a global given? Why is nationalism present at different times and places, and to different degrees? Gellner’s criticism of this theory is that we do not live in a world of nations but in a world where some “potentially

national groups, in claiming this status, exclude others from making similar claims."168

According to Gellner, nationalisms can overlap and overtake one another. Breuilly observes that these overlapping nationalisms, as with Canada and Québec or Spain and Basque, can prove disruptive to many models of nationalism.169 Van den Berghe’s model – and indeed most models of long-term nationalism – insists that social groups of the type that lead to nationalism are organized by common descent and are mutually exclusive; van den Berghe’s pseudo-essentialist kinship model cannot explain Québécois nationalism.170 One counterargument that proponents of the long-term theory can deploy against the charge of essentialism is that while nationalism has deep roots (maybe even at the genetic level) its current expression is an effect of modern conditions. Kohn, for example, argues in The Idea of Nationalism that although nationalism has pre-modern roots, “the rise of the nation-state marked the gateway to modernity.”171 Gellner reveals this idea to be self-defeating: if nationalism were dormant or “slumbering” and required the conditions of modernity to emerge, then nationalism as it existed previously must have been ineffective and unimportant.172 Since all theories of nationalism attempt to explain its ability to mobilize populations and unify societies, the idea that nationalism exists and yet is negligible in its manifestations is antithetical to the theorization of nationalism, since it implies that nationalism is not significant enough to impact historical events. The idea that nationalism is merely a latent, unrealized force within a specific pre-modern population follows the same logic as the nationalist myth itself by suggesting that

168 Cited in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 78.
169 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 297.
171 Kohn, Prelude to Nation-States, 2.
172 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 48.
nationalism is the realization of static and pre-destined national units. Van den Berghe’s explicit articulation of the kinship basis for the long-term theory shows that despite its seemingly intuitive logic, it cannot respond to modernist critiques.

Van den Berghe, however, rejects the charge of essentialism: the socio-biological argument is self-admittedly reductionist, but he insists it is not racial, social Darwinist, or anti-culture. All modern science, van den Berghe argues, is reductionist, and therefore this charge should not be held against socio-biology in particular. His defense becomes problematic, however, once his theory is examined from a gendered perspective. Van den Berghe’s model privileges ethnicity, and more specifically kinship, as the basis of nationalism. In this respect, the long-term theory is the only theory of the three that integrates and relies on female activity in a non-peripheral way; therefore a discussion of gender in general, rather than specifically masculinity, is more helpful in this context.

Van den Berghe posits a static model for kinship: he supposes that ties between genetically-related individuals cannot be influenced by culture, politics or material conditions to any degree significant enough to override the desire for genetic survival through the maintenance of kinship ties. His kinship model is noticeably ungendered, and his failure to explicitly mention gender indicates that he assumes a static, ahistoric, “natural” vision of gender and family dynamics. In his connection between kinship structures and the desire for genetic survival, van den Berghe takes a biologically-determinist stance and collapses distinctions between individual interests, personal affections, and family loyalties. These factors, van den Berghe implies, are not culturally-mediated but solely the result of peoples’ evolutionary need to promote the interests of

the next generation. As historians of the family have shown, however, kinship structures are by no means static: "[t]he family was (and is) no universal, biologically-determined institution: on the contrary, its nature varies from one social milieu to another." Robert Lee’s study on Bavarian peasant families observes that "[t]oo many children were seldom regarded as a benefit to the family and after the birth of the fourth child it was claimed by contemporaries that parental attitudes noticeably deteriorated." This family structure stands in sharp contrast to the ideal bourgeois family unit of the nineteenth century, which was a product of an increasingly industrialized society and a growing middle-class ideology of respectability informed by strict gender divisions. The bourgeois family idealized the role of the child, whereas excess children in peasant families were often considered by their parents to be less valuable than a farm animal. These two opposing views of kinship (which depend upon the gendered nature of labour, among other factors) suggest that if van den Berghe’s argument is correct, biological determinants must be able override the vastly dissimilar forms of socialization that characterize these disparate structures. By using kinship as a constant variable that is always subject to the three principles of kin selection, reciprocity and coercion, van den Berghe provides a model that is not only reductionist but essentialist.

Van den Berghe’s lack of interest in gender stems from his disavowal of the importance of culture with regards to nationalism. Nationalism’s power originates in the

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176 Ibid., 33.
fact that it is inherent in human biology; he argues that the “ease and speed with which [nationalist] sentiments can be mobilized even in modern industrial societies [...] the blind ferocity of the conflicts to which these sentiments can lead, the imperviousness of such sentiments to rational arguments are but a few indications of their continued vitality, and their primordiality."177 The historical root of nationalism is pre-industrial and even, it seems, pre-logical; van den Berghe uses “primordiality” as a self-explanatory rationalization of nationalism’s “naturalness.” Not only does he argue that biology provides the explanation for individuals’ nationalistic tendencies, he argues that culture is irrelevant to this discussion: “[t]o explain the universality of ethnocentrism and kinship organization in human societies by invoking culture is completely question begging.”178 Van den Berghe’s disregard for cultural factors is exemplified in his statement that early societies were “prototypical ‘tribes’ that regarded themselves as ‘the people’, sharing common descent, real or putative, and as children of the mythical founder couple or creator god.”179 Both the development of religious beliefs and the development of social self-awareness are structured as biologically-ingrained responses to population growth within a society. Yet his exclusion of culture and his insistence on kinship ties is a highly contradictory combination, for kinship ties are influenced by gender, and gender is culturally defined, a “knowledge of sexual difference produced by culture and society – a knowledge that is neither absolute nor true.”180 Laqueur has argued extensively against the notion that cultural differences between men and women are reflections of biological

177 Van den Berghe, “A Socio-Biological Perspective,” 98
178 Ibid., 99.
179 Ibid., 98.
sex. "I have no interest in denying the reality of sex or of sexual dimorphism as an
evolutionary process," Laqueur reasons, "[b]ut I want to show on the basis of historical
evidence that almost everything one wants to say about sex – however sex is understood
– already has in it a claim about gender. Sex […] is situational; it is explicable only
within the context of battles over gender and power."\textsuperscript{181} There is no static standard of
sexual difference, totally divorced from cultural influences, upon which van den Berghe
can prop his kinship model. Van den Berghe’s own (contradictory) admission that culture
was employed by superfamilies to emphasize intergroup phenotypical differences
suggests that if biological factors can be used to explain the “universal” presence of
ethnocentrism and kinship organization in human societies, then so too can cultural
factors; after all, van den Berghe does not argue that some societies are more suited for
nationalism than others, but that all people have the biological impetus to protect their
kin and form social groups, and therefore culture, as a universal category of human
experience, can conceivably play the same role. Despite van den Berghe’s insistence
upon the importance of Darwinian evolution in socio-biology, he is ironically closed to
the option of change in the social structures that he claims stem from kinship ties. His
insistence on excluding cultural factors such as gender in his explanation undermines the
long-term theory of nationalism.

At first glance, the long-term theory of nationalism seems to be insulated against
the rationale of gender analysis. While gender historians argue that masculinity was
fundamental to the processes that caused nationalism to emerge in the modern period, the
long-term view bases nationalism in a “natural” pre-modern tribalism. Armstrong in
\textsuperscript{181} Laqueur, Making Sex, 11.
particular provides a complex and thorough survey of the deep roots of European nationalisms. His theory relies on cultural as well as biological factors, yet while he emphasizes the role of the mythomoteur and dominant myth culture in the development of primitive social groups, he ultimately insists upon an ethnoreligious basis for nationalism. Although Hayes and Kohn merely hint at the mechanics of this development, van den Berghe’s biological explication of these processes reveals the essentialist tendencies of the long-term theory. Quite aside from the fact that this theory struggles with the criticisms posed by modernist scholars, gender analysis reveals that this tendency towards essentialism is a fundamental and insurmountable problem. Van den Berghe’s socio-biological perspective attempts to sidestep gender dynamics, yet by using a static and supposedly ungendered model for kinship, he betrays essentialist assumptions about sex and gender and implicitly makes claims about cultural gender norms in the name of biological sex. This essentialist understanding posits that sex is ahistoric and naturally segues into a standard model for all human reproduction, family units, kinship groups and, eventually, nationalisms. This essentialist model for sex and gender is transformed into an essentialist model for nationalism. A gender analysis shows that the long-term theory of nationalism cannot accommodate these criticisms.
V. Conclusion

Gender is a crucial aspect of historical analysis, yet it is persistently omitted from histories of nationalism, and masculinity remains peripheral to most nationalist models. For example, Tosh observes that Hobsbawm’s 1999 edition of Industry and Empire did not address men as gendered subjects at all, and only briefly discussed women.\textsuperscript{182} The quotation with which I began this paper suggests a reason for this: Alonso states that since the majority of (nonfeminist) scholars understand the nation as a space in which women’s voices are generally irrelevant, gender is not an important paradigm through which to understand nationalism. The implication of this statement is that gender is understood to be a property of women but not of men; while women’s history seeks to reclaim women’s voices as gendered subjects both within and without nationalist narratives, masculinity remains tenaciously invisible. In the words of Rousseau, “[t]he male is only a male at times; the female is a female all her life and can never forget her sex.”\textsuperscript{183} As Pusch observed in her discussion of gender-neutral language, “man” is the default historical subject, and as such his gender is often invisible; men are the standards against which women are measured, and therefore a woman’s gender is a marker of her identity in a way that a man’s is not. “It is probably not possible to write a history of man’s body,” opines Laqueur, “because the historical record was created in a cultural tradition where no such history was necessary.”\textsuperscript{184} Yet gender is relational; masculinity

\textsuperscript{183} Cited in Tosh, “What Should Historians Do with Masculinity?” 180.
\textsuperscript{184} Laqueur, Making Sex, 22.
no more constitutes a static and self-sufficient category than femininity. Masculinity is a crucial aspect of historical inquiry not because it is a matter of maintaining parity with the increasing number of gendered works on women’s history, but because gender — like class and race — is a constitutive element of every historical subject’s social identity, whether s/he is male or female.185

In this respect, the topic of nationalism is well-poised to serve as a vehicle for the integration of gender into mainstream history. Tosh observes that while theorists of nationalism have often dismissed (women’s) gender as irrelevant to discussions of the public sphere, masculinity is highly pertinent to previously “ungendered” historical topics, such as nationalism.186 The challenges that have been posed to nationalism through the lens of masculinity by historians of gender such as Hagemann (who uses a modernist perspective of nationalism), but also by historians of sexuality such as Laqueur (whose theory does not address nationalism directly), demand a re-examination of how nationalism is conceived in relation to its gendered participants. Indeed, by ignoring gender, scholars of nationalism obscure the gendered character of the very processes they attempt to understand. Masculinity was one of the most significant factors in the emergence of nationalism in the period from the French Revolution to the Wars of Liberation, and modernist theories of nationalism are amenable to an integration of masculinity in a thorough and fundamental way without derailing the main explicative processes of the arguments themselves. Materialist theories can be enhanced by the understanding that the material and political conditions of nationalism and nationhood

186 Ibid., 179.
were contingent upon gender; an individual’s access to the rights and resources of the
nation depended on his status as a man and a potential citizen-soldier just as much as (if
not more than) his economic or political status. Likewise, it is possible for non-materialist
theories to include a discussion of hegemonic masculinities and gender’s unique status as
a divisive rather than a unifying element in the imagined community, which thereby
significantly alters the nationalist experience for women and men. Mosse’s *Nationalism
and Sexuality*, which pays special attention to masculinity, is an example of this
profitable integration of gender analysis and nationalist history. It is more difficult,
however, to successfully integrate masculinity into a discussion of long-term nationalism;
gender analysis reveals the essentialist tendencies of this theory and therefore undermines
it as a useful method of explanation. While masculinity as a critical tool fundamentally
alters modernist theories of nationalism, these theories are more amenable to gender
analysis than long-term theories and are therefore more useful historical frameworks. The
integration of masculinity into a discussion of nationalism reveals that despite the
persistently “ungendered” character of mainstream history, nationalism and theories of
nationalism cannot be addressed without gender; gender is not merely a useful but a
necessary component of this discussion.

In this paper I have used masculinity as a deconstructive tool, and through it I
have revealed long-term nationalism’s inability to respond to a gendered critique. Lynn
Hunt argues in “The Challenge of Gender” that gender as a category of historical analysis
can do more than merely augment existing narratives; she suggests that it is the best-
poised paradigm in current historical discourse to create a new master narrative, since it
provides a way to overcome the ubiquitous androcentrism of mainstream history, as well as the narrower focus of traditional women’s history.\footnote{Cited in Angelika Schaser, “The Challenge of Gender: National Historiography, Nationalism, and National Identities,” \textit{Gendering Modern German History: Rewriting Historiography}, eds. Karen Hagemann and Jean H. Quataert (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 54.} While gender’s ability to provide a master narrative is as yet unproven, historians of gender cannot be content with mere deconstruction. The interaction of masculinity and nationalism in France and Germany from 1789 to 1815 shows how gender can be successfully integrated into mainstream history. Masculinity does not supplant but \textit{alters} modernist views of nationalism, and it does so in a fundamental way. Although the title of this work is “Gendering Theories of Nationalism,” I hope I have argued that this gendering is in no way a peripheral exercise. Both materialist and non-materialist theories must not only include masculinity but must also rely on its implications for their arguments. The main explicative processes of these arguments do not emerge unscathed from this gendering; the introduction of masculinity alters the way in which these theories conceive of their (newly-gendered) subjects, and thereby transforms the claims that historians can make about nationalism.
VI. Works Cited


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