A Review of Canadian Metropolitan Regions: Governance and Government

Andrew Sancton

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Department of Political Science
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
N6A 5C2
Tel: 519-850-2985
Fax: 519-661-3904
asancton@uwo.ca
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The aim of this paper is to describe and analyze the various approaches that have been taken within Canada over the past fifty years to the problems of metropolitan governance. This has been a period of exceptionally rapid urban growth, especially in areas immediately outside the boundaries of central-city municipalities. Such growth has caused the various provinces constantly to seek changes in local governmental institutions so as to adapt to this growth and to attempt to shape it efficiently and effectively.

Metropolitan areas

Statistics Canada defines census metropolitan area (CMAs) as follows:

A census metropolitan area (CMA) is formed by one or more adjacent municipalities centred on a large urban area (known as the urban core). The census population count of the urban core is at least 100,000 to form a census metropolitan area. To be included in the CMA…, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area, as measured by commuting flows derived from census place of work data. (Statistics Canada, 2006).

In this paper, we are focussing on Canada’s ten largest CMAs. They are listed in Table 1. The main difficulty in using this list of CMAs relates to Toronto. The five CMAs of Toronto, Oshawa, Hamilton, Kitchener, and St. Catharines-Niagara are contiguous, forming a continuous built-up urban area often known as the Golden Horseshoe, because of the horseshoe shape it forms as it wraps around the western tip of Lake Ontario. Only two of the CMAs in the
Golden Horseshoe -- Toronto and Hamilton -- are in the top ten. For the purposes of this paper, each will be treated separately.

Table 1 shows that there is considerable variation in the demographic characteristics of Canadian metropolitan areas. Between 2001 and 2006, five of the ten most populous metropolitan areas grew faster than the national average of 5.4 percent, with Calgary growing at a rate of 13.4 percent. At the opposite end of the scale was Winnipeg at only 2.7 percent.

Probably the most significant demographic differences among these CMAs relate to the diversity of their respective populations as measured both by the percentage of visible minorities and the percent foreign-born. Here both Toronto and Vancouver rank extremely high, attracting immigrants of all racial backgrounds from all over the world. The equivalent numbers for Quebec City are very low, confirming the city=s image as a governmental centre populated by provincial civil servants and as a regional centre for Canadians whose French origins go back about four centuries.

Toronto and Vancouver are both globalizing metropolitan areas with significant population growth fed by very high immigration levels. Although not as attractive to immigrants as Toronto and Vancouver, Montreal has increasingly become a magnet for French-speaking immigrants from places such as Haiti, Vietnam, Lebanon, and North Africa and for immigrants who are willing to learn French as a second or third language. The result is that Montreal has become the main physical location for the transformation of French Canada from an ethnically and racially homogeneous community to a much more diverse one, the members of which continue to share a common language (Germain and Rose, 2000).

Calgary and Edmonton are both riding a resource boom led by rising oil prices. As the corporate and financial centre of the Canadian oil industry, Calgary has been especially
prosperous in recent years, but neither place is a significant global city. Even less so are the remaining metropolitan areas listed in Table 1.

Public framework for addressing policy issues

Canada is a highly-urbanized and highly-decentralized federation. Under the Canadian constitution, provinces have direct responsibility not only for municipal institutions but also for education and health-care facilities. This means that many of the most important decisions about public-sector institutions within Canada’s metropolitan areas are under provincial jurisdiction. In theory at least, the federal government can spend money on such provincial matters as education and health, but it cannot attempt to regulate them by enacting legislation. There is no constitutional obligation for provinces even to establish municipalities and local special-purpose bodies such as school boards, let alone devolve authority to them.

Most provinces have articulated strategic land-use policies, which municipalities are expected to follow. Most provinces have also been highly interventionist with respect to municipal structures, such that Canadian metropolitan areas over time and in different provinces have experienced almost every kind of institutional arrangement imaginable. The fact that provinces have been heavily involved has meant that non-governmental actors have been less important in metropolitan governance, certainly in comparison with metropolitan areas in the United States where involvement of private-sector and voluntary agencies has been a hallmark of what has often been labelled the “new regionalism” (Sancton, 2001).

Among the ten largest CMAs in Canada, there are effectively four different types of institutional arrangements for metropolitan governance:
No metropolitan level of government; various single-purpose authorities; and strong provincial involvement in metropolitan issues. This is the institutional arrangement for Toronto.

A multi-functional metropolitan-level institution covering all or most of the CMA, as found in Montreal, Vancouver, and Quebec City.

A federal-government institution (the National Capital Commission) with multi-functional capability in the National Capital Region, which straddles the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

4) A single municipality that covers all or most of a CMA, making another level of metropolitan government unnecessary. This is the arrangement for each of the remaining top-ten CMAs, including Ottawa in Ontario and Gatineau in Quebec, which are the dominant municipalities within the National Capital region. Ironically, it is also the situation in Quebec City, where the central city comprises more than seventy percent of the population of the CMA and there is a form of metropolitan government.

Each arrangement will be described in turn.

Toronto: The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1954-97) was probably Canada’s best known municipal institutional innovation. “Metro” and its constituent municipalities became the textbook example of successful two-tier system. The upper-tier Metro council was created by the province of Ontario in 1953, primarily to solve a service crisis in the rural and suburban municipalities surrounding the City of Toronto. These municipalities had been unable to cope with the infrastructure demands in the Toronto region caused by the explosive growth of the post-war economy. With its functional responsibility for water-supply and sewage-treatment systems, arterial roads, and regional planning, “Metro” facilitated, in a relatively orderly way, the
continued growth of the Toronto CMA in the late 1950s and 1960s (Frisken, 2008). By the 1970s, however, the Metro system in Toronto was facing at least three major problems:

1. Suburban municipalities within Metro had collectively surpassed the population of the central city, largely because of the infrastructure paid for through taxes collected within the central city. Once in the majority, suburbs seemed unwilling to use Metro to help rebuild deteriorating infrastructure within the central city and political tensions between the two sides mounted.

2. Most of the new urban growth within the Toronto CMA was taking place outside the boundaries of Metro but the provincial government did not extend its boundaries, thereby insuring that Metro’s regional planning functions became increasingly irrelevant.

Because the upper-tier authority was spending an increasing share of total municipal revenues, there was increasing pressure to have members of the upper-tier council directly elected to serve only at that level, rather than to have Metro councillors chosen by the lower-tier councils from among their own members. After the new arrangements for direct election were implemented in 1988, jurisdictional battles and disputes between elected politicians at the two levels became more common and the two-tier system was increasingly seen as politically dysfunctional.

In late 1996 the government of Ontario announced that the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and its constituent parts would be merged into one new City of Toronto. The primary stated purpose of this policy was to save money. The policy caused a huge political battle that has been well-documented elsewhere (Horak, 1998; Boudreau, 2000; and Sancton, 2000). The
key point for this chapter is that the controversial amalgamation had nothing to do with metropolitan governance. In 2006, the population of the Toronto CMA was 5.11 million but the amalgamated City has a population just under half that number. In fact, the Golden Horseshoe really contains more like 6.70 million people. Most of the difficult issues associated with metropolitan growth were taking place outside the amalgamated city’s borders.

**Multi-functional metropolitan institutions -- Vancouver, Montreal, Quebec City:** In the late 1960s the legislature in British Columbia established a network of “regional districts’ throughout the entire province that remains in place today. Metro Vancouver (as the regional district is now called) provides a mechanism for metropolitan government in British Columbia’s most populous CMA.

The provincial government in British Columbia was anxious to emphasize that a new level of government was not being created. The regional districts were to include many existing intermunicipal special-purpose bodies and to act as an institution through which increased intermunicipal cooperation could be encouraged. Regional districts are governed by a “board of directors,” not a council; directors are all themselves elected members of municipal councils and they have multiple votes depending on the size of the population they represent; municipalities can opt out of many regional services or, if they are near the outer boundaries, opt in to the services being provided by a neighbouring district; the districts were created without changing any existing municipal boundaries. Although there have been some calls for direct election to the boards of directors of regional districts (Smith and Stewart, 1998), no government has moved toward implementing such a change, presumably because of a concern about the jurisdictional conflicts that would likely ensue.
Metro Vancouver has 21 member municipalities having a population in 2006 of 2.117 million. Its territory corresponds exactly to that of the Vancouver CMA. The population of the City of Vancouver was 578,041. The suburban City of Surrey is not far behind, with a population of 394,976 (Statistics Canada, 2006). In short, by Canadian standards, the municipal system of the Vancouver CMA is quite highly fragmented, but the GVRD acts to provide regional services such as public transit, water and sewage services, garbage disposal, and regional parks.

Although it is impossible to determine objectively an ideal institutional model for metropolitan governance, it is hard to imagine a mechanism that could better combine local self-government through established municipalities with the existence of an institution at the metropolitan level that can both provide a degree of consensual metropolitan leadership (the strategic plan) and a framework within which municipalities can voluntarily cooperate with each other. Those who must live with the system find it hard to believe that the system they often find frustrating can be judged so positively. What they need to do, however, is to compare Vancouver with other places.

In 2000, the Quebec legislature established somewhat similar institutions, called metropolitan communities, for Montreal and Quebec City. The territory of the Montreal Metropolitan Community (MMC) corresponds very closely to that of the Montreal CMA. It comprises the territories of the urban agglomeration councils of Montreal and Longueuil and eighty other municipalities. The MMC has potential responsibilities relating to regional planning, waste disposal, regional parks, co-ordination of public transport, economic development, regional infrastructure, and cost-sharing for public housing. It is governed by a 28-person council, of which 13 come from the Island of Montreal. The council’s chair is the mayor.
of Montreal, who is the MMC’s main political spokesperson (Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal, 2005). Similar structures are in place for the Quebec [City] Metropolitan Community, which comprises 27 municipalities on both sides of the St. Lawrence River and on the historic Île d’Orléans. It is still far too early to assess the impact of the new metropolitan communities on Quebec’s two major CMAs.

The National Capital Commission-- Ottawa and Gatineau: Canada’s fourth most populous CMA is Ottawa-Gatineau, with a 2006 population of 1,130,761. Of this number, 846,802 lived on the Ontario side of the Ottawa River in the city of Ottawa. The remainder lived on the Quebec side in what, since 2002, has been the amalgamated city of Gatineau. The territory of the CMA is roughly co-terminus with the territory of the National Capital Commission (NCC), an agency of the federal government that has existed in its current form since 1959. The commission comprises 15 members appointed by the federal government. In its earlier institutional manifestations it played a major role in drawing up and implementing a regional plan for the entire area, the most notable feature of which is a Greenbelt around the original city of Ottawa. The NCC also is also responsible for significant green spaces and recreational areas on the Quebec side of the river. An important constitutional ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1966 held that “the federal government had the power to plan for the National Capital Region, and to expropriate land for its purposes, including land for the Greenbelt... (Fullerton 1974, I-14).” Such a power related exclusively to the fact that the area in question was the federal capital. Similar federal powers do not exist in other Canadian CMAs.

In the last few decades the NCC has built parkways, removed railway tracks from the Ottawa’s downtown, renovated historical buildings, provided sites for national museums, and
created a winter skateway on the frozen Rideau canal. In short, it has done many of the things that are often expected of metropolitan governments. The difference, of course, is that metropolitan governments are generally accountable in one way or another to metropolitan residents. In the case of the NCC, board members are accountable only to the federal government that appointed them. Although there have been many examples of localized objections to NCC actions, most residents of Ottawa-Gatineau are highly appreciative. They should be: the NCC spends money from all Canadians to provide urban amenities for the approximately three percent of Canadians who live in the National Capital Region.

A single municipality that covers all or most of a CMA: Calgary is Canada’s fifth most populous CMA, with a 2006 population of 1,079,310. The 2006 population of the city of Calgary was 988,193, meaning that there was no possible reason for a distinct metropolitan level of government. The city’s territory has increased incrementally over many decades as a result of a continuing series of annexations. Some have been controversial and have generated intense opposition. Decisions on annexation applications from cities in Alberta are made by a quasi-judicial body, the Local Authorities Board (LAB). The usual pattern in the past has been for Calgary to ask for very large annexations and for the LAB to grant less than what it asked for (Masson, 1994, pp.164-66).

The creation of a single-tier metropolitan authority without there having been a strong two-tier system is likely to be possible only within metropolitan areas that do not have large populations. Calgary is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. Its municipal evolution has been made possible by a continuing process of annexation combined with the absence of longstanding urban municipalities nearby. Simple as single-tier structures are, they are not
without their problems. Annexation battles -- even in Calgary -- are often slow, messy, unpopular, and expensive; occasionally the provincial government has to step in directly to sort out intractable disputes. If longstanding, distinct urban, suburban, and rural communities are brought together by legislative fiat, there will be continuing pressures for decentralized decision-making and/or secession.

The territory of the city of Edmonton has also increased dramatically over the years using the same Alberta laws and practices that were in force in Calgary. The difference in Edmonton is that incorporated suburban municipalities are nearby and they have generally fought hard against forced annexation. As a result, while the 2006 population of the Edmonton CMA was 1,034,945, the population of the city was only 730,372 or 70.6 percent of the total CMA population. Although this percentage is small compared to Calgary, it is high compared to most North American central cities. There is no pressure from anyone for a distinct level of metropolitan government. However, the city of Edmonton has often called for municipal amalgamations over the years while the suburban municipalities have claimed that voluntary intermunicipal co-operation is quite sufficient. The latest institutional vessel for such co-operation is the Premier’s Capital Region Integrated Growth Management Plan.

Like Edmonton, Canada’s tenth most populous CMA, London, Ontario has also grown incrementally through annexation and amalgamation, but other significant incorporated municipalities still remain within the CMA. The city of London comprises 77.0 percent of the 2006 CMA population of 457,720. It clearly dominates the area and has ample developable land for future growth.

Winnipeg is Canada’s seventh most populous CMA. In 1970 the social-democratic party that at the time controlled the Manitoba provincial legislature (the New Democratic Party [NDP])
decided to create a single City of Winnipeg -- a “unicity” -- to replace a two-tier system of municipal government comprising the Corporation of Greater Winnipeg and its twelve constituent municipalities. The main declared objective of the provincial government was to equalize taxes and service levels within the territory of the new unicity (Brownstone and Plunkett, 1983).

The Manitoba NDP believed at the time that it could create a single, amalgamated city and at the same time create innovative mechanisms for decentralization and citizen participation. Indeed, there was great initial optimism that a new era in municipal government was being launched.

The first unicity council had 50 members, each of whom sat on one of 13 community committees that would advise the main council on matters of more local concern. These committees were in turn advised by residents’ advisory groups whose members were chosen at open community meetings. Over time, enthusiasm for consultation and advice waned, especially as it became evident that the unicity council could not possibly do what every councillor and local group wanted. By 1992, the council had been reduced to 15 members and much of the special machinery for citizen participation had eroded or been abolished. Since then, the provincial government has seemed more concerned with managing growth outside the unicity’s borders than with the institutions within (Manitoba, 2003). In 1991, unicity comprised 94.5 percent of the population of the Winnipeg CMA. In 2006, the equivalent figure was 91.1 percent, meaning that the CMA area beyond the unicity’s boundaries is growing faster than unicity itself.

The remaining CMA among the ten most populous is Hamilton. As in Winnipeg in 1970 and Toronto in 1998, Hamilton’s two-tier system of metropolitan government was completely amalgamated in 2001.
3. Agenda setting, political representation, and the exercise of power

Not surprisingly, the politics of metropolitan areas varies quite dramatically, depending on the institutional settings that are involved. Nevertheless, there are some significant generalizations that apply more or less to all major Canadian metropolitan areas. First, there are no metropolitan governments that are themselves the subject of great political loyalty, conflict, or functional importance. As we have seen, the city governments of Calgary, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and London can be seen as metropolitan governments because of their wide territorial scope and because they include such a high proportion of the population of their respective metropolitan areas. These governments are seen as important, but not because they are metropolitan. They are important because they do the normal things that city governments do. The Montreal and Quebec metropolitan communities are so new, so functionally weak, and so overshadowed by recent debates about municipal de-amalgamation that only a tiny proportion of the metropolitan population would know that they even exist.

Because provincial governments play such important roles with respect to policy-making for health, income security, education, and social services, none of these policy areas are thought of by Canadians as having a particularly metropolitan focus. Social housing is often considered to be more of a municipal function in Canada, but metropolitan institutions, to the extent that they exist at all, have no direct operational role with respect to housing. At best, notably in the province of Quebec, they have a potential role as planners for the territorial distribution of social housing.

Above all, the metropolitan agenda in Canada is about urban infrastructure (roads, rapid transit systems, sewers, water-supply-systems) and the regional planning that is required to build such infrastructure in a reasonably effective manner such that the inefficiencies
resulting from uncontrolled urban sprawl are at least minimized, if not prevented. To the extent that there is popular interest in such issues, it comes from commuters caught in traffic jams, truckers who cannot move their cargoes, developers concerned about servicing capacities, and environmentalists of many different stripes, whose concerns in most cases are antithetical to the other groups. But such conflicts are not manifested in a metropolitan political arena. They sometimes play themselves out in local municipal politics, but more often in provincial politics.

Outward and explicit evidence of conflict in metropolitan policy-making is not often found election platforms, political advertising, or in the other kinds of political activity that usually attract the attention of the media. Instead, the conflicts are often buried in municipal official plans, consultants= reports, and in the assumptions made by developers as they compete with each other in a complex marketplace. At various times and in various provinces, there have been requirements that some kind of metropolitan institution come up with a Aregional plan.® The making of such plans sometimes reveals the real stakes in metropolitan politics, but just as often, unfortunately, the plans simply paper over political conflicts so as to meet the technical requirements of the plan-making exercise. Worse still, regional plans sometimes get formally adopted, but are then ignored as circumstances change, new governments come to power, and items that were once political priorities (e.g. homelessness) seem to fall off the political agenda.

Because metropolitan issues are often seen as technical and specialized, they rarely provoke significant political mobilization. Perhaps because provincial governments are usually seen as having the capacity -- and sometimes even the political will -- to tackle metropolitan infrastructure problems, it is relatively rare for urban business interests to attempt to build community coalitions designed to act as substitutes for governments. Such coalitions are famously prevalent in American cities, precisely because governments appear so often to be
unwilling or incapable of addressing metropolitan issues.

In recent years Toronto has perhaps become the Canadian exception to the rule. In the absence of any metropolitan governmental structure for this area, a business-led group called the Toronto City Summit Alliance has emerged to attempt to provide some leadership with respect to city-region issues. Like its counterparts in many American city-regions which also lack formal mechanisms for city-region governance, the Alliance brings together representatives from many of Toronto’s various communities and attempts to arrive at some consensus as to how public and private resources can be used to confront the area’s many problems and to enhance its global competitiveness (Toronto City Summit Alliance, 2003).

With respect to managing growth, it now appears that it is the provincial government itself that is taking the initiative. A common argument advanced in Canada in general and in Toronto in particular in recent years is that, in this age of global city-regions, the ten provinces that comprise the Canadian federation have no long-term future as viable units of government. Instead, they will somehow give way to institutions of government that are based on the most important of the city-regions, Toronto being a prime example. But new initiatives from the government of Ontario to shape the nature of Toronto’s long-term growth and to provide for greenbelts and other conventional mechanisms of regional planning suggest that the role of the provincial government with respect to urban affairs might well be increasing, rather than decreasing (Ontario, 2005). Indeed, it is likely the provincial governments, instead of simply fading away, will consolidate their roles as the real strategic authorities for Canada’s city-regions.

**Metropolitan policy**

In addition to the formal metropolitan structures described previously, almost every other
conceivable mechanism for addressing metropolitan issues can be found in one Canadian city or another. For example, intermunicipal agreements are a mechanism through which the City of Toronto provides water for two of its northern suburban neighbours (White, 2003). Similarly in Toronto, a special-purpose authority provides fixed-rail transit for the larger Toronto metropolitan area, although there is continuing controversy as to exactly who should be subsidizing what. Because, as we have seen, regional planning has largely been taken over by the province, there are no longer any metropolitan institutions concerned with crucial government function.

In British Columbia, on the other hand, there has been much controversy about the extent to which regional land-use plans formulated by the regional districts should have precedence over the local plans of their constituent municipalities. Regardless of the legal technicalities, regional districts have played a major role in managing growth, aided by the provincial Land Reserve Commission which is charged with protecting agricultural and forest land from undue urban development (Bish and Clemens, 1999, p.127). Metro Vancouver’s Livable Region Strategic Plan appears to be playing a significant role in maintaining and enhancing the remarkable quality of life for which Vancouver is so well known. If winning international awards is a measure of success in such things, then Metro Vancouver has done very well (Greater Vancouver Regional District 2005)

Unlike Vancouver, the Calgary almost all the metropolitan area is governed by one municipality, the City of Calgary. The city’s official objective is ‘to maintain at least a 30-year supply of developable land within its boundaries. Having this land supply allows for the long-term planning necessary to accommodate Calgary's high rate of growth and to facilitate the planning and budgeting of infrastructure (sewers, roads). Periodic annexations are proposed to
maintain a long-term land supply.” The city claims that its annexation policy is a key part of Calgary’s “growth management strategy.”

It helps ensure that sprawl does not occur, that is, haphazard development, often at very low density. Calgary's planned suburban communities now achieve densities of 6 to 8 dwelling units per acre. This is almost 40% denser than communities built in the 1970's and 1980's, and some 12 to 16 times more land efficient than existing rural residential development outside Calgary's borders (City of Calgary 2005).

The city’s strategy has been greatly aided by the absence of any significant nearby urban municipalities that have been in the path of its outward expansion.

In Winnipeg’s metropolitan area there is similarly only one significant municipal government. The expectation of the creation of the Aunicity in 1971 was that the growing tax base of suburban areas could be used to support the deteriorating position of the central city. But, as suburban political strength grew over time within the unicity council, it became increasingly obvious that such an outcome was far from automatic. Tax levels might be equal, but decisions about infrastructure investment were always the result of a political process that depended largely on where the votes were. Parts of the central city of Winnipeg remain among the most troubled in any city in Canada. To the extent that they have been assisted by new infrastructure investment, the source of the funds has been the federal government rather than suburban Winnipeg taxpayers.

The term “metropolitan governance” now has virtually no political salience in Canada. As we have seen, in seven of Canada’s ten largest CMAs) the municipality of the central city is sufficiently significant in its territorial scope to itself act as the government of the metropolitan area. Metro Vancouver is clearly a form of metropolitan government, even if officially it is
primarily a mechanism to facilitate intermunicipal cooperation. The Montreal Metropolitan Community is so functionally weak and so recent in its creation that it has not entered the public consciousness. It is only in Toronto where there is any serious concern about how metropolitan issues can be confronted. But, even here, it is becoming increasingly obvious that an institutional solution is in sight -- the provincial government of Ontario is taking direct control itself.

**Possible future shapes of metropolitan governance**

Of the major CMAs being analyzed here, only Vancouver has a distinct metropolitan-level institution of government with any real functional capabilities. But even here, Metro Vancouver acts as a kind of umbrella institution for various special operating authorities for water, sewerage, and transportation. Metro Vancouver is obligated to adopt a regional planning document, but it must mobilize significant local municipal consent before its own plan is legally enforceable.

It is impossible to imagine, even in the Canadian context, that there will ever be a single municipality encompassing more than seventy percent of the population of the country’s three most populous CMAs (Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver). But what of the remaining seven? Is the large-central-city or single-tier model worthy of emulation? The first point is that, by international standards, these CMAs are relatively small, with populations ranging from one million in Calgary to 450,000 in London, Ontario. In all of these places, boundary extensions or outright municipal amalgamations have been extremely controversial and have been accomplished without the approval of the people who were forced to join the central city. There are many jurisdictions in North America, including British Columbia, where such a mechanism for extending municipal boundaries is simply out of the question.
But, if such changes were politically possible elsewhere, are they desirable? The Canadian experience is ambiguous at best. In Winnipeg, where a social-democratic provincial government legislated complete municipal amalgamation largely in order to equalize tax rates, suburban politicians quickly dominated the new council and were reluctant to invest heavily deprived areas of the central city. Meanwhile, secession movements sprung up (one of which, in Headingley, was successful) and urban growth took place at a faster rate outside the city’s boundaries than within them, causing policy-makers to fret about the need for planning arrangements covering both the (relatively) populous city and the mainly rural municipalities that surround it. In Edmonton, annexation battles have been extremely controversial; the central city has not attained the complete consolidation it has been seeking for many years; and there is still therefore a perceived need for a metropolitan co-ordinating mechanism.

Hamilton and London -- both in Ontario -- have large rural areas within the city boundaries, yet the boundaries are still not so perfect that they eliminate the need for difficult negotiations with their municipal neighbours, especially around transportation issues. In both places there are concerns about the representation of rural areas in city decision-making and in Hamilton there is a rural secessionist movement, the strength of which is difficult to gauge.

Calgary would appear to be the single-tier system that has worked most smoothly, but questions remain about how long it can continue its apparently ceaseless expansion across the prairie and toward the Rocky mountains. Eventually, it will come up against significant towns in its hinterland and the traditional intermunicipal metropolitan conflicts will inevitably break out.

Governance arrangements for the CMAs of Vancouver and Calgary appear to have been sufficiently successful so as to offer potential Canadian models for other countries. The new metropolitan communities in Montreal and Quebec City might one day -- after they have become
better established -- offer yet another model. But it is Toronto that appears to be the model of how not to govern a metropolitan area. In the early 1990s it looked as though the provincial government was moving toward establishing a form of metropolitan government for much of the Toronto CMA and beyond. But this plan was rejected by a provincial government of a different political stripe and with much strength in the outer suburbs. This government chose to ignore the larger issues of metropolitan governance and invest its political capital in sponsoring a forced merger into one City of Toronto of the component parts of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. The result was a municipal behemoth having a population of more than two million, but with no capability to influence growth patterns in the suburbs beyond its borders. The next provincial government to face the problem has effectively chosen to itself become the metropolitan government. This model might well turn out to be functionally effective, especially in the eyes of those who favour greenbelts and limits on urban sprawl (Sancton 2008). But it will confound those who believe that city-regions should govern themselves and that Canada’s provinces are outmoded relics of the days when Canada was a rural nation, rather than an urban one.

Except in Ottawa-Gatineau, Canadian provincial boundaries do not bisect metropolitan areas – and in Ottawa-Gatineau, the federal government’s National Capital Commission pulls them together. This means that Canadian provinces are much better suited than American states are to act as over-arching governments for entire city-regions. The absence of provincial constitutions that limit provincial involvement in otherwise local issues re-enforces the capacity of Canadian provinces to be strong institutions for metropolitan planning and governance.
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Table 1: Canada=s Ten Most Populous Census Metropolitan Areas, 2006

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<th>CMA</th>
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Source: http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/release/index.cfm