

Women and Entrepreneurship: Japan, Canada and Beyond



In January of this year CAPI's Fall 2009 Japan Program Visiting Research Associate, Dr. Aegean Leung, hosted a full-day workshop on [Women, Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Japan, Canada and Beyond](#). Hosted with support from UVic's Centre for Cooperative and Community-Based Economy and Dr. Leung's home unit, the UVic Faculty of Business, the workshop brought to light how institutional changes shape the development of women's entrepreneurship in Japan and Canada and, at the same time, how women entrepreneurs are instigating changes at the community and societal level.

This event included presentations on a diverse range of topics from "The Revolution of Middle-Class Housewives: The Study of the Seikatsu Club as a Social Enterprise in Japan" to "Women Entrepreneurs and Small-Scale Agriculture in Canada" and featured presenters from Japan, Canada and the United States. The workshop concluded with a presentation from Dr. Judith Sayers of the Hupacasath First Nation who spoke about female entrepreneurship within the context of First Nations communities in Canada.

The workshop was a great success, and not only drew in a diverse audience from on-campus and the local community, but also represented the beginning of a new era for CAPI. All of the presentations at the workshop were filmed and posted [on CAPI's website](#) and [on CAPI's new Vimeo channel](#), and are now available for viewers from around the world to watch at their leisure. Given the increasing role that new media is playing in the academy and in broader society, CAPI will continue to offer online video recordings of our conferences and events in the future.

Opinion Piece: Canada and the Dragon – Environment and Development Relations with China



By Arthur J. Hanson

China is surprising the world with its rapid ascent as an environmentally-engaged nation. Yet as Elizabeth Economy rhetorically asked in *Foreign Affairs* a few years back, is China engaged in "The Great Leap Backward" when it comes to pursuing environmental protection? This view still prevails in many circles. But an alternative view is taking hold-based on hundreds of billion dollars being invested in

environmental protection and for new industrial, transportation and energy infrastructure that is more environmentally friendly. China has received considerable praise for focusing a good portion of its 2008-2010 stimulus package on environmental improvements. Major cities, especially Beijing, with the Olympic Games, and Shanghai with the World Fair, have taken environmental improvement to new levels, often with visible results, for example, the cleaner waters and greater number of "blue sky days." In rural areas there are major investments for improved access to better quality of drinking water, biogas for home heating and cooking to improve environmental health in households. In the past year there have been debates in many parts of the country about how to apply concepts for a "Low Carbon Economy."

Is the environmental situation actually improving overall in China, or will China yet fall environmental victim to its rapid economic growth and the likely increase in consumerism over the coming decades? This is a big question which likely cannot be answered for decades to come. Indeed, as the Gulf of Mexico BP oil spill has demonstrated, even the richest country with some of the most advanced environmental control systems is still not adequately safeguarded from environmental disaster.

An overview, below, of the complex realities of China's environment and development situation provides a backdrop for the main theme and question of this essay-how should Canada deal with the most significant and rising nation in the world on the subject of the environment and development?

China and the Environment: Progress or Treading Water?

China is investing heavily in renewable energy technologies and other environmental industries that it views to be important for both its future domestic economy and new export markets. Wind generating turbines and blades, solar cells, electric automobiles, and advanced battery technology, are some of the key areas where China believes it can be a leader. It is investing heavily in sustainable development R&D with a long-term vision to become one of the leading science-based economies. Some governance reform has taken place, including pricing and taxation measures on fuel and natural resources intended to lower demand, and improving enforcement of environmental laws. There has been a slow but worthwhile move towards somewhat greater public participation in addressing environmental assessment, and greater sharing of pollution information.

On the other side of the ledger, it is clear that China is facing growing challenges. Badly contaminated brownfields, rivers drowning in chemical filth, growing numbers of red tides, green algal blooms and other signs of damage to the oceans, replacement of coastal wetlands to create more industrial parks, ports and urban communities, very rapid growth of private auto ownership resulting in smog and traffic, and many other environment and development problems that are becoming more prominent in decision-making. The people of China are more aware of the issues, and often more vocal about them. Although local public administrators are being judged by the central government on their environmental problem-solving performance, the key problems are not under very good control.

And the problems do not stop at China's borders. The country's leaders believe that China is already facing serious problems arising from global climate change. They point to the strange new patterns of droughts and flooding, and various extreme conditions such as severe winters in southern China. There is general concern about the future role of China as the "water tower for Asia" due to melting of glaciers in the western regions. Some rivers form an international border, such as in the North between Russia and China, or flow from China into Southeast Asian countries, such as in the Southwest. Air currents and weather systems carry contaminants such as sulphates and nitrates, lower level ozone, and mercury to countries such as Japan and well beyond to North America.



China is a rich country in its land, water and seas, and in its very high biological diversity. Yet it is extremely land- and water-limited for meeting the food needs for its substantial population, for meeting the needs of healthy ecosystems, which provide habitat for plants and animals as well as for healthy communities and other demands of a population that will eventually exceed 1.5 billion people. Despite a generally low per capita consumption level, China's

ecological footprint in total is quite large and growing. Most alarming has been the rapid rise in greenhouse emissions to the point where China and the United States are about equal, together forming some 40% of global emissions. These two countries are certainly the most important at the moment in determining the outcome of climate change negotiations. It is not surprising that both came in for criticism regarding their performance at the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations on this subject.

China is becoming an important player, although not necessarily a rising star, in many international environmental negotiations. Indeed, while China repeatedly notes that it takes such negotiations very seriously, and wishes to contribute to a global "Ecological Civilization," it still views its own situation as that of a developing nation with major challenges, such as urban migration of hundreds of millions of people from the countryside, and improving the living standards and well-being of many more who will remain as farmers.

China also is now a major investor in many other countries, with a focus on securing long-term access to natural resources, opening new markets, and other reasons, some quite political. Chinese international development assistance is complex, often overlain with business or other interests, but also of potentially great value to poorer nations. There are a number of direct environmental concerns, such as impacts of engineering projects. Of special international interest are the environmental aspects of market supply chains, illegal movement of wildlife parts, and unsavory trade such as for electronic wastes that are banned from entry into China but still find their way into the country. Chinese overseas corporate accountability and social responsibility is still limited and often in the hands of state-owned enterprises, or other arrangements closely tied to government. Therefore there is an opportunity for government to provide guidelines, but these are still relatively rudimentary by most accounts, although they are certainly a matter of concern.

It is fair to conclude that China is at an environment and economy crossroads, or, putting it another way, has entered a transformative stage in the relationship between environment and development. Either the country shifts towards environmental protection in an unprecedented fashion as it continues its economic growth, or its future overall development will be severely threatened. Clearly the leaders want the shift to occur. So do China's citizens. And there are some good examples of nearby nations that have undergone similar shifts, notably Japan and South Korea. Yet neither of these countries had to deal with the scale and complex environment and development realities faced by this massive nation.

While China can be quite self-sufficient and innovative in dealing with some of its environmental concerns, it also needs the help of the world's nations. There are a number of reasons why, including the following points. First, China still lacks some technical knowledge and access to the most advanced forms of environmental control, especially in energy and environment. The high cost of sustainable technology development such as carbon capture and storage from coal burning is likely to be met only through partnerships with others. A second major concern is developing the innovative institutional arrangements and management systems required for key issues such as integrated resource and environmental management required for dealing with problems like non-point pollution from sources such as agriculture. A number of countries have more advanced experience than China. A third concern is how to overcome today's market failure in addressing the problem of wastes left in China from manufacturing goods for export. This accounts for a quarter to a third of China's pollution. And along with this issue is how China can grow its future economy around "green products" such as solar panels, electric vehicles and other products that can meet both domestic and international demand. Finally, all the major international environment and development agreements, plus international trade agreements with environmental considerations, require improved cooperation among all nations.

Canada's Situation

Compared with the European Union or the United States, Canada might appear to be a minor-league player with China on environmental matters. But that is not necessarily the case, nor is it likely ever to be. We share the Pacific Ocean, receive the effluent from Asian nations especially through the prevailing west to east winds, and seek to develop closer trading relations, often with environmental consequences. Canada and China have a shared interest in the Northwest Passage, need to worry about problems such as invasive species carried between the continents, and have good reason to sell environmental technologies to each other. This short list can be expanded to include land and water management, planning for sustainable communities, waste management, control of acid rain and other harmful pollutants, and various aspects of public health and the environment including problems such as mercury. There are mutual interests at stake in all of the topics listed and more. Fast-moving China is likely to be gaining ground over the next decade on many of the technological issues of interest to Canada such as those related to clean energy. At the same time China will have markets on a scale that should encourage greater entry of our environmental industry. Some of these reasons for engaging with China on environment and development issues are explained in more detail below.

Stewardship Expectations

Together, Canada and China comprise about 13 % of the world's total land area. Both countries are expected by the international community to be good stewards. Canada and China have similar problems of building national standards and management systems while taking into account tremendous diversity and local challenges, national-provincial relationships, rights of minority groups and in Canada, of First Nations and Inuit. They share a common need to understand how to sustainably manage their vast lands and waters, as well as their natural resources and ecosystems at internationally acceptable standards. Germany, Japan and other populous but smaller nations have not the same scale of problems related to land, water, biological and mineral resources. The cold areas of China have much in common with Canada-melting glaciers and permafrost, lands that will require expensive environmental management in the future.

There is good reason for both countries to cooperate in the future on mechanisms that will be advantageous for large countries on issues related to forest and agricultural land management, freshwater and marine issues, mineral development, and biodiversity management, and on how ecological services such as carbon sequestration in soils can lead to carbon credits and advantageous eco-compensation arrangements. The cooperation should help in shaping future international regimes related to these topics, and help to improve our national environmental standing in the international community.

Intercontinental Pollution Control

Canada is the recipient of pollutants that cross the Pacific Ocean in the atmosphere and via ocean currents. The people and ecosystems in the Canadian Arctic are on the receiving end of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPS) and mercury. There are concerns about toxins in marine mammals and other ocean life along Canada's west coast, and about mercury levels in freshwater throughout North America. China is not the only source but it is believed to be a major one for such contaminating substances. There is a need for better scientific cooperation. Intercontinental pollution is a problem where joint Canada-US cooperation with China might be productive, as would cooperation via the Arctic Council, where China is now an observer.

Sustainable Urban Development

Despite the great differences of scale between Chinese and Canadian cities (eight of theirs have populations greater than 10 million and by 2025 China will have about 220 cities with more than one million), our urban experience is of considerable relevance to China. Canadian cities' reputation for quality of life, environmental management, and governance relationships make them of interest to China. The massive urbanization of China offers many business opportunities. Chinese urban environmental management focuses on cost-effective infrastructure for solid waste management, drinking water and sewage; on green development such as energy efficiency of buildings and transportation; on livable neighborhoods; on land reclamation and redevelopment; and on pollution prevention. There is a strong interest in addressing urban sprawl since agricultural land is so scarce.



Photo: Skyline of Shanghai, the 8th largest city in the world and host of Expo 2010. (Photo credit: iStock)

Mayors of Canadian cities have become strong environmental advocates, and are providing much needed leadership on some aspects of green growth and climate change mitigation and adaptation. The role of the supportive organizations, such as the Canadian Federation of Municipalities, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation, and many other bodies, including city foundations such as the Winnipeg Foundation, provide models of potential interest to China. More could be done, especially through presenting what might be called "full value" approaches drawing upon coordinated approaches that could involve community interests, universities and colleges, business and city officials. Within China the point is made that everyone wishes to engage with the big cities, but there are many opportunities for collaboration and cooperation with medium-sized ones, which are often the ones in greatest need. And on the Canadian side, perhaps some of the opportunities would be with places like Surrey or Abbotsford in British Columbia, where it is suburban development that is a key concern.

What is the advantage to Canada of linking urban-to-urban? Obviously business opportunities. But it is more than that. It is also building the long-term linkages that will encourage future flow of tourists and investment from a country that is rapidly growing richer. And it is the potential for experiencing new ideas about urban development along lines that our own planners, leaders and community activists may not have fully assimilated to date.

Investment, Trade and Environment

Both China and Canada depend upon foreign direct investment and international trade for their wealth creation. China is Canada's second largest trading partner, and Canada is China's 12th largest.^[1] Environmental matters are beginning to play a more significant role. While China was rebuffed in its initial efforts to enter Canadian resource sectors such as mining, there has been a shift. China now is an investor in the oil sands, and certainly has strong interests in the construction of a pipeline to Kitimat for transshipment of these resources. Eventually there will be a need for China to demonstrate a good level of corporate social responsibility in all of its overseas investments, whether in Canada, Latin America, Africa or in parts of Southeast Asia. This will not come about easily, for the topic is a new one at home. In recent times there have been statements that Chinese firms will be required to follow both the environmental laws of the country they are working in, plus pertinent Chinese regulations. How this will be governed and monitored is not very clear.

Canada has considerable experience with these issues via Canadian companies operating abroad in various sectors. Sometimes this experience has been gained the hard way, especially in the mining sector. This is the time for sharing that experience. And that has happened in the case of a number of Canadian companies operating in China, including those mining for gold and silver.

It is in Canada's interest to ensure that Chinese enterprises are good corporate citizens when they are operating in Canada, and so far there have not been major problems with the limited number of Chinese investments. But the volume of investment is likely to be larger and more diversified in the future. We need to be prepared by understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese approach, driven as it is by close ties between the Chinese government and enterprises operating abroad, and by the strategy and motives of engagement. Often the driving force is not short-term profit but rather the long-term security of resources and of securing future markets for Chinese products. Also, China wishes to spread its risk by seeking a variety of sources, often from countries of widely varying concern for the environment. So it is necessary to work with China via both governmental and non-governmental bodies to ensure suitable standards are followed. The role of the Worldwide Fund For Nature (WWF) with its efforts for forest stewardship and certification is an example that bridges Canada and China.

There is also the matter of increasing the investment by Canadian enterprises in China's sustainable development, and also in transferring Canadian environmental experience through this mechanism. China's laws governing foreign direct investment now include environmental safeguards, with some expectation that there will be demonstration value for similar Chinese firms. A number of Canadian firms, Sino-Forest Corporation being an example, have built their business around sustainable development approaches. This firm has become the largest forest plantation operation in China, making a good profit.

Greater cooperation between China and Canada would be advantageous on environmental issues related to international trade agreements, including embedded carbon and many other market supply chain concerns, import and export of wildlife products, invasive species and disease organisms, trade involving genetically modified species, including fish and forest products, and trade issues related to recycling, including electronic wastes and possibly other types of banned products that get smuggled into China for recycling. While these concerns are covered under the World Trade Organization, the Basel Convention and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, they are still not working all that well. In addition both China and Canada have experienced trade barriers set up on environmental grounds even when unwarranted.

Climate Change

China's emissions can change the global outcome of climate, while Canada's represent a relatively small overall contribution. But both countries face strong international scrutiny. Canada because it failed miserably on a goal it agreed to under the Kyoto Protocol, and China since its emissions, already the largest in the world, are unlikely to peak before 2030 or later under current projections. Both countries share the fact that a large portion of their emissions are exported as embedded carbon to countries that hold no responsibility for these emissions on their carbon scorecards.

China's positioning is governed by its own strongly held views that: (1) progress should centre around substantial reduction progress by rich countries, and some assurance that its own development will not be affected; (2) by its concern to build a mutually acceptable approach with the United States; and (3) by a desire to turn this large problem into new opportunities through a green growth strategy. Certainly at the bargaining table Canada has not had any strong influence on moving China towards targets, or towards accepting any particular position. But that does not mean Canada and China should go their separate ways on this issue, or that either can afford to ignore the other in what will be a long-term struggle.

First, both countries likely will be bound by the outcomes of negotiations that will be needed for a workable framework covering climate change action from 2013 to 2020 and beyond. Over that time there will be a remarkable change in carbon trading relationships globally, and in the pricing of carbon. These changes will affect Canada's biggest exports, including hydrocarbon, forestry and agricultural products, and the types and sources of automobiles we import and produce. For example, what are the implications for Canada if China is successful in the early introduction of electric automobiles into the North American market? Canada and China should both be able to take advantage of any agreement that gives greater recognition to carbon sequestration through improved agricultural and forestry practices. But such agreement will require better monitoring and careful carbon bookkeeping. Who will we partner with in the development of such agreements? Is it possible that China could be a key partner?

The second reason for building stronger cooperation with China on energy, the environment and climate change is the growing linkages across the Pacific on these issues. The linkages include west coast port development and safe shipping of resources such as coal and petroleum products. The problem of atmospheric pollutants from China to the eastern Pacific and Arctic will need to be solved, especially those from coal burning. And there will be growing international pressures to address "dirty" energy at the source, which will include both exported Canadian coal and oil sand products.

The third reason is the great need for technological cooperation. This point is stressed by China and other major developing countries. Chinese researchers have identified more than sixty energy and environment technologies that they need but do not have full access to. Canada does have direct experience with various types of low carbon energy and environmental solutions, and is prepared to invest much more money in their development. Examples include cellulosic biofuels, hydrogen as a fuel source, advanced models for coal burning, oil sand carbon dioxide sequestration into oil and gas wells, advanced wind power use, and advanced building technology. Some of the technologies of the next twenty to thirty years will emerge from China through joint ventures and research consortia. Canada should be working with China and other countries to take full advantage of what will be a remarkably large research and development investment in sustainable energy.

If Canada believes that it can and should be an "energy superpower", it should recognize that there is another country that also has these aspirations, with the intent of meeting its own needs *and* becoming a major exporter of renewable energy technology and expertise.

So far Canada and China have failed to produce a strategic relationship on energy and climate change issues. At least half a dozen European Union nations believe they have such a relationship with China. The new economic dialogue established at the highest levels between the United States and China is strongly focused on technology cooperation for green growth. Canada needs to appraise carefully what its best advantages may be for environmental and sustainable development technology with China, and move quickly in order not to lose competitive advantage. Success in China will translate into global green market advantages later.

China in the Arctic

With climate warming will come open seas in the Northwest Passage. China has long-standing Antarctic experience and its scientific reach now extends to the far north, with several expeditions of its research vessel/ice-breaker the *Xue Long*-the *Snow Dragon*. With growing research commitments planned for the years ahead, China is getting a place at the bargaining table for future use, and likely with implications for the stewardship of the Arctic. Canada and Russia are the two most significant among the several players at the table, at least based upon geographical considerations. We have complex considerations including intercontinental air pollution issues, transportation management and ocean pollution concerns as well as our fundamental assertions of ownership and some security concerns. How will we develop working relationships with China in the Arctic that are productive from a Canadian point of view? It is vital that we try our best to do so.

Conclusion

I have touched in only a limited way on some of the issues where greater cooperation between China and Canada might be warranted. Given the recent visit of President Hu Jintao to Toronto, and the signing of agreements on environmental cooperation and the interest in doubling trade during the coming years, all would seem well for this to happen. But Canada will have to work much harder. While Canada's environmental interests and Canada's interests in China have drifted, others have moved into high gear, notably a substantial number of European nations, and now the United States, which is deeply interested in energy and environment opportunities with China.



Canada has many things to offer in the development of workable institutional arrangements for environment and development. We have a reasonable framework for dealing with transboundary pollution and resources, carefully worked out federal-provincial and other cross-jurisdictional relationships, reasonable and productive models for public participation in environmental decisions, businesses and communities committed to sustainable development, and considerable experience in

all sectors with international environment and sustainable development thinking and action. Already some of this experience has been of use to China, for example in integrated river basin management, and in cleaner production by industry. Much more could be done. There have been

a number of constraints on exchanges and relationship-building over the past decade precisely at the time when they have been most needed-at this new stage of transformative action on the environment within China. The time for action on strengthening our relationships with China on environment and development matters is now. Otherwise we may see ourselves fall behind not only our existing allies on the environment, but also China.

Should we see China's and the global environmental situation as a new opportunity to build substantive new markets for Canadian goods and services? Yes. Should we presume that bigger players such as the United States and the European Union will generally be the most influential in China's future environment and development relationships? Yes, but Canada can find important niches, and will suffer if it fails to do so. And should we be promoting China into more substantive roles in international relations on the environment? Yes, but in doing so, we should seek our own partnerships and better define the areas of greatest mutual interest.

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[1] Zhu Taoying. 8 June, 2009. *China's Policy on Environmental Protection and the Industrial Cooperation between China and Canada in the Environmental Protection*. Third Annual Canada China Environmental Forum.

As a regular feature in [Asia-Pacific News](#), **Opinion Piece** invites members of CAPI's broader network to explore Asia-Pacific issues from a more personal angle. The opinions expressed in **Opinion Piece** solely reflect the views of the author and should not be seen as representative of CAPI's views in any way.

Environmental Migration in the Asia-Pacific

By Michael Pickering

The most widely accepted figures estimate that there will be 50 million people globally displaced due to environmental factors by 2010, and 200 million by 2050.[i] To contextualize, the UN reported a total of 190 million migrants worldwide in 2005.[ii] Such a dramatic increase in the number of migrants globally will have far-reaching social and ecological implications. The

immediacy of this trend necessitates a concerted evaluation by all relevant stakeholders of the multifarious crises that have already begun, and will continue to emerge, over the coming decades. The current international policy framework which deals with refugees and natural disaster response may be insufficient for meeting the demands of this influx of people. In the past, such large movements of populations have often led to conflict over land and resources. Thus, a mass migration of people could pose a threat to global security if governments have not undertaken sufficient preparations to prevent such conflicts. Now is the time to begin implementing strategies that can build the resilience and adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities in order to mitigate the factors contributing to forced migration.



Photo: Increasingly rapid desertification in the Gobi desert is a "push factor" for migration in Mongolia and China (Photo credit: Lindsay Walton)

Environmental migration in the Asia-Pacific is currently being driven by two major effects of climate change: rising sea levels and intensified desertification. The World Bank estimates that a one metre increase in sea levels would displace 37 million people throughout East Asia and six million throughout South Asia, while a five metre sea level rise would displace an estimated 162 million people throughout East Asia and 39 million people throughout South Asia. [\[iii\]](#) To put this in perspective, the most recent report compiled for the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen estimates that sea levels could rise as much as two metres by 2100 and five metres by 2300. [\[iv\]](#) There are numerous places throughout the Asia-Pacific that have already begun to experience the devastating impacts of rising sea levels. Whether or not politicians continue to deny the anthropogenic nature of climate change, we are now forced to deal with the impending wave of climate refugees which have already begun to emerge.

The river deltas of Southeast and South Asia are particularly vulnerable to the rising sea levels and devastating storm surges that now occur more frequently. The Mekong River Delta in Vietnam and the Ganges River Delta in Bangladesh have been acutely affected. If the sea level rises one metre by 2100 it will have a catastrophic impact on the Mekong Delta, inundating 20 to 30 percent of the land mass with salt water, causing a significant saline intrusion into the most fertile agricultural areas.^[v] So far there have been relatively few people displaced permanently within Vietnam, but every typhoon now brings with it the promise of major flooding. In Bangladesh, residents of the Ganges Delta have been affected more severely. In a country that already suffers from widespread poverty, flooding in recent years has caused a significant reduction in crop yields from the once fertile delta region. As the sea slowly carves away the land in the delta, these floods now displace an estimated 500,000 people every year.^[vi] Many other low lying coastal communities throughout the Asia-Pacific will be threatened by rising sea levels in the near future.

The impacts of climate change are also being felt throughout the islands of Oceania, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The very existence of many small island nations, such as the Maldives, Kiribati, and Tuvalu, is being threatened by rising tides. In response to this crisis, nations and international institutions will have to make some major adjustments to immigration policies to allow for the potential influx of refugees from these regions. While moving relatively small populations of islanders to nations able to support them seems the obvious solution, this is not as easy as it sounds. Tensions over cultural identity and political sovereignty arise when an entire country's population is being relocated within the borders of another nation-state. For example, the 12,000 Tuvaluans who still remain on Tuvalu are concerned that moving to Australia or New Zealand will threaten their cultural survival and political self-determination.^[vii] While other forms of adaptation to climate change would be preferable, nations such as Kiribati recognize it is most likely too late to look for alternatives to evacuation.^[viii] Proverbial canaries in the coal mine, these drowning island nations send a stark message about the consequences of climate change.

Another noticeable effect of climate change is the increasing intensity of desertification. While dry regions of the Asia-Pacific, particularly Northwestern China and Mongolia, have long been fighting a battle against the encroachment of the desert, the increase in dry, hot weather patterns has accelerated this process. Since 2001, China has actively been relocating herders in Inner Mongolia under a policy known as *shengtai yimin*, "ecological migration." This policy has led to tensions between the state and ethnic minorities (mostly Mongolian) over forced resettlement, but the Chinese government argues that it is absolutely necessary in fighting desertification.^[ix] This policy is one of the first official responses attempting to deal with ecological migration at a national level. Its success or failure can provide guidance for policymakers looking to address the coming wave of environmentally induced migration across the Asia-Pacific.

The communities most vulnerable to forced environmental migration throughout the Asia-Pacific are predominantly the poorest as well. This simultaneously presents environmental migration as a social justice issue. Ensuring that already marginalized populations are not further marginalized will be an important subtext to any policies developed in the future.



Photo: Atolls like this one in the Marshall Islands face particular challenges in the face of climate change and sea level rise. (Photo credit: Heidi Tyedmers)

CAPI is currently exploring the possibility of developing a larger-scale research program in this area. Michael Pickering worked with CAPI in 2009/10 as a student researcher helping to conceptualize and lay the ground work for a longer-term project on environmental migration.

[i] Brown, Oli, "The Numbers Games," *Forced Migration Review* 31 (2009): 8-9.

[ii] Martin, Philip. "Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trends, Factors, Impacts." United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Research Paper 32 (2009): 3.

[iii] Dasgupta, Susmita, et al., "The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis," The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4136, Development Research Group, World Bank, 2007: 27-39.

[iv] Allison, I., et al., "The Copenhagen Diagnosis, 2009: Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science," University of New South Wales Climate Change Research Centre, Sydney, Australia, 2009: 39-40.

[v] Nguyen, Huu Nihn, "Flooding in the Mekong River Delta, Viet Nam," UNDP Human Development Report, 2007: 6-7.

[vi] Environmental Justice Foundation, "No Place Like Home: Where Next for Climate Refugees?" EJF, London, 2009: 15.

[vii] Kelman, Ilan, "Island Evacuation." *Forced Migration Review* 31 (2009): 20-21.

[viii] Loughry, Maryanne, and Jane McAdam, "Kiribati - Relocation and Adaptation," *Forced Migration Review* 31 (2009): 51-52.

[ix] Togocho, Enhebatu, "Ecological Immigration and Human Rights in Inner Mongolia," Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Centre. Accessed Online 3 December 2009: <http://www.smhric.org/AAS_2.htm>.

Focus On...Mark Sidel, CAPI Associate



At CAPI we are fortunate to be able to rely upon a talented team of [Associates](#) who bring valuable and diverse expertise to our initiatives. One such Associate, who offers a truly impressive range of experience and knowledge, is [Mark Sidel](#). A Professor of Law, Faculty Scholar and Lauridsen Family Fellow at the University of Iowa, and a Research Scholar at the University's Obermann Centre for Advanced Studies, Mark is a busy academic whose geographic interests span from Vietnam and China, to India and South Asia, and whose multi-faceted research interests include philanthropy and nonprofit institutions, contracts, and comparative and international law. With an academic career that began in the Department of History at Princeton University

and then continued with graduate work at Yale, Mark went on to study Law at Columbia University, earning a Juris Doctor degree in 1985. In addition to his positions at the University of Iowa, Mark has held visiting professorships at Harvard, the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, the University of Melbourne Law School, and has served as a visiting professor of Law at several universities, including the University of Victoria.

With a very active [publishing](#) record, Mark has written extensively on comparative law in Asia, as well as on philanthropy, the nonprofit sector, and civil society. His more recent books include *Regulation of the Voluntary Sector: Freedom and Security in An Era of Uncertainty*; *The Constitution of Vietnam: A Contextual Analysis*; and *Law and Society in Vietnam*. Mark's writing has appeared in numerous and diverse academic journals including *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, *China Quarterly*, and *Vietnam Forum*, as well as in many other journals, and a number of edited volumes.


Before assuming his [current position](#) at the University of Iowa, Mark spent several years with the Ford Foundation in Asia. His various roles with the Foundation included: managing a regional

program on philanthropy and the nonprofit sector in South Asia; managing the Foundation's programming in Vietnam; serving on the team that established a Foundation office in China; and serving as the first Program Officer for Law and Legal Reform in China. In addition to these duties, Mark has also served as a consultant on legal reform, philanthropy, the nonprofit sector and related areas for several foundations and institutions from the United Nations Development Programme to the Vietnamese Ministry of Justice and the World Bank. He has also served as academic director in a five-nation research and policy project on Philanthropy and Law in South Asia, funded by the Ford, Asia, Himalaya, Myer and Rockefeller Foundations, and convened by the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium.

More recently Mark has been a frequent consultant to the United Nations Development Programme, and has worked with other major international donors to assist on issues of legal reform in Vietnam, including involvement in research and policy projects on university legal education; clinical legal education; constitutional reform; and strengthening civil society. Mark is also currently acting as the long-term International Advisor to a major UN-funded legal reform program on access to justice that is working with the Vietnamese Ministry of Justice and the General Office of the Party Central Committee. In addition to these duties, Mark is an active adviser to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law on nonprofit law and legal reform in China.

In 2007, we had the great pleasure of hosting Mark through the University of Victoria's [Summer Law Program](#), where he worked with CAPI Law Chair and Director, Andrew Harding, and taught a unit on human rights and civil society in Asia. Mark was also a key participant in CAPI's [New Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region Workshop](#) that took place that same year. According to Mark, he enjoyed his time in Victoria very much, and hopes to get back to Victoria again soon. For our part, we cannot wait until the next opportunity arises to benefit from Mark's gracious counsel, and wealth of expertise and talent.

Focus On... is a regular feature in [Asia-Pacific News](#) and allows us to feature some of the talent and expertise that exists in CAPI's extensive network of Associates and advisors. Look for **Focus On...** in our next issue.



Arts & Minds: A Review of 'Marshall of Singapore'

By Andrew Harding

David Marshall (1908-1995) was one of Asia's most fascinating lawyers of the 20th century. More than that he was one of its most fascinating people of any description. He was a criminal defence lawyer of towering presence and ability, who made

public prosecutors weak at the knees. He was Singapore's first chief minister in 1955-6, whose brief political career, ending ultimately (and astonishingly) in a lost deposition in the 1963 elections, was described by political scientist Chan Heng Chee as like a 'shooting star' which 'filled the sky with brilliance and disappeared'.

Marshall was an extraordinary character. He was larger than life, and a bundle of contradictions. Generous to a fault but with the sting (in public fora) of a particularly vicious mosquito, a confirmed bachelor who later married and had four children, supernaturally intelligent and a mesmerising speaker but often hopelessly impractical, quick to anger, mercurial, idealistic, unpredictable, and ultimately as unsuccessful in politics as he was successful in the law. Indeed he had several careers or faces - as a teacher in the Law Faculty at the University of Singapore, and in his later years as a diplomat, serving as Singapore's ambassador to France (where he was known as 'l'ambassadeur a ordhidee' in tribute to the ever present orchid on his lapel, and where his staff reckoned they lived under 'marshall law'); also as a civil society activist and doer of large numbers of good works. He was personal friends with the great and the good the world over, from Malcolm McDonald, Edith Summerskill and Louis Blom-Cooper to Jawaharlal Nehru, Han Suyin and Zhou Enlai, as well as Singaporeans of all stripes, persuasions and races, from Kampong kids to law clerks, to the elite of Singapore society, and not excluding the most beautiful women.

While Marshall was without question a great man, his achievements are harder to pin down than his personality. The story of his life, while fascinating both in its breadth and in its detail, leaves one with a sense of sadness that such a sheer force of nature could not have had a longer and more decisive impact on Singapore's politics and legislation, dominated for so long by that diametrically opposite character, and indeed another lawyer, Lee Kuan Yew, whom Marshall excoriated incessantly from the sidelines. Marshall chafed at being ousted from public life for what must have seemed an era as Lee and the People's Action Party (PAP) consolidated its rule. At one point he was even banned from legal practice for six months over a alleged breach of an undertaking. It is nonetheless typical of Marshall that he counted several PAP politicians amongst his closest friends and treated even his erstwhile political enemy Lee with great generosity when the Lees visited Paris in 1990.

There were great achievements, as Kevin Tan points out - the alleged murderers saved from the gallows, the hundreds of Shanghai Jews liberated to Israel and Russia, the decisive rousing of the Singapore masses against colonialism, the entrenchment of parliamentary democracy and belief in a multi-racial community and responsible government. And yet perhaps his greatest achievement was simply to be his extraordinary self and to be an inspiration to so many others. He was, in a way, Singapore's alternative founding spirit and to many of a certain generation he simply *was* its founding spirit. It was, at any rate, remarkable for an Iraqi Sephardic Jew (born David Mashal), a member of Singapore's smallest minority group, to become chief minister at all, especially given Singapore's dangerous racial, ideologically polarised, politics of the 1950s.

Kevin Tan is highly qualified to write this book as a law professor and a historian both of law and politics, and an experienced author having unique access to Marshall's papers via his widow Jean. The book is simply superbly written. It does perfect justice to the man and all those around him, friends and enemies. It maintains a wonderful balance between recording the detail

of an important life (this is in itself a legacy - one suspects it will be many decades before Tan's careful and well-judged research will seem to need revisiting), and fitting that life into the particular historical and social setting in which it was lived. It is far from a hagiography.

Marshall is painted richly and convincingly, warts and all. Just as he is full of praise for Marshall as lawyer, Tan does not shy away from criticising both the naiveté of Marshall the politician, who allowed himself to be used as a pawn by the communists even as he advocated progressive and humanist positions with unremitting passion, and also his one-man-show predisposition which ruined the chances of agreement on Singapore's independence in the 1956 constitutional talks - this being the issue on which Marshall staked all and lost, precipitating his resignation after a whirlwind 14 months in office.

What ultimately endears me most to this very admirable book is that unlike Chan Heng Chee's political study of Marshall (*A Sensation of Independence*, Singapore, OUP, 1984), Tan takes the ideals and the contribution of Marshall as a lawyer as uniquely interesting and important in themselves, not just as background to the politics. The book should indeed be compulsory reading for Singapore law students, for in so many ways Marshall was the lawyerly ideal both in method and in his deep revulsion against injustice of all kinds. In a superb summation Tan contradicts Chan's shooting star image, preferring that of the aurora borealis. In this assessment he is right. The spirit of David Marshall is not always obvious in modern pragmatic, cut-and-dried Singapore, but it is nonetheless there, and the fact that this book was written, and written so well, is living proof of that.

[Marshall of Singapore](#) was written by Kevin Tan Yew Lee and was published in 2008 by the Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore.

As a regular feature in [Asia-Pacific News](#), Arts & Minds invites members of the CAPI community to explore the visual arts, film, music, literature, theatre and dance in the Asia-Pacific region. We look forward to hearing from you!

Student and Intern Stories

And they're off...



In May of this year CAPI was very pleased to receive word that all of our requested 2010-11 Students for Development placements were funded. [Seven talented and excited UVic students](#) will be heading to the Philippines and Vietnam throughout the summer of 2010 to work with some of our fabulous host organizations. Keep an eye on our [intern blogs](#) to find out more about what our interns are up to in the Asia-Pacific!

UVic Talent Shines at CAPI's Bi-Annual Student Symposium on the Asia-Pacific



In February 2010 CAPI hosted another successful [CAPI Student Symposium on the Asia-Pacific](#). Twelve graduate and undergraduate students presented their work from a diverse range of disciplines including History, Political Science, Sociology, Geography, Law, Linguistics and Business. The symposium not only gave students valuable presentation experience and provided an excellent opportunity for students to meet each other and to network, but also showcased the top-notch student research on the Asia-Pacific being carried out at

UVic. The following two excerpts are from papers presented at the symposium.

Identity, Biopolitics, Terror: Reading the Xinjiang Riots through the friend/enemy dialectic


Excerpted from a presentation made by Tristan Evans, MA student in the Department of Political Science, at CAPI's 2010 Student Symposium

The "7.5" riots of the summer of 2009 provoked a widespread response from the Chinese state. Sparked from an ethnic brawl between Hans and Uyghurs in a toy factory in the province of Guangdong, the Urumqi riots resulted in the killing of 197 people, (including some Uyghurs), the injury of around 1700, the destruction of 627 vehicles, and considerable damage to surrounding properties. The People's Armed Police and other security forces put down the riot and by the sixth of July had 1,434 people detained. This wave was quickly followed by a surge of hypodermic needle attacks and inflicted considerable psychological and physical damage to the people of the region. This violence provoked an overwhelming reaction from the Chinese state which led to the question of how to explain the states (re)action, and how to situate it in the state's colonial project of development?

The answer lies in two parts. The first can be understood through Foucault's notion of biopolitics. To crudely define the term, biopolitics refers to a reliance of the state on the logic of "to make live or let die." It relies on a neo-liberal vision of the individual, as self-governing, self-maximizing rational actors, and a biological understanding of the phenomena of the population. In short, power of the state works to optimize life, and to sustain it.^[1] This understanding is critical to any analysis of Xinjiang since it captures the strategies and tactics of governance in the region including its liberalizing economy. It also captures the colonial relationship, since biopolitics is deployed in a manner that privileges a particular understanding of the Chinese

nation, and is supported by a discursive construction of Uyghur identity in a subaltern position. This representation is supported by a host of discourses ranging from anthropology to economics. At all times, the project of biopolitics is fixed to an understanding of the Uyghur subject as less-civilized and necessitating Han guidance to bring them forth into modernity.

The second part lies with German political theorist Carl Schmitt, one time Crown Jurist of the Third Reich. Read as a rejoinder to Mao's infamous question "who are our enemies? who are our friends?" Schmitt offered the term the "friend/enemy" dialectic to represent this process of distinguishing friend from enemy, and argued that this logic is at the heart of politics. Michael Dutton in *Policing Chinese Politics* provided a compelling exegesis of the way this process of distinguishing friend from enemy drove revolutionary politics during the Mao period, and has become increasingly demobilized as a symptom of economic reform. This demobilization has been far from uniform, however, and it could be argued that this process of distinguishing friend from enemy has not disappeared but rather been displaced, with Xinjiang and the Uyghurs as a compelling example. Linking the two together, the friend/enemy dialectic operates as an extension of the project of biopolitics, located in the "let die" side of the logic. While the development of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs has been pursued with gusto, the state still reserves the possibility of deploying widespread violence to eliminate its enemies.



Turning to these reactions, there have been substantial responses from the state that fit the profile of the friend/enemy dialectic and a move away from biopolitical governance. As one example, all forms of protest or public display have been banned unless they receive prior approval. Another example, and the mainstay of the war, is the declaration of a strike-hard campaign against these enemies. These (*yanda*) campaigns which rely on severe highly public punishment, an enormous spike in arrests and streamlined trials, a loosening of procedural protections, and a dramatic increase in executions, reflect a short circuiting of the logic of biopolitics. Put another way, the state shifts its focus away from supporting life and focuses more on suppressing it. Buttressing this claim, so far 26 executions have taken place to swiftly punish those involved in the 7.5 riots and some of the needle attackers have received prison terms of 15 years for their actions. Many more have been arrested, are in detention or are on trial. Although this campaign was set to finish at the end of December it has been extended until the end of this year.

Another example of the shift in focus away from biopolitics into the logic of the friend/enemy dialectic, is the fact that the budget of the People's Armed Police in Xinjiang has been ratcheted up by 90% from 1.54 billion yuan to 2.89 billion and the Ministry of Public Security has declared that for 2010 the main task of law enforcement agencies is anti-terrorism. Five thousand new special police officers have also been added in Xinjiang, with a mandate to specifically crackdown on terrorism. Many other measures have been taken including the training of public officials in the proper actions during "emergencies", cell phone services have only in the last several weeks allowed text messaging, international calls have been blocked, and internet service was shut off though access has been restored to a handful of government sites in the last several weeks. All of these actions have been to the detriment of business, education, and public life in general in the region, and have focused on the Uyghurs as the group responsible.

These excessive measures have all been legitimated through the categories of the "three evils" which seek to isolate and excise the enemy from the Chinese nation. Thus, the state's reaction and (re)deployment of the friend/enemy dialectic reflects that in spite of the economic reforms and the changing role of the state in China, we can see in critical moments, as in the 7.5 riots, that the state reverts from the rational, productive logic of biopolitics, and returns to the raw politics of the friend/enemy dialectic.

Bibliography:

Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended*. New York: Picador, 2003.

[1] Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended* (New York: Picador, 2003), 248.

Something of Value: Contemporary Ainu Identity

Excerpted from a presentation made by Nicole Evans, BA student in the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies, at CAPI's 2010 Student Symposium



It has been suggested by many social scientists and researchers that the Ainu of Japan have established their identity on the basis of consumerism, using carvings and traditional objects as commodities of value to appeal to the larger tourist market. In my paper, "Something of Value: Contemporary Ainu Identity" the argument, based in Jonathan Friedman's book, *Cultural Identity and Global Process*, is challenged. A re-analysis of Ainu identity reveals that multiple methods exist when conceptualizing identity; not just *one* as Friedman suggests. Friedman's theory, with the help of Katrina Sjoberg, identifies a consumerist approach, through tourism and woodcarving in Ainu

initiatives to establish who they are in the world. However, in my paper, this theory that Ainu identity is centered on consumption is brought into question through a detailing of the complexities of *Ainu-ness* and the social self within the larger Japanese sphere of influence.

My paper examines alternatives using data gathered from other social scientists, in order to demonstrate that the Ainu are also utilizing other strategic methods when it comes to preserving culture and identity. In many respects, the Ainu have sought to engage and build upon the foundations of their identity regardless of the tourism and woodcarving industry. Factors of land reform, as well as connections with other indigenous people, counteract the restrictions of a solely consumerist approach to Ainu identity through a movement away from tradition and more concentrated within an urban lifestyle. A comparative analysis can also be drawn with other

indigenous groups, particularly from the Canadian Aboriginal context in their similarities in overcoming challenges within their society as a minority group. This has provided inspiration for many Ainu and has provided them with a new perspective of embracing who they are.

In 2010, the Ainu, and questions about their identity is still a struggle, however, it is an issue that is slowly seeing change from its government, despite the long history and ambiguity surrounding Ainu affairs. Although, there is no definitive way to explain *Ainu-ness*, in our contemporary global world, it is clear that there are many diverse approaches that can be taken; some Ainu are defining themselves based on the idealized past and do not mind engaging in tourism as a way of promoting their culture. Others prefer to hide their Ainu identity and "go with the flow" of mainstream Japanese culture. And there are those who want to "have the best of both worlds" and take pride in what makes them Ainu while also seeing the value of the larger Japanese society. Jonathan Friedman's theory is valid to some extent when analyzing the Ainu but tourism and carving is only *one way* in which the Ainu are defining themselves as a people.

Awards and Recognition



And the Winner is...

CAPI is pleased to announce the winners of the [CAPI Student Fellowship Competition](#) for 2009-10. Kathleen Gregson, an MA student in Pacific and Asian Studies, was awarded CAPI's Student Language Fellowship to support her in the study of Indonesian in preparation for intensive field research in Papua, Indonesia later this summer. The winner of CAPI's Student Research Fellowship was Harpreet Jaswal, an MSc student in Geography, whose research looks at ways of increasing community resilience in rural coastal areas of Kerala, India. [CAPI's Student Essay Prize](#) in 2010 went to Faculty of Law student Daniel Oleksiuk for his outstanding paper "Asian Values and the Spirit of Capitalism: Pragmatism and Ideology in Southeast Asian Law Reform". Honourable Mention was awarded to History student Amy Matthewson for her engaging and insightful paper "Fashionably Chic: The Formation of Chinese Women's Identity through Fashion". Congratulations to all of our winners for their excellent work!

CAPI and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 20 Years On

By Bill Neilson



The Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives at the University of Victoria and the [Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada](#) (APFC) both owe their very existences to the mid-1980s explosion of

government interest in Canada's economic, social and strategic ties with the Pacific Rim.

While that official interest, both federal and provincial, has ebbed and flowed over the past 25 years, and now has taken root once again, the mutuality of interest and support between CAPI and the APFC became steadily stronger, particularly since 1996 when Yuen Pau Woo, now President and CEO, joined the APFC staff.

Over these years, CAPI programming, networking and research have benefited immeasurably from APFC's counsel, financial support and conference/project involvement. Their ready participation on these fronts is gratefully recognized here - we happily recall the APFC's recent support for CAPI's Japanese Identities Conference (2002), West China Development (2003), Why Japan Matters More than Ever Before (2004) and our 2008 Program on Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast. In each case, the cooperation between the two centres was quite remarkable for its informality, mutual respect and ease of achievement.

CAPI extends its sincerest congratulations to its closest West Coast friend on its 25th birthday. Canada and the academic community honour and need you.



Photo: CAPI's table at the APFC 25th Anniversary Gala Celebration in Vancouver in April, 2010. From centre left, around the table: Jim Boutilier, Stacey Lambert, Helen Lansdowne, Guoguang Wu, Art Hanson, Connie Carter, David Wang, Andrew Harding, Art Wright and Donna Greshner (Photo credit: APFC).

Former CAPI Intern, Joanna Wong, Wins Prestigious Youth Video Contest



As an intern in the inaugural year of the CAPI International Internship Program, [Joanna Wong](#) was a stand out. She was a top student in the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies, and already exhibited both an agile mind and a keen and unwavering interest in Asia-Pacific affairs. After her placement in Bangkok, Thailand working with a child rights and community development organization, Joanna spent a year in China through UVic's East China Normal University Scholarship Program, and she never looked back. Based in China for the past several years, Joanna's interest and commitment to youth movements, environmental and social justice, and Canada-Asia relations has continued to evolve and develop.

In February of this year, Joanna was [awarded the Grand Prize](#) in the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada's 25@25 youth video conference for her video entry [Canadian Resources 2.0](#). This contest asked young Canadians from 18 to 35 to share their vision for the future of Canada-Asia relations, and represented one of the many ways the Foundation marked their 25th anniversary year.

Joanna has continued to be involved with CAPI, and for the past several years has been instrumental in the expansion of CAPI's [International Internship Program](#) into China. Over the past year, she has helped us to initiate internship placements in Beijing with two dynamic civil society organizations, [FutureGenerations/China](#) and [China Dialogue](#), and has provided ongoing advice and guidance on this, and other CAPI initiatives. We congratulate Joanna on her success and her vision, and feel extremely proud and fortunate to call her one of our team!

Joanna's prize-winning video, 'Canadian Resources 2.0':

UVic Team to Host Research Project on Zheng He

In March of this year, [Dr. Zhongping Chen](#), an Associate Professor in UVic's Department of History, received the news that a major project "The Indian Ocean World: The Making of the First Global Economy in the Context of Human-Environment Interaction," received 2.5 million dollars through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council's Major Collaborative Research Initiatives program. The principal investigator on this seven-year project is [Dr. Gwyn Campbell](#) of McGill University, and the UVic team includes Dr. Chen as a co-investigator, and [Dr. Gregory Blue](#) (History) and [Ms Ying Liu](#) (McPherson Library) as collaborators. This international research project features co-investigators from four Canadian universities and one institute, as well as two universities in Germany and Australia. There are also twenty-six collaborators from Canadian, American, European, Asian and African universities and

institutions. The project will trace the rise and development of the Indian Ocean region, including Eastern Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the emerging superpowers of China and India.

In 2014 CAPI will collaborate with the UVic team to host an international conference on "China, the Indian Ocean World and Zheng He's Epic Voyages". This conference will involve 40 to 50 scholars and graduate students from Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and the Americas, and will result in a publication of the edited conference proceedings. The UVic team also hopes to create a website on Zheng He, the great Chinese navigator who carried out epic voyages across the Indian ocean between 1405 and 1433, decades before Columbus' voyages. We congratulate Dr. Chen and the UVic research team, and look forward to collaborating with them in support of this fascinating and visionary project.

Conferences, Events, and Publications

Upcoming Conferences and Events



On November 5 and 6, 2010, CAPI will host a workshop on "Human Security in China's Foreign Relations" featuring a small group of leading scholars working on China's foreign relations from diverse perspectives. This workshop is being offered with the support of SSHRC and is being organized by CAPI's China Chair [Dr. Wu Guoguang](#).



[Guoguang](#).

CAPI is pleased to announce the visit of renowned Chinese environmental activist, Dai Qing, who will present a public lecture at UVic in early November 2010 in conjunction with CAPI's "Human Security in China's Foreign Relations" workshop. This talk is being generously supported by the Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions and organized by CAPI's China Chair [Dr. Wu](#)



In 2010, CAPI's prestigious [Hung Lecture](#) will be delivered by leading scholar of Oceania, playwright and filmmaker, [Dr. Vilsoni Hereniko](#), Director of the Center for Pacific Islands Studies at the University of Hawai'i, and newly appointed Director of the University of the South Pacific's Oceania Center for Arts and Culture. This lecture will take place in mid-November 2010 in conjunction with [Pacific Peoples' Partnership's](#) 35th Anniversary celebrations.